The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner

by R.W.K. Paterson

This work discusses the nihilistic approach to the philosophy of Max Stirner.

Genres: Philosophy

322 pages, Hardcover

First published March 25, 1971

Reviews

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Max Stirner (born Johann Caspar Schmidt) was one of the more interesting thinkers in the 19th century. His work never caught on as those of his contemporaries, such as Karl Marx.

This book begins by telling us what is known of Schmidt's life. It also describes the work of his, published under his writing name, Max Stirner. This includes a chapter describing his most important work--The Ego and His Own.

Part II considers Stirner's relationship to other thinkers and schools of thought. These include Marxism, anarchism, existentialism, and Nietzsche. Part III? The chapters are entitled "Total Atheism," "The Nihilist," "The Egoist," and "Philosophy as Play."

The Conclusion gives a sense of the author's perspective (Page 311): "'Der Einzige' [Part of the German title for "The Ego and His Own":] surely remains a profoundly original and disturbing book. After a hundred and twenty years Stirner's voice rings no less urgently, and the grim solution which he describes certainly retains its power to fascinate and to dismay."

[Michael Shockley · Rating 3 out of 5]

Paterson's book on Max Stirner, an iconoclastic German(ish) thinker whose works have been appropriated by everyone from the existentialists to the satanists (and, nowadays, left/pol/), should be of interest to anyone who is looking to familiarize themselves with the work of this overlooked thinker. Though highly imperfect (Paterson's text is dry, owing to how enraptured he seems to be with his gassy prose, which makes one wonder who the real egoist is here), Paterson's text forms part of the small, English language canon of available Stirner studies. One half-way reads the text reluctantly, due to Paterson's overbearing locution, but his text can provide one with some decent, albeit limited, background information before deciding whether or not to pursue further studies.

Paterson's method of bringing Stirner's work to life necessitates that he provide readers with information regarding the various continental philosophers that Max Stirner either provoked or was provoked by, and while this proves to be useful method at times, it has its limitations; in Paterson's case, this mostly involves talking a lot about Feuerbach constantly, and how Stirner, the "radical atheist," out-atheists all the other atheists by not succumbing to secular dogmatisms ("fixed ideas" in Stirner's language) like the existentialists (Sartre and Marxism, or Heidegger's later philosophy, for example). He does put forth one particularly interesting view, that being that Marx's embrace of materialism was a reaction to the challenges posed by Stirner's philosophy to that of left-wing reformers and Hegelians, but he doesn't dedicate much time to pursuing this line of thinking before he's off to talking about other things (Stirner's tenuous relations to anarchism, similarities between him and Nietzsche, how his philosophy compares to existentialism, and so forth).

Paterson's exposition is somewhat binary, swinging back and forth between apologetics for Stirner's philosophy and criticisms of it; he goes to great lengths at times to protect Stirner from his critics, but ultimately ends the book with the suggestion that Stirner's philosophy is a game of sorts, if not some kind of satire. In protecting the uniqueness (heh) of Stirner's philosophy, he sometimes levels other people's views, such as when he, perhaps inadvertently, attacks existentialism in the process of comparing their views to Stirner's (existentialism, we learn, is largely a philosophy of disloyalty and inauthenticity).

Ultimately, Paterson paints a picture of Stirner not as a philosopher, but of an anti-philosopher, if not a prankster. Stirner's philosophy, such as it is, appears to be a philosophy concerned primarily with finding a way for the individual to make use of ideas and structures without being dominated by them - without the individual's interests and "uniqueness" being infringed upon. The "Unique One," the thing or concept that Stirner's work seems to be concerned with, does not allow the truth values or ethical content of ideas to pose any obstacles towards their employment; rather, the expediency of ideas is what counts, with the so-called "Unique One," being willing to take ideas up for their own amusement, and just as quickly dispose of them. The Unique One consumes ideas, but is not consumed by them.