tl;dr Rather than a scholarly look at unreason’s history within philosophical thought it is an onanistic encomium to American branded neo-liberalism. So, if that’s your thing, you’ll love this book. Not so much for me, however.
I once went to a haunted house with my mother. We thought it would be fun and decided to check it out. After going through the entertainingly amateur exhibits, we found ourselves in a white room. The doors were shut. The real horror was to begin. We were obliged to sit through a sermon beseeching us to find Christ or else what we had passed through would be our fate. Replace Christ with capitalism and you get a fitting metaphor for what this book entails.
Although I am not contesting the documentation and the ability for one to read these figures the way that they are in this book, I question the author’s committal to pegging the individuals with these interpretations. I am genuinely intrigued by the topic but was dismayed at the pointed readings. It is as if the author is dead-set on completely discounting these figures as a whole rather than trying to give a portrait of unreason itself. Nor is postmodernism exclusive to those selected. It seems, rather, that the author chose those salacious individuals who could be discounted based, not on what their philosophies actually say, but what their personal lives represented. I am far from a postmodernist, but I am sympathetic to their theories, whereas this book is almost a virulent attack against anything suggestive of anti-enlightenment or anti-bourgeois/capitalist notions.
I will limit myself to commenting upon the first philosopher whom is addressed and is the one I have the most familiarity with so as to give you an idea of how misrepresented the “postmodernists” are. The evaluation of Nietzsche is sloppily attempting to suggest that Nietzsche’s desystematization of value is nothing but an inversion – but when calling into question a system of values you do not accept its converse, which would simply reaffirm the whole. It also takes Nietzsche’s “Will to Power” as a normative deontological tenant which is simply not supported by the scholarship. The author falsely treats Nietzsche’s final work as a completed philosophy whereas it was only a disorganized collection of notes misused by his anti-Semitic sister. Can Nietzsche be read this way? Yes. Which is in fact what the Nazi’s did. But to accuse Nietzsche and then use this as one’s evaluation of further philosophy’s application of him is to misread the whole. The fact that the author would go so far as to say that Nietzsche “despised the Jews,” in flagrant contradiction to Nietzsche’s attacks against anti-Semitism, shows how distasteful a representation is given of the “political” Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s philosophy is an overcoming of the self, not society. Yes, he despised Christian ethics, but as an institution, not Christ, going so far as to say that “the last Christian died on the Cross.” Calling Nietzsche a proto-fascist because his writings can be misinterpreted is like calling Christianity a call to Satanism because others have used it to that end.
The author pretty much side steps any serious thought with any of the philosophers’ theories in favor of criticizing their personal and political lives. Although this is not without relevance, to accuse postmodernism of justifying fascism seems dishonest in this context. Now, again, such theories can and have been read this way, but I think that that is the lesson that is trying to be avoided. Until we accept that Nazism and other totalitarian ideologies are completely within the realm of justification within the human psyche and in line with humanist ideals, we will never be able to combat them. So long as we treat them as aberrations or agents of evil, outside the realm of reason, we will surely fail.
In the chapter on Bataille we get this curious statement: “Much has been written about the corollaries between fascism and “irrationalism” that remains conjectural and superficial. It would be foolish to assert that all doctrines that radically question the primacy of reason exist in a symbiotic relation with forces of political reaction, let alone fascism.” Yet, the whole premise of this book is exactly that! Rather than discuss the tradition of unreason, this is a polemic against any anti-enlightenment thinking as being inherently fascistic with the consequent assumption that the only alternative is neo-liberalism. Just because the radical left can incorporate irrationality, however, does not mean it touches with fascism. Fascism is not only ill-defined but is an amalgam of various tendencies including but not limited to organicism, authoritarianism, and mythologizing, not to mention its economic statist-corporatist monopoly.
What I garner from my reading of this book is that the author is committed to a defense of liberalism that abhors any form of affirmative violence and equates any violence whatsoever as fascistic. Like we get in the news today, anti-fascists are equated with the fascists they oppose for their use of violent means to confront them. This is simply ridiculous, however. Leftism, at least to me, is firstly defined by the role of the state, and fascism, with its dependence on authority and its great-man hero worship, is antithetical to that. It is about social organization and economic relations as well, and although the far right and left both share affinities with unreason as presented in this book in regard to notions of how personal life is to be liberated, it does not mean they are equal to each other.
This liberal bias is evident in the section devoted to Derrida. Although I do in fact agree with the author that Derrida fails to provide a practical answer to the question of political action, at least in the earlier writings that I am familiar with, I found this particular passage:
“Yet, historically, the liberal democratic ideals have often entered into sharp conflict with the capitalist ethos of profit maximization, a fact one notes time and again in the history of the labor, women’s, and ecology movements. In the interstices of these various social spheres, with their conflicting normative claims, lie significant potentials for constructive social reform that Derrida excludes by virtue of his chosen apocalyptical discourse.”
To my understanding these victories stood in opposition to liberal democrats and were in fact victories of leftist organizations such as the IWW and the remnants of the US’s socialist party the likes of Eugene Debs. This misrepresentation is characteristic of this book. Not to mention the perfectly lucid claim by Derrida that it was Heidegger’s post-enlightenment humanism that led him down the road to its logical conclusion in National Socialism.
As a matter of fact, the rhetoric the author displays in treating the earlier portions of the book wherein he discuses the likes of Nietzsche and Heidegger is markedly sympathetic to the later depictions of aristocratic racism. I can only suppose this is because, the latter lacking the postmodernist villainy, it is easier to knock down than the former and therefore the author is more easily, though unsuccessfully (in my opinion), able to align leftism with fascism by drawing false parallels. And lest us not return to denigrate Nietzsche for criticizing America!; juxtaposing these racial disharmonies with myopic representations that had previously been drawn over. It seems the whole intention of the book is to culminate in the end for an onanistic encomium for American values and virtues and refers to the cultural left as slavish and clueless.
The purpose of this book is nothing less than to legitimate neo-liberalism, not against fascism, but leftism, by attempting to equate each’s irrationalist tendencies into a moral victory for corporatist America. As the following passage shows, it bemoans the lack of esteem liberalism has found itself in: “As philosophers of “difference,” they [postmodernists] present themselves as advocates of the politically marginalized. Yet the antiliberal rhetorical thrust of their arguments risks undermining the very norms of tolerance that, historically, have provided such groups with the greatest measure of political and legal protection.” So please, don’t be fooled, this book is less a scholarly look at strains of unreason in philosophical thought, but rather a defense of American brand neo-liberalism. Even more than a defense, it is rather a desperate attempt for legitimation in the face of being the butt of a joke even though it is the firmly entrenched prevailing order. It reads like the tears of a tyrant for not being invited to the cool kids party.