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Essence in the Age of Evolution: A New Theory of Natural Kinds
This book offers a novel defence of a highly contested philosophical biological natural kind essentialism. This theory is routinely and explicitly rejected for its purported inability to be explicated in the context of contemporary biological science, and its supposed incompatibility with the process and progress of evolution by natural selection. Christopher J. Austin challenges these objections, and in conjunction with contemporary scientific advancements within the field of evolutionary-developmental biology, the book utilises a contemporary neo-Aristotelian metaphysics of "dispositional properties", or causal powers, to provide a theory of essentialism centred on the developmental architecture of organisms and its role in the evolutionary process. By defending a novel theory of Aristotelian biological natural kind essentialism, Essence in the Age of Evolution represents the fresh and exciting union of cutting-edge philosophical insight and scientific knowledge.
- GenresScience
152 pages, Kindle Edition
Published October 10, 2018
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May 20, 2022
In former centuries Philosophers and Scientists held a broadly Aristotelian view of the world. They saw the physical world as consisting of distinct types of things, like cats and dogs, trees and rivers, (etc). These types of things had a fixed or stable ‘essence’ (or ‘nature’) which determined them as the type of thing that they were. Nothing could change. Dogs begat dogs, transmitting their essence of dogginess, in an unchanged and unchangeable form.
Then, along came Charles Darwin who showed that the natural world is not fixed and stable. Individual things change, and types of things change. Dogs have evolved from other life forms, and they will probably continue to evolve, and may well evolve so much that they cease to be what we currently think of as dogs.
This evolutionary approach effectively ended the previous Aristotelian view. Combining it with ‘constructivist’ perspectives, some Philosophers and Scientists even began to assert that there is no such thing as ‘types’ of things. Words like ‘cat,’ ‘dog’ (etc) merely assert convenient ways which humans have constructed for dividing up reality. But there is nothing underneath the words, within nature itself, which compels those kinds of distinctions.
This book pitches itself into the middle of arguments about these kinds of issues. It accepts that Aristotle’s views can no longer be maintained, as evolution has shown that we can no longer talk of fixed unchangeable ‘essences.’
But the book also argues that modern science (and philosophy) has gone too far in assuming that Evolutionary perspectives should completely supplant Aristotle. The book is arguing for a ‘via media.’ It thinks that there are important insights in both approaches, which are at risk of being lost if people take an extremist view and insist on either Aristotle or Evolution.
To advance its view, the book insists that there are ‘natural kinds.’ When we look around the world, we are not imposing differences on the world which lead us to distinguish between plants and animals. Yes, our minds contribute to what we see, but there are also fundamental differences existing in nature, independently of human perception. Those differences mean that that there are ‘natural kinds’ and the differences between the natural kinds comes down to the fact that there are differing ‘essences’ which constitute each natural kind.
Accepting that Aristotle’s view of fixed essences and fixed properties has been disproved, the author suggests that dispositional causal powers are a better way of defining essences. Ultimately, things like ‘trees’ and ‘dogs’ behave in different ways, because they have different dispositional causal powers. Yes, the causal powers of natural kinds change, as things evolve, but it is also true that distinct sets of causal powers exist at specific points in time – as we can see by looking at the world.
This means that there is a meaningful way of talking about ‘essences’ within an evolutionary framework, and there is a scientifically useful reason for doing so.
This is a “brave” book because it is taking on the scientific consensus, which is firmly anti-essence. It does so by showing that Science has nothing to lose by adopting a more nuanced view on this issue, and it suggests that the more nuanced view addresses the common sense experience of many people.
The book is written in an academic style, so it is not a ‘popular’ read. However, jargon and terminology is generally explained, so the book is accessible to patient readers from any background, if they are prepared for some modest intellectual exertion.
Then, along came Charles Darwin who showed that the natural world is not fixed and stable. Individual things change, and types of things change. Dogs have evolved from other life forms, and they will probably continue to evolve, and may well evolve so much that they cease to be what we currently think of as dogs.
This evolutionary approach effectively ended the previous Aristotelian view. Combining it with ‘constructivist’ perspectives, some Philosophers and Scientists even began to assert that there is no such thing as ‘types’ of things. Words like ‘cat,’ ‘dog’ (etc) merely assert convenient ways which humans have constructed for dividing up reality. But there is nothing underneath the words, within nature itself, which compels those kinds of distinctions.
This book pitches itself into the middle of arguments about these kinds of issues. It accepts that Aristotle’s views can no longer be maintained, as evolution has shown that we can no longer talk of fixed unchangeable ‘essences.’
But the book also argues that modern science (and philosophy) has gone too far in assuming that Evolutionary perspectives should completely supplant Aristotle. The book is arguing for a ‘via media.’ It thinks that there are important insights in both approaches, which are at risk of being lost if people take an extremist view and insist on either Aristotle or Evolution.
To advance its view, the book insists that there are ‘natural kinds.’ When we look around the world, we are not imposing differences on the world which lead us to distinguish between plants and animals. Yes, our minds contribute to what we see, but there are also fundamental differences existing in nature, independently of human perception. Those differences mean that that there are ‘natural kinds’ and the differences between the natural kinds comes down to the fact that there are differing ‘essences’ which constitute each natural kind.
Accepting that Aristotle’s view of fixed essences and fixed properties has been disproved, the author suggests that dispositional causal powers are a better way of defining essences. Ultimately, things like ‘trees’ and ‘dogs’ behave in different ways, because they have different dispositional causal powers. Yes, the causal powers of natural kinds change, as things evolve, but it is also true that distinct sets of causal powers exist at specific points in time – as we can see by looking at the world.
This means that there is a meaningful way of talking about ‘essences’ within an evolutionary framework, and there is a scientifically useful reason for doing so.
This is a “brave” book because it is taking on the scientific consensus, which is firmly anti-essence. It does so by showing that Science has nothing to lose by adopting a more nuanced view on this issue, and it suggests that the more nuanced view addresses the common sense experience of many people.
The book is written in an academic style, so it is not a ‘popular’ read. However, jargon and terminology is generally explained, so the book is accessible to patient readers from any background, if they are prepared for some modest intellectual exertion.
Displaying 1 of 1 review