Was it the captain's fault, as many said? Or did the company, the Coast Guard and the American Bureau of Shipping all have a hand on the helm of the SS El Faro as she steered too close to Hurricane Joaquin? This is an examination of a tragedy that has been well-researched and investigated — heroically so at times — by the United States Coast Guard and the National Transportation Safety Board. Three very well-done books have been published. All of these efforts produced detailed recommendations and observations and all are publicly available. I commend them to you. My effort touches on the broad sweep and events of the tragedy and investigation, but if you want the detailed story of the final voyage of the ship, you’re better off with the other books. My main goal here is to show how the SS El Faro fit into a larger system and culture — one that I have been covering off and on as a journalist and author for 38 years. It’s this system, I feel, that will result in another SS El Faro someday unless it is reformed. Another note on style. My preference in non-fiction is “narrative.” In other words, whenever I can, I tell a story and show what is happening; I prefer that to “telling” the reader, because I think “showing” is more readily absorbed. Humans learn through stories. Story telling rather than a lecture better illustrates the emotions at play here, as well as the moods, culture and vibe of the ship and the industry. This does not mean I take a pure poetic license. The dialogue quoted here is real, not made up. The material is factual.
An essential read for anyone involved with today's shipping industry, whether or not they have heard of the aptly nick-named "Frankenships". This fascinating book pieces together all of the evidence relating to the sinking of the El Faro, and provides a consummate analysis of the many failures of the system that is supposed to ensure that all ships are seaworthy before being declared same. The principal inspection agencies involved in the surveys of the El Faro, both leading up to, during and after the conversion from a high speed general cargo ship designed for operations in Alaskan waters to a dangerously ill conceived out-of-balance container ship, ABS and USCG, come in for some severe criticism, enough to scare anyone who has ever been involved in ship survey work into rethinking their own possible errors over the years. As with the majority of industrial accidents the real root cause of the disaster comes down to money, the greed of the highest echelons of upper management who are willing to ignore the advice of their operational personnel and cut corners to increase profits, all at the expense of employee safety. Captain Davidson, the Master of the El Faro when it capsized and sank during a hurricane in the Caribbean, was under extreme pressure to ignore his own best experience and make decisions that would satisfy the company's bean counters but tragically lead to the deaths of all his crew and himself. A real wake up call
Excellent read about the tragic loss of the SS EL Faro.
Robert Frump spins a great tale about how the SYSTEM of paid inspectors by shipping companies was the REAL ROOT cause of the sinking of the container ship El Faro. Was Ship Master Michael Davidson the most to blame by sailing the ship into Hurricane Joaquin, despite his crew's concerns and advice? Absolutely. However, the reader discovers how the history of past ships like the Marine Electric, that have sunk show the owners of these vessels send out ships these companies KNOW are not seaworthy, as their paid inspectors give these ships the OK, even ships that are too old and have no business being on a pool in a Hollywood movie lot, never mind out at sea. The reader learns that it is easier for the companies to just blame the captain than take any responsibility for the safety of these mariners and the seaworthiness of their ships. This is an industry that continues to ignore the lessons from past tragedies as money has to be earned.
An important story that needed to be told. But there are soooo many typos in the book, especially with punctuation. And the Captain of the Exxon Valdez was Joe Hazelwood, not James Hazelwood. I also disagree with the argument the author makes that the Jones Act is in part responsible, if that were the case then the safety record of foreign flag vessels would be better than the Jones Act, but there is no evidence to support that. Regardless, if you have any interest at all in marine safety you should read this book. It can be easily read in one sitting.
I thought my Amazon review had posted here automatically. Here's what I wrote:
Rather than repeat in complete detail the 26 hours leading up to the sinking, Mr. Frump acknowledges the three previous works that do, and then concentrates on the problems with the "system" that sends unsafe vessels to sea.
Just realized that I finished Captains of Thor and wrote that Amazon review on February 12, 2019, the 36th anniversary of the sinking of the SS Marine Electric. I highly recommend Mr. Frump's book "Until The Sea Shall Free Them" which details that incident and the investigation that followed.