"Part of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series. Throughout the recorded history of warfare, military planners and commanders have sought to deceive their adversary as to the size, timing, or location of an attack, in order to gain a decisive advantage. From the famous "Trojan Horse" to modern efforts to use the electromagnetic spectrum to "spoof" or "jam" sensors, deception in some form remains an essential component of military operations. Whether attacking an unsuspecting enemy on Christmas morning, as Washington did at Trenton, or emplacing "Quaker guns" (logs painted black to resemble cannon) to provide the impression of strength, US forces have successfully built on a long legacy of military deception (MILDEC) in order to prevail in the nation's wars. While technology continues to advance at a dizzying pace, threatening to render previous lessons obsolete, MILDEC operations have successfully withstood previous developments and even incorporated new technologies continue to continue to form an important part of combat operations. While potentially capable, in some cases, of enabling military forces to prevail without a fight, as the theorist Sun Tzu postulated, more often MILDEC confers an advantage that helps the side that successfully harnesses it prevail, often at a much lower cost that it would have otherwise. Thus, MILDEC, and its long and successful history, remain an important, even vital, tool for any future leader"--Provided by publisher.
Volume 1 in the Army series addressing Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). The chapters are a series of historical case studies highlighting military deception operations in the greater context of LSCO.
WHAT IS THIS BOOK? - This book is part of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series
- these twelve case studies also ought to provide us with some “universal truths” regarding deception operations.
WHAT ARE SOME OF THE BIG TAKE-AWAYS? - One of the first is the importance of coordination in deception campaigns,
- Another “principle” that emerges from the narrative is that of the “Magruder Principle,” the idea that it is easier to convince an adversary to hold on to a pre-existing belief that to convince them of a new one.
- Careful readers of the accounts in this volume will notice that weaker powers tend to favor the use of deception to overcome a stronger opponent.
WHICH CASE STUDIES IN DECEPTION ARE COVERED? - Chapter 1: The Belfort Ruse: The American Deception Plan for the Battle of St. Mihiel, 1918
- Chapter 2: From Beersheba to Megiddo British Deception Operations during the Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918
- Chapter 3: Operation BERTRAM British Deception at El Alamein
- Chapter 4: Operations BARCLAY, CASCADE, and MINCEMEAT Allied Deception in the Mediterranean, 1943
- Chapter 5: Operation KREML German Strategic Deception on the Eastern Front in 1942
- Chapter 6: Red Star Resurgent Soviet Deception Operations at Stalingrad, 1942-1943
- Chapter 7: Operation BAGRATION Maskirovka at Its Height, Summer 1944
- Chapter 8: Deceive, Divert, and Delay Operation FORTITUDE in support of D-Day
- Chapter 9: Chinese Deception and the 1950 Intervention in the Korean War
- Chapter 10: From Maneuvers to War: The Egyptian Deception Plan on the Eve of the Yom-Kippur War
- Chapter 11: Target San Carlos British Deception during the Repossession of the Falkland Islands
- Chapter 12: Deception in the Desert Deceiving Iraq in Operation DESERT STORM
MASKIROVKA - Soviet doctrine has defined maskirovka as: The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various military objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the plans of the command… maskirovka contributes to the achievement of surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation of combat readiness, and the increased survivability of objectives.
DECEPTION TO BE INTEGRATED AT ALL LEVELS - In the end, deception cannot just be a paragraph in a plan, it must be emphasized, integrated, and resourced across all levels of the joint force in order to help achieve the desired effects.
FACTOIDS - TITANIC I dropped dummy paratroopers inland from the Pas-de-Calais “invasion” beaches to simulate an entire Allied airborne division landing in the dark. The dummies (called “Ruperts”) contained pyrotechnic firefight simulators while two SAS teams engaged the responding Germans troops to add realism.
HAHA - For instance, Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt, commander of the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division, still believed in 1951 that “approximately 50 enemy divisions [were assembled] in the area of Algiers-Tunis” when the Allies possessed far fewer.