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Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility
What bearing do our histories--our influences, what we have done and what has happened to us--have on our responsibility for the actions we take or consider in the present? This is the question at the center of Alfred R. Mele's examination of moral responsibility, including the moral responsibility of manipulated agents.
Departing from other scholars writing on free will and moral responsibility, Mele reflects on a wide range of thought experiments that feature agents who have been manipulated or designed in ways which directly affect their actions. Although such thought experiments are often used by philosophers to illustrate significant features of moral responsibility, little attention has been paid to ways in which various details make a difference. In Manipulated Agents , Mele addresses this gap, arguing that such vignettes have the potential to unlock an understanding of moral responsibility that takes an agent's history into account when assigning moral praise or blame. In his analysis of these thought experiments, Mele presents a highly accessible, compelling defense of a "history-sensitive" conception of moral responsibility that has implications for free will.
Departing from other scholars writing on free will and moral responsibility, Mele reflects on a wide range of thought experiments that feature agents who have been manipulated or designed in ways which directly affect their actions. Although such thought experiments are often used by philosophers to illustrate significant features of moral responsibility, little attention has been paid to ways in which various details make a difference. In Manipulated Agents , Mele addresses this gap, arguing that such vignettes have the potential to unlock an understanding of moral responsibility that takes an agent's history into account when assigning moral praise or blame. In his analysis of these thought experiments, Mele presents a highly accessible, compelling defense of a "history-sensitive" conception of moral responsibility that has implications for free will.
184 pages, Hardcover
Published April 1, 2019
About the author
Alfred R. Mele
31 books34 followersAlfred Remen Mele is an American philosopher. He has been the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University since 2000. He specializes in irrationality, akrasia, intentionality and philosophy of action.
Born in Detroit, Michigan, Mele attended Wayne State University, and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Michigan in 1979. He took a position at Davidson College in 1979 as a visiting professor, which led to a tenured position at Davidson, where he remained for 21 years until accepting his position with Florida State.
Mele explores the concepts of autonomy or self-rule and the concept of self-control. as they relate to terms like "free will."
Without committing himself to the idea that human autonomy is compatible with determinism or incompatible (a position held by both libertarians and incompatibilists), Mele provides arguments in support of autonomous agents for both positions. He is, as he says, "officially agnostic about the truth of compatibilism" and describes his position as "agnostic autonomism."
Mele proposed a two-stage model of "Modest Libertarianism" that follows Daniel Dennett's 1978 "Valerian" model for decision making. Like Dennett, Mele requires that the indeterminism should come early in the overall process. He describes the latter - decision - part of the process as compatibilist (effectively determinist).
Born in Detroit, Michigan, Mele attended Wayne State University, and received his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Michigan in 1979. He took a position at Davidson College in 1979 as a visiting professor, which led to a tenured position at Davidson, where he remained for 21 years until accepting his position with Florida State.
Mele explores the concepts of autonomy or self-rule and the concept of self-control. as they relate to terms like "free will."
Without committing himself to the idea that human autonomy is compatible with determinism or incompatible (a position held by both libertarians and incompatibilists), Mele provides arguments in support of autonomous agents for both positions. He is, as he says, "officially agnostic about the truth of compatibilism" and describes his position as "agnostic autonomism."
Mele proposed a two-stage model of "Modest Libertarianism" that follows Daniel Dennett's 1978 "Valerian" model for decision making. Like Dennett, Mele requires that the indeterminism should come early in the overall process. He describes the latter - decision - part of the process as compatibilist (effectively determinist).
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October 27, 2025
Well-argued for its topic, but I wonder about its scope. Given that manipulation arguments are so often meant to make us worried about common subtle forms of manipulation, such as nudges or upbringing, then why limit one's discussion to such a restricted form of manipulation?
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