The Struggle for Europe

by Chester Wilmot

Chester Wilmot’s The Struggle for Europe is the most highly regarded single-volume history of the Second World War in Europe. First published in 1952, the book has the advantage of the author's extensive interviews with participants from all sides of the conflict, when recollections of the war were still painfully fresh. The pattern of post-war Europe, he maintains, was determined during the fighting; he sees the shaping events through a study of wartime diplomacy and strategy and of the impact on wartime policies of the personalities of the statesmen and generals with whom the decisions lay. Throughout Wilmot hews to one guiding To concern ourselves solely with the course of military events would be to tell only half the story and to see only half its significance. It is the political outcome that counts, and in this book the two are closely related at every stage.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History, War, Military Fiction, American History

766 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1952

Reviews

[Badger · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant book that sparked my lifetime's interest in the history of the Second World War. I was probably fifteen when I read it (first published in 1952) and I was thrilled by how exciting history could be.

The title is a little misleading, since it is only concerned with the preparations for D Day and the progress of the war in Western Europe up to the German surrender, but my goodness, this is how history should be written.

One of my all time favourites.

[William · Rating 4 out of 5]

Trying to describe WWII in one volume is like trying to pack 10 pounds of substance into a five-pound bag. Chester Wilmot pulls it off, surprisingly offering a comprehensive examination of WWII in Europe less than 10 years after the conflict ended.

American readers may find Wilmot's analysis off-putting, given its anglo-centric focus. To gain a good understanding of the war, one cannot limit reading to just those books with an American viewpoint. The war would be a struggle for the allies to develop a decisive superiority focused against a portion of the German line, obtain a breakthrough, then exploit through the gap to hasten Germany's defeat. That this strategy was not done under Field Marshall Montgomery's guidance is a tragedy, according to Wilmot.

Realistically, it is politically impossible to argue for the British strategy, given the preponderant contribution the US made on the western front. But that does not discourage Wilmot from sticking to his guns. His stubborn defense of Montgomery's approach, vs. Eisenhower's broad front strategy, illuminates the logic behind the British position, showing its rationality where Americans perceive Churchillian churlishness.

[Keith · Rating 4 out of 5]

More than 60 years ago war correspondent Chester Wilmot wrote this, a book still regarded as among the best one volume treatments of this horrendous conflict. There are certainly details that are passed over quickly but this is an excellent starting point from which to grasp the origins and ultimate outcome of World War Two. Recommended.

[Shaun Appleby · Rating 4 out of 5]

A reliable, balanced and comprehensive history of Allied military activities in North Europe from D-day to VE Day, Wilmot's engaging and readable account benefits from first-person access to a wide variety of significant actors in near real-time to the events he narrates. Notably Wilmot takes on the sometime role of public defender for Montgomery's reputation and makes a credible argument for the Field Marshal's claim to a share of the Normandy breakout victory rather than approbation for heavy losses at Caen. Wilmot's cautious advocacy for Montgomery's subsequent operations on the Rhine, however, and his balanced and insightful account of the often acrimonious competition for resources among Allied commanders does little to enhance anyone's reputation save that of the beleaguered Eisenhower; which goes a long way toward explaining the Supreme Commander's subsequent political apotheosis.

Wilmot has a gift, enhanced in the original edition by excellent and detailed maps, for forensic examination of the critical military operations where events hinged on a single engagement or decision; competent narratives with varied and impressive sourcing and ample footnotes. One feels a satisfying sense of the actual ebb and flow of events on the field at important turning points.

An essential volume on the European theatre it is also a ripping good yarn in Wilmot's capable hands.

[Jamie Campbell · Rating 5 out of 5]

Probably the grand daddy of all such books that followed. Wilmott's maps are first class. His conclusions are sound. The narrative is also a breeze compared with Bradley, Eisenhower, Montgomery et. al.

His analysis of Eisenhower's broad front cf Montgomery's thrust is interesting. Wilmott doesn't go as far as Broke goes (in calling Montgomery out); but to my mind he comes down against Eisenhower.

Post B of B we are over run by small unit books.

I was glad to have read Wilmott first; and some years prior to B of B - as it helped to place the personal narratives in B of B, and other of its ilk, within the wider scope of the west.

[AskHistorians]

A detailed account of the European theater during World War II, starting with the allied preparations for D-Day, subsequent invasion of Normandy, and major battles / strategies of the rest of the war.

[Geoffrey Macharia · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the best books I have ever read, Its narration of military history is perfect. It is both intriguing as well as entertaining. It is forthright and well-researched. It is in a league of one.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must-read if you want to understand WWII in Europe

[Shady Gobran · Rating 5 out of 5]

كتاب عظيم وفاق كل توقعاتي. وقد انتهيت منه في الوقت المناسب.
يوم ٥ يونيو ٢٠٢٤ تحل الذكرى الثمانون لأكبر عملية إنزال لقوات جيش على أرض عدو (نورماندي) في التاريخ.
يتناول الكتاب تفاصيل الحرب العالمية الثانية (١٩٣٩-١٩٤٥)، ولكن ابتداء من مايو ١٩٤٠ بعد محاصرة الجيش البريطاني في مدينة دٓنكيرك Dunkirk الفرنسية وعملية إجلائه الإعجازية.

بلغت أوج قوة وأكبر اتساع لألمانيا النا زية في صيف ١٩٤٢. من المحيط الأطنطي غربا حتى البحر الأسود شرقا، ومن القطب الشمالي حتى البحر شمال أفريقيا جنوبا. فقط سويسرا هي من كانت تتمتع بحكم ذاتي في الوسط.
يشرح الكاتب عملية الاستعداد للحرب ضد ألمانيا بشكل تفصيلي عن طريق دول الحلفاء (الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وبريطانيا والاتحاد السوفيتي).
يخوض في تفاصيل إعادة بناء الجيش البريطاني والأمريكي، وتشكيل هيكل القيادة العامة لجيوش الحلفاء المشتركة. ورسم الخرائط لتحديد زمان ومكان وعتاد وقوة الجيوش المطلوب إنزالها على أرض قارة أوروبا، لأن تلك الخطوة هي مفتاح الحرب (عملية أوڤرلورد overlord).
لن أخوض في تفاصيل الحرب حتى التحرير. ولكن ما لفت انتباهي هي الأخطاء التي تم ارتكابها أثناء الحرب من الفريقين. على سبيل المثال:
- كان بإمكان @تلر القضاء على الجيش البريطاني المحاصر في دنكيرك ولكنه لم يفعل، مما كان سيخرج بريطانيا من المعادلة كقوة عالمية.
- قيام @تلر بحرب كبرى على جبتهين شرقية وغربية.
- رفض القادة الأمريكيين لمقترح تشيرشل بتركيز القوات المتمركزة في البحر المتوسط لغزو إيطاليا وتحريرها بالكامل للضغط على ألمانيا جنوبا، وبذلك يتم فتح جبهة ثالثة. ولكنهم فضلوا غزو فرنسا من الجنوب بعد الإنزال شمالا في نورماندي.
- ترك دول البلقان للسوفيت لتحريرها.
- إصرار أيزنهاور (القائد العام لجيوش الحلفاء) بالحرب على جبهة ممتدة وطويلة، ورفضه اقتراحات الفيلد مارشال مونتجومري (قائد الجيشين البريطاني والكندي) بالتركيز على جزء محدد. مما قلل من قوة وسرعة الهجوم في بعض المعارك.
- ترك تشيكوسلوفاكيا للسوفيت لتحريرها، وانتظارهم للوصول لحدود برلين على الرغم من وصول الأمريكيين قبلهم.
- تعنت ستالين الشديد في الاجتماع الثلاثي مع روزفلت وتشيرشل في مدينة يالطا في الاتفاق على سياسات دول الحلفاء بعد الحرب. وعدم التزامه بأغلب الاتفاقيات التي تمت بعد نهايتها.
- سلامة نية روزفلت والتعامل مع ستالين بشكل ودي، على عكس الثعلب الماكر تشيرشل. الذي كانت له خبرة أكبر سياسيا ورؤية أوضح وبعد نظر لأطماع السوفيت بعد الحرب.
كما أظهر الكاتب نقاط الخلاف بين القادة الأمريكيين والبريطانيين، مما كان سيؤدي لكارثة حربية لولا براعة ودبلوماسية أيزنهاور في القيادة.
تكمن أسس الاختلاف بين المدرسة الأمريكية والبريطانية في اقتناع الأمريكيين بالهجوم على جبهة طويلة لتشتيت العدو، وعدم التفريط في شبر من الأرض لأنه ضد شرفهم العسكري، وإطلاق يد القادة العسكريين على أرض المعركة في كيفية الوصول للأهداف بدون إملاء تعليمات تفصيلية. أما البريطانيين فيفضلون التركيز على نقطة معينة للهجوم بقوة ضاربة لفتح ثغرة داخل خطوط العدو، ولا يوجد مشكلة لانسحاب استراتيجي إما لنصب فخ للعدو أو لإعادة ترتيب الصفوف وانتظار التدعيمات، والتخطيط لكل كبيرة وصغيرة وما على القادة الأصغر إلا التنفيذ.
لا يخفي الكاتب انحيازه وإعجابه الشديد بتشيرشل ومونتجومري وباتون (قائد الجيش الثالث الأمريكي)، واتفاقه في أغلب النقاط مع أيزنهاور، ونقده الشديد لبرادلي (قائد الجيش الأول الأمريكي).
أما أهمية الكتاب تكمن في المؤلف نفسه. تم تأليف الكتاب عام ١٩٥٢. كان تشيستر ويلموت مؤرخا أستراليا، وعمل كمراسل لـ BBC أثناء الحرب، فقد كان شاهدا للعيان في كثير من المعارك، مثل طبرق في تونس. ثم كان ضمن قوات المظلات (أولى قوات الحلفاء التي التي نزلت في أوروبا) خلف خطوط العدو في نورماندي. وكان حاضرا لحظة اعتقال بعض القادة الألمان بعد الحرب وأثناء التحقيق معهم، كما أجرى معهم العديد من الحوارات الصحفية في المعتقلات. وكان حاضرا لأهم جلسات محاكمة نورنبرج.
المراجع رائعة. اعتمد على مذكرات قادة الجيوش وصناع القرار، وأيضا على آلاف المستندات الأصلية من تفريغ لمحاضر اجتماعات @تلر مع قادته، والسجلات التليفونية والمراسلات بين مقرات القيادة العامة للجيوش الألمانية.
في آخر فصلين (وهم الأهم) يكشف تبعيات الثقة الزائدة بالسوفيت. وكيف أن القيادة العليا لجيوش الحلفاء ركزت فقط على العمليات العسكرية ورفضت التدخل من تشيرشل ووضع الاعتبارات السياسية في عملهم. وهو ما أدى لخسارة أهداف الحرب بعد القضاء على النا زية، بإرساء قواعد الديمقراطية وحرية الدول التي كانت محتلة في تقرير مصيرها بعيدا عن الغزو الشيوعي.
فقد تم استبدال ديكتاتور بآخر، وحكم فاشي بآخر.
تقييمي ٥/٥. على الرغم من وجود بعض التفاصيل الزائدة عن الحد بالنسبة لي مثل تفاصيل المعارك يوما بيوم وساعة بساعة في بعض الأحيان، ولكن بالنسبة لوقت نشره، فهو مرجع تاريخي عسكري هام في ظل قلة المعلومات المتاحة بعد ٧ سنوات فقط من الحرب.

[Andy Hart · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is essential reading for any serious student of modern war and for anyone hoping to understand the strategic nuances of the Anglo-American alliance's war against Germany and the laying of the foundations of the Cold War. It is superb.

Australian war correspondent Chester Wilmot's credentials are impeccable (He landed with the British 6th (Airlanding) Brigade on the evening of D-Day) but he stays clear of the tactical trip-wires in this unsurpassed and magisterial examination of the United Nations' operations in North West Europe. His sources, which include the post-capture testimonies of senior German officials and officers, transcripts of the Nuremberg interviews, recovered fragments of the twice-daily conferences held by Hitler with his senior military staff and personal interviews, give his account a balance that few have since achieved. Suggestions that The Struggle for Europe is Anglo-centric are simple nonsense (I have yet to meet an Australian that would give the English any benefit of doubt); Wilmot is clinical in his collection and assessment of evidence and entirely unbiased in his narrative.

He does not shy away from criticism of Montgomery and Churchill, but their all too apparent human frailties did not mean that they were always wrong just as their all too apparent human qualities did not mean that they were always right. That Eisenhower was probably the greatest leader of a military coalition that the world will ever see does not make him faultless, but Wilmot deals with Ike with the same dispassionate measure as he does with the other key players. He rightly points out that Patton's relentless aggression probably did as much strategic harm to the Allied campaign in western Europe as it did operational good, and that Bradley, while superb in command of an Army operating on the Normandy battlefield shaped by Montgomery, was virtually witless in command of an Army Group when faced with the daunting challenge of shaping the battlefield himself following the breakout.

The real value in this essential book lies in its command of the socio-economic as well as the military factors that played their tightly interconnected roles in determining the strategic direction of the final year of the Second World War - and in doing so it does not forget Stalin and the Russians. Those reviewers who have condemned The Struggle for Europe as Anglo-centric may wish to go back and read its last hundred pages and ask themselves whether our post-War world might perhaps have been a little safer had Roosevelt adopted a little more Anglocentricity at Yalta.

There are some superb histories of the Normandy campaign that tell the stories of the soldiers who fought and provide wonderful operational narratives. If you are looking for that then The Struggle for Europe is not for you. But if you want to know why they fought when and where they did, then you must read this book.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

A superbly written account of the, well, the struggle for Europe. Focusing on the western front and the American, British and Canadian armies fight from Normandy to Berlin, Wilmot clearly thinks Montgomery a better general than Patton or Bradley and he is, at times, patronising towards Eisenhower though, ultimately, finds much in him to praise. His analysis of the failures of American policy - too focused on winning the miltary battle and not nearly enough on the politican situation that would prevail after the war - is fascinating and explains the American mistakes that led to the pre-eminent position of the Soviet Union after the war, a position owing a great deal, as well, of course, to Stalin's strategic brilliance.

[John Geddes]

Found in the Bibliography of A.K. Chesterton's New Unhappy Lords under Section C of the books "written by authors either unaware of the implications of the policy-pattern described in "The New Unhappy Lords" or aware of the implications and approving of them."
https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/2...

[Carl · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent, if a little outdated, account of the Allied invasion of Europe

[Bec · Rating 3 out of 5]

Useful for it's history, but horrifying.

[Bill · Rating 5 out of 5]

Magnificent.

[Bill · Rating 5 out of 5]

I came to this book late, as I have read through most of the more recent histories of the European campaign (Weigley, Atkinson, et al). I should have started here. I noticed that many of the authors just cited drew mightily from this book. Once I got started, I realized that Wilmot, who was an Australian war correspondent during the war, had opportunities to interview many of the principals n both the allied side and the German side shortly after the war. This book came out in the early fifties.
So we don't hear about the intelligence gleaned from breaking the German code, but nobody has done a better job at showing the strategies employed by both sides, with cogent analysis. Regarding the allies, Eisenhower comes in for criticism because he would not budge from a broad front strategy, while Hitler gets credit for much more egregious stupidity. The book presents the supreme commander's lieutentants, especially Bradley and Patton, as prone to going off in another direction after receiving orders for their missions. Finally, this book has by far the best maps I have seen in a general campaign study. Modern students of the war have been very poorly served in this area.

[Wayne Richardson · Rating 5 out of 5]

First published in 1952 this is one of the best histories of the Second World War.

As a journalist Chester was able to draw from extensive interviews with participants from all sides of the conflict.

It is a must read for those interested in WW2.

[Nigel Street · Rating 5 out of 5]

Unlike other books I have read on the 2nd world war this was written by a journalist who was embedded in the Allied forces from the commencement of Overlord. Phenomenal detail gleaned from a mass of information across many sources including alone remarkable German papers provides an incredible insight into not only the strategy and movement of the battle front and armies but also the logistical challenges that influenced the war for boy sides to such a large extent. The political background was also fascinating with great coverage of first Tehran then Yalta and finally Potsdam. Much of it helping to put into context some of the attitudes and outcomes in the later part of the 20th century and even into the 21st. For anyone really wanting to really get into the detail this is a must read however there is a bias, perhaps understandable in the circumstances, to some of the way events are viewed in my opinion. Nonetheless a very rewarding read.