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Dionysius I: Warlord of Sicily
Portrays Dionysius I (c. 430-367 BC) not as a stock tyrant-figure but as a crusader, determined to liberate Sicily from the Carthaginiansand surpass in glory the greatest of Sicilian military heroes, Gelon of Syracuse who had crushed the Carthaginians a century earlier. After discussing the historical background down to 411 BC, Caven describes the first and second Carthaginian invasions of Sicily, Dionysius’s accession to power, his dealings with the Italiots and Greeks of the motherland, his conduct of the Punic Wars, and the nature of his empire.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1990
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November 25, 2022
During the last years of the 400's BCE Syracuse was embroiled in bitter social strife and was on the verge of subjugation by Carthage. According to later hellenistic mythmaking the persian and carthaginian invasions were defeated on the very same day, proof of both systematic barbarian encroachment and the destiny of greek expansion. Whereas Athens emerged from the brink of destruction during the Persian Wars as a confident new democracy with power shared by the polis, Dionysius had seen his city prostrate before the enemy as a result of social instability, and so he went in a different direction. Shortly after being voted powers of generalship and driving the invaders away from the city Dionysius took direct control with the help of his mercenaries and disarmed the population, establishing himself as tyrant. This would be the beginning of a 40 year long reign devoted to expelling the Carthaginians from Sicily.
Caven is of the opinion that Dionysius was not a tyrant in the later hellenistic sense, but rather a warlord, and tried hard to style himself not as a ruler but as a leader of his people. We know that there was one attempt at revolution, and that he disarmed the population (which would be anathema to the traditional city-state with its hoplite-based army) to prevent this from recurring. He did construct a fortress for himself on Ortigia, safely sheltered from the rest of the city with the armaments, fleet and mercenaries under his close watch. He would and did depopulate entire cities and transplant their populations to Syracuse to destroy any notion of "demos" as understood on the mainland (much like our own politicians). Later on the people were however rearmed, and Dionysius apparently walked freely among them and would personally join in construction work to foster his image as one-of-the-people (much like our own politicians). His military build-up, his vastly expanded defensive walls, his new fleet and his conquests of the other greek cities on the island did leave Syracuse more secure, more powerful and more affluent than it had ever been before. While he could not dislodge the Carthaginians entirely, he did come close, and conquered several parts of mainland Italy and trading-posts in the Adriatic. This was in many respects the first greek empire, a foreshadowing of Alexander the Great, including the first developments of modern siege equipment and strategy.
This is at its core a work of narrative synthesis, a retelling of events based on our surviving written sources, including Diodorus, Thucydides, Aristoteles, Philistus, Justin and others. As the narrative is based on written sources the level of detail and the pacing of events varies wildly. Caven does go to quite a bit of effort to appraise the ancient historians and their trustworthiness, both in general and when discussing specific events in which the sources conflict or where only one source survives. One of our main sources is written by a follower of Dionysius who obviously wants to paint his master in the brightest of colours; on the other hand the democratic greeks of the mainland wanted to drape him in the darkest cloth as an exercise of mythologizing about the evils of tyrany. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. Caven is not afraid to disregard the written sources or to challenge other historians where he deems them inadequate, or to point out the hypocrisy of Athenian historians frothing over the subjugation of sicilian greek cities when they did much the same against their erstwhile allies. I am not really familiar enough to be able to judge his conclusions, but even though his admiration for Dionysius clearly shows, I rarely felt there to be overheavy bias.
Caven is of the opinion that Dionysius was not a tyrant in the later hellenistic sense, but rather a warlord, and tried hard to style himself not as a ruler but as a leader of his people. We know that there was one attempt at revolution, and that he disarmed the population (which would be anathema to the traditional city-state with its hoplite-based army) to prevent this from recurring. He did construct a fortress for himself on Ortigia, safely sheltered from the rest of the city with the armaments, fleet and mercenaries under his close watch. He would and did depopulate entire cities and transplant their populations to Syracuse to destroy any notion of "demos" as understood on the mainland (much like our own politicians). Later on the people were however rearmed, and Dionysius apparently walked freely among them and would personally join in construction work to foster his image as one-of-the-people (much like our own politicians). His military build-up, his vastly expanded defensive walls, his new fleet and his conquests of the other greek cities on the island did leave Syracuse more secure, more powerful and more affluent than it had ever been before. While he could not dislodge the Carthaginians entirely, he did come close, and conquered several parts of mainland Italy and trading-posts in the Adriatic. This was in many respects the first greek empire, a foreshadowing of Alexander the Great, including the first developments of modern siege equipment and strategy.
This is at its core a work of narrative synthesis, a retelling of events based on our surviving written sources, including Diodorus, Thucydides, Aristoteles, Philistus, Justin and others. As the narrative is based on written sources the level of detail and the pacing of events varies wildly. Caven does go to quite a bit of effort to appraise the ancient historians and their trustworthiness, both in general and when discussing specific events in which the sources conflict or where only one source survives. One of our main sources is written by a follower of Dionysius who obviously wants to paint his master in the brightest of colours; on the other hand the democratic greeks of the mainland wanted to drape him in the darkest cloth as an exercise of mythologizing about the evils of tyrany. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. Caven is not afraid to disregard the written sources or to challenge other historians where he deems them inadequate, or to point out the hypocrisy of Athenian historians frothing over the subjugation of sicilian greek cities when they did much the same against their erstwhile allies. I am not really familiar enough to be able to judge his conclusions, but even though his admiration for Dionysius clearly shows, I rarely felt there to be overheavy bias.
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