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L'âme réécrite. Étude sur la personnalité multiple et les sciences de la mémoire
Peut-on réécrire l'âme", la façonner, créer de nouveaux troubles psychologiques ? Depuis le 19e siècle, la mémoire en est l'instrument. Nous "nous" pensons désormais largement à travers cette question de la mémoire. Mais elle est venue en percuter une autre : celle des traumas et en particulier des violences sexuelles faites aux enfants. Le mélange pourrait bien être explosif. Ignorée jusque dans les années 1970, la question des violences sexuelles faites aux enfants a envahi notre quotidien.
On a vu apparaître des experts, témoin de la véracité des propos des enfants. "L'enfant ne ment pas" est devenu un slogan politique. Après la bio-politique de Michel Foucault, Ian Hacking propose de s'intéresser à la "mémoro-politique". Ce n'est pas seulement la mémoire collective mais aussi la mémoire individuelle qui est devenue une question politique.
Ian Hacking interroge les troubles psychologiques qui se répandent de manière privilégiée à certaines époques (en particulier le trouble de la personnalité multiple) puis disparaissent.
On a vu apparaître des experts, témoin de la véracité des propos des enfants. "L'enfant ne ment pas" est devenu un slogan politique. Après la bio-politique de Michel Foucault, Ian Hacking propose de s'intéresser à la "mémoro-politique". Ce n'est pas seulement la mémoire collective mais aussi la mémoire individuelle qui est devenue une question politique.
Ian Hacking interroge les troubles psychologiques qui se répandent de manière privilégiée à certaines époques (en particulier le trouble de la personnalité multiple) puis disparaissent.
452 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1995
29 people are currently reading
707 people want to read
About the author
Ian Hacking
53 books150 followersIan Hacking is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Toronto, specialised in the History of Science.
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
January 6, 2021
This is one of the most influential books I've ever read - that's not an exaggeration. I read it a few years ago for my first time, and now would like to write up a summary of it (in case that'd entice tentative readers to go for it). Hacking does not only argue that social factors contribute to the development of mental disorders; more fundamentally, social factors contribute to determining the very definition and possible symptoms people can find themselves having. This generalizes beyond mental disorders and to any label we might use to understand ourselves (e.g., race and gender).
Hacking focuses on multiple personality disorder (MPD) and uses this case as the basis for a more general account of the socially constructed nature of mental illness. Before 1972, in the US about a dozen cases of MPD had ever been reported, and after 1986, there were too many cases for any accurate count; one estimate was that 1 in 20 people in the US had this disorder. Virtually only women were diagnosed. Then, after 1990, the diagnosis rate dramatically dropped. Today, the incidence is less than 1 in 100 people. Moreover when MPD was first regularly diagnosed, a patient had 1 alter on average. But within a decade, a patient had 25 alters on average. Trendy practices in psychotherapy may be responsible for this increase. Therapists deliberately encouraged patients to take their alters as real persons, trapped in the patient’s body, because the psychiatric consensus was that developing alters is crucial to healing from trauma. Only after researchers noticed the sudden increases in the incidence of MPD cases, and in the number of alters manifested in each case, did they challenge these practices.
Looping effects account for the etiology of this disorder. Looping effects are the processes by which a social category constructed to describe a certain population influences the self-understanding and behavior of the people described. Thus social categories can alter the phenomena that they are supposed to objectively describe. This can happen because humans are uniquely self-reflective; they can respond to the ways they're categorized, unlike other things in nature. Molecules and monkeys, for example, do not change in their composition or behavior when we impose categories on them. When people respond with conformity to these categories, then categories appear to gain scientific validity.
Hacking proposes semantic contagion, a theory of looping effects. Hacking first assumes that personal identity is based in memory. But episodic memories are often unreliable and easily confabulated. Hacking, drawing on Anscombe’s philosophy of action, argues that an action is defined by intentions or descriptions of behavior. A description of behavior motivates a sequence of bodily motions and thereby unifies it as an action. Identical motions can constitute distinct actions depending on the description of behavior at hand. In everyday experiences, we usually do not have clear descriptions of behavior. By remembering experiences, we can ad-hoc interpret ourselves as acting under particular descriptions of behavior. This “rewrites” the memory and renders the previously indeterminate experience into a determinate action; altered memories can then reshape beliefs, self-understanding, and other domains that influence “personality.”
Hacking argues that social, political, and scientific institutions play major roles in constructing the descriptions of behavior that structure our actions, revisions of memory, and ultimately the trajectories of personal development. Psychiatric diagnoses consist in descriptions of behavior, which a self- or clinically diagnosed person might internalize. A person might have previously performed a sequence of bodily motions without recognizing it as motivated by any clear description of behavior, so it did not constitute a determinate action or experience. But after she is diagnosed, she subsumes this sequence under a new description of behavior—which a psychiatrist or scientific article assures is scientifically accurate. Over a course of interpretations, she no longer experiences the previously indeterminate sequence but experiences a particular symptom of the disorder with which she is diagnosed. Hacking calls this semantic contagion. Being diagnosed with a disorder can thus facilitate the development of the very disorder.
This is relevant to our present day for two major reasons. First, we take scientific findings as absolute fact, a faith that can be as dogmatic as religious faith. This is both likely warranted and definitely not socially harmful when it comes to findings about low-level physical properties of our world (e.g., physics and chemistry). But social sciences are discontinuous with the hard sciences with respect to validity. Social phenomena simply are too complex to be exhaustively modeled by any principles or laws we might formulate. Moreover, it is not just unwarranted to believe in the validity of much social sciences (including psychology and psychiatry). It is also socially harmful, for the reasons that Hacking discovered: looping effects and semantic contagion enable authoritative knowledge about people to transform those people, sometimes in ways that constrain their freedom and flourishing.
Second, there are so many cultural wars going on driven by identity politics. People's actions are interpreted as being motivated by intentions taken to be characteristic of the racial or gender groups to which they belong. In other words, people are reduced to their racial or gender identities. In light of looping effects, this may perpetrate divisiveness between social categories and hinder progress towards our liberal social goals. Of course matters are much more complicated than this, but this is part of the story and a starting point for critical thought.
Hacking focuses on multiple personality disorder (MPD) and uses this case as the basis for a more general account of the socially constructed nature of mental illness. Before 1972, in the US about a dozen cases of MPD had ever been reported, and after 1986, there were too many cases for any accurate count; one estimate was that 1 in 20 people in the US had this disorder. Virtually only women were diagnosed. Then, after 1990, the diagnosis rate dramatically dropped. Today, the incidence is less than 1 in 100 people. Moreover when MPD was first regularly diagnosed, a patient had 1 alter on average. But within a decade, a patient had 25 alters on average. Trendy practices in psychotherapy may be responsible for this increase. Therapists deliberately encouraged patients to take their alters as real persons, trapped in the patient’s body, because the psychiatric consensus was that developing alters is crucial to healing from trauma. Only after researchers noticed the sudden increases in the incidence of MPD cases, and in the number of alters manifested in each case, did they challenge these practices.
Looping effects account for the etiology of this disorder. Looping effects are the processes by which a social category constructed to describe a certain population influences the self-understanding and behavior of the people described. Thus social categories can alter the phenomena that they are supposed to objectively describe. This can happen because humans are uniquely self-reflective; they can respond to the ways they're categorized, unlike other things in nature. Molecules and monkeys, for example, do not change in their composition or behavior when we impose categories on them. When people respond with conformity to these categories, then categories appear to gain scientific validity.
Hacking proposes semantic contagion, a theory of looping effects. Hacking first assumes that personal identity is based in memory. But episodic memories are often unreliable and easily confabulated. Hacking, drawing on Anscombe’s philosophy of action, argues that an action is defined by intentions or descriptions of behavior. A description of behavior motivates a sequence of bodily motions and thereby unifies it as an action. Identical motions can constitute distinct actions depending on the description of behavior at hand. In everyday experiences, we usually do not have clear descriptions of behavior. By remembering experiences, we can ad-hoc interpret ourselves as acting under particular descriptions of behavior. This “rewrites” the memory and renders the previously indeterminate experience into a determinate action; altered memories can then reshape beliefs, self-understanding, and other domains that influence “personality.”
Hacking argues that social, political, and scientific institutions play major roles in constructing the descriptions of behavior that structure our actions, revisions of memory, and ultimately the trajectories of personal development. Psychiatric diagnoses consist in descriptions of behavior, which a self- or clinically diagnosed person might internalize. A person might have previously performed a sequence of bodily motions without recognizing it as motivated by any clear description of behavior, so it did not constitute a determinate action or experience. But after she is diagnosed, she subsumes this sequence under a new description of behavior—which a psychiatrist or scientific article assures is scientifically accurate. Over a course of interpretations, she no longer experiences the previously indeterminate sequence but experiences a particular symptom of the disorder with which she is diagnosed. Hacking calls this semantic contagion. Being diagnosed with a disorder can thus facilitate the development of the very disorder.
This is relevant to our present day for two major reasons. First, we take scientific findings as absolute fact, a faith that can be as dogmatic as religious faith. This is both likely warranted and definitely not socially harmful when it comes to findings about low-level physical properties of our world (e.g., physics and chemistry). But social sciences are discontinuous with the hard sciences with respect to validity. Social phenomena simply are too complex to be exhaustively modeled by any principles or laws we might formulate. Moreover, it is not just unwarranted to believe in the validity of much social sciences (including psychology and psychiatry). It is also socially harmful, for the reasons that Hacking discovered: looping effects and semantic contagion enable authoritative knowledge about people to transform those people, sometimes in ways that constrain their freedom and flourishing.
Second, there are so many cultural wars going on driven by identity politics. People's actions are interpreted as being motivated by intentions taken to be characteristic of the racial or gender groups to which they belong. In other words, people are reduced to their racial or gender identities. In light of looping effects, this may perpetrate divisiveness between social categories and hinder progress towards our liberal social goals. Of course matters are much more complicated than this, but this is part of the story and a starting point for critical thought.
November 19, 2013
Ian Hacking is a subtle, thoughtful, and often frustrating writer. In Rewriting the Soul, he takes a genealogical approach to Multiple Personality Disorder, epidemic at the time of writing in the early 1990s, and links it to political movements, 19th century French psychiatry, and the philosophy of self and memory. All science, particularly the human sciences like psychiatry, are informed by politics, but Multiple Personality Disorder is is more informed than most. The appearance of alters, personality fragments, is linked to recovered memories of abuse, either mundane child abuse at the hands of close relatives or esoteric (and entirely fictional) ritualized satanic abuse.
Hacking is n expert both in 19th century psychiatry and the intricacies of the modern multiple personality disorder movement, and ably shreds any commonplace notion of a singular self based on factual memory by showing all the ways in which this commonplace self breaks down at the fringes of medicine. To the question, "Is MPD real?" Hacking replies 'Yes. But it is a grave moral wound inflicted upon people by psychological entrepreneurs.' For a philosopher, a seeker after truth, the scanty evidentiary basis of MPD must be infuriating, especially given the way that it afflicts the lives and communities of people diagnosed with it. But I'm not sure that Hacking earns his normative critique, or an alternative formulation of the self not reliant on a fallible and fluid memory.
Hacking is n expert both in 19th century psychiatry and the intricacies of the modern multiple personality disorder movement, and ably shreds any commonplace notion of a singular self based on factual memory by showing all the ways in which this commonplace self breaks down at the fringes of medicine. To the question, "Is MPD real?" Hacking replies 'Yes. But it is a grave moral wound inflicted upon people by psychological entrepreneurs.' For a philosopher, a seeker after truth, the scanty evidentiary basis of MPD must be infuriating, especially given the way that it afflicts the lives and communities of people diagnosed with it. But I'm not sure that Hacking earns his normative critique, or an alternative formulation of the self not reliant on a fallible and fluid memory.
January 17, 2015
Ian Hacking's monograph "Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory" is a fascinating and insightful look at the history and politics of the psychiatric diagnosis known as "multiple personality disorder." Hacking starts by informing the reader of the then current state of knowledge and opinion about the disorder. (The book was published in 1995.) He discusses the ways in which late twentieth century discoures about child abuse and feminism in particular have fueled the reemergence of this psychiatric diagnosis in the popular consciousness. The second part of Hacking's book attempts to trace these contemporary discourses back to the time of Freud and other pioneers of psychological treatment, research, and theorizing. The book contains many fascinating ideas, is very well written from a stylistic perspective, and is obviously very well researched. However, while Hacking claims throughout the book that his task is to show how the science of memory came to displace faith-based concepts of the soul and to elucidate what this process says about multiple personality disorder past and present, it does not seem to me upon having finished reading this book in its entirety for the first time that Hacking does this in a way that is clearly understood and compelling as an explanation for the functions which Hacking claims that multiple personality disorder and what he terms "memoro-politics" serve in our culture during this point in history. This book was good, but it had the potential to be great if some of Hacking's theoretical insights were more fully developed and less space in the book was devoted to Hacking's endlessly run throughs of who's who in the history of psychology.
November 8, 2020
An outstanding work from a philosopher into the complex dissociation studies.
A bit old, but good for history
A bit old, but good for history
December 17, 2015
This book certainly contained a wealth of interesting information about the natural history of DID, however, I found the authors argument to be incoherent and not well organized. I think he did not provide any new insights but rather talked around them. A must read for anyone interested in DID, but don't expect much from the text as a whole. Lots of words to say very little.
February 15, 2010
Terrible title, fascinating book.
September 28, 2023
Hacking retraces the genesis of 'multiple personality disorder' / 'dissociative personality disorders' in order to construct a theory of the "sciences of memory": the complex of social sciences attempting to bring the individual soul within the purview of science (particularly psychology) so that it can be studied, quantified, fixed. He has a natural, sympathetic skepticism of this pursuit, and a profound disdain for the characters of this history who lose their compassion or their common sense in the project of turning patients into a grand theory.
Hacking's dissection of the symbiotic relationship between the patient and the physician - the conscious and unconscious ways that patients learn to tailor their self-expression and even the manifestations of their sufferings to the categories and reactions of their doctors - will probably stick with me forever. 'Making up people', as Hacking has titled another of his books, is not a neutral or passive activity. It plays a role in shaping the social reality that we inhabit along with others.
RIP to Ian Hacking - I wish I'd found your work during your lifetime but I am grateful to the community of Twitter (especially Ryan Ruby and Christian Lorentzen) for commemorating your work at your death and thereby bringing this to my attention.
Hacking's dissection of the symbiotic relationship between the patient and the physician - the conscious and unconscious ways that patients learn to tailor their self-expression and even the manifestations of their sufferings to the categories and reactions of their doctors - will probably stick with me forever. 'Making up people', as Hacking has titled another of his books, is not a neutral or passive activity. It plays a role in shaping the social reality that we inhabit along with others.
RIP to Ian Hacking - I wish I'd found your work during your lifetime but I am grateful to the community of Twitter (especially Ryan Ruby and Christian Lorentzen) for commemorating your work at your death and thereby bringing this to my attention.
March 10, 2021
An interesting philosophical analysis of multiple personality disorder and memory.
The author discusses historical movements that led to the changes of how multiple personality disorder became tied to child abuse and placed on the spectrum of dissociative responses to psychological trauma. He chronicles how the manifestation went from only a one alter to hundreds that crossed age and sex.
He relays how memory went from being looked at as an important skill to a means of defining who a person is (i.e., their soul).
He concludes with his concerns over analyzing past action. The ideas behind the etiology of DID/MPD may lead to individuals falsely remembering child abuse that never occurred to them, and manifesting the disorder in the way it’s currently described. The author also adds that having people forget their traumatic pasts under hypnosis is problematic in the same way that having people falsely remember trauma that never occurred, as both negatively impact an individuals identity.
The author discusses historical movements that led to the changes of how multiple personality disorder became tied to child abuse and placed on the spectrum of dissociative responses to psychological trauma. He chronicles how the manifestation went from only a one alter to hundreds that crossed age and sex.
He relays how memory went from being looked at as an important skill to a means of defining who a person is (i.e., their soul).
He concludes with his concerns over analyzing past action. The ideas behind the etiology of DID/MPD may lead to individuals falsely remembering child abuse that never occurred to them, and manifesting the disorder in the way it’s currently described. The author also adds that having people forget their traumatic pasts under hypnosis is problematic in the same way that having people falsely remember trauma that never occurred, as both negatively impact an individuals identity.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
July 26, 2024
In my studies on the looping effect, hysteria and social contagion I kept hearing about Ian Hacking and making up people. I was a little leery about reading this book mostly because I do not enjoy philosophy or books by philosophers but Hackings' ideas seemed relevant and important so I dove in.
It was one of the more accessible books on philosophy for me. While Hacking did like to get lost in his long winded arguments, he did find real world analogues, brought in research, and focused a lot of the fascinating history of hysteria and Dissociative Identity Disorder. My big critique is that it felt rather disorganized. Hacking organized the book by topic and the arguments he was making rather than chronologically, and being someone who does enjoy history chronologically makes more sense to me. This was a philosophical work though.
If you love philosophy you would likely enjoy this book. If you're not, this is one of those philosophy books that is worth the effort especially if you are interested in social contagion, hysteria, the looping effect and dissociative disorders.
It was one of the more accessible books on philosophy for me. While Hacking did like to get lost in his long winded arguments, he did find real world analogues, brought in research, and focused a lot of the fascinating history of hysteria and Dissociative Identity Disorder. My big critique is that it felt rather disorganized. Hacking organized the book by topic and the arguments he was making rather than chronologically, and being someone who does enjoy history chronologically makes more sense to me. This was a philosophical work though.
If you love philosophy you would likely enjoy this book. If you're not, this is one of those philosophy books that is worth the effort especially if you are interested in social contagion, hysteria, the looping effect and dissociative disorders.
October 14, 2018
La démarche de Hacking, que je découvre avec ce livre, est passionnante : il s'agit d'étudier un trouble psychiatrique sous le prisme des sciences sociales et en faisant appel à Foucault et aux théories féministes. Il a donc pour objectif de replacer la personnalité multiple dans son contexte historique et social, de déconstruire les concepts sur lesquels il repose (quand et comment s'est construite la notion d'abus sur enfant ? et la notion de trauma ? et d'ailleurs, qu'est-ce que la mémoire ? etc.), et d'étudier la façon dont les patients ont pu s'imprégner des classifications qui leur étaient imposées à mesure que la psychiatrie se développait au début du 20e siècle. Le style simple et clair de l'auteur rend le propos très accessible.
October 28, 2020
Is the soul unitary or does it have multiple parts?
Remember, Plato believed there were three parts to the soul. Thomist Catholics, the book argues, advocate for a unitary model of the soul. The soul is one, not many. These debates are some of what's at stake when we talk about multiple personality disorder and claim that our conversations are consistent with timeless definitions of how the mind works.
Remember, Plato believed there were three parts to the soul. Thomist Catholics, the book argues, advocate for a unitary model of the soul. The soul is one, not many. These debates are some of what's at stake when we talk about multiple personality disorder and claim that our conversations are consistent with timeless definitions of how the mind works.
November 9, 2017
Fuuuck! I have lots to say...but can't seem to think of how to say it right now. This book truly makes you think. Multiple Personality, memory, biopolitics, false memories, ways of being, semantic contagion, child abuse, false consciousness.
My biggest qualm is he could have kept writing for 500 more pages and it would have been necessary. God damnit I want more.
My biggest qualm is he could have kept writing for 500 more pages and it would have been necessary. God damnit I want more.
April 6, 2023
Hacking is a cautious writer; its frustrating to follow his arguments, in a good way.
Must read. 100%.
Must read. 100%.
March 22, 2025
“I say that in their hearts they suspect that the outcome of multiple therapy is a type of false consciousness. That is a deeply moral judgement. It is based on the sense that false consciousness is contrary to the growth and maturing of a person who knows herself. It is contrary to what the philosophers call freedom. It is contrary to our best vision of what it is to be a human being.”
October 8, 2014
A philosophical critique of the "politics of memory" using multiple personality disorder as a sort of focusing lens. The author's thesis is that multiple personality disorder, at least in its full-blown modern form, was made possible only by the (fairly recent) advent of a science of memory, which was itself created to provide a secular alternative to the soul.
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November 21, 2009None
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September 15, 2013I had to turn it back in to the library before I finished it. It was definitely interesting, but after my thesis, I turned to less intellectual fare. I may return to finish it someday. Maybe.
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