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Autopsy of an Unwinnable War: Vietnam
A compelling and informed narrative of the war in Vietnam 1945-75, seeking to answer why America "lost" the war in Vietnam.
Since the fall of Saigon in 1975 there have been many books published on why (and whether) America lost the war in Vietnam. The senior American commander in charge of prosecuting the war during its buildup and peak of fighting, Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, concluded his memoir, “The real tragedy of Vietnam is that this war was not won by the other side, by Hanoi or Moscow or Peiping. It was lost in Washington, D. C.” This remains an all too common belief. The stark facts, though, are that the Vietnam War was lost before the first American shot was fired. In fact, it was lost before the first French Expeditionary Corps shot, almost two decades earlier, and was finally lost when the South Vietnamese fought partly, then entirely, on their own.
Offering an informed and nuanced narrative of the entire 30-year war in Vietnam, this book seeks to explain why. It is written by a combatant not only in six violent, large battles and many smaller firefights, but a leader with a full range of pacification duties, a commander who lost 43 wonderful young men killed and many more wounded, men who were doing what their country asked of them. This story is the result of a quest for answers by one who, after decades of wondering what it was about – what was it all about? – turned to a years-long search of French, American, and Vietnamese sources. It is a story of success on the one hand, defeat on the other, and the ingredients of both, inspirational or sordid as they may be.
It is a story mostly lived and revealed by the people inside Vietnam who were directly involved in the from leaders in high positions, down to the jungle boots and sandals level of the fighters, and among the Vietnamese people who were living the war. Because of what was happening inside Vietnam itself, no matter what policies and directives came out of Paris or Washington, or the influences in Moscow or Beijing, it is about a Vietnamese idea which would eventually triumph over bullets.
Table of Contents
Foreword by LtGen Dave R. Palmer
Preface
Part The French War - The Idea, and Bullets
Part The American War - Many More Bullets
Part The Vietnamese War - The Result
Conclusion
Notes
Selective Bibliography
Index
Since the fall of Saigon in 1975 there have been many books published on why (and whether) America lost the war in Vietnam. The senior American commander in charge of prosecuting the war during its buildup and peak of fighting, Admiral U.S.G. Sharp, concluded his memoir, “The real tragedy of Vietnam is that this war was not won by the other side, by Hanoi or Moscow or Peiping. It was lost in Washington, D. C.” This remains an all too common belief. The stark facts, though, are that the Vietnam War was lost before the first American shot was fired. In fact, it was lost before the first French Expeditionary Corps shot, almost two decades earlier, and was finally lost when the South Vietnamese fought partly, then entirely, on their own.
Offering an informed and nuanced narrative of the entire 30-year war in Vietnam, this book seeks to explain why. It is written by a combatant not only in six violent, large battles and many smaller firefights, but a leader with a full range of pacification duties, a commander who lost 43 wonderful young men killed and many more wounded, men who were doing what their country asked of them. This story is the result of a quest for answers by one who, after decades of wondering what it was about – what was it all about? – turned to a years-long search of French, American, and Vietnamese sources. It is a story of success on the one hand, defeat on the other, and the ingredients of both, inspirational or sordid as they may be.
It is a story mostly lived and revealed by the people inside Vietnam who were directly involved in the from leaders in high positions, down to the jungle boots and sandals level of the fighters, and among the Vietnamese people who were living the war. Because of what was happening inside Vietnam itself, no matter what policies and directives came out of Paris or Washington, or the influences in Moscow or Beijing, it is about a Vietnamese idea which would eventually triumph over bullets.
Table of Contents
Foreword by LtGen Dave R. Palmer
Preface
Part The French War - The Idea, and Bullets
Part The American War - Many More Bullets
Part The Vietnamese War - The Result
Conclusion
Notes
Selective Bibliography
Index
288 pages, Hardcover
Published March 4, 2019
53 people are currently reading
45 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 22, 2024
Colonel Haponsky is not a writer ("a soldier and a scholar", says he. Well! - sez I), in that he does tend to repeat himself a bit, or to treat his personal experiences as universal. Still, even if during his stint in Vietnam he was meekly following orders, his hindsight is fine, 20/20. And so he provides a solid summation of the long war, unwinnable for anyone but the North Vietnamese, who were the only ones to have well-defined long-term goals and a set of mostly workable strategies for achieving those. Recommended.
September 28, 2019
The first part of the book, the overview of the history form the closing days of WWII to the American entry into the war was excellent. The American involvement and period after US withdrawal doesn't provide much analysis, but a lot of anecdotes.
Col Haponski, accepts as a tenant that the war was unwinnable, by the French, Americans or South Vietnamese because the Vietnamese fought of national liberation, (not all wars of national liberation have been successful) then spend chapters analyzing and recommending or criticizing various tactics and strategies in a seemingly inconsistent manner.
I prefer to look at Viet Nam as a front in the Cold War against the spread of Communism, and the Cold war was won largely as a result of the wars on the periphery. It wasn't important that we won on every front as long as we won in the end.
Col Haponski, accepts as a tenant that the war was unwinnable, by the French, Americans or South Vietnamese because the Vietnamese fought of national liberation, (not all wars of national liberation have been successful) then spend chapters analyzing and recommending or criticizing various tactics and strategies in a seemingly inconsistent manner.
I prefer to look at Viet Nam as a front in the Cold War against the spread of Communism, and the Cold war was won largely as a result of the wars on the periphery. It wasn't important that we won on every front as long as we won in the end.
April 30, 2019
The America War in Vietnam continues to haunt the generation that fought it and resisted it. The authors are both veterans of that war and have the insights that can only be known by experiencing the event. Colonel Haponski was inspired to write by the loss of 45 men under his command, one of whom was a high school classmate of mine.
The authors argue the premise that no one could have won a war against the Vietnamese determination for independence that is thousands of years old. They begin with the French War and segue into the American war. In addition to their historical research, the authors have done extensive research with original documents and interviews with surviving members of the French colonial forces, US forces, and NVA, VC and ARVN survivors.
They document the interpretations and plans of both sides in the war as the events unfolded, and the tragic misunderstandings the motivations of the Vietnamese by both the French and the US. They present convincing arguments that the US forces were not prepared by strategic doctrine or military equipment for this jungle war of liberation. The generals were WWII veterans who were used to overwhelming firepower used in defense of a welcoming population, and the US and South Vietnamese governments could not determine how to deal with a war of independence.
The conclusions are not pleasant, but it is necessary to come to terms with them, especially for the families of the dead, and those wounded who bear lifetime wounds. The need for a diverse game plan with equipment for many situations remains pertinent: in Gulf War I the camouflage uniforms were only green, and in Gulf II the HUMVs were not designed or protected for IEDs, as all design had focused on a European war situation.
This book complements the evaluation of General HR McMasters, the Vietnam veteran who wrote about the US misconceptions with the advantage of unclassified US documents. Colonel Haponski broader view fills in many questions that have been unanswered previously. I highly recommend this book.
The authors argue the premise that no one could have won a war against the Vietnamese determination for independence that is thousands of years old. They begin with the French War and segue into the American war. In addition to their historical research, the authors have done extensive research with original documents and interviews with surviving members of the French colonial forces, US forces, and NVA, VC and ARVN survivors.
They document the interpretations and plans of both sides in the war as the events unfolded, and the tragic misunderstandings the motivations of the Vietnamese by both the French and the US. They present convincing arguments that the US forces were not prepared by strategic doctrine or military equipment for this jungle war of liberation. The generals were WWII veterans who were used to overwhelming firepower used in defense of a welcoming population, and the US and South Vietnamese governments could not determine how to deal with a war of independence.
The conclusions are not pleasant, but it is necessary to come to terms with them, especially for the families of the dead, and those wounded who bear lifetime wounds. The need for a diverse game plan with equipment for many situations remains pertinent: in Gulf War I the camouflage uniforms were only green, and in Gulf II the HUMVs were not designed or protected for IEDs, as all design had focused on a European war situation.
This book complements the evaluation of General HR McMasters, the Vietnam veteran who wrote about the US misconceptions with the advantage of unclassified US documents. Colonel Haponski broader view fills in many questions that have been unanswered previously. I highly recommend this book.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews