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The Yom Kippur War
In excellent shape dustcover intact
- GenresHistory
310 pages, Paperback
First published December 31, 1982
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
September 5, 2019
On October,6 1973, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, Syrian and Egyptian forces, supplied by Soviet arms, and encouraged by the USSR, launched a cowardly surprise attack on Israel from the north and south.
The massive attack found Israel vastly outnumbered and unprepared and the use of "smart" weapons rendered Israel's air force ineffective giving the attacking Arab forces an unprecedented advantage on the battlefield.
Israel's existence was under mortal threat but with a courageous defence by the Israeli tank battalions and the daring counter attacks ordered by Israel's generals turned the imminent destruction of Israel into a route of the invading Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi armies.
Peter Allen relies on hundreds of interviews and eyewitness account, relaying both the desperate fighting and the diplomatic shenanigans, when the Soviet Union that had egged the Arabs into the war, threatened to join in the attack on Israel, once there Arab clients started losing.
The author illustrates how Israel forewent a response of pre-emptive action, in a false and tragic belief that world opinion would swing to her support.
As the author explains she was wrong and "the novel and brave political move did nothing to prevent her condemnation by the swaggering Third World hanger-on to Soviet policy...As her losses mounted and the Arabs were seen to be winning, other states began to pour in aid to deliver the coup de grace."
And so it has always been since, particularly in the last two decades.
no matter how the Arabs have clearly been the aggressors to any unbiased and honest observer, every outbreak of conflict leads to hysterical and emotionally charged condemnation of Israel from around the world.
Nevertheless Islamic and Leftist historical revisionists continue to distort facts and events to paint Israel as the aggressor, never hesitating at brazen lies and distortions.
The author covers well the open invitation by the Soviets to attack Israel, the training and massive arming of Egypt and Syria by the USSR and other Communist States.
The massive Soviet replenishment of arms to the Arab belligerents, while US arms were blocked from reaching Israel by most states in Europe, wild and vicious Soviet accusation at the UN, when Israel defended herself (echoed almost word for word by polemicists of the international left today), and end eventually when the Syrians and Egyptian were being routed, Soviet threats to attack Israel directly.
The last word go's to the author when he exclaims how the answer to all the questions and dilemmas surrounding the Middle East conflict boil down to what is "so deeply embedded into the Jewish nature that is life ands death itself. Ten million Jews walked unresisting into the gas chambers, believing that some great force would surely save them at the last moment. now they have that great force, and it beyond belief that they will ever again go pacifically to their doom, now they fight".
Which is precisely what fuels the rage of the Islamic world and international left.
"But who is take the chances for Israel if not Israel herself? Who will stop the next holocaust except the victims of the last."
The massive attack found Israel vastly outnumbered and unprepared and the use of "smart" weapons rendered Israel's air force ineffective giving the attacking Arab forces an unprecedented advantage on the battlefield.
Israel's existence was under mortal threat but with a courageous defence by the Israeli tank battalions and the daring counter attacks ordered by Israel's generals turned the imminent destruction of Israel into a route of the invading Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi armies.
Peter Allen relies on hundreds of interviews and eyewitness account, relaying both the desperate fighting and the diplomatic shenanigans, when the Soviet Union that had egged the Arabs into the war, threatened to join in the attack on Israel, once there Arab clients started losing.
The author illustrates how Israel forewent a response of pre-emptive action, in a false and tragic belief that world opinion would swing to her support.
As the author explains she was wrong and "the novel and brave political move did nothing to prevent her condemnation by the swaggering Third World hanger-on to Soviet policy...As her losses mounted and the Arabs were seen to be winning, other states began to pour in aid to deliver the coup de grace."
And so it has always been since, particularly in the last two decades.
no matter how the Arabs have clearly been the aggressors to any unbiased and honest observer, every outbreak of conflict leads to hysterical and emotionally charged condemnation of Israel from around the world.
Nevertheless Islamic and Leftist historical revisionists continue to distort facts and events to paint Israel as the aggressor, never hesitating at brazen lies and distortions.
The author covers well the open invitation by the Soviets to attack Israel, the training and massive arming of Egypt and Syria by the USSR and other Communist States.
The massive Soviet replenishment of arms to the Arab belligerents, while US arms were blocked from reaching Israel by most states in Europe, wild and vicious Soviet accusation at the UN, when Israel defended herself (echoed almost word for word by polemicists of the international left today), and end eventually when the Syrians and Egyptian were being routed, Soviet threats to attack Israel directly.
The last word go's to the author when he exclaims how the answer to all the questions and dilemmas surrounding the Middle East conflict boil down to what is "so deeply embedded into the Jewish nature that is life ands death itself. Ten million Jews walked unresisting into the gas chambers, believing that some great force would surely save them at the last moment. now they have that great force, and it beyond belief that they will ever again go pacifically to their doom, now they fight".
Which is precisely what fuels the rage of the Islamic world and international left.
"But who is take the chances for Israel if not Israel herself? Who will stop the next holocaust except the victims of the last."
January 26, 2024
The Yom Kippur War, also known as The Ramadan War to the Arabs, was the largest, bloodiest, and from a global perspective, the most dangerous of the Arab-Israeli Wars fought in the 20th Century. Peter Allen, a journalist by trade, used his journalistic contacts to compile his narrative analysis of this crucial conflict. Written in the early 80's, the Cold War is still very much at the front of the mind of the narrative, though this did offer some advantages.
The early 80's were a period were relations between the US and the Arabs weren't as fraught as they are now, so Allen is able, even so soon after the War, to lace his narrative with at least something of the Arab perspective of the conflict. While this means that he does focus on the Egyptians, considering the souring of Cairo's relations with Moscow even before the War in 1973, he did manage to get some soldier's tales from the Syrian Army.
One of the strengths of this early work on the War is that Allen puts a greater emphasis on the influence of the two superpowers to the conflict. Allen makes a very good case at the midway point that, due to the Nixon Administration’s desire to force Tel Aviv to the peace table at a point where the Arabs could still claim at least something of a victory (which would have revitalized Arab nationalism, very possibly avoiding the slide to Salafist radicalism that followed) was likely the best hope for a lasting peace in the Middle East. However, Washington was soon frightened into escalating its support to Israel due to Moscow's panic over Arab losses.
The Soviet Union, staking a great deal on an Arab victory, for nothing else than its own prestige in the Middle East (which would translate into influence, not to mention a controlling hand in the flow of oil), refused to allow an IDF military victory of any kind, and so when the Syrians began to be pushed out of the Golan, and the Sinia front was locked in stalemate, Moscow flooded Syria with enough weaponry for the entire region.
Ironically, this spooked Washington away from forcing Israel to accept a peace advantageous to the Arabs, which was Nixon's desire, and instead, fearful of Soviet escalation, Washington responded in kind.
All this did was ensure the war continued, and the rising tensions between Washington and Moscow almost blew up into WWIII. More on that later.
To backtrack to the beginning, the War had its genesis with the disaster the Arabs endured in 1967.
While the book is too slim to go into any depth on the causes, Allen marks it as a simple grasping for revenge on the part of Damascus, and Cairo, he does at least view it from their perspective. However, to gain vengeance, the Arabs had to accept further Soviet influence, and interference, in exchange for Soviet weaponry, training, and technology. Many Arabs viewed this as a bit of Sophie's choice.
Anwar El Sadat in particular thought as much, and his relationship with the Soviet envoy in Cairo, Sergei Kosygin, was a tense one to say the least. The Arabs were quite cognizant that the Soviets viewed them as pawns in the grander strategic game against the West, and they weren't exactly pleased to be in a position where they were forced to allow themselves to be pushed around the board for a while, in exchange for a chance to better contain the Jews.
The Israelis, as is well known by now, were full of self assured hubris. The IDF, a genuinely world class military organization, had run circles around the Arabs in 1956, and 1967, growing mighty indeed after its perilous birth in 1948. However, as often happens with top notch militaries, self congratulation gave way to lazy apathy, and a loss in readiness (much like in 2023...), which greatly impacted capabilities.
While closer studies have shown that the numerical and material disparity between the Israelis and the Arabs wasn't as one sided for the Arabs as the Israeli mythology would have one believe, the truth is that the Arabs did outmass the IDF in their conflicts. The real quantifier, however, was not sheer mass, or numbers on a spreadsheet. It was quality.
And in that, in terms of training, doctrine, small unit leadership, and the Israeli's adoption of the very Western virtue of individual initiative and flexibility, gave the qualitative edge to the IDF. As events would prove, however, the Arabs were more than keen, and capable, to contest Israel's hold on that particular title belt.
While it's debatable wether or not the Arab plan was to overrun all of Israel (honestly doubtful, as the Arabs were well aware of their limitations, and even some Israeli scholars in the two generations since this war have pointed out that Arab goals were more for a forcible return to pre June 1967 boundaries, not the total crushing of Israel), Allen does suggest the possibility, but admits that Egypt in particular took pains to lecture the Syrians on being on a firm leash when operations began, to avoid an escalation that would force Israel, and America's, hand. My own thoughts, too, are that Moscow likely would never have allowed a total Arab victory, as the state of Israel was advantageous for Moscow in that Tel Aviv acted, unintentionally of course, as a fulcrum leveraging the Arabs to seek aid, and influence, from Moscow.
Somewhat Ironically, the Europeans were a bit of a boon to the Arabs, as well. French and British relations with Israel had cooled by this time, and Bonn (West Germany) was far more concerned about access to Arab oil than they were Israeli security. And with France, and the UK on the Security Council, the Arabs knew they had the votes to forestall an American forced series of negotiations in Israel's favor. (The Arabs never caught on that Nixon preferred that the Arabs restore more of a favorable to them balance of power, as he hoped to some day ease tensions, and leverage the Arabs away from Moscow...oh how thick the Cold War web of relations and ambitions was spun)
With all of these calculations in mind, and with Soviet weapons, tech, and training restoring Arab confidence, the Arabs determined upon war. Without going deep into details, as Allen didn't, either, the Arab plan was partly brilliant, and partly a gamble. Crossing the Suez canal in the face of the Bar-Lev Line (an only partially completed Israeli defensive network along the Canal Zone), while simultaneously assaulting up the Golan Heights was simple enough to be readily understood by the less well educated Arab soldiery and junior command cadres, while being audacious enough to shock, and surprise the Israelis when the blows came.
In brief, the Arabs achieved almost total surprise and managed to seize the west bank of the Suez in a genuinely exceptional operation that is still, rightly, celebrated in the Arab world. The Syrian Army, with less opportunities for any strokes of genius like the Egyptians were given, made up for it with a well trained, highly aggressive, relentless, and very courageous frontal assault on the Golan Heights.
The IDF, on both fronts, was caught off guard, and badly hammered in the first several days of the war. Allen's narrative of the actual combat is superb. Although largely from the Israeli perspective, he doesn't lose sight of the other side, and he made some astute observations for the time, and for not being military himself.
The Arabs did have a technology advantage over the Israelis in this war. The T-62 was a superior tank to the M-48's, aging Super Sherman's, and the upgraded Centurions used by the IDF. The Arabs also had early night vision equipment which the IDF utterly lacked.
The man portable, and team portable wire guided anti-tank missiles destroyed a huge percentage of the Israeli tank fleet, and SAM's, both the fixed battery ones, and the shoulder fired ones, more than made up for the Arab shortcomings in the air be leveling the aerial playing field. And the Arab advantage in the sheer preponderance in artillery, both tubed, and rocket, was a huge advantage in the early stages.
However, as previously mentioned, the IDF capability to adopt the Western way of war via inculcating individual initiative, and dynamic flexibility into their doctrine turned out to be the game changer far more than anything technical supplied to them by America. This flexibility allowed the Israelis to far more rapidly adapt to swiftly changing circumstances, and to recognize opportunities to be exploited much better than could the Arabs.
The Syrians, in particular, tended towards panic when plans went awry, a hallmark of a far too rigid adherence to stratified, and woefully inflexible Red Army doctrine. When the Syrians panicked, the IDF merely turned up the heat, and in what is now termed 'The Valley of Tears', slaughtered the Syrian armored force, driving the Syrians out of the Golan, and began to push towards Damascus itself.
Syrian panic over their disastrous defeat forced the Egyptians, who had thus far played a brilliant hand on the Sinai front, to launch an ill fated major offensive to seize the inner Sinai passes, the seizure of which would have forced Israel to retreat to her borders, all but winning for Egypt at least their war, as they would have then achieved their objectives. Instead, the Egyptians entered into a dynamic battle of fluidity, never an Arab strong suit, and one in which the Israelis thrived. The Egyptians were smashed, and forced onto the defensive, giving Israel the initiative.
This was the point where Nixon looked to intervene, where the Syrians, being reinforced by contingents from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, were still doggedly fighting the Israelis, and inflicting heavy losses on them, and the Egyptians held control of the west bank of Suez.
Except the Soviets escalated affairs...
The Israelis, however, had no intention of assaulting Damascus, they too knew their limitations, and were content with drubbing the Jordanian and Iraqi contingents before turning to focus on the Sinai. The Israelis, after very severe fighting, managed to cross onto the east bank of Suez, and began to eliminate the massive SAM network that had protected the Egyptian operations thus far, all the while at places like Chinese Farm, the two sides fought the largest armor battles since 1944, in see-saw, blood soaked fighting that was apocalyptic enough without Washington and Moscow nearly coming to blows.
With Moscow panicking over yet another Arab defeat, and with the Soviets seriously considering direct military intervention (mobilizing their VDV forces, all 50,000 of them, and placing them on high alert in the Black Sea, and in Romania, and Bulgaria, and loading up over 6,000 Marines and sending them towards the Mediterranean, not to mention mobilizing their strategic bomber fleets, and moving squadrons of them towards air bases within range of Israel), Washington dropped plans for an Arab friendly intervention, and instead fully backed Israel, and put their own forces on DEFCON-3, and began to move naval, air, and Marine assets into the warzone.
In short, well before I was born, the world came to the brink of total destruction.
Lovely.
Thankfully Sadat was a reasonable man, saw the writing on the wall, refused to become a full auxiliary of the Soviet Union, and agreed to sue for peace. The war, horrid enough as it was, thankfully ended in other than Armageddon.
For an older, fairly concise work on the topic this is a very good book on one of the most fascinating events of the later 20th century. Both the Arabs, and the Israelis have every right to feel martial pride over the deeds of their grandfather's in this war, while the actions of both Moscow, and Washington, should serve as a warning about the inherent dangers of near Imperial powers willing to interfere in the affairs of others for the sake of their own ends.
Highly recommended.
The early 80's were a period were relations between the US and the Arabs weren't as fraught as they are now, so Allen is able, even so soon after the War, to lace his narrative with at least something of the Arab perspective of the conflict. While this means that he does focus on the Egyptians, considering the souring of Cairo's relations with Moscow even before the War in 1973, he did manage to get some soldier's tales from the Syrian Army.
One of the strengths of this early work on the War is that Allen puts a greater emphasis on the influence of the two superpowers to the conflict. Allen makes a very good case at the midway point that, due to the Nixon Administration’s desire to force Tel Aviv to the peace table at a point where the Arabs could still claim at least something of a victory (which would have revitalized Arab nationalism, very possibly avoiding the slide to Salafist radicalism that followed) was likely the best hope for a lasting peace in the Middle East. However, Washington was soon frightened into escalating its support to Israel due to Moscow's panic over Arab losses.
The Soviet Union, staking a great deal on an Arab victory, for nothing else than its own prestige in the Middle East (which would translate into influence, not to mention a controlling hand in the flow of oil), refused to allow an IDF military victory of any kind, and so when the Syrians began to be pushed out of the Golan, and the Sinia front was locked in stalemate, Moscow flooded Syria with enough weaponry for the entire region.
Ironically, this spooked Washington away from forcing Israel to accept a peace advantageous to the Arabs, which was Nixon's desire, and instead, fearful of Soviet escalation, Washington responded in kind.
All this did was ensure the war continued, and the rising tensions between Washington and Moscow almost blew up into WWIII. More on that later.
To backtrack to the beginning, the War had its genesis with the disaster the Arabs endured in 1967.
While the book is too slim to go into any depth on the causes, Allen marks it as a simple grasping for revenge on the part of Damascus, and Cairo, he does at least view it from their perspective. However, to gain vengeance, the Arabs had to accept further Soviet influence, and interference, in exchange for Soviet weaponry, training, and technology. Many Arabs viewed this as a bit of Sophie's choice.
Anwar El Sadat in particular thought as much, and his relationship with the Soviet envoy in Cairo, Sergei Kosygin, was a tense one to say the least. The Arabs were quite cognizant that the Soviets viewed them as pawns in the grander strategic game against the West, and they weren't exactly pleased to be in a position where they were forced to allow themselves to be pushed around the board for a while, in exchange for a chance to better contain the Jews.
The Israelis, as is well known by now, were full of self assured hubris. The IDF, a genuinely world class military organization, had run circles around the Arabs in 1956, and 1967, growing mighty indeed after its perilous birth in 1948. However, as often happens with top notch militaries, self congratulation gave way to lazy apathy, and a loss in readiness (much like in 2023...), which greatly impacted capabilities.
While closer studies have shown that the numerical and material disparity between the Israelis and the Arabs wasn't as one sided for the Arabs as the Israeli mythology would have one believe, the truth is that the Arabs did outmass the IDF in their conflicts. The real quantifier, however, was not sheer mass, or numbers on a spreadsheet. It was quality.
And in that, in terms of training, doctrine, small unit leadership, and the Israeli's adoption of the very Western virtue of individual initiative and flexibility, gave the qualitative edge to the IDF. As events would prove, however, the Arabs were more than keen, and capable, to contest Israel's hold on that particular title belt.
While it's debatable wether or not the Arab plan was to overrun all of Israel (honestly doubtful, as the Arabs were well aware of their limitations, and even some Israeli scholars in the two generations since this war have pointed out that Arab goals were more for a forcible return to pre June 1967 boundaries, not the total crushing of Israel), Allen does suggest the possibility, but admits that Egypt in particular took pains to lecture the Syrians on being on a firm leash when operations began, to avoid an escalation that would force Israel, and America's, hand. My own thoughts, too, are that Moscow likely would never have allowed a total Arab victory, as the state of Israel was advantageous for Moscow in that Tel Aviv acted, unintentionally of course, as a fulcrum leveraging the Arabs to seek aid, and influence, from Moscow.
Somewhat Ironically, the Europeans were a bit of a boon to the Arabs, as well. French and British relations with Israel had cooled by this time, and Bonn (West Germany) was far more concerned about access to Arab oil than they were Israeli security. And with France, and the UK on the Security Council, the Arabs knew they had the votes to forestall an American forced series of negotiations in Israel's favor. (The Arabs never caught on that Nixon preferred that the Arabs restore more of a favorable to them balance of power, as he hoped to some day ease tensions, and leverage the Arabs away from Moscow...oh how thick the Cold War web of relations and ambitions was spun)
With all of these calculations in mind, and with Soviet weapons, tech, and training restoring Arab confidence, the Arabs determined upon war. Without going deep into details, as Allen didn't, either, the Arab plan was partly brilliant, and partly a gamble. Crossing the Suez canal in the face of the Bar-Lev Line (an only partially completed Israeli defensive network along the Canal Zone), while simultaneously assaulting up the Golan Heights was simple enough to be readily understood by the less well educated Arab soldiery and junior command cadres, while being audacious enough to shock, and surprise the Israelis when the blows came.
In brief, the Arabs achieved almost total surprise and managed to seize the west bank of the Suez in a genuinely exceptional operation that is still, rightly, celebrated in the Arab world. The Syrian Army, with less opportunities for any strokes of genius like the Egyptians were given, made up for it with a well trained, highly aggressive, relentless, and very courageous frontal assault on the Golan Heights.
The IDF, on both fronts, was caught off guard, and badly hammered in the first several days of the war. Allen's narrative of the actual combat is superb. Although largely from the Israeli perspective, he doesn't lose sight of the other side, and he made some astute observations for the time, and for not being military himself.
The Arabs did have a technology advantage over the Israelis in this war. The T-62 was a superior tank to the M-48's, aging Super Sherman's, and the upgraded Centurions used by the IDF. The Arabs also had early night vision equipment which the IDF utterly lacked.
The man portable, and team portable wire guided anti-tank missiles destroyed a huge percentage of the Israeli tank fleet, and SAM's, both the fixed battery ones, and the shoulder fired ones, more than made up for the Arab shortcomings in the air be leveling the aerial playing field. And the Arab advantage in the sheer preponderance in artillery, both tubed, and rocket, was a huge advantage in the early stages.
However, as previously mentioned, the IDF capability to adopt the Western way of war via inculcating individual initiative, and dynamic flexibility into their doctrine turned out to be the game changer far more than anything technical supplied to them by America. This flexibility allowed the Israelis to far more rapidly adapt to swiftly changing circumstances, and to recognize opportunities to be exploited much better than could the Arabs.
The Syrians, in particular, tended towards panic when plans went awry, a hallmark of a far too rigid adherence to stratified, and woefully inflexible Red Army doctrine. When the Syrians panicked, the IDF merely turned up the heat, and in what is now termed 'The Valley of Tears', slaughtered the Syrian armored force, driving the Syrians out of the Golan, and began to push towards Damascus itself.
Syrian panic over their disastrous defeat forced the Egyptians, who had thus far played a brilliant hand on the Sinai front, to launch an ill fated major offensive to seize the inner Sinai passes, the seizure of which would have forced Israel to retreat to her borders, all but winning for Egypt at least their war, as they would have then achieved their objectives. Instead, the Egyptians entered into a dynamic battle of fluidity, never an Arab strong suit, and one in which the Israelis thrived. The Egyptians were smashed, and forced onto the defensive, giving Israel the initiative.
This was the point where Nixon looked to intervene, where the Syrians, being reinforced by contingents from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, were still doggedly fighting the Israelis, and inflicting heavy losses on them, and the Egyptians held control of the west bank of Suez.
Except the Soviets escalated affairs...
The Israelis, however, had no intention of assaulting Damascus, they too knew their limitations, and were content with drubbing the Jordanian and Iraqi contingents before turning to focus on the Sinai. The Israelis, after very severe fighting, managed to cross onto the east bank of Suez, and began to eliminate the massive SAM network that had protected the Egyptian operations thus far, all the while at places like Chinese Farm, the two sides fought the largest armor battles since 1944, in see-saw, blood soaked fighting that was apocalyptic enough without Washington and Moscow nearly coming to blows.
With Moscow panicking over yet another Arab defeat, and with the Soviets seriously considering direct military intervention (mobilizing their VDV forces, all 50,000 of them, and placing them on high alert in the Black Sea, and in Romania, and Bulgaria, and loading up over 6,000 Marines and sending them towards the Mediterranean, not to mention mobilizing their strategic bomber fleets, and moving squadrons of them towards air bases within range of Israel), Washington dropped plans for an Arab friendly intervention, and instead fully backed Israel, and put their own forces on DEFCON-3, and began to move naval, air, and Marine assets into the warzone.
In short, well before I was born, the world came to the brink of total destruction.
Lovely.
Thankfully Sadat was a reasonable man, saw the writing on the wall, refused to become a full auxiliary of the Soviet Union, and agreed to sue for peace. The war, horrid enough as it was, thankfully ended in other than Armageddon.
For an older, fairly concise work on the topic this is a very good book on one of the most fascinating events of the later 20th century. Both the Arabs, and the Israelis have every right to feel martial pride over the deeds of their grandfather's in this war, while the actions of both Moscow, and Washington, should serve as a warning about the inherent dangers of near Imperial powers willing to interfere in the affairs of others for the sake of their own ends.
Highly recommended.
June 21, 2019
good book
March 21, 2017
This is a book for any age reader that covers the basics of the Yom Kippur war between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq and Israel in 1973. It has almost enough maps and will inform the reader on the topic. But it ends there. I've reviewed at least three other book on the topic- and they all are better written than this one. And there are many Super-Hawk references about the Cold War element to this war that make one see it more as a period piece than a strong reference work for study. A fine choice, but there are many better choices....
October 1, 2026
None of the editions listed gives the correct number of pages in the hardbound edition, which is 244 pages.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews