In 1757 Robert Clive bribed the head of the defending military force of West Bengal to stand down, and allow the East India Company to take control of the area. Montero chronicles many other examples since where corporate power gets its way through payoffs.
Efforts by governments to reign in these practices are fraught with hypocrisy and contradiction, starting with Clive himself who was able to buy his way into the British Parliament, and every top national honor in the books. The USA was formed in part as a protest against corruption, as manifested in the rising price of tea due to East Asia Company exploitation and destruction of India. However, even in the USA, there wasn't much beyond just rhetoric until after Watergate, when a small team at the SEC started looking at corruption in US corporations. This led to the FCPA, which both required corporations to keep accurate accounts of transactions, including bribes, and also a provision that giving a bribe was unlawful. While an important initiative, hypocrisy was still rife. For example, one keen supporter, Joe Biden, was a young senator from Delaware, the state that is ground zero for registering shell companies with little documentation that then become conduits for corrupt practices. The goal initially was the noble one of protecting the interests of citizens of other countries: government purchases say of military airplanes facilitated by bribes could divert scarce resources away from schools and health clinics. Yet after the end of the cold war, there was much less concern for welfare of other countries, and the emphasis shifted under the pro-trade Clinton administration to protecting the interests of US corporates (giving them reasons not to pay bribes).
Baron Sir Robert Clive set the example of corrupt oligarchs airbrushing their reputations with political connections and charity. More recently, Victor Dahdeleh came up first as a middleman for aluminum transactions with Bahrain, and now controls all bauxite in Guinea. He has made large donations to LSE, McGill University, and the Clinton Foundation.
One example of the challenge in combating corruption involves the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business transactions, a voluntary agreement among member countries to outlaw commercial bribery, and to share evidence on corruption investigations. An analysis of evidence on the Iraq Oil for Food scandal found intricate patterns of kickbacks from companies in 66 nations of $1.7 billion between 1996 – 2003. While the UN required that all funds from oil sales go into a UN managed account, the government had the power to choose oil traders, and suppliers of goods and services procured using the UN funds; the government received the kickbacks from these traders and suppliers. The UN official appointed to oversee the program received kickbacks himself. Government proceeds were in turn reportedly used first to build up Iraq’s military, and then to fund the insurgency and ISIS after the government of Saddam Hussein was toppled. Looking at a sample of companies that did business in Iraq, 58 percent of those based in countries that signed the OECD convention paid bribes for contracts, compared to 71 percent of those based in countries that did not sign the agreement. While fewer firms pay bribes in the convention signing countries, the difference is smaller than would have been hoped for. Part of the reason for this was the scant enforcement of the OECD convention and related national laws. For example, in the home of the FCPA that provided the template for the OECD convention, there was for the initial 25 years only a single attorney in the Justice Department's FCPA unit. While he and one or two prosecutors brought a number of key cases, there were limits to what a small team could do.
Kickbacks have unanticipated consequences. For example, Montero documents how China's medical system has intricate networks of corporate middlemen for rewarding doctors for helping to sell drugs and other medical supplies. International drug companies faced with strict regulatory requirements in Europe and the US that are holding down profits, seek to make profits in less regulated China. The government is complicit in allowing this, in part to permit low salaries for doctors that keeps down budgets. What Montero doesn't mention is that these illicit deals also give the government greater control, for example allowing them to fire a doctor for corruption whenever needed. The result is a system where Chinese pay more than they should for medical care, due to overprescribing of expensive, newer and more powerful drugs. There is also the risk of overuse of antibiotics leading to antibiotic resistance. The high expense of medical care dissuades sick people from seeking treatment, and the corruption undermines trust in the medical system. These and other dysfunctional aspects of Chinese medical care stemming from illicit practices may contribute to the outbreak of and challenges in controlling pandemics like SARS and Coronavirus 19.
Another unintended consequence came from the Siemens bribes to Bangladesh telecommunications minister Aminul Haque. Siemens had the simple objective of winning a contract, which it did. However, Haque was at the same time patronizing Jamat'ul Mujahadeen Bangladesh, an Islamic militant group in Bangladesh. Haque was a leading member in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), one of the country's two political parties. Its main rival is the Awami League. According to victims, Haque allegedly used JMB militants to kill Awami League members to ensure his party's supremacy in the area. In return, Haque provided the group with political cover to continue its Islamist agenda, and presumably funding from the bribe money. In 2007, Haque was sentenced in absentia to 31 years and six months' imprisonment for aiding and abetting the militants. In 2009, Haque surrendered and was sent to jail where he died in 2019. Another case, as in Iraq, where bribes funded insurgency.
What to do? Billions in fines and recovered funds have gone to US, UK, and other governments instituting legal action. Very little gets back to the countries that lost the funds in the first place, in part due to reluctance to give money back to corrupt governments. One successful case of World Bank setting up foundation in Kazakhstan and funding with recovered funds under FCPA. Some corporations setting up KYC and other compliance regimes. One challenge: companies make net return on corruption, even if have to pay fine. Suggests that NPV of fine * probability of being caught should be greater than NPV of benefits from corruption; at present, the latter is much greater, so naturally, firms continue corrupt behavior.