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Creation and the Timeless Order of Things: Essays in Islamic Mystical Philosophy
A leading Japanese philosopher and author explores the deep structures of Zen Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian philosophies. Izutsu compares the concepts of the three disciplines regarding time, metaphysics and visionary experiences, and more.
190 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1994
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About the author
Toshihiko Izutsu
85 books197 followersToshihiko Izutsu was a university professor and author of many books on Islam and other religions. He taught at the Institute of Cultural and Linguistic studies at Keio University in Tokyo, the Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy in Tehran, and McGill University in Montreal, Canada.
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Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews
January 18, 2020
سنت فلسفي عرفاني ايران بيش از 1400 سال قدمت داره و از حكمت خسرواني ملهم از نور از قبل از اسلام ريشه مي گيره. قرنهاست كه آتش اين حكمت باپرجا و فروزانه. ايزوتسو پروانه اي است كه از دور اين آتش را ديد و نزديك آمد و با آرامش خاطر در لواي گرماي اين آتش قرار گرفت. كتاب آفرينش، وجود و زمان كتابيه كه روشنگر و گرمابخشه، چرا كه ريشه در آن آتش داره. ميزان آشنايي ايزوتسوي ژاپني با سنت ايراني و احترامش به اين سنت فكري حيرت برانگيزه. در اين كتاب كه به قول يكي از دوستان ايزوتسو ، مهمترين كتاب اوست، فلسفه وحدت وجود، عرفان شبستري و عين القضات از زواياي زبانشناسي، هستي شناسي و يا معرفت شناسي درمقايسه با ديگر فلسفه هاي شرقي مثل ودانتيسم، تائوئيسم، زن بوديسم، كنفوسينيسم به صورت تطبيقي بررسي شده . مقاله آخر از 7 مقاله كتاب مربوط به مقايسه اي بين اگزيستانسياليسم و فلسفه وجود ايرانيه كه لينك دانلودشو پايين گذاشتم اگه علاقه داشتيد مطالعه كنيد.
همينطور در ادامش مطلبي از ايزوتسو كه در بي بي سي كار شده بود.
http://s6.picofile.com/file/838394705...
https://www.bbc.com/persian/blog-view...
همينطور در ادامش مطلبي از ايزوتسو كه در بي بي سي كار شده بود.
http://s6.picofile.com/file/838394705...
https://www.bbc.com/persian/blog-view...
June 12, 2008
There is a problem common to many writers on Sufism. They write their analyses as if they are 'devotional' texts. I don't mean to say that they lack scholarly objectivity, though a few do, but their style of prose is so dense, and the concepts that their are trying to convey are treated in such an esoteric manner, that one almost has to reach fana' to grasp what it is they want to say. Maybe I'm an intellectual lightweight, but I can only encounter concepts like 'ontology' so many times in a single paragraph before my brain turns into a mass of jelly. What is the difference between 'monism,' 'pantheism,' and 'solipsism'? The distinction is there, but it's fine. Too fine to be throwing the three together regularly. What's better than an extended discussion of 'immanence'? Learning the Arabic word for it . . .
November 12, 2024
"The children, observing a lamp burning continuously, would naturally think that what they see is one single flame. But the elders know very well that it is a series of different flames appearing and disappearing moment by moment." – Ayn al-Qudat al-Hamadani
This magnificent work expounds on the linguistic and semantic tools employed by Islamic mystics. Primarily showcased in this volume are Shabastari, ‘Ayn al-Qudat, and Ibn al-Arabi, in elucidating their gnostic findings, which, as we have seen, most of the time ended tragically.
The entire Kantian debate revolves around how he claimed that Reality unfolds in accordance with human cognitive apparatus, denying any possible attempts to escape this self-imposed straitjacket. But, as Wittgenstein showed in the field of semantics, there’s no such atomistic conception in language. We set the rules for language, yet a total delineation of the meanings behind particular words is impossible. The aim of language is not to provide mathematical precision, as Russell and other Vienna Circle members believed, but pragmatic and feasible use in communicating ideas and concepts. We set the ground rules for football, yes, but not to the extent of determining how tall the ball can be kicked or what the strict age limit is for playing it. The organic nature of language is not due to the inherent fallibility of language but points toward the transcendental origin of Reality. There’s always something beyond mere words; words primarily denote things—they point toward things, yet we can never exclude their connotative role: they indeed point beyond mere things. For example, light can be physical light, a term of endearment such as "my wife is the light of my eye," or metaphysical light.
Inversion of Metaphors
This brings us to the first semantic tool the mystics employed, which is the inversion of concepts in metaphors. Metaphors are linguistic tools that connect at least two different things due to some structural similarity between them. When we say, “the man is like a lion,” it demonstrates the ambiguous nature of the word, whereby the word bears both the literal “signs” or “meanings,” which are immediate to it (the physical, animal lion), and the figurative signs, which are mediated through the word (the quality of courage). Yet, in the experiences of mystics, there is an inversion of the concept of metaphors. When the mystic mentions the word "Light" in his experiences, he refers to the Light not in the figurative sense but in the immediate sense; the metaphysical Light is the Reality, while the light in our common usage exists only metaphorically. This is due to words only refers to the mental concept we “capture” to denote a thing, but its reality in the transcendental sense, escaped our understanding. It is this transcendental domain that the Sufis directly experiencing.
In regard to his experience of the pervading Existence, he has no room for free choice to express it except as "Light." But this Light he refers to as the Source of Everything, not to be subsumed merely as a metaphor as mentioned above. Simultaneously, the mystic would also experience the opposite of Light: Darkness itself. Yet, this Darkness must not be understood in its figurative sense, for during the overpowering experiences, the mystic perceives Existence in its pure sense, where the rest of creation, including his subjective consciousness, is purely dark in nature, just as gazing toward the Sun extinguishes everything into a total darkness. This also implies, in a literal sense, how utterly dependent the rest of creation is on the Absolute.
It is in this sense that it is said that the stage of “annihilation” (fanā') in the face of Existence is called the bright night, referring to the blindness (night) caused by the overpowering (bright) Existence. And the stage of “continuance” (baqā') is referred to as the dark daylight, as the multiplicities of the world are, in essence, a shadow (dark) utterly dependent on their Source, yet for the inhabitants of the shadowy world, everything is seen as it is, alighted by the physical light and lamp (daylight). Therefore, the expressions of the mystics must not be understood as figurative in nature; in reality, even at the semantic level, they confirm the mystical experiences of the ontological relationship between the Absolute and the Created.
Concept of Polysemy
What makes the inversion of metaphors possible is the concept of polysemy, a semantic phenomenon in which a word happens to have several related meanings in its basic structure. There is the basic meaning of a "book" being written texts within a range of pages, which seems to embody the literal nature of the book. But there also seems to be an infinite number of meanings that extend beyond the physical body of the book: wisdom, law, etc. We have mentioned the dual nature of words, which consist of the meaning employed by rational thinking as well as the transcendental usage of the word.
Timeless Creation
The mystical concept of timeless and perpetual creation also employs these two concepts: inversion of metaphors and polysemy. What this means is that it is possible for the concept to be viewed in its immediate and literal sense (which is the transcendental Reality) rather than merely in its figurative sense. It also implies that, due to the constraints of our rational faculties, metaphors must be erected, made possible by the concept of polysemy, but only to accommodate the Real within the mundane reality, rather than vice versa, and this is done still by using the most apt expressions possible. Seen in this light, it is the mundane sense that stands as the figurative/metaphorical component.
We must clear up several fundamental problems. Firstly, it must be understood that creation happens with the Will of God, not from any necessity, at a determined point in time. Creation is understood as that which requires a Cause for its existence, which also occurs in time. Some philosophers reject the idea of ex nihilo creation because of the eternalness of God’s Power, but this can be refuted due to the inherent nature of creations as only potential things—they lack the necessary conditions to be necessarily actualized instantaneously with their Cause. For example, Man can speak but can choose to remain silent; the cause exists throughout, but the effect does not necessarily have to be actualized throughout. Some would say that creation in temporal time would imply that something originated occurred within God’s essence, but this is not the case. When we write letters, temporally the third letter is further than the first, but the word has already been determined simultaneously by the writer, though its actualizations happen temporally. Thus, it is possible for God to create the World from pre-eternity or “timelessness” without associating Him with any attributes of origination, for in the eyes of the Sempiternal, everything and every time are equidistant to Him.
Perpetual Creation
This brings us to the second part of the concept: perpetual creation, a ubiquitous idea agreed upon by both Ash’arite theologians and rightful mystics. Let us meditate on a firewood burning into ashes. Does the firewood really change into ashes? Is it not that both firewood and ashes possess their own definition of “whatness,” and by saying that changes occurred, are we not including extraneous attributes to their quiddity, which would negate their definitions? Even as the firewood burns, it has a "before" and an "after." Is it not that the before-firewood possesses a different degree of "whatness" compared to the after-firewood? If the before-firewood has already been instantiated with a particular degree of its quiddity, can it be said to be equal to the after-firewood, which has its own degrees? It will not be so. In between before and after, there arises an instantiation of a new quiddity and the extinguishment of the prior, and this must not only happen to the accidents of the thing but also to its very substance. As Husserl observed in his theory of wholes and parts, if something depends upon a thing, then it is a dependent part of the whole. If the dependent part changes, then the whole must also change necessarily, just as if “clay statue A with its big head” has its head squashed, it is no longer "clay statue A." So, when the quiddity of a thing changes, then the whole it depends on—not just the substance of the firewood but also the entire World—must change, as the World itself is a totality of dependent parts.
The stable pictures of the extramental reality are due to the stability of the fabric that it unfolds, and this we call Existence. The basic intuition of Existence, and our automatic reference to an external world, remains coherent despite the ever-changing forms, just as the dervishes maintain a stable pole.
Never did we lose sight of the dervishes while they whirled into infinity...
This magnificent work expounds on the linguistic and semantic tools employed by Islamic mystics. Primarily showcased in this volume are Shabastari, ‘Ayn al-Qudat, and Ibn al-Arabi, in elucidating their gnostic findings, which, as we have seen, most of the time ended tragically.
The entire Kantian debate revolves around how he claimed that Reality unfolds in accordance with human cognitive apparatus, denying any possible attempts to escape this self-imposed straitjacket. But, as Wittgenstein showed in the field of semantics, there’s no such atomistic conception in language. We set the rules for language, yet a total delineation of the meanings behind particular words is impossible. The aim of language is not to provide mathematical precision, as Russell and other Vienna Circle members believed, but pragmatic and feasible use in communicating ideas and concepts. We set the ground rules for football, yes, but not to the extent of determining how tall the ball can be kicked or what the strict age limit is for playing it. The organic nature of language is not due to the inherent fallibility of language but points toward the transcendental origin of Reality. There’s always something beyond mere words; words primarily denote things—they point toward things, yet we can never exclude their connotative role: they indeed point beyond mere things. For example, light can be physical light, a term of endearment such as "my wife is the light of my eye," or metaphysical light.
Inversion of Metaphors
This brings us to the first semantic tool the mystics employed, which is the inversion of concepts in metaphors. Metaphors are linguistic tools that connect at least two different things due to some structural similarity between them. When we say, “the man is like a lion,” it demonstrates the ambiguous nature of the word, whereby the word bears both the literal “signs” or “meanings,” which are immediate to it (the physical, animal lion), and the figurative signs, which are mediated through the word (the quality of courage). Yet, in the experiences of mystics, there is an inversion of the concept of metaphors. When the mystic mentions the word "Light" in his experiences, he refers to the Light not in the figurative sense but in the immediate sense; the metaphysical Light is the Reality, while the light in our common usage exists only metaphorically. This is due to words only refers to the mental concept we “capture” to denote a thing, but its reality in the transcendental sense, escaped our understanding. It is this transcendental domain that the Sufis directly experiencing.
In regard to his experience of the pervading Existence, he has no room for free choice to express it except as "Light." But this Light he refers to as the Source of Everything, not to be subsumed merely as a metaphor as mentioned above. Simultaneously, the mystic would also experience the opposite of Light: Darkness itself. Yet, this Darkness must not be understood in its figurative sense, for during the overpowering experiences, the mystic perceives Existence in its pure sense, where the rest of creation, including his subjective consciousness, is purely dark in nature, just as gazing toward the Sun extinguishes everything into a total darkness. This also implies, in a literal sense, how utterly dependent the rest of creation is on the Absolute.
It is in this sense that it is said that the stage of “annihilation” (fanā') in the face of Existence is called the bright night, referring to the blindness (night) caused by the overpowering (bright) Existence. And the stage of “continuance” (baqā') is referred to as the dark daylight, as the multiplicities of the world are, in essence, a shadow (dark) utterly dependent on their Source, yet for the inhabitants of the shadowy world, everything is seen as it is, alighted by the physical light and lamp (daylight). Therefore, the expressions of the mystics must not be understood as figurative in nature; in reality, even at the semantic level, they confirm the mystical experiences of the ontological relationship between the Absolute and the Created.
Concept of Polysemy
What makes the inversion of metaphors possible is the concept of polysemy, a semantic phenomenon in which a word happens to have several related meanings in its basic structure. There is the basic meaning of a "book" being written texts within a range of pages, which seems to embody the literal nature of the book. But there also seems to be an infinite number of meanings that extend beyond the physical body of the book: wisdom, law, etc. We have mentioned the dual nature of words, which consist of the meaning employed by rational thinking as well as the transcendental usage of the word.
Timeless Creation
The mystical concept of timeless and perpetual creation also employs these two concepts: inversion of metaphors and polysemy. What this means is that it is possible for the concept to be viewed in its immediate and literal sense (which is the transcendental Reality) rather than merely in its figurative sense. It also implies that, due to the constraints of our rational faculties, metaphors must be erected, made possible by the concept of polysemy, but only to accommodate the Real within the mundane reality, rather than vice versa, and this is done still by using the most apt expressions possible. Seen in this light, it is the mundane sense that stands as the figurative/metaphorical component.
We must clear up several fundamental problems. Firstly, it must be understood that creation happens with the Will of God, not from any necessity, at a determined point in time. Creation is understood as that which requires a Cause for its existence, which also occurs in time. Some philosophers reject the idea of ex nihilo creation because of the eternalness of God’s Power, but this can be refuted due to the inherent nature of creations as only potential things—they lack the necessary conditions to be necessarily actualized instantaneously with their Cause. For example, Man can speak but can choose to remain silent; the cause exists throughout, but the effect does not necessarily have to be actualized throughout. Some would say that creation in temporal time would imply that something originated occurred within God’s essence, but this is not the case. When we write letters, temporally the third letter is further than the first, but the word has already been determined simultaneously by the writer, though its actualizations happen temporally. Thus, it is possible for God to create the World from pre-eternity or “timelessness” without associating Him with any attributes of origination, for in the eyes of the Sempiternal, everything and every time are equidistant to Him.
Perpetual Creation
This brings us to the second part of the concept: perpetual creation, a ubiquitous idea agreed upon by both Ash’arite theologians and rightful mystics. Let us meditate on a firewood burning into ashes. Does the firewood really change into ashes? Is it not that both firewood and ashes possess their own definition of “whatness,” and by saying that changes occurred, are we not including extraneous attributes to their quiddity, which would negate their definitions? Even as the firewood burns, it has a "before" and an "after." Is it not that the before-firewood possesses a different degree of "whatness" compared to the after-firewood? If the before-firewood has already been instantiated with a particular degree of its quiddity, can it be said to be equal to the after-firewood, which has its own degrees? It will not be so. In between before and after, there arises an instantiation of a new quiddity and the extinguishment of the prior, and this must not only happen to the accidents of the thing but also to its very substance. As Husserl observed in his theory of wholes and parts, if something depends upon a thing, then it is a dependent part of the whole. If the dependent part changes, then the whole must also change necessarily, just as if “clay statue A with its big head” has its head squashed, it is no longer "clay statue A." So, when the quiddity of a thing changes, then the whole it depends on—not just the substance of the firewood but also the entire World—must change, as the World itself is a totality of dependent parts.
The stable pictures of the extramental reality are due to the stability of the fabric that it unfolds, and this we call Existence. The basic intuition of Existence, and our automatic reference to an external world, remains coherent despite the ever-changing forms, just as the dervishes maintain a stable pole.
Never did we lose sight of the dervishes while they whirled into infinity...
May 6, 2022
ایزوتسو در هفت فصل هفت مقاله درباره مسایل مختلف عرفان/حکمت بیان می‌کند. نکته بارز مقالات جنبه تطبیقی آن با فلسفه های شرقی بودیسم یا حتی در فصل آخر فلسفه‌های غربی اگزیستانسیال است. ایزوتسو طبق معمول در هر مقاله به زیبایی جان کلام رو توضیح و بعد سعی می‌کند مفاهیم مشابه را مثلا در بودیسم توضیح و در آخر ارتباط آن‌ها را آشکار کند که از ابتدا اصلا روشن نیست.
October 12, 2022
This was my favorite book when I was in college.
August 26, 2023
At the end, he’s pretty much mask off with cliche religious arguments against the here and now… after a whole book of pushing what the here and now would be like yum yum eat ‘em up
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August 13, 2007A brief and tetative tour on the concept of Zamaan-e Bi-Karaane. Although sear old Izutsu did not know much about its ancient avestaic version.
October 20, 2007
Amazing. I need to read it again. A bit beyond me, but well worth reading and rereading.
Displaying 1 - 8 of 8 reviews