What do you think?
Rate this book
Teoria della politica internazionale
The seminal text on neorealist analysis! From Theory of International Politics: National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation. . . . States, like people, are insecure in proportion to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted. Organizations that establish relations of authority and control may increase security as they decrease freedom. If might does not make right, whether among people or states, then some institution or agency has intervened to lift them out of nature s realm. The more influential the agency, the stronger the desire to control it becomes. In contrast, units in an anarchic order act for their own sakes and not for the sake of preserving an organization and furthering their fortunes within it. Force is used for one s own interest. In the absence of organization, people or states are free to leave one another alone. Even when they do not do so, they are better able, in the absence of the politics of the organization, to concentrate on the politics of the problem and to aim for a minimum agreement that will permit their separate existence rather than a maximum agreement for the sake of maintaining unity. If might decides, then bloody struggles over right can more easily be avoided.
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Laws and Theories 2. Reductionist Theories 3. Systemic Approaches and Theories 4. Reductionist and Systemic Theories 5. Political Structures 6. Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power 7. Structural Causes and Economic Effects 8. Structural Causes and Military Effects 9. The Management of International Affairs
399 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1979
115 people are currently reading
4612 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 62 reviews
Read
January 13, 2016I read Waltz's books and articles as a graduate student and again, years later, as a professor. This book merits the attention it has held, now, for decades. With a simple explanation of the utility of theory alongside the introduction of structural realism, Waltz changed political science and the study of international relations. He made clear that there is value, if not descriptive truth, in simplifying assumptions and parsimonious explanations, in using a lens that lets us watch and predict behavior on the basis of a few key variables, even in the most tangled, complex web of dynamics. His work serves as a foundation for endless discussions of the levels of analysis, the role of power in international relations, rationality, the nature of the game, the roots of states' interests, and the possibility of cooperation. It can be effectively compared with feminist literature, constructivist writing, and, of course, liberalism. By so clearly and succinctly laying out his argument, Waltz creates room for all of these bigger conversations. This book (and I recommend it alongside his first) is must-read literature for students of world politics and valuable for anyone interested in international relations.
October 18, 2012
I nerded out on this one. Waltz's style can tend to make him come off as pompous. From what I understand, that is completely intentional. However, the logic of his argument is nearly unassailable, and that appeals to my engineery-type brain.
According to Waltz, the world "hangs together" in a balance of power among states. The complex nature of the anarchic international system requires a system theory to describe those forces that operate upon the states. In a system theory, the units and the interaction between them don't matter. What is interesting is effect of the system on the units themselves - how they are constrained by the forces imparted by the system. In his system, Waltz describes states as the primary actors and repeatedly reminds the reader that the internal composition of the states do not matter. The primary factors involved are the constraints placed on the states by the system, not the interactions between the states themselves.
Each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the presence of other states as well as by the interactions with them. Structurally, Waltz says that we can describe and understand the pressures states are subject to. With that said, we cannot predict how they will react to the pressures without knowledge of their internal dispositions.
According to Waltz, the world "hangs together" in a balance of power among states. The complex nature of the anarchic international system requires a system theory to describe those forces that operate upon the states. In a system theory, the units and the interaction between them don't matter. What is interesting is effect of the system on the units themselves - how they are constrained by the forces imparted by the system. In his system, Waltz describes states as the primary actors and repeatedly reminds the reader that the internal composition of the states do not matter. The primary factors involved are the constraints placed on the states by the system, not the interactions between the states themselves.
Each state arrives at policies and decides on actions according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the presence of other states as well as by the interactions with them. Structurally, Waltz says that we can describe and understand the pressures states are subject to. With that said, we cannot predict how they will react to the pressures without knowledge of their internal dispositions.
December 28, 2019
A book for all seasons! Highly recommended to students and lovers of IR.
If you want to know better Waltz, read his own writings, not ones about him.
If you want to know better Waltz, read his own writings, not ones about him.
October 11, 2013
[Disclaimer: This is a snapshot of my thoughts on this book after just reading it. This is not meant to serve as a summary of main/supporting points or a critique – only as some words on how I engaged with this book for the purposes of building a theoretical framework on strategy.]
Waltz presents his theory in the context of his proposed definition of what a theory is (and is not), against a backdrop of his criticism of existing reductionist and systemic theories of his time. It is important to understand that he writes in competition with liberal explanations of international politics, as well as a relatively stable bipolar international system. Nevertheless, his concept of a political structure is viable, as it provides a means to explain events and anticipate outcomes. In my view, a structure implies governance – as Waltz implies himself through his explanation of the influence of markets (90). The bipolarity of Waltz’s context, by its nature, provide the necessary foundation for such a structure. This in effect was the external pressure that became the policing force. If realism’s premises were infallible (which it does not claim for itself), then the policing force would be effective at eliminating force-on-force conflict. This did not prove to be true. Finally, Waltz’s handling of non-state actors appears dismissive to me, especially from the perspective of hindsight. Non-state actors have been able to have a significant impact on US engagement in international politics, and non-state actors have been able to drain power (and subsequently, influence) from the US and former USSR. The UK has also seen a significant power drain from non-state influences such as illegal immigration and terrorism.
My initial impression of Waltz’s critique of the existing theories of his time is that while he qualifies his own simplification (for the purposes of developing a coherent theory), he criticizes others’ reduction for the same purposes. His theory appears to be a combination of the two types of theories, which he proposes takes the best of both. However, any error in both in effect multiplies as well, thereby creating more opportunity for predictive error. I disagree with Waltz’s premise that theories need be predictive, although it would be helpful if they are at least anticipatory.
To his credit, Waltz is consistent with Man the State and War in that power is the ultimate aim of the state; however, power is to be gained for a purpose. The accumulation of power does not necessarily equate to positive control. Power provides freedom of action (194), which permits greater room for error without significant loss of influence, and “great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake” (195). The goal is the ability to manage for the sake of state interest. A greater stake in international management allows for pursuit of state interest. Does the idea of international management therefore imply an international governing force whereby some states operate in a governed position of international relations while others operate in a governing position – thereby doing harm to the realist premise of anarchy? Subsequently, weaker states by necessity cannot pursue power to support its interest, but instead must align through institutions and relationships to pursue their interests. This is perhaps ignorance on my part in understanding the gamut of international relations theory.
Waltz clearly hopes that bipolarity will be the permanent state of politics, since he sees that it provides a predictable balance in international relations. He sees the international structure of states as relatively hierarchical, with power being measurable. I do not see power as easily measurable given the impact of asymmetric information (Jervis; Brauer & van Tuyll) and cognitive bias (Kahneman; Jervis; Khong; Corbett) on value assessment. Additionally, if bipolarity worked, then limited wars could only be accounted for as they extended from US and USSR interest – clearly not the case for Vietnam and Korea. Civil wars and weaker-state interests made limited wars more complex, as well as draining strategic influence from both of the superpowers. Waltz saw the US as having a desire to maintain the bipolar system (203); however, major international crises such as the fall of the USSR, the UK’s withdrawal from colonialism, and the non-state actor attacks against the US, and more recent US overreach have all conspired to put the US in a sole superpower role with dynamic international influence. Some are already arguing that we are quickly moving toward a true anarchic state of international politics with no state-centric management. States may no longer have the only voice in initiating war.
Waltz’s most dangerous assumption, that “competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors” (127), is what can lead a powerful state to miss the hostile actions of another state (or non-state actor). While some states may see force as the primary tool to acquire power, the Internet has made information a powerful tool. Iran, North Korea, and Russia have been asynchronously effective at shaping the information environment in their favor. Waltz could not have foreseen this development, but he does try to provide flexibility: “to be politically pertinent, power has to be defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities; the extent of one’s power cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not get” (192). The anticipatory potential of his theory gets lost in its need to be explanatory.
Finally, with regard to Waltz’s “4 p’s” – “poverty, population, pollution, and proliferation” (209), he seems to stray outside his paradigm. I think he could have tied this well into his theory by suggesting that superpowers should help with this issues as long as they provide influence within the states they assist. Where this can be harmful is when by affecting these issues, we harm a state’s economy. This becomes problematic because, in my opinion, morally can be expensive. Correcting for any of Waltz’s 4 p’s may not provide a positive cost/benefit for any of the participating states, and also may create animosity within the state receiving such help. Also, regional hegemons may believe that help coming from other regions to be a threat, thereby creating tension between hegemons that otherwise would not exist.
Waltz presents his theory in the context of his proposed definition of what a theory is (and is not), against a backdrop of his criticism of existing reductionist and systemic theories of his time. It is important to understand that he writes in competition with liberal explanations of international politics, as well as a relatively stable bipolar international system. Nevertheless, his concept of a political structure is viable, as it provides a means to explain events and anticipate outcomes. In my view, a structure implies governance – as Waltz implies himself through his explanation of the influence of markets (90). The bipolarity of Waltz’s context, by its nature, provide the necessary foundation for such a structure. This in effect was the external pressure that became the policing force. If realism’s premises were infallible (which it does not claim for itself), then the policing force would be effective at eliminating force-on-force conflict. This did not prove to be true. Finally, Waltz’s handling of non-state actors appears dismissive to me, especially from the perspective of hindsight. Non-state actors have been able to have a significant impact on US engagement in international politics, and non-state actors have been able to drain power (and subsequently, influence) from the US and former USSR. The UK has also seen a significant power drain from non-state influences such as illegal immigration and terrorism.
My initial impression of Waltz’s critique of the existing theories of his time is that while he qualifies his own simplification (for the purposes of developing a coherent theory), he criticizes others’ reduction for the same purposes. His theory appears to be a combination of the two types of theories, which he proposes takes the best of both. However, any error in both in effect multiplies as well, thereby creating more opportunity for predictive error. I disagree with Waltz’s premise that theories need be predictive, although it would be helpful if they are at least anticipatory.
To his credit, Waltz is consistent with Man the State and War in that power is the ultimate aim of the state; however, power is to be gained for a purpose. The accumulation of power does not necessarily equate to positive control. Power provides freedom of action (194), which permits greater room for error without significant loss of influence, and “great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake” (195). The goal is the ability to manage for the sake of state interest. A greater stake in international management allows for pursuit of state interest. Does the idea of international management therefore imply an international governing force whereby some states operate in a governed position of international relations while others operate in a governing position – thereby doing harm to the realist premise of anarchy? Subsequently, weaker states by necessity cannot pursue power to support its interest, but instead must align through institutions and relationships to pursue their interests. This is perhaps ignorance on my part in understanding the gamut of international relations theory.
Waltz clearly hopes that bipolarity will be the permanent state of politics, since he sees that it provides a predictable balance in international relations. He sees the international structure of states as relatively hierarchical, with power being measurable. I do not see power as easily measurable given the impact of asymmetric information (Jervis; Brauer & van Tuyll) and cognitive bias (Kahneman; Jervis; Khong; Corbett) on value assessment. Additionally, if bipolarity worked, then limited wars could only be accounted for as they extended from US and USSR interest – clearly not the case for Vietnam and Korea. Civil wars and weaker-state interests made limited wars more complex, as well as draining strategic influence from both of the superpowers. Waltz saw the US as having a desire to maintain the bipolar system (203); however, major international crises such as the fall of the USSR, the UK’s withdrawal from colonialism, and the non-state actor attacks against the US, and more recent US overreach have all conspired to put the US in a sole superpower role with dynamic international influence. Some are already arguing that we are quickly moving toward a true anarchic state of international politics with no state-centric management. States may no longer have the only voice in initiating war.
Waltz’s most dangerous assumption, that “competition produces a tendency toward the sameness of the competitors” (127), is what can lead a powerful state to miss the hostile actions of another state (or non-state actor). While some states may see force as the primary tool to acquire power, the Internet has made information a powerful tool. Iran, North Korea, and Russia have been asynchronously effective at shaping the information environment in their favor. Waltz could not have foreseen this development, but he does try to provide flexibility: “to be politically pertinent, power has to be defined in terms of the distribution of capabilities; the extent of one’s power cannot be inferred from the results one may or may not get” (192). The anticipatory potential of his theory gets lost in its need to be explanatory.
Finally, with regard to Waltz’s “4 p’s” – “poverty, population, pollution, and proliferation” (209), he seems to stray outside his paradigm. I think he could have tied this well into his theory by suggesting that superpowers should help with this issues as long as they provide influence within the states they assist. Where this can be harmful is when by affecting these issues, we harm a state’s economy. This becomes problematic because, in my opinion, morally can be expensive. Correcting for any of Waltz’s 4 p’s may not provide a positive cost/benefit for any of the participating states, and also may create animosity within the state receiving such help. Also, regional hegemons may believe that help coming from other regions to be a threat, thereby creating tension between hegemons that otherwise would not exist.
May 21, 2017
کتاب خوب و بنیادینی که هر اهل سیاستی باید آن را مطالعه کند. لزوما با والتز هم نظر نیستم ولی مبانی مورد بحث در این کتاب برای من به عنوان یک دانشجوی روابط بین الملل بسیار راهگشاست
Read
April 15, 2022საბაკალავროს რა ვუთხარი ამას რო ვკითხულობ
Read
February 16, 2022read this for as essay, so it doesn't feel right to rate this tbh :)))
October 20, 2025
does bro ever agree with other people or is he just here to criticise..
March 27, 2022
This book seeks to create a "systemic" theory of international relations, i.e. one explaining general patterns. It argues that the international system is anarchistic - i.e. without relations of subordination, etc. as found within domestic politics and so fundamentally 'undifferentiated'. This produces a system composed of self-help units, i.e. various states who strive their own goals - the one which grounds everything being the goal of security. What does this produce? A balance of power between great powers, as other large powers will ally with each other and against each other if the balance is threatened.
This is contrasted against 'reductionist' theories, i.e. theories concentrating on the individual and national level. For example, Lenin's / Hobson's theory of imperialism, which Waltz sees as explaining the world through an aggregate of national economics' behaviours converting in external political behaviour. A position which to him is fundamentally in question, as international systems constrain the behaviour of its units instead - as any system does.
The main issue is that (a) a lot of it is analogised to neoclassical economics' view of everything, specifically the way it constructs its view of economics, (b) there is no mechanism to explain foreign policy at all - it is entirely restricted to system-level, without no avenue to any other level of abstraction, (c) the three image structure is entirely abandoned for one entirely focused on what in the previous book of his was the third image - international system and lastly (d) the view of the international system being 'anarchistic' is to me questionable as it is *structured*, in my view.
Nonetheless, it is quite thought-provokoking in how it conceptualises the world - even if wrong-headed to me.
This is contrasted against 'reductionist' theories, i.e. theories concentrating on the individual and national level. For example, Lenin's / Hobson's theory of imperialism, which Waltz sees as explaining the world through an aggregate of national economics' behaviours converting in external political behaviour. A position which to him is fundamentally in question, as international systems constrain the behaviour of its units instead - as any system does.
The main issue is that (a) a lot of it is analogised to neoclassical economics' view of everything, specifically the way it constructs its view of economics, (b) there is no mechanism to explain foreign policy at all - it is entirely restricted to system-level, without no avenue to any other level of abstraction, (c) the three image structure is entirely abandoned for one entirely focused on what in the previous book of his was the third image - international system and lastly (d) the view of the international system being 'anarchistic' is to me questionable as it is *structured*, in my view.
Nonetheless, it is quite thought-provokoking in how it conceptualises the world - even if wrong-headed to me.
Want to read
June 1, 2013Waltz's argument of an anarchical order in international politics and its ramifications regarding state's behaviour was logically presented. I specifically read chapter five and six, one on political structure and the other anarchy. One question I have is how realists account for the shift of power in international politics or in a cruder term how do one state triumph over another in an anarchical order?
If all states pursue realpolitik, then presumably status quo will likely remain, the stronger states, the great powers, will remain strong while the weak will remain just as they are. Is there a realist explanation for the rise of the Third Reich? Obviously in not concerning itself with domestic politics, it does not. This is what puzzles me. There is a relationship, as far as international politics is concerned, not only between each constituent in a structure but also between any internal change within a constituent and the ability of that constituent to impinge on its relations with others, is there not?
If all states pursue realpolitik, then presumably status quo will likely remain, the stronger states, the great powers, will remain strong while the weak will remain just as they are. Is there a realist explanation for the rise of the Third Reich? Obviously in not concerning itself with domestic politics, it does not. This is what puzzles me. There is a relationship, as far as international politics is concerned, not only between each constituent in a structure but also between any internal change within a constituent and the ability of that constituent to impinge on its relations with others, is there not?
October 20, 2008
An application to International Relations theory of an idea made famous by the Scottish Enlightenment: human or unit-level actions create structures which, though not designed by any humans or unit-level entities, nevertheless constrain humans or unit-level entities. Translation: actions create patterns that constrain actions.
Is there more to the book that is worth considering?
I don't think so. Better to read Waltz's man, the state, and war.
Nevertheless, if you are going into the field of IR, it would be a miracle if you managed to avoid this book.
Is there more to the book that is worth considering?
I don't think so. Better to read Waltz's man, the state, and war.
Nevertheless, if you are going into the field of IR, it would be a miracle if you managed to avoid this book.
January 28, 2021
Kenneth N. Waltz çok kutuplu dünyanın istikrarsızlığa ve çatışmaya meyilli olduğunu, iki kutuplu dünyanın ise daha dengeli ve barışı korumakta daha etkili olduğunu savunuyor. Aşırı karışık anlatımı, kötü bir çeviri olması ve tarihin her döneminde geçerli olabilecek bir teori geliştirememesi yüzünden kitap beni tatmin etmedi.
February 17, 2007
Well-written, manages to get the whole world of IR theory moving with two assumptions. Not the most defensible of all IR theories, it is one of the most important, not simply for neorealism.
June 8, 2017
This book is so influential. It is a must read for students of International Relations. It is the beginning of the theory of structural realism.
July 5, 2025
First of all I must say that TIP is a terrific book because it was strongly influenced by economics (both micro and macro)- indeed, I saw that Waltz was an undergrad econ major (having changed his major from math as well! So he’s the real deal), and initially planned to get his grad degree in econ, but only switched to polisci later on. Although the system-building in TIP is fairly intuitive and not densely technical like econ, so anyone interested in world affairs could enjoy it, I can certainly imagine a counterfactual where I couldn’t fully appreciate TIP for what it is had I not had an econ background.
The intellectual depth of TIP also practically leaps off the pages, because other than borrowing insights from econ, Waltz also draws a lot of influence from philosophy, e.g. the likes of Hume, Hobbes and Kuhn, so this was obviously my cup of tea. Chapter 1 was essentially a fantastic meditation on the skeptical problem posed by Hume which casts many doubts on the definition of a ‘theory’ and what it is supposed to do (Prediction? Validation? Generalization of observed facts? Explanation? etc) - a problem which has haunted me ever since I read Hume’s Treatise. I can’t say that Waltz has satisfactorily solved the skeptical problem however, but then I do not hold him strictly accountable to this nor do I think that the foremost aim of any book of theory is to first solve this problem - if it were so, then no books can be written! (Not to mention such a high expectation to be unfair and even pedantic.) Waltz compromises, with a lot of hedging, that a theory is essentially supposed to explain much of observed phenomena - but I must revise this book a bit more carefully to determine that this is what he is in fact saying.
I find it hard to disagree with the core insight of realist thought: that the international order is one of anarchy, and so in this system, the foremost goal of states is survival. In a system devoid of a Leviathan, agents are locked in a state of self-help - and thus condemned to a perpetual curse of struggle. This can definitely feel quite depressing but then that’s just life as it is - a struggle for survival. No one ever said it would be easy, and there’s always a schism between what we want and how the world works.
The final few sections of the book, where Waltz attempts go beyond theory and try to apply it to a geopolitical analysis of his time, was sobering to say the least. This is because, frankly speaking, I notice that how much of Waltz’s more concrete predictions were dead wrong - Waltz seems to think the bipolarity of his time was here to stay, it would be hard for other great powers to challenge the US and the Soviet Union, that China would likely not rise, and that if there were ever a likely contender against the US and USSR it would be Western Europe. This faulty analysis seems to confirm my view more than ever that there is little way out of Hume’s skeptical problem. It also made me audit my own geopolitical analysis, and more importantly, the little geopolitical analysis I use for actual investment decisions. If Kenneth frickin Waltz could be so wrong, then what chance do I have? But curiously, Mearsheimer has been dead right on his predictions on more than 1 occasion.
The intellectual depth of TIP also practically leaps off the pages, because other than borrowing insights from econ, Waltz also draws a lot of influence from philosophy, e.g. the likes of Hume, Hobbes and Kuhn, so this was obviously my cup of tea. Chapter 1 was essentially a fantastic meditation on the skeptical problem posed by Hume which casts many doubts on the definition of a ‘theory’ and what it is supposed to do (Prediction? Validation? Generalization of observed facts? Explanation? etc) - a problem which has haunted me ever since I read Hume’s Treatise. I can’t say that Waltz has satisfactorily solved the skeptical problem however, but then I do not hold him strictly accountable to this nor do I think that the foremost aim of any book of theory is to first solve this problem - if it were so, then no books can be written! (Not to mention such a high expectation to be unfair and even pedantic.) Waltz compromises, with a lot of hedging, that a theory is essentially supposed to explain much of observed phenomena - but I must revise this book a bit more carefully to determine that this is what he is in fact saying.
I find it hard to disagree with the core insight of realist thought: that the international order is one of anarchy, and so in this system, the foremost goal of states is survival. In a system devoid of a Leviathan, agents are locked in a state of self-help - and thus condemned to a perpetual curse of struggle. This can definitely feel quite depressing but then that’s just life as it is - a struggle for survival. No one ever said it would be easy, and there’s always a schism between what we want and how the world works.
The final few sections of the book, where Waltz attempts go beyond theory and try to apply it to a geopolitical analysis of his time, was sobering to say the least. This is because, frankly speaking, I notice that how much of Waltz’s more concrete predictions were dead wrong - Waltz seems to think the bipolarity of his time was here to stay, it would be hard for other great powers to challenge the US and the Soviet Union, that China would likely not rise, and that if there were ever a likely contender against the US and USSR it would be Western Europe. This faulty analysis seems to confirm my view more than ever that there is little way out of Hume’s skeptical problem. It also made me audit my own geopolitical analysis, and more importantly, the little geopolitical analysis I use for actual investment decisions. If Kenneth frickin Waltz could be so wrong, then what chance do I have? But curiously, Mearsheimer has been dead right on his predictions on more than 1 occasion.
December 12, 2024
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics has undoubtedly shaped the field of international relations, introducing a systemic approach that prioritizes the anarchic structure of the international system and the distribution of power among states.
My primary critique of Waltz’s work lies in its methodological rigidity and detachment from historical specificity. His emphasis on parsimony leads to an overgeneralization that cannot adequately explain complex, context-dependent phenomena. For instance, Waltz’s theory downplays the significance of economic crises, ideological shifts, and social upheavals in shaping state behavior. By abstracting away domestic variables, Waltz reduces international relations to a static interplay of power dynamics, overlooking how internal transformations influence states' decisions within the anarchic system. This limitation is particularly evident in his treatment of major global conflicts, such as World War II, where systemic pressures alone fail to explain the rise of fascism, aggressive expansionism, and the divergent responses of various states.
Moreover, Waltz’s structural realism faces challenges in reconciling its broad claims with the empirical complexity of international politics. While the theory aspires to explain recurring patterns of state behavior, it falters in addressing why similar structural conditions can produce different outcomes or why identical causes may lead to disparate effects. This abstraction weakens the explanatory power of Theory of International Politics, rendering it ill-suited for understanding specific events or periods of significant systemic upheaval. While Waltz’s work has contributed valuable insights into the role of systemic constraints, its inability to incorporate historical and domestic variables limits its applicability and relevance for comprehensively analyzing global conflict and state behavior.
My primary critique of Waltz’s work lies in its methodological rigidity and detachment from historical specificity. His emphasis on parsimony leads to an overgeneralization that cannot adequately explain complex, context-dependent phenomena. For instance, Waltz’s theory downplays the significance of economic crises, ideological shifts, and social upheavals in shaping state behavior. By abstracting away domestic variables, Waltz reduces international relations to a static interplay of power dynamics, overlooking how internal transformations influence states' decisions within the anarchic system. This limitation is particularly evident in his treatment of major global conflicts, such as World War II, where systemic pressures alone fail to explain the rise of fascism, aggressive expansionism, and the divergent responses of various states.
Moreover, Waltz’s structural realism faces challenges in reconciling its broad claims with the empirical complexity of international politics. While the theory aspires to explain recurring patterns of state behavior, it falters in addressing why similar structural conditions can produce different outcomes or why identical causes may lead to disparate effects. This abstraction weakens the explanatory power of Theory of International Politics, rendering it ill-suited for understanding specific events or periods of significant systemic upheaval. While Waltz’s work has contributed valuable insights into the role of systemic constraints, its inability to incorporate historical and domestic variables limits its applicability and relevance for comprehensively analyzing global conflict and state behavior.
August 20, 2017
Classical, canonical text in IR theory. It provides probably the most influential reinterpretation of the realist international political thought since Thucydides and re-examines all of the important conceptual constructs used in the field of IR: the anarchy of the structure, the balance of power, the state survival as a primary goal, the security dilemmas… you have it all there. Although I disagree almost completely with the structural neorealism, as developed by Waltz in the book, and I do not share most of his philosophical and epistemological commitments, I find it rather ridiculous that I have considered myself a student of international politics, for some time now, without having read this book. Additionally, to amaze me further, this is an elegantly written, depressingly convincing and, as regards its treatment of the international system’s causal forces, virtually unmatched academic work. Therefore, it goes without saying: anyone who is professionally devoted to the study of international affairs should be acquainted in depth with Waltz’s “Theory of International Politics”.
April 16, 2019
The concepts and ways one ought to think about international politics are well elucidated, but I found Waltz's focus on systems theory to be the biggest takeaway. This book is a textbook example on good argument structure. Waltz lays out the difference between theory and law, and bases his analysis of the current argument landscape in the political science field on this. Though I've commented on the main concepts from the other parts of the book in other reviews, the ending was absolutely worth the time it took to get there. He looks specifically at the responsibility of nations that hold power and contrasts their role in bipolar vs. multipolar systems. He discusses some of the distinct challenges in mandating behavior within systems, as most wielding of power is born at the unit level. His main thesis when examining geopolitical power in the economic, political, and military domains is primarily that the three have important differences and all serve a goal of maintaining national autonomy. As I reflect more I'll add to this review.
September 5, 2024
This is the bible of international relations theory. Neorealism should be the first thing every student learns about IR. Instead, most students start by learning about critics of Waltz who have obviously never read this book.
Here's what you need to know: neorealism is like the opening credits scroll of a movie like Star Wars. It can't tell you everything that is going to happen, it can't mention every single character, and by the end of the movie, many of the things that were true at the start will no longer be true. However, it tells you who the major players are and what are the main dynamics of their relationships...that is what neorealism does. Once you have that understanding, other theories can be much more helpful, but everyone should start with neorealism.
Here's what you need to know: neorealism is like the opening credits scroll of a movie like Star Wars. It can't tell you everything that is going to happen, it can't mention every single character, and by the end of the movie, many of the things that were true at the start will no longer be true. However, it tells you who the major players are and what are the main dynamics of their relationships...that is what neorealism does. Once you have that understanding, other theories can be much more helpful, but everyone should start with neorealism.
November 29, 2020
When it comes to International Relations, I'm the farthest thing away from neo-realism. However, this doesn't stop me from appreciating the greatness of this book. Waltz represents the most powerful, reasonable, and thorough case for neo-realism, and while I strongly disagree with his overall outlook, I can say that I've learned a lot from this book and have come away with many useful lessons. Also Waltz is much more nuanced and complex in his approach than many of his students, and he can present his own case while keeping in mind the different shades of truth. There's no wonder that Waltz is the king, and therefore everyone feels the need to come at him!
June 30, 2024
Represents a departure from classical realism but shares basic presumptions: the theory represents the world as is, state as primary actor, state as single actor. The text dismisses prior "realist" presumptions as they pertain to human nature. Rather than human nature shaping the international system, the culprit for shaping the international system is the ever present vacuum which necessitates self-focus. Less philosophical, more ahistorical, more "structural." Actors become interchangeable. Power becomes less narrowly defined. Capacity in a wide array of spheres becomes more important than armaments as such.
August 30, 2025
Classic articulation of realism
The e-textbook format was less nimble than a regular Kindle e-book. Much of the core conceptual work is over two generations old and Waltz praises bipolarity with only passing regard for the Third World proxy conflicts that geopolitical maneuvering inspired, funded, and oversaw. He seems tone deaf to the foreign policy costs borne of the Vietnam War misadventure. Still, I found his opening chapters on the robustnes of theory insightful and his economic analogies throughoout very useful This was the first book that I have read as a doctoral candidate.
The e-textbook format was less nimble than a regular Kindle e-book. Much of the core conceptual work is over two generations old and Waltz praises bipolarity with only passing regard for the Third World proxy conflicts that geopolitical maneuvering inspired, funded, and oversaw. He seems tone deaf to the foreign policy costs borne of the Vietnam War misadventure. Still, I found his opening chapters on the robustnes of theory insightful and his economic analogies throughoout very useful This was the first book that I have read as a doctoral candidate.
January 18, 2022
Unless you REALLY want to be bored to sleep (or if that is your purpose), then skip the first 6 chapters. The relevant material is covered in Chapters 7 - 9.
His theory about the bipolar world is solid for the time, but, as this was written nearly 50 years ago, it is quite dated now. Still, it does go on to explain the realities of the world at that time and it does apply to some small scale to the world as it is today. Superpower countries may afford small losses, but those whose power is a bit more precarious must be quite careful in how they proceed against their rivals.
His theory about the bipolar world is solid for the time, but, as this was written nearly 50 years ago, it is quite dated now. Still, it does go on to explain the realities of the world at that time and it does apply to some small scale to the world as it is today. Superpower countries may afford small losses, but those whose power is a bit more precarious must be quite careful in how they proceed against their rivals.
February 23, 2019
I read this book for a Fundamentals of International Relations course in university. While I found Waltz's arguments convincing, the first few chapters are very dry, often involve complex discredits of past theory and a lot of technical details regarding economics. But what else can you expect from a book like this. I appreciate it as the work of theory exploration that it is, but can't say that I particularly enjoyed my experience reading it.
August 18, 2018
Perhaps the book is foundational because of what it does from Chapter 5 onwards, yet I find myself particularly invigorated by the first four chapters.
Waltz appears (probably too) much in secondary literature, to the point that he is oversimplified in most cases. I would have misjudged him for the rest of my life if I wasn’t pushed to examine this classic piece.
Waltz appears (probably too) much in secondary literature, to the point that he is oversimplified in most cases. I would have misjudged him for the rest of my life if I wasn’t pushed to examine this classic piece.
November 2, 2023
The foundation of most of modern realism between two covers. Not all-around-tight despite his obvious efforts to argue in the most meticulous manner (especially the chapter about (inter)dependence is questionable), but still making a highly compellent case arguing for emergent systemic factors in an anarchical environment.
May 5, 2017
Libro assolutamente importante ma parecchio complesso e molto molto noioso. L'ho dovuto leggere per un esame al posto di un altro che avevo scelto inizialmente, altrimenti non l'avrei nemmeno sfiorato.
February 27, 2021
Un must per gli studenti di IR ma consigliato anche a chiunque sia appassionato di politica internazionale o sia semplicemente curioso di comprendere qualcosa in più dei meccanismi di funzionamento di quel gioco un po’ criptico che sono le relazioni internazionali.
March 25, 2022
Incredibly interesting to revisit a text which I have heard, read, and written son much about - but had never actually read myself. Now I have, and think my discussions regarding the book will be better for doing so.
June 13, 2023
Went into it with a shit attitude and spending 5 chapters defining what theory is didn’t help but actually was very interesting in the last few chapters. Not fun but as far as political science theory books go it was pretty good. Shout-out professor Vanderhaven for making me read this.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 62 reviews