It was the original forever war, which went on interminably, fuelled by religious fanaticism, personal ambition, fear of hegemony, and communal suspicion. It dragged in all the neighbouring powers. It was punctuated by repeated failed ceasefires. It inflicted suffering beyond belief and generated waves of refugees. No, this is not Syria today, but the Thirty Years' War (1618-48), which turned Germany and much of central Europe into a disaster zone.
The Thirty Years' War is often cited as a parallel in discussions of the Middle East. The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the conflict in 1648, has featured strongly in such discussions, usually with the observation that recent events in some parts of the region have seen the collapse of ideas of state sovereignty--ideas that supposedly originated with the 1648 settlement.
Axworthy, Milton and Simms argue that the Westphalian treaties, far from enshrining state sovereignty, in fact reconfigured and strengthened a structure for legal resolution of disputes, and provided for intervention by outside guarantor powers to uphold the peace settlement. This book argues that the history of Westphalia may hold the key to resolving the new long wars in the Middle East today.
Impressive historical analysis of Westphalia, less comprehensive analysis of Middle East history. The prescriptions made by the authors tend to oversimplify the region and, thus, are unrealistic. For those in the ivory tower, it’s a creative and generally well-researched book.
Partially, a restatement of the common perception of the Peace of Westphalia as the origin of state sovereignty, interestingly pointing out that in many ways it led to greater interventionism and limitation of the powers of European princes. Partially, it is an attempt to see the Congress of Westphalia as an abstract paragon of a potential peace settlement for the contemporary Middle East. The authors are well aware that the 400-year gap makes any comparisons tricky and they know most of the concrete parallels they draw between the different actors in the 30-year war and contemporary Middle East are necessarily far-fetched. Still, sometimes they get carried away into parallels that look truly absurd.
The main lesson of the book and the international workshops on which the book is based is, however, the abstract idea of a great conference that would invite all the interested parties in the Middle East and try to find a convergence between the great-power interests to create a single agreement redefining the entire regional dynamics and leading to a lasting peace. That is certainly an over-optimistic idea idea which might seem to be nothing but wishful thinking. Yet, the same could be said if someone imagined the Peace of Westphalia in 1620s...