John A. Gentry and Joseph S. Gordon update our understanding of strategic warning intelligence analysis for the twenty-first century. Strategic warning ― the process of long-range analysis to alert senior leaders to trending threats and opportunities that require action ― is a critical intelligence function. It also is frequently misunderstood and underappreciated. Gentry and Gordon draw on both their practitioner and academic backgrounds to present a history of the strategic warning function in the US intelligence community. In doing so, they outline the capabilities of analytic methods, explain why strategic warning analysis is so hard, and discuss the special challenges strategic warning encounters from senior decision-makers. They also compare how strategic warning functions in other countries, evaluate why the United States has in recent years emphasized current intelligence instead of strategic warning, and recommend warning-related structural and procedural improvements in the US intelligence community. The authors examine historical case studies, including postmortems of warning failures, to provide examples of the analytic points they make. Strategic Warning Intelligence will interest scholars and practitioners and will be an ideal teaching text for intermediate and advanced students.
This one sat on the shelf for a couple of years, and I finally picked it up and gave it a read. Turns out, a large chunk of it just reviews a very general history of warning intelligence, with the expected case studies (Pearl Harbor, Barbarossa, the '73 Arab-Israeli War, etc.) and the focus mostly on the US IC, although the warning structures of a couple of our European allies are given a surface-level review. Not much original thought here, with the authors making very frequent reference to other authors. If you've previously read anything on warning you'll hear all the familiar names, Grabo, Wohlstetter, Jervis, and many others.
The last couple of chapters are a focused critique of the current US warning capability - or the lack of one, as the authors assert. It is a commonly-heard refrain of the undermining of strategic intelligence, particularly warning, by a too-heavy focus on current intelligence and tactical warning.
Not a bad book, but no real insights. If you've never read anything on strategic warning before, it may be an interesting read as it is a decent broad review of the subject. However, if you've read any of the aforementioned authors or more generally on warning intelligence, particularly Jervis, don't bother with this one as it doesn't really cover any new ground.
This book was a Best of the Best for the month of July, 2019, as selected by Stevo's Book Reviews on the Internet. You can find me at http://forums.delphiforums.com/stevo1, on my Stevo's Novel Ideas Amazon Influencer page (https://www.amazon.com/shop/stevo4747) or search for me on Google for many more reviews and recommendations.