Why Free Will Is Real

by Christian List

A crystal-clear, scientifically rigorous argument for the existence of free will, challenging what many scientists and scientifically minded philosophers believe.

Philosophers have argued about the nature and the very existence of free will for centuries. Today, many scientists and scientifically minded commentators are skeptical that it exists, especially when it is understood to require the ability to choose between alternative possibilities. If the laws of physics govern everything that happens, they argue, then how can our choices be free? Believers in free will must be misled by habit, sentiment, or religious doctrine. Why Free Will Is Real defies scientific orthodoxy and presents a bold new defense of free will in the same naturalistic terms that are usually deployed against it.

Unlike those who defend free will by giving up the idea that it requires alternative possibilities to choose from, Christian List retains this idea as central, resisting the tendency to defend free will by watering it down. He concedes that free will and its prerequisites―intentional agency, alternative possibilities, and causal control over our actions―cannot be found among the fundamental physical features of the natural world. But, he argues, that’s not where we should be looking. Free will is a “higher-level” phenomenon found at the level of psychology. It is like other phenomena that emerge from physical processes but are autonomous from them and not best understood in fundamental physical terms―like an ecosystem or the economy. When we discover it in its proper context, acknowledging that free will is real is not just scientifically respectable; it is indispensable for explaining our world.

Genres: Philosophy, Science, Psychology, Nonfiction

224 pages, Hardcover

Published May 6, 2019

Reviews

[Amora · Rating 4 out of 5]

What an excellent and accessible book on free will! List’s arguments are robust and easy for even a novice philosopher to understand. List uses the same arguments he has used in his academic papers here but he condenses and simplifies them so even laymen could understand!

[Alan Johnson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Christian List is a professor of philosophy and political science at the London School of Economics and Political Science and is a Fellow of the British Academy. In this book, he defends the concept of free will against three attacks: (1) radical materialism, which denies that humans are intentional agents; (2) determinism, which denies that humans have alternative possibilities; and (3) epiphenomenalism, which denies that humans have causal control over their actions. Although his entire argument is complicated, List's main claim is that the opponents of free will commit a category error in attempting to reduce all human thought and behavior to physics. List argues that much of human thought and action cannot be explained at the physical level. The "special sciences" (the studies of biomedical, social, economic, and political phenomena, for example) exhibit the existence and operation of higher-level human thought and activity, which is impossible to understand on the basis of physics alone. He suggests that free will as well as such higher-order human endeavors emerged from a lower-level physical substrate, though he does not attempt to explain how such emergence and/or evolution occurred. For relevant theories of emergence/evolution, see, for example, the writings of neuroscientists Terrence W. Deacon, William R. (W. R.) Klemm, and Peter Ulric Tse. See also the work of philosopher-scientist Bob Doyle.

Although I am not certain whether I agree with all the details of List's analysis, his overall approach is commendable, and I accordingly have no hesitation in assigning a five-star rating to his book.

(minor edits on June 13 and 24, 2019)

[Chris · Rating 4 out of 5]

I’m torn on this book. I came to it after reading Sam Harris’ “Free Will” in which he makes the case that there is no such thing. I was mostly convinced by Harris’ arguments and the present book didn’t change my mind.

List goes through three main arguments against hard determinism; (1) intentionality is a higher-level phenomenon which cannot be reduced to the physical level, (2) alternative possibilities exist on this higher level and are compatible with physical determinism, and (3) causation only functions on this higher level. Arguments for 1 and 3 seemed sound and List makes a strong case about their realism, but I have reservations about 2.

List shows that alternative possibilities can exist but he doesn’t show how they would actually work. I had hoped to find some arguments against Harris’ views here. It’s worth noting that Harris tackles this issue mainly from a first-person view while List does so from a third-person view. While Harris claims that intentions and thoughts arise in the mind without our volition, eliminating any alternative possibilities, List only makes the case that there could be alternative possibilities regardless of the determined physical states that gave rise to them. However, there’s no explanation about how a person could engage these possibilities from a first-person view.

Either way, the book is a great introduction to some of the main aspects of the free will debate, and while it’s moderately technical it’s still an enjoyable read.

[Kasperi Tervonen · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book offers a clear overview of the three most common skeptical challenges against free will: (1) The challenge from radical materialism, (2) The challenge from determinism, and (3) The challenge from epiphenomalism.

When skeptics argue that free will is an illusion, the argument is almost always based on one or more of these challenges. Radical materialism implies that intentional agency is an illusion, since scientifically speaking there is no such thing as "agency" - just physical events in the brain. Determinism, on the other hand, implies that free will is impossible, since the future is fully determined by laws of physics and all the physical facts about the present: there are no genuine alternative possibilities. And finally, epiphenomalism implies that mental causation is an illusion: the real causes of our actions are solely physical brain events.

In my opinion, List succeeds in showing that the debate is still far from settled. Personally, I was quite convinced by his counterarguments against radical materialism and epiphenomalism, but didn't find his case for alternative possibilities as convincing. However, 2/3 (if my judgement is correct) is already quite good!

[Ville Kokko · Rating 4 out of 5]

A lucid look at the topic of free will that brings many important concepts into the discussion. Though I am a bit peeved that List joins the ranks of people who don't understand the logically inevitable consequences of indeterminism for freedom (he thinks higher-level indeterminism is good and required), that's far from sinking the whole thing. I might recommend this to anyone wanting an introduction to the topic with a bit of depth in it. It doesn't cover everything, but it covers a lot from a good perspective.

[Luisa]

@Juli Determinismus Diskussion kann starten come at me bro

[Yupa · Rating 4 out of 5]

No, il libro non mi ha convinto, non ha cambiato la posizione sull'argomento, ma mi ha dato comunque modo di rifletterci a fondo, ha sfidato le mie idee e certezze, rendendole meno certe e forse questo è più di quanto si possa chiedere a un saggio, e sicuramente su quelle idee ci tornerò anche in futuro, per ripensarle, per ripensarci. E chissà se magari un giorno troverò di nuovo dei giorni per tornare su queste pagine e vedere se non riusciranno a smuovere anche di più.
Quel che tuttavia ho più apprezzato del libro è il suo ordine, la chiarezza, la limpidezza dell'esposizione, la capacità di rendere comprensibili anche questioni particolarmente complesse, sempre con pacatezza, sempre con pazienza nei confronti del lettore.
Un libro insomma che può far da esempio di come secondo me dovrebbe essere il tipico libro di filosofia, sempre capace di porsi nel punto di visto anche del lettore più digiuno senza rifugiarsi in irritanti fumisterie o in equilibrismi verbali e concettuali inutili ed esibizionistici.

[Neal Tognazzini · Rating 4 out of 5]

I assigned this book in a class on free will this term, and it was my first time reading it too. I wasn’t exactly sure what to expect, but I came away mostly satisfied with it. It is very clearly written and the overall argument of the book is impeccably organized. It ended up being mostly about issues in the philosophy of mind, which is different from the more ethics-focused stuff on free will I typically read, so that was both kind of jarring and also a nice change of pace. Still, the central chapter on alternative possibilities left a lot to be desired, I thought. And various opportunities were missed for connecting the arguments of the book to the wider philosophical literature. Glad I read it, though, and I think it’ll work well as a teaching tool.

[vivian · Rating 3 out of 5]

Bonus points for being mildly easy to follow

[Chip Morris · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent and approachable defense of free will

Christian List presents an important, if rather technical, argument that free will, and even causality itself, operate at a "higher level" than the physics that we all assume implies determinism. His argument is in the realm of science and metaphysics rather than morality, so he does not approach questions of moral responsibility. Nonetheless, he provides important insights that challenge simplistic "hard deterministic" arguments while respecting their significance.

[Salvador Gouveia · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very high-power

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

It is often difficult to wade through the free will debates because varying definitions of free will are used.

Here, Christian List very cleverly defines free will based on the 3 major objections to it:
1. Radical Materialism
2. Determinism
3. Epiphenomenalism

Hence, he defines free will as:
1. Intentional Agency: Any bearer of free will is an intentional agent, whose intentions support the relevant actions.
2. Alternative Possibilities: Any bearer of free will faces the choice, at least in relevant cases, between two or more alternative actions: each is a genuine possibility for the agent.
3. Causal Control: The relevant actions of any bearer of free will are caused, not merely by some nonintentional physical processes, but by the appropriate mental states, and specifically the intentions behind those actions.

The bulk of the book is a defence of these 3 propositions.

If you enjoy this book, I recommend reading Freely Determined by Kennon Sheldon who takes it further from a psychological perspective.

[Daniel Pellas · Rating 3 out of 5]

Buon libro come introduzione al tema del libero arbitrio, molto chiaro, fin troppo chiaro, diventando ridondante in ogni discorso, peccato perché la tesi è interessante ma poteva essere riassunta in un libretto da 50 pagine.
Credo che la sua più grande dimostrazione alla tesi libertaria compatibilista sia la seguente:

Nonostante la determinazione certa che List provocava a livello micro fisico, in ogni mio atomo, a farmi saltare le palle, ha saputo convincermi dell’esistenza di un’indeterminazione nel piano superiore psicologico e dell’esistenza di una mia libera scelta a non perseguire quelli che erano altrimenti istinti inevitabili, e si può dire fatali.

[Pablo Magaña Fernández · Rating 4 out of 5]

The problem of free will is hard. It is therefore refreshing to read a book that is so clear and rigorously articulated. List defends the view that we shouldn't care whether the universe is, at its most fundamental level, deterministic. That's simply the wrong level of description/explanation. At the right level, we're not determined: we could have acted otherwise. Is this correct? I have no clue, but it's definitely something worth thinking about. While not exhaustive, the book is very clearly structured, presentend, and argued. You should read it - provided that you can do otherwise!

[Taylor Cyr · Rating 3 out of 5]

I learned a lot from this book, and it is very readable, with only a little bit of background assumed. I think there are problems with several of the main moves List makes, especially the way he tries to secure alternative possibilities in a physically deterministic world. But I am hopeful that the book will spark some interesting discussion and developments in the free will debate.

[David Diaz · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excellent primer on the mind-body problem. List is a scientist who calls himself a "Compatibilist Libertarian," meaning that he believes that determinism is not only compatible with free will but that free will operates apart from determinism. It's an interesting and thought-provoking analysis.

[Ryan Arthur · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great book arguing for the existence of an emergent free-will, or as List puts it, the "compatabilist libertarian" view on free-will. Great points throughout and well thought out arguments. I'll need to read it again!

[Elena]

dnf, had to give it back to the library before i was done. another cogsci reading, i understood little but was regardless convinced. will now go use my free will to go nap instead of work on my upcoming papers

[dv · Rating 2 out of 5]

Per me una delusione: una summa di concetti che chi conosce almeno superficialmente il modo in cui i temi decisionali vengono trattati da logica e filosofia della scienza già conosce.

[Paul Sand · Rating 3 out of 5]

[Imported automatically from my blog. Some formatting there may not have translated here.]

If you've been paying attention to my reading history (and, don't worry, there's not the slightest reason why you should), one recurring topic is the controversy over whether "free will" exists. This latest book—you may have inferred from the title—is pro-existence. The author, Christian List, is professor of political science and philosophy at the London School of Economics.

With the typical philosopher's care, he dissects "free will" into three components:

People are "intentional agents", whose intentions support actions;

In relevant cases, people face multiple alternative actions, and each is a genuine possibility;

And the resulting action is the result of appropriate mental states, reflecting the actual intention of the agent.

Anti-free willers object to at least one of these components. Respectively:

There's no room in neurophysiology (let alone in the underlying physics) for "intention"—it's just atoms and their electrons flying around synapses, firing off hormone releases and causing muscle proteins to contract. I oversimplify, but no amount of further detail will get to "intention".

The universe is essentially deterministic. You might think you have alternate choices, but that's an illusion; only one action will actually happen, governed by the biochemical processes described above.

(But what about quantum uncertainty? Well, yeah: some of the dice-throwing wackiness described by the inherently probabalistic Copenhagen interpretation of nanoscopic processes might get manifested in macroscopic outcomes. But that coin-flipping doesn't put you in control.)

The last objection is subtle: "you" might think "you" are in control of your actions, but in fact your consciousness is merely a helpless observer along for the ride. The famous "Libet experiments" are invoked: the ones that allegedly show that your body has already made its "decision" to do something milliseconds before you "think" you're deciding yourself.

(But what about quantum uncertainty? Well, yeah: some of the dice-throwing wackiness described by the inherently probabalistic Copenhagen interpretation of nanoscopic processes might get manifested in macroscopic outcomes. But that coin-flipping doesn't put you in control.)

List discusses each objection, hoping to refute each one. And to my mind, he's successful. He argues that "free will" is an emergent property of our complex nervous systems interacting with the rest of our body. It is no less "real" than (say) life itself, or consciousness. His argument is language-heavy, and (frankly) difficult for a dilettante like me to grok in fullness, but I think I got the high points.

But (for me) the knock-down argument for free will is one adapted from Caltech physicist Sean Carroll: tomorrow morning when you want to get dressed, go stand in front of your closet and try saying: "Well, I'll just stand here and let the atoms in my body do whatever they were deterministically going to do anyway." Wait as long as you need to before you're convinced that that the atoms in your body aren't gonna get that clothes-picking job done for you. Or go to work in your jammies. Your call.

[Carlos Morel · Rating 4 out of 5]

While there are some qualms I have about this book, I have to applaud the author's decision to write it in simple prose that is accessible to everyone, which makes it easy to recommend. I also appreciate how this book further explains the importance of levels in science and human knowledge. This confusing element makes great thinkers and experts in subjects such as physics, make grave mistakes when coming to generalized conclusions.

Simply put, the order of things in a lower level of reality (let's say the fundamentals of physics) cannot accurately explain higher-level phenomena. Understanding this is critical for the continuous advancement of science.