“Whiteshift” in this book means the making in the West of a new population of mixed race “white” people born from the current majority white population and migrants recently arrived. The author, a professor of politics at Birkbeck College, University of London, does not attempt any definite conclusions about the color of the “whiteshifted” people compared to their parents. This is sensible since the offspring of two people of intermediate color may be lighter or darker than either one of them. The whiteshift is necessarily an inexact concept, but there is no doubt it is happening.
Non-whites are increasing more rapidly than whites. There is a belt from Central America through Africa and into West Asia where the Total Fertility Rate (TFR), the number of children a woman bears in her lifetime, is above the 2.1 level needed to replace the population. For the developed world of the West plus East Asia, the TFR is well below replacement level. Thus the West, especially its European-origin population, will be a demographic speck of a few percentage points by the end of the century. The low birth rate and growing population deficit, which has been observed for many years, is seen as indicative of a decline and possible extinction in the West, and therefore of white people, who are not encouraged to take pride in their identity as Africans or Asians are. It should be remembered that TFRs over the world are decreasing now, so the trend may not be as rapid as it appears. This does not mean whites are fated for extinction. But even nonwhite minorities in the US have a feeling that whites are under attack. “After the August 2017 Charlottesville riots, 70 percent of nearly 300 Latino and Asian Trump voters agreed that ‘whites are under attack in this country’ and 52 percent endorsed the idea that the country needed to ‘protect and preserve its white European heritage’ - sounding like the white Trump voters.” (p. 10)
One trait of whites favoring their survival is a certain exclusiveness or clannishness in terms of where they flock to raise their families (this is only one of many factors that determine housing patterns). After hundreds of years, America is still “a nation of immigrants” and despite having been built up, so to speak, from many different ethnicities, whites remain central. America has grown through immigration but always around this white core.
Among the intellectual class, the dominant American attitude on immigration was formed shortly before World War I and has continued through to this day. Originating with John Dewey and especially Randolph Bourne. Immigrant groups were to maintain their ethnic boundaries, while anglo protestants were to give up their boundaries and morph into cosmopolites. Obviously Bourne was projecting his own self-image into his country. The author quotes Bourne: “[The American Protestant would-be cosmopolite] may be absurdly superficial, his outward-reaching wonder may ignore all the stiller and homelier virtues of his Anglo-Saxon home, but he has at least found the clue to that international mind which will be essential to all men and women of good will if they are ever to save this Western world of ours from suicide.” (p. 53) This international mind was to be the result of a literary study attempting to get at the essences of various peoples: “new enthusiasms for continental literature, for unplumbed Russian depths, for French clarity of thought, for Teuton philosophies of power...”
Dewey and Bourne had a remarkable power to convince American intellectuals of the vacuity of the US and their own white race. I have a tentative explanation as to why. After World War II, the Russians and Teutons had left their world more damaged than ever before. The Anglo-Americans put it back together. But this patched-together world responded with the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, neither of which has global sovereignty, a requirement for any entity that would “save this Western world from suicide”. Certainly a nation would need a great deal of cosmopolitanism to cede its power to organizations possessing so little military force. But Dewey and Bourne provided a noble objective. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the fear of global war was over. There was only one superpower. Political correctors of the time took for granted that the United States, relieved of its Cold War burden, had no proper basis for opposing an appeal to “international law.” So if (for example) a majority on the UN Security Council wanted Israel to make a concession on West Bank security, it was only right for the US to pressure Israel into making it, even if from its experience Israel felt that more was necessary to prevent terrorist incursions. The conflict was between security (part of sovereignty) and cosmopolitanism. Belief in open borders was part of the cosmopolitan point of view, and part of the dispute over the proposed wall at the US southern border. This is the best explanation of campus “political correctness” I can think of.
After three chapters dealing with immigration history in Britain, Europe, and Canada, the author takes up the recent campus wars and their connection with race, which implies immigration. Here he finds the crucial concepts to be Timur Kuran’s “preference falsification” and the “Overton window”. Generally when people believe others observe a norm, they conform to it, even if they have doubts. When the changing moral narrative makes the norm seem dubious, skeptics realize others share their doubts; a self-augmenting rollback begins to unravel attitudes previously seen as unchallengeable. Likewise there are other norms that are favored but under accidental circumstances become disfavored. Of the total spectrum of policies on any given issue, some can be proposed without inciting moral odium and some are considered outrageous. The portion of the spectrum that is not considered outrageous is known as the “Overton window”. Obviously preference falsification and the Overton window are applicable to almost any public policy issue. Most opinion journalists and political operatives are constantly trying to change norms of policy, or open the window wider or pull it shut.
Immigration and race involve a number of possible limits in policies that most people don’t want to openly reject even if they are subconsciously resent them: for example, reductions in immigration levels, point-based systems for deciding who to admit, and so on. They were not so much talked about, and then Trump came along. His challenge
prepared immigration skeptics to bring neglected ideas up for open consideration.
Multiculturalism gained new force in 1965, the year of the Hart-Cellar Act which eliminated quotas based on national origin. Anti-immigrant attitudes are driven by the number of immigrants present and the rate of increase of immigrant population, both of which have turned out much larger than expected. Anti-immigration organizing began in the 1980s with the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) which gave amnesty to 1.6 million but didn’t effectively enforce employer sanctions. The huge inflows continued. Polls have shown that the public clearly wants immigration restriction. It seems to me that the fundamental question on immigration is whether to set a limit to the yearly total of immigrants. This cannot be done unless we secure the Southern border. “Build that wall!” is still not quite within the Overton window but not outside either.
Chapters 7 and 8 provide an interesting analysis of attitudes on immigration and race, using the analytical tools previously described. Some attitudes on immigration are taboo in the current “national discourse”. But taboos can come and go. What we see demonstrators doing on TV may not mean very much. The author has polling data showing that people are repelled by leftist attacks on complex symbols like Christopher Columbus, despite the prominence given these attacks. He cites a series of ideological taboos which he visually represents as concentric circular zones, with multiculturalism on the periphery and attacks on white or Christian identity in the center. Gradually they weaken from 1990 to 2010. (Figure 8.1 in the book.) (Much of his data is drawn from Europe, where there are minority parties that broadcast their positions.) Transitions between highly publicized attitudes in the zones occur in a feedback process by means of the Overton window and Kuran’s “preference falsification.” Really to prove this, though, would require more data than he provides.
These analyses raise the question of how people really feel about the propaganda that is hurled at them. The author’s belief is clear: “At the crux of this debate is the question of whether whites can legitimately defend their group interests through restricting immigration. Liberals insist that this is racist ...” (p.367) The author cites evidence that liberal attitudes are wrong. Consideration of white self-interest is supported by the Brookings social scientist Shadi Hamid. He says: “For me the more useful question isn’t why Trump voters voted for him, but rather why they wouldn’t. ... I can’t be sure I wouldn’t have voted for Trump ...This may make me a flawed person or even as some would have it, a ‘racist’. But it would also make me rational, voting if not in my economic self-interest then at least in my emotional self-interest.” (quote on p.368) Concerning the current furor at the southern border, we might consider the viewpoint of those Americans who want their country to stay mainly as it is rather than absorb an enormous number of immigrants. But that idea is not within the mainstream media’s Overton window.
In the last four chapters, the author takes up the question of whether whites will respond to the global transition with flight or intermarriage. The concluding discussion is “Will ‘Unmixed’ Whites go extinct?”. Flight, in this context, means moving to another location. Whites prefer small cities and towns over larger ones and this is not the case does not occur with other populations. Diversity of population has the disadvantage of social fragmentation. The author acknowledges, “Despite the persistence of discrimination, [white desire to separate from minorities] is unlikely to account for today’s segregation picture.” (p.391) In London, white British decline ... is less a story of white flight than one of white British families avoiding dense and diverse neighborhoods.” (p.195) So the uneven racial distribution cannot be attributed to whites alone.
The author does not believe there will be white extinction, and points out that whiteness is more than a question of what people look like. “There are no physical colors or races, but our color perception and linguistic evolution mean we have a set of racial categories, centered on archetypes, that may be as difficult to dislodge as the primary colors . ... The acceptance of those who don’t look white as members of the ethnic majority will probably require both intellectual arguments and emergent processes such as intermarriage which make this more compelling.” (p. 478-479). There will likely be two steps in the race-mixing process: (1) whites remain “a large tightly-bounded group, part of a diminishing share of a multicultural society of discrete groups” then evolving evolution into (2) “a melting pot in which the white group melts with others”. The question is how well the white majority culture thrives compared to that of the other cultures that compete with it. Based on studies of American films, the author thinks the white culture will prevail.
There will continue to be groups maintaining their distinctness like Native Americans in the US. The author notes the tendency of whites to form compact sects like the Mormons, Amish, Hutterites, or Haredim; their high birthrate and endogamous marriage bodes well not just for their surviving but thriving. There will be skeptics who assert that distinctness claims are false. For example Shlomo Sand in Israel denies the existence of European Jews, but feels a commonality with Israeli Arabs and considers Judaism strictly a religion. In East Asia, a concern for racial distinctiveness runs in the other direction, as in the case of Chia-hsiang Wang who maintains that as a Han Chinese he bears some responsibility for the treatment of Taiwanese. The whole question of the popular meaning of “race” will probably be reconceived.
This is a long and complex book, not as clearly organized as it could be. The author verifies most of his assertions with statistics collected from the US, Britain, and Europe. There is a wealth of interesting material here; this review doesn’t begin to present its variety.