George Marshall: Defender of the Republic

by David L. Roll

The extraordinary career of George Catlett Marshall—America’s most distinguished soldier–statesman since George Washington—whose selfless leadership and moral character influenced the course of two world wars and helped define the American century.

Winston Churchill called him World War II's "organizer of victory." Harry Truman said he was "the greatest military man that this country ever produced." Today, in our era of failed leadership, few lives are more worthy of renewed examination than Marshall and his fifty years of loyal service to the defense of his nation and its values.

Even as a young officer he was heralded as a genius, a reputation that grew when in WWI he planned and executed a nighttime movement of more than a half million troops from one battlefield to another that led to the armistice. Between the wars he helped modernize combat training, and re-staffed the U.S. Army's officer corps with the men who would lead in the next decades. But as WWII loomed, it was the role of army chief of staff in which Marshall's intellect and backbone were put to the test, when his blind commitment to duty would run up against the realities of Washington politics. Long seen as a stoic, almost statuesque figure, he emerges in these pages as a man both remarkable and deeply human, thanks to newly discovered sources.

Set against the backdrop of five major conflicts—two world wars, Palestine, Korea, and the Cold War—Marshall's education in military, diplomatic, and political power, replete with their nuances and ambiguities, runs parallel with America's emergence as a global superpower. The result is a defining account of one of our most consequential leaders.

Genres: Biography, History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, World War II, American History, Leadership

704 pages, Hardcover

First published July 9, 2019

Reviews

[Max · Rating 5 out of 5]

In 1947 Harvard president James Conant awarded George Marshall an honorary degree with the citation “To George Catlett Marshall, an American to whom Freedom owes an enduring debt of gratitude, a soldier and statesman whose character and ability brook only one comparison in the history of this nation.” Why would Conant compare Marshall to George Washington? Roll answers this question in his penetrating look into Marshall’s fifty-year career, his personal life and his character. Marshall was an icon of his era, respected and consulted by world leaders. He served in WWI and was Army Chief of Staff during WWII becoming the first five star General. He was Time magazine’s person of the year in 1943 and 1947. He served as Secretary of State and was the driving force behind the European Recovery Program popularly known as the Marshall Plan. He was president of the American Red Cross and then Secretary of Defense during the Korean War. But Roll offers us more than a chronology of Marshall’s achievements; he shows us the traits that made Marshall one of the most admired leaders of his time. First and foremost, Marshall had presence. Marshall was always composed. He had a temper, but controlled it with remarkable self-discipline. He was always respectful and extraordinarily patient. He was direct, never self-promoting, with a well-deserved reputation for honesty. He had an insightful intelligence that allowed him to see the bigger picture, the implications of proposed actions. His hallmark as a soldier was his planning and organizational ability. He built strong friendships with leaders in the U.S and abroad. He was excellent at nurturing alliances.

Roll does a masterful job of analysis using materials not available when prior biographies were written. Roll relies heavily on firsthand accounts and presents all sides when as is often the case, they don’t agree. We see the imprecision of history as Roll lays out the conflicting accounts giving us the opportunity to decide for ourselves before telling us his own take. Roll shows us how decisions were made between the Americans and British in WWII with Marshall at the nexus of the military and political. Since FDR typically backed Marshall’s recommendations and Churchill initiated his own, policy conflicts were often Churchill’s ideas vs Marshall’s with FDR chiming in to reach a final decision or compromise. Some condensed notes follow.

21-Year-old George Marshall entered the US Army as a 2nd Lieutenant in 1902. In WWI he planned and carried out the 60-mile nighttime movement from one front line to another of half a million US troops with their guns and equipment and got them in battle position on time and ready for the Meuse Argonne offensive that ended the war. Then Colonel Marshall worked with General Pershing as well as aligning American movements with the allies. This experience and the relationships he developed in WWI with American, British, and French officers would serve him well later. Pershing became his mentor and in 1919 selected Marshall to be his aide de camp.

Pershing delegated much to Marshall and he learned firsthand top-level management and the Army’s intersection with politics and government. In 1924 Marshall served a three-year stint in China amidst constant fighting among Chinese warlords, another experience that would prove important. In 1927 Marshall chose a position as Assistant Commandant of Fort Benning in Georgia. This put him in charge of the training of junior and senior officers. He replaced the teaching of lengthy procedures for processing and giving orders with ones that facilitated the quick implementation of decisions which he found to be imperative on the battlefield in WWI. He kept notes on those he trained which would help him placing officers in WWII. Marshall handpicked his instructors, 50 of whom became WWII generals along with 150 of his students. People willingly accepted Marshall's leadership.

In 1938 Brigadier General Marshall was put in charge of War Plans at the War Department. In November with war on the horizon FDR assembled his senior military leaders to float his plan to build 10,000 aircraft. Only Marshall objected to what he saw as an unbalanced and amateurish plan. Despite this confrontation in April 1939 FDR selected Marshall to be the Army chief of staff starting in September. Marshall’s very strong relationship with FDR’s closest adviser Harry Hopkins had to help. In the face of Germany’s 100 infantry divisions and Japan’s 40, Marshall took over a tiny ill-equipped American army that could at best field 4 divisions.

In May 1940 with Germany crushing France Marshall teamed up with another FDR close friend Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau to convince the president to expand the army. FDR went before a joint session of Congress to secure funding. In June FDR selected the highly capable Henry Stimson to be Secretary of War. The Stimson-Marshall pairing would prove to be very effective. According to historian Mark Stoler “their collaboration would be one of the closest and most important in Washington during the war.” With Congressional testimony by Marshall and Stimson a draft was approved. Marshall would have 1.4 million men by the middle of 1941.

On August 8 Marshall was on the Augusta with Roosevelt when he met Churchill. Marshall met his counterpart, British Field Marshal Sir John Dill, forming another close relationship that would prove important to maintaining the alliance through WWII. On July 16, Marshall recalled Douglas MacArthur to active duty to lead Army forces in the Far East. FDR was squeezing Japan with an oil embargo and Marshall feared Japan would attack the Philippines to gain access to oil in the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese had a much bigger plan attacking Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on December 7.

On December 12 Marshall selected General Dwight Eisenhower to join his War Plans team in Washington. Marshall was impressed by Eisenhower. Another important partnership began. On Dec 22 Churchill and his military leaders arrived in Washington for the three-week long Arcadia conference. Marshall was adamant about two issues: a Germany first strategy and a unified command with broad powers. Churchill was opposed to a single command. Marshall spent hours with Churchill and others making his case and threatened to resign without it. But as Lord Moran, Churchill’s physician wrote, “Neither the PM or President can contemplate going ahead without Marshall.” He emerged as the dominant force among allied commanders. On March 25, 1942 Marshall presented a plan drawn up by Eisenhower to FDR and Hopkins. It called for a cross channel invasion in 1943. FDR, Hopkins, Stimson, and Navy agreed and Marshall flew to London to present it to Churchill. The British disingenuously accepted planning to get it changed.

In July 1942 FDR sent to Britain “the three musketeers” as he called them, Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King, and Hopkins. Marshall’s assignment – reach consensus with the British which he did in the end. Churchill wanted a North Africa campaign to save his army bloodied by Rommel. King wanted to focus on the Pacific. Marshall wanted a cross channel invasion even if it had to be modified. The debate and maneuvering were intense. Churchill rejected the cross-channel invasion plan. Marshall was disappointed. Eisenhower was “despondent.” Invasion of North Africa won which allowed Marshall to send more troops and planes to the pacific.

In August 1943 another contentious conference between the Americans and the British took place in Quebec. Marshall was adamant about a cross channel invasion. Churchill wanted to focus on Italy and the Balkans. The US demanded an American lead. British Chief John Dill was critical in bringing the two bitterly opposed sides together. Dill and Marshall had a trusting and close relationship sharing their honest opinions with each other. Dill routinely shared confidential communications between Churchill and FDR with Marshall. Commitment to a cross channel invasion was finalized at the Tehran conference in November 1943 with Stalin, Churchill, FDR, Marshall and his counterparts. Stalin demanded the cross-channel invasion be the priority and wanted Marshall to lead it. But others wanted Marshall in Washington to lead global strategy, coordination, and planning. Pershing wrote FDR that it would be a great mistake to assign Marshall to a tactical theater. Admirals King and Leahy wanted Marshall in Washington telling FDR it would be a demotion to appoint him to the European invasion. In Tehran FDR pulled Marshall aside and asked him directly what he wanted. Marshall, never self-promoting, told FDR to do what he thought was best. FDR chose Eisenhower. America’s most read magazine, Time, named Marshall 1943’s “Man of the Year” headlining “He armed America”.

On June 6, 1944 the invasion took place at Normandy. Churchill wanted to get to Vienna before the Russians. Marshall wanted to “keep to the main thing,” the defeat of the German army. On the 10th, Marshall spent the evening with Churchill at Chequers. Marshall held firm. On December 16 Marshall became the first five star general. That same day the Battle of the Bulge began, catching the allies by surprise. British General Montgomery questioned Eisenhower’s management of allied forces suggesting he should be put in charge of all allied ground troops. Marshall cabled Eisenhower not to do so under any circumstances and congratulated him “You are doing a grand job…give them hell.” Eisenhower showed Monty’s chief of staff Marshall’s cable and gave him an ultimatum. Monty apologized.

Marshall resigned as chief of staff at the war’s end. Shortly after Truman called and asked him to go to China as special ambassador. Marshall asked for detailed instructions to govern his mission. He rejected it as unclear and not understandable by the public. He revised it himself then worked out acceptable language with Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, who wrote that Marshall possessed “the art – of judgement in its highest form. Not merely military judgement, but judgement in great affairs of state, which requires both mastery of precise information and apprehension of imponderables.” Marshall was assigned to unify China, an impossible task. Marshall spent 1946 meeting again and again with Chiang Kai-shek, Chou En-lai, Mao and many others before admitting failure. He realized the two sides were intractable and that ultimately the communists would win the war. In January 1947 he returned to Washington to take over as Secretary of State, a job Truman had offered him months earlier.

As Secretary of State Marshall immediately created a planning function (none existed!) to anticipate future possibilities and identify responses. Marshall put Soviet expert George Kennan in charge. Marshall went to Truman and congressional leaders to support aid to Greece and Turkey against communist threats, then went to a foreign minister’s meeting in Moscow with Soviet expert Chip Bohlen. Months of meetings to reach agreement on the demilitarization of Germany and Austria went nowhere. Marshall met with Stalin and realized that negotiating with the Soviets was useless and Europe was facing economic collapse. Upon his return to America, he addressed the nation on radio saying Europe was facing “disintegrating forces” and that “Action…must be taken without delay.” The following day, April 29 Marshall gave George Kennan and his staff two weeks to prepare a plan to save Europe. This would lead to the European Recovery Program, aka the Marshall Plan. Marshall, not perceived as partisan and held in high regard by the public congressional leaders, was the ideal person to take the plan to Congress and the American public. He worked tirelessly with congressional leaders to gain bipartisan support for a large-scale comprehensive aid program. On May 28 Marshall and his key advisors (Kennan, Acheson, Bohlen, and others) hammered out the elements of the plan. He outlined them in a speech he gave at Harvard on June 5th. It became known as the Marshall Plan speech. British Foreign secretary Bevin later called it “a life-line to sinking men.” It gave “hope where there was none.”

The Marshall Plan required the European countries to issue a single joint request for funds. They had to decide among themselves how to allocate the funds. This process of negotiation and cooperation led to a new reality of working together to manage their economic needs foreshadowing the European Union. Stalin rejected the plan. The plan helped unite the free European countries and set the stage for NATO. In September 1947 Marshall began the work of getting it through Congress. Marshall cemented another close relationship, this time with Republican Senator Vandenberg who became an important ally. On December 19 after attending the foreign minister’s meeting in London Marshall addressed the nation on television and radio. He reported that Germany would remain divided and that the Soviets were looking to take advantage of a weakened Europe. He reiterated the need for the European Recovery Program to thwart the Soviets. Marshall never referred to the program as the Marshall Plan. He didn’t claim authorship and as always didn’t seek credit. But he was again Time’s person of the year noting “one man symbolized US action. He was Secretary of State Marshall…a man of stubborn unswerving honesty – a good man.” Marshall continued lobbying for the plan, speaking before Congress and barnstorming the country with speaking engagements to secure public approval. In April 1948 Truman signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 authorizing the funds for the Marshall Plan. Marshall had assembled a talented team to create the plan then saw it through its development in Europe and passage in Congress. His amazing ability to collaborate and work harmoniously with others just as in WWII was at the fore.

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Quiet Servant

General George Catlett Marshall has been hailed as one of the greatest Americans of the twentieth century. It is hard not to admire a man with ideas, great judgement, a willingness to do the right thing and above all, a sense of duty. The subtitle of this book is Defender of the Republic and nothing could be more true. He served it with distinction. As Commander in Chief during the Second World War he was for me, the right man for the job. Such an important and central figure during this war it is amazing to know that he never led troops into battle, something he wanted and could have had if he asked Franklin D Roosevelt. But he didn’t, as he was thought to best serve the war effort leading the other generals from the top. His skills in checking and advising FDR alongside organisation and administration is why he stayed behind the lines.

Like Dwight D Eisenhower, another military great of the age, the majority of Marshall’s war was not to fight the enemy. Even though he did show promise as a tank commander. Instead he ensured that Americans soldiers were properly trained and equipped for war in Europe. He also planned the first major American offensive of the war, at Cantigny in May 1918. General John Pershing recognised his talent and there after became a life long mentor. This influenced his decisions and kept him out of politics. Something Marshall felt essential as a military commander. Marshall was built in WWI, much like George S Patton or Douglas MacArthur, but in a different way. Here he became a master of planning, organising, training and logistics. During the inter war years this talent and closeness to Pershing pushed him to the top.

For me his manners, almost stoic reservedness and apolitical nature made Marshall. He had qualities that few could replicate. This allowed him to make clear informed decisions and advise his superiors correctly. This often led to telling them what they didn’t want to hear. He shied away from the spotlight, was humble and did not unashamedly self promote himself. In some ways it’s is amazing he made it to the top of the greasy pole. But it is clear it was due to his incredible character and ability. He also incredibly, was not close with the majority of people he worked with, famously insisting FDR call him ‘General Marshall’ rather than ‘George’. Something the president learnt quickly.

When the Second World War came, Marshall was elected by FDR to oversee the military’s mass expansion into a huge industrial war machine. It was his finest hour. This book may seem like a hagiography, but Roll does criticise Marshall. He failed to racially integrate the US army in WWII, Marshall stated you should not experiment socially with the army during a global war. Probably more practical than anything else, even if he did most likely hold standard racial views of his time. He was not only hostile towards people of colour, but didn’t promote them either. Roll also criticises Marshall’s failures leading up to Pearl Harbour. After obtaining intelligence of an imminent attack he failed to put the Pacific Fleet on high alert.

Marshall was certainly the brain that connected the organisation of victory, and was one of the geniuses with FDR, Winston S Churchill and Alan Brooke who brought about allied victory from command. The British and Americans often clashed and Marshall was central to forging relationships with the British. He favoured a built up of forces in the UK to bring about an all out stuck in France. The others disagreed and planned a attack on the ‘soft underbelly’ of Europe through an invasion of North Africa and then Italy, via Sicily. Tilly agrees with most historians Marshall was wrong in trying to invade France in 1942, the allies simply weren’t ready and needed to build up experience. It may come as no surprise that when Operation Overlord came he was the strongest advocate. But here he was denied command in the field once again, with FDR giving it to Dwight D Eisenhower. Marshall said nothing, but if he did he would have got it. After the war Marshall served as President Harry Truman’s envoy to China, this was not a successful deployment. He enjoyed further roles before retiring in 1951.

Roll does touch on the personal life of Marshall, but not to a great degree. Perhaps there was not much more than a man married to the job. He had no children of his own and sadly lost his stepson Alan Brown in combat in 1944. For me this is where the biography doesn’t reach its full potential. Who was Marshall the man? Roll doesn’t seem answer the question of his character and does not seem to mention his background and upbringing. I accept this is low on this list for most people, but when I want to learn about someone, I want to understand them. This starts with where they came from and how they got onto their journey. Otherwise this was an excellent biography of a great and admirable man.

[Eric Wishman · Rating 4 out of 5]

I’ve always thought that George C. Marshall deserved a great, one volume account of his life that would interest a broad audience. While Forrest Pogue is Marshall’s definitive biographer, his four volumes might be too much for most so I’ve been hoping for something like Truman by McCullough for Marshall.

I was excited to pick up George Marshall: Defender of the Republic by David L. Roll when it was released earlier this month. While I haven’t read his book on Harry Hopkins, another lesser known player in the drama of World War II, I've seen and heard positive reviews and was anxious to see if he could help shed light and recognition on one of America's underappreciated leaders.

I was initially disappointed when I started and realized it wasn't a typical cradle-to-grave biography. Mr Roll jumps right into Marshall’s military service in World War I without much attention to his childhood or early adult years. However, I soon realized his focus on Marshall's professional career was well-written and balanced. At times, he does focus on his personal life, but the majority is focused on his Chief of Staff, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense roles.

Mr. Roll devotes considerable space to Marshall's years as Army Chief of Staff before and during World War II. In addition to describing his role in key decisions and his relationships with key political and military leaders, Roll also objectively calls out Marshall where he falls short like his part in the lack of warning to Pacific commanders before the attack on Pearl Harbor and the lack of effort to desegregate the Army.

Marshall's time as Secretary of State focused on two main topics: the Marshall Plan and U.S. recognition of Israel. I appreciated the insightful and descriptive retelling of how the Marshall Plan was conceived and passed through Congress, especially the bipartisan partnership with Senator Arthur Vandenberg which makes one long for the days when politicians could work together across the aisle.

The books ends with quick overviews of his time as Secretary of Defense as well as his last years.

While I'm still waiting for the great, one volume biography on Marshall, overall, David L. Roll's look at Marshall's professional career is a good read that I hope will make George Marshall better known and his contributions to our country more appreciated. I would recommend this book to anyone who wants to know more about this great American.

[Steve · Rating 4 out of 5]

https://thebestbiographies.com/2021/0...

Anyone who has read a biography of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman or Dwight Eisenhower has encountered George Marshall (1880-1959). During his five decades of public service he was chief of staff to “Black Jack” Pershing, Chief of Staff of the Army, a Five-Star General, Special Envoy to China, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. He was also the driving force behind the Marshall Plan which re-built post-war Europe (and for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953).

The most thorough biography of Marshall is Forrest Pogue’s four-volume series published between 1963 and 1987. Two notable single-volume biographies of Marshall appeared three decades ago: Ed Cray’s “General of the Army: George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman” and Mark Stoler’s more abbreviated “George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman.” The controversial “George Marshall: A Biography” by Debi and Irwin Unger appeared in 2014.

Much like Marshall, David Roll’s 605-page narrative is consistently serious and restrained in tone; it is not overflowing with euphuistic language or colorful scene-setting. But it is deep, insightful and often wonderfully thoughtful. Roll’s biography is also accentuated by insights gleaned from Marshall’s private correspondence which just became available in 2012.

The narrative begins in earnest during Marshall’s military service in France during World War I, at which point he was already thirty-six years old. The book later reaches back in time to fill in bits of Marshall’s education at the Virginia Military Institute, but some readers will be puzzled by Roll’s decision to leave the first two decades of Marshall’s life almost entirely unexplored.

Like many biographers, Roll is clearly fond of his subject. But he does thoroughly examine Marshall’s imperfections and faults such as his curiously stubborn opposition to recognition of the state of Israel.

Throughout the book most of the important events within Marshall’s orbit receive excellent coverage including the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the conception and implementation of the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift and the circumstances surrounding – and the execution of – the Korean War.

Other marvelous moments include Roll’s observations relating to Harry Hopkins’s actions, personality and relationships, a scene where Marshall hosts a dinner for his stepson who is headed to war and behind-the-scenes deliberations concerning Truman’s eventual firing of General MacArthur. Finally, the last chapter covering Marshall’s retirement years and legacy is brief but powerful.

But as good as this biography proves to be, readers with no interest in the “nitty-gritty” details of warfare – and the related political battles – will find stretches of the book tedious or dull. And even readers who are casually acquainted with World War II may find themselves occasionally disoriented as the narrative rarely seems to concern itself with the “big picture.”

In addition, job transitions such as Marshall’s resignation as Chief of Staff and his selection as Secretary of State often seem to happen without explanation or context. But the most inexplicable (and disappointing) issue with this biography is Roll’s failure to explore Marshall’s pre-military life – something which might have explained Marshall’s unique style and depth of moral character.

Overall, David Roll’s “George Marshall: Defender of the Republic” is an excellent if sometimes demanding biographical journey through the life of an uncommonly commendable American. Well-researched, well-considered and convincing in its conclusions, this is almost certainly the best modern biography of George Marshall.

Overall rating: 4¼ stars

[Arthur · Rating 3 out of 5]

A 27 hour unabridged audiobook.

I wanted the back story of US involvement in WW2. Not the actual things that happened, but how and why. I credit this book with opening my eyes. I never knew an invasion of Cherbourg, France was strongly considered in 1942. Or that once the Torch landings were selected it was pushed hard to ensure one of the landing sights were outside the straits of Gibralter - this way if Spain entered the war on the Axis side the Allied landing forces would not be cut off if the Spanish smashed into Gibralter and closed off the Mediterranean Sea. When you read history you read what did occur, but this book shows the backstories of why those choices were made. I never knew he was an envoy to China, and knowing more of the backstory behind the Marshall Plan and his time as secretary of Defense was likewise interesting.

[Joseph Sciuto · Rating 5 out of 5]

A CURIOUS VIEW: “GEORGE MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE REPUBLIC,” BY DAVID L. ROLL

In President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugural address he famously asks, “And so my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country?”

In the heightened political environment we are currently living in and with a Presidential election a little over a year away I will ask the presidential candidates, in a slightly deviated take on President Kennedy’s question, “What have you done for your country that you deserve to be President of the United States?” And after I calculate your contributions to our country, the one who comes close to 10 per cent of what General George Marshall contributed to his country that is the individual I will be rooting for to become President.

David L. Roll’s biography on George Marshall is undoubtedly one of the best biographies I have ever read on any individual. It is a detailed, engrossing, unbiased and exceptionally well-written account of his life, from his birth to the time of his death in 1957. With the possible exception of George Washington, George Marshall’s contributions to our country cast a long and inspiring shadow that span more than a half a century and three wars… a 5 star General, chief of staff of the armed forces during World War 2, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the architect behind ‘The Marshall Plan’ and one of the visionaries behind the formation of NATO and that’s just a few of his contributions.

Apolitical, unselfish to a fault, loyal, and generous in his praise and humility toward his country and its citizens… seldom has a better man served his country. “America has a built-in advantage in the quest for peace,” he said. “Immigrants now constitute an organic portion of our population.” As a consequence, he argued, “Americans have acquired a concern for the problems of other people, a deep urge to help the oppressed, a readiness to cooperate with other nations in preserving peace, and our attitude is one of the great and hopeful factors of the world today. (George Marshall on accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.)”

Sadly, a whole generation of Americans have grown up with no sense of our history, with no appreciation for the sacrifices that have went into building this great country and our role in preserving world peace. In the long and deserving shadows of great men like George Washington, President Lincoln, TR, and FDR, far too many men and women who sacrificed so much have been forgotten, such as President John Adams, Alexander Hamilton (previous to the Broadway play), Nathan Greene, General Theodore Roosevelt JR., Eleanor Roosevelt, and MR. George Marshall.

[Porter Broyles · Rating 4 out of 5]

What an incredible book. For months I kept putting this book off, it had been auto checked out of my library twice without my listening to it. When it popped up in my audio library a third time, I decided to read it now or never.

How I regret not reading it the first time! This book captured my attention from the beginning. I did not know much about George Marshall. I knew that he was Chief of Staff under Franklin Roosevelt and later Secretary of State. I knew that he was all over the place during WWII, but those incidents were told from the perspective of others. Marshall often took a back seat to others---King, Halsey, Ike, McArthur, FDR, Churchill, etc. He’s overlooked because he was not as self-promoting as others.

That’s what makes this book so interesting, this book tells stories that the reader may be familiar with, but from a perspective that is overlooked---that of the man who had to straddle the line between military needs and political realities.

[Ian Beardsell · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really enjoyed reading The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler by David L. Roll, so when I found this book in Portland, Oregon's magnificent Powell's Bookstore (hardcover discount), I snapped it up without hesitation.

My mom grew up in the Netherlands in WWII, so I will always be grateful for the American participation to ensure the defeat of the Nazis, and, perhaps just as important, the economic assistance to rebuild Europe that came from the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s and 1950s. I actually think I'd heard the term Marshall Plan earlier than I'd heard of George Marshall, so this biography was ideal to learn about the man behind the plan!

While reading The Hopkins Touch, I felt like we got a real intimate look at Harry Hopkins and, by extension, several key players of WWII, such as Roosevelt, Churchill, Harriman, etc. I did not get quite the same satisfaction in reading Defender of the Republic, perhaps because Marshall was a somewhat private individual. Nonetheless, through third-person anecdotes, letters and historical documentation, Roll provides us with glimpses into the man's fine character and hard-work ethic.

Marshall was a career military man, starting out from the Virginia Military Institute and building an impressive resume quite quickly, especially with his experiences working for General Pershing in France in WWI. Marshall was heavily involved in the 1918 offensive that helped push the Germans back from northern France and Belgium.

In the 1920s he spent a large part of his career in the Philippines with his wife and her mother in tow. Sadly, after arriving back in the US, his wife became ill and died. This greatly affected Marshal; they never did have children. However, Marshall remarried in the 1930s, to a woman who brought several children into the marriage, including a teenage son, who became really close to George. Sadly he was killed in Italy during WWII.

Marshall's career continued to blossom, and he was literally sworn in as the US Chief of Staff right at the beginning of Hitler's invasion of Poland. Roll makes it clear that Marshall was a supreme organizer, someone who could be relied upon to get difficult things done quickly and efficiently. Although there was some opportunity for him to become the supreme US military commander instead of Eisenhower, Marshall graciously accepted to remain chief of staff, as he knew Roosevelt really seemed to rely on him being close by in Washington for his advice.

After successfully guiding the US military through WWII, Marshall retired as chief of staff and worked for President Truman in both China and Korea to try to solve the military issues that arose there with the rise of the Communists under Mao. In between those Far-Eastern conflicts, he also recognized the precarious state of a destroyed Europe, including the vanquished Germany, and was the driving force, along with others such as George Kennan, who developed the economic assistance package that was named after him.

George Marshall was not infallible. Roll makes it clear that he made a few mistakes along the way; however, one is truly hard-pressed to find other examples of this "greatest generation" persona who served his country so well.

[Philipp · Rating 4 out of 5]

A new biography of George Marshall, who, let's say, had a long life: WW1 veteran, head of a military school, lived in China for a few years, then Chief of Staff in WW2, then Secretary of State, later Defense, the guy who came up with the Marshall Plan (still a positive figure in my native Germany for that), had a significant hand in the partitioning of Palestine, was sent to China to try and get Mao and Chiang Kai-shek to form a government together (and remained great friends with Kai-shek's wife, Soong Mei-ling/Madame Chiang), ran the Red Cross for a while, and returned as Secretary of Defense to handle the Korean War before his death at 78.

What a life!

Americans love their heroes, and so does the author Roll, who has a whole chapter as to why Marshall was so great (selflessness, magnanimity, his 'moral character'), but I don't know, I don't fully buy it - and look, I'm inventing a term now! - let's call this the 'Mockingbird problem'.

In To Kill A Mockingbird, the lawyer Atticus is an incorruptible beacon of justice. In the much later published Go Set A Watchman, Atticus is revealed to be a racist, it's just that in his position as a lawyer he's putting his convictions into the back while he becomes a vessel of the law. Because of his failings with African-American soldiers, his avoidance of protecting or freeing Jews during WWII (how much would it have cost to bomb the train-tracks bringing Jews to concentration camps!?!), his rather half-assed treatment of Palestine's partitioning (including simply not talking to his president), contrasted with his fight to give billions to (white) Western Europe via his Marshall Plan - you could see a pattern similar to Atticus, but you can't prove that.

Roll mentions these problems often, but he still maintains that Marshall wasn't a racist. We will never know as there's very little private correspondence remaining, and Marshall was always working hard on maintaining his outer mask with colleagues and the outer world (compare that with the Japanese Honne/tatemae). We don't have a Go Set a Watchman.

Although I did like this sentence from Roll on how Marshall could have helped his African-American soldiers:

But Marshall was by no means a conformist. He was capable of rising above army tradition and societal mores. In the case of racial integration, however, he did not rise, convincing himself that war was not the time for engaging in social experimentation.

This is a nice counter-point to the common argument that 'the person wasn't racist, it was their times'. If that particular person was a non-conformist, why excuse their conformism in this particular point?

Marshall's decisions remain too gray for me to fall into worship for him as Roll does in his last chapter, or as other Americans too (I got the recommendation for this book from Ryan Holiday's newsletter, who also had nothing but praise).

I guess in these Trumpian times, where US politicians seem to have been replaced by angry, unthinking, absolute non-entities, it's good to read a long, complicated book set in gray areas about politicians who are actually putting thought into their actions, and at least try to do something for the greater good.

P.S.: For those like me who panic as they're getting older and feel like they have achieved nothing, Marshall's life is something of a reassurance: during his military career he steadily rose through the ranks, only after 40 did his life really 'take off' - Roll's biography spends most of its pages from there on.

P.P.S.: Roll correctly writes that the Marshall Plan, which pumped billions into the European economy, wasn't an act of selfishness. It was more of a mix of trying to stop the communists and trying to get their trading partners back into the business.

[Boudewijn · Rating 4 out of 5]

With 24 hours this audiobook was well worth the effort.

[John Damon Davis · Rating 4 out of 5]

A respectable, although somewhat uninspired, biography of a remarkable man. By following Marshall's career I felt like I really came to understand the beginning framework of the postwar world order.

[Brian Miracle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although I’d read quite a bit on World War 2, I confess to not knowing much about George Marshall, other than that he was Army Chief of Staff during the war and his authorship of the Marshall Plan for economic recovery in Europe when he was Secretary of State. This book covers the highlights of Marshall’s career and does a good job putting those events in the larger context of world events.

What was apparent throughout was Marshall’s desire to serve a country and a cause greater than himself, even at the risk of damaging his career or reputation. This is most apparent when Franklin Roosevelt asked him if he wished to command Operation Overlord, the invasion of France, and Marshall replied that the President should make that decision without regard to Marshall’s feelings.

Although the book did cover Marshall’s family life, perhaps more time could have been spent on that aspect of his life. However, overall, this is a fine one volume biography of a great American whom too few Americans know.

[Richard Marney · Rating 5 out of 5]

"If you want to test a man's character, give him power"

So ends this special book on a special American.

His contribution to the reconstruction of Europe and the establishment of a decades of relative peace and great economic progress post WWII for the world as a whole (not to mention the central role in defeating the scourge of totalitarianism during the war) stand as a singular achievement in history. Yet, his selfless dedication to democracy and personal modesty shown consistently whilst at the pinnacle of power are even greater achievements.

In these dark times where corrupted men threaten the principle of equal opportunity and justice for all, and many follow the siren call of a plainly bad man, let us remember the example of General Marshall and pray we return to heed our "better angels".

[Dizzle729 · Rating 5 out of 5]

A thorough, in-depth, and fair review of a complex man. His contributions to 20th Century American military and foreign policy response cannot be understated. This book did a very nice job of highlighting both his strengths and flaws. This was a deep, engaging look at a man more American should be aware of and admire.

[Chris · Rating 5 out of 5]

'George Marshall: Defender of the Republic' is aptly titled. Although he was not president of the United States, it was one of the few titles he did not hold. As a soldier, and graduate of VMI, Marshall never failed to catch the eye of a superior. When he served in the Great War in his late 30s he was considered too old to lead a combat force. Instead he served under General Pershing and formulated successful battle plans for virtually every American engagement during the war. When war ended he continued his relationship with Pershing but also assumed commands of his own. Most notable was his service in China between the wars where he tried to broker a peace between the Peoples Party of Mao Tse Tung and the Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai Shek. Although his efforts were unsuccessful his experience enabled him to articulate an American policy when the Communists took over China in 1949. When America went to war in 1941 Marshall was head of the Joints Chief of Staff with overall command of all military forces in the war theaters. The most coveted position during the war was command of Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy, a position he would have liked for himself. But he left the decision to FDR who preferred that Marshall remain where he was, and the position went to General Eisenhower who performed brilliantly. Perhaps his greatest achievements occurred after the war, however. As Secretary of State he was involved in every major decision during this tumultuous time. He oversaw the creation of the State of Israel the impact of which is still being felt today. He engineered the Marshall Plan which helped Europe get back on its feet after six years of war's devastation. Marshall was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. He was in office when Mao's Communists completed their takeover of China. This led to specious charges from McCarthy and his ilk that Marshall was responsible for losing China. And in his last service to his country he was Secretary of Defense after the outbreak of the Korean War. He supported President Truman's decision to relieve General MacArthur of command. This was a very unpopular decision but the correct one. MacArthur, although a brilliant commander was a loose cannon who conducted his own foreign policy in opposition to the constitutional requirement that the military be under the command of a civilian president. Marshall was a great American and a man of high morals and integrity. He served in many capacities for half a century and was the ultimate patriot. Because of the sheer volume of issues he was forced to deal with he didn't always get them right. Neither did any great leader like Washington, Lincoln or Reagan. But no one can deny, after reading this book that no one assumed the role as defender of the republic better than General George C. Marshall.

[Douglas Trent · Rating 5 out of 5]

Incredible book. Easily one of the best books I have ever read about one of the most important people in the history of the United States. Every history buff and most Americans should read this book about a selfless, principled man who devoted his life for his country. He was the rarest of people in that he did not seek fame, power or credit only service to the United States and the world. Marshall was the man who kept all Allies together toward one goal, defeat the Axis powers and save lives.

The author's research was impeccable and the story was incredibly well written. I learned so much about a man that I had barely heard of and I didn't want the book to end. FDR, Truman, Churchill, Stalin, MacArthur, Eisenhower - all of these men highly respected Marshall and Marshall was the man who kept all these incredible men moving towards winning World War 2. But Marshall was a central figure in more than just WW2, but also in WW1 and Korea.

The book is long, very detailed but is very well paced. This book is easily one of the top biographies ever written. Buy it, read it and lend it to another person and tell everyone about it.

[Chad Manske · Rating 5 out of 5]

Undoubtedly the greatest worldwide soldier-statesman since George Washington. Self-effacing, honest, fair, selfless—he epitomized these traits and others to his core. From VMI, to Army Chief of Staff during WWII and both a Cold War Secretary of State AND Defense, as well as architect of the 1947-51 European Recovery Program known by his namesake, Marshall Plan, George Marshall was a living legend whose biographies never get old and can teach us a lot about someone who actually walked the talk. At 600+ pages it’s long, but the journey is worth it!

[Chrissie]

********************

The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler 4 stars

[Steve Bookman · Rating 5 out of 5]

Masterful, sometimes genuinely surprising biography of one of the true indispensable American statesmen and soldiers of the 20th Century. Buttressed by a full bibliography and set of footnotes.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

David Roll's George Marshall: Defender of the Republic (2019) is the biography of one of the greatest American leaders of the twentieth century.

The Early Years

Marshall was known as a young man with a temper, but as he aged he developed a longer fuse. He spoke quietly, thought quickly, and was willing to "speak truth to power." A 37-year old Captain in France, Marshall wanted a combat command, but his skill as an organizer and logistician destined him to staff duties. Marshall completed WWI as a temporary Colonel but reverted to his permanent rank of Major.

In 1924 he was sent to China—a country riddled with warlords and revolution against both western powers and internal monarchy. His posting was to the major northeastern city of Tianjin (then called "Tientsin"). His wife was with him for those three years—the longest period together of their marriage, and an important time for them because she had a chronic heart illness and, after returning to the States, she developed fatal complications from thyroid disease. She died childless in 1927; he would remarry in 1929 and acquire several stepchildren.

Sun Yat-sen's protege, Chiang-Kai-shek, was allied with the Mao Zedong's Communists to eradicate war lords and evict foreigners, but Chiang was in the process of building the Nationalist Army and would later oppose Mao's forces. After Marshall's 1927 departure Chiang massacred communists at a white-flag meeting in Shanghai and established the Republic of China with its capitol at Nanking, Mao, greatly weakened, set out with the remnants of his forces on the Long March to Yenan in remote northern China .

On his return to the U. S. Marshall, taught at the Army War College in Washington D.C. His wife's death after twenty-six years of marriage threw him into deep mourning. Life in a classroom left him too much time to focus on his loss, and during that period his friendship with Pershing was a solace. Pershing had lost his wife and three of his four children in a fire at San Francisco's Presidio years earlier and he understood what Marshall was experiencing. Pershing arranged a more active role for Marshall—as Assistant Commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. There he guided the training of many future WWII generals.

Buildup to WWII

Through the 1930s the U. S. Army consisted of volunteers who chose the Army as a career. Marshall was an advocate of a national requirement that men spend an extended time in the Army for training and, after release, have an obligation to return to the military in times of need. When Marshall became Chief of Staff in 1939, with war on the horizon, he pursued his vision with like-minded leaders, including FDR. Ultimately it became the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, commonly called "the Draft."

Hitler initiated the air attacks on RAF field and the London Blitz; His plan to invade Britain (Operation Sealion) was scrapped when the RAF won the Battle of Britain. Germany, Italy and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, a formal recognition of the lines that would be drawn when war arrived. In October 1940 Admiral Harold "Betty" Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, developed "Plan D," an outline of war principles that tied the U. S. and Britain together by stating that until Britain was free of threat—meaning Europe was free of threat—the U. S. would put all other theaters of action into a secondary role. This became known as the "Germany First" principle, and it was a basic tenet for Roosevelt and Marshall even in the face of a popular "Japan First" principle advanced by many (including MacArthur) after Pearl Harbor.

The Atlantic Conference: August 1940

In August 1940 Roosevelt and his entourage, including Marshall, left Washington to meet the USS Augusta and proceed to Newfoundland, where Churchill and Roosevelt would meet to discuss war strategy at the Atlantic Conference. In his masterful Churchill (2019) Andrew Roberts says that during the voyage to the Atlantic Conference Churchill wrote the outlines of the war plan that was eventually followed: his "Mediterranean Strategy"—secure North Africa, Sicily and Italy, then move through the Balkans to achieve important British Empire-saving objectives. Roberts intimates that Churchill's strategic vision won the war, but Roll makes it clear that the Mediterranean Strategy was less the result of agreement and more the outcome of Churchill's intransigence. In short, Churchill didn't just propose a strategy, he also forced it into being.

The Arcadia Conference: Dec 1941 - Jan 1942

In December 1941 a second U. S.-Britain conference, codenamed Arcadia, was held in Washington. The goal was to develop a long-range war plan. The first order of business was reaffirmation of the "Germany First" strategy, an important commitment to the British who feared that the U. S. would give highest priority to the Pacific theater. Then attention turned to the structure of command for the war. Marshall had seen the confusion created during WWI when each nation—and each national service—commanded its own forces; communication failures were rampant. From this he developed a commitment to a "unified command structure." Rather than each service, led by its Chief of Staff, running its own war, he proposed that the U. S. should form a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the four services with one selected as Chairman (CJCS); this mimicked the British Imperial General Staff (IGS) with one (at that time, Sir Alan Brooke) selected as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). Coordination between Britain and the U. S. would be through a newly created Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). This structure was adopted.

Churchill, never one to agree quietly, argued that there should also be a civilian Munitions Assignment Board to allocate war materiel among the various national services. The MAB would be independent of the CCS, thereby allowing it a veto of CCS plans simply by refusing to provide the required materiel. FDR initially agreed to this step backward, but Marshall threatened to resign if the CCS was subject to civilian control. The MAB idea was modified: rather than being independent it operated under the CCS.

The European Theater: Strategic Disputes

Following the Arcadia Conference, Marshall tagged Dwight Eisenhower to plan an Allied invasion of France. The result—the Marshall Memorandum—proposed a buildup of men and weapons in Britain (Operation Bolero) followed by a cross-channel invasion of France (Operation Roundup); this would be supplemented by a secondary invasion in southern France in the area of Marseilles (later dubbed Operation Anvil). Roosevelt approved this in order to give Stalin the Second Front he demanded; the timing was set for 1943. But the British were equivocal, arguing thatGermany needed far more softening by air attack and by Russia before that decision was needed. But the underlying British view on the Marshall Memorandum was negative.

Churchill's "Mediterranean Strategy" would be the British strategy, and they would "yes" the U. S. until they got it. Their objection was, in part, from the vivid memories of massive slaughter at the Somme and Paaschendaele. Churchill proposed attacking through Europe's "soft underbelly:" first eliminating the Italians and Germans from North Africa, then taking Sicily and Italy, and meeting up with the Soviet army as it had swept Germany westward or proceeding into the Balkans and into Germany.

The Mediterranean Strategy's virtues in the British mind were that it would block Germany from invading Egypt and capturing the Suez Canal, thus interdicting shipment through the Mediterranean to Britain's Asian colonies; it would also block the Germans and Japanese from linking up in the Middle East and combining against Russia's southern flank, and it would establish an Allied presence in Eastern Europe to counter Russian dominance of the area after the war. The two Allies clearly had different agendas: the Americans wanted to defeat Germany; the British wanted that but also sought to preserve the British Empire by protecting India—its "jewel in the Crown."

Roosevelt had no sympathy for the British Empire and the American view appeared to win out, in part because the U. S. would provide the bulk of men and munitions. The Americans continued to play "Whack-a-Mole," knocking the Mediterranean Strategy down in favor of a direct attack on France, getting apparent British support, then watching the Meditteranean Mole pop up again.

If the Americans wanted Germany First, why were the first stages of the Mediterranean Strategy—North Africa, Sicily and Italy—were executed. The answer lies in part in the Second Battle of Tobruk, where Rommel ejected the British Eighth Army from Libya and pushed them back to El Alamein in Egypt. With Rommel back in control of the Mediterranean littoral and Suez Canal exposed to threat, Germany could control the traffic through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal, cutting off a southern route to send supplies to Russia, India and Asia. This was a legitimate concern, but erupted in other contexts, with the British pretending support of the Marshall Memorandum while clearly undermining it. At one point Marshall suggested that Roosevelt should propose a "Japan First" policy just to get Churchill to back off; Roosevelt refused, fearing that news of a Japan First policy—even as a ruse—would get back to Stalin.

Then in early 1942, to Marshall's amazement, Roosevelt assured Stalin that there would be a cross-channel invasion in 1943, even though it was clear that that was too early. This tore up the Marshall Memorandum, but it was clear that 1943 would be too early for Operation Overlord nee to be successful. But something had to be done to supprt he Second Front assurance. American and British planners developed a plan, called Operation Sledgehammer, that would satisfy the Second Front commitment: a 1942 cross-channel invasion landing at the Cherbourg Peninsula on Normandy's northwest coast to draw Hitler's troops away from Russia. The Cherbourg troops would survive the winter in situ and be available in 1943 to support Operation Overlord. Operation Sledgehammer was never executed. Roll notes that historians have judged that it would have been a disaster, and if Operation Overlord was delayed beyond 1943—as it was—those troops could become another Dunkirk.

With Sledgehammer out for 1943, an: an invasion at Casablanca in Morocco to sweep across North Africa and drive Rommel from Libya. Churchill's Mediterranean Strategy came back through the back-door. In November 1942 the three-pronged Operation Torch (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) was successful, followed by the successful invasions of Sicily and of Italy (Operations Avalanche at Salerno, Husky at Anzio, and Baytown at Calabria on the Italian toe). By March 1943 the Italians and Germans were out of North Africa, and in June 1944 Rome was taken—though German troops remained active in northern Italy until Germany's surrender in May 1945.

Eisenhower had commanded the North African action, launched in November 1942. When he was selected to plan Operation Overlord he returned to Britain and the Italian Campaign was led by Sir Harold Alexander and his British 15th Army, comprising Mark Clark's U. S. Fifth Army and Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth Army. Roll reports that after the September 1943 Salerno Invasion by the Eighth Army, Roosevelt received a phone call from Churchill asking if Churchill could borrow 156 Landing Ships. He approved it without asking questions and Churchill authorized the Anzio invasion (Operation Shingle) in January 1944 using the ships to land Clark's Fifth Army.

Meanwhile, the tide was turning elsewhere. The German defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943, followed by its defeat in August 1943 at the massive tank battle at the Kursk Salient, had sent the Germans into retreat. U. S. naval victories in the Pacific, beginning at Midway in June 1942, had reduced the prospects of a Japanese invasion of India and the linking of German and Japanese troops in the Middle East.

At the May 1943 Trident Conference in Washington the British seemed finally to reaffirm their much earlier and much-neglected commitment to a cross-Channel invasion. Marshall's attention turned to planning for Overlord. Recommendations by Simon Kuznets—who would win the first Nobel Prize in Economics in the 1970s—and his committee of economists placed 7.7 million as the military manpower that the U. S. economy could provide while still meeting domestic production needs and military aid commitments. Marshall accepted that and requested authorization for 88 Army divisions with another 12 divisions if necessary.

Before the August 1943 Quadrant Conference in Quebec, Marshall had learned that Churchill was considering a covert plan to extent the Allied position in Italy through the Balkans to continue his Mediterranean Strategy. This would once again divert forces from western Europe and undermine Overlord, giving Churchull a reason to claim that Overlord was still premature.

Knowing that a firm hand would be needed because the British would "yes" America to death until Churchill finally got his way. Roosevelt rejected Churchill's plea for time with Roosevelt in Cairo to apprise him that there were "grave defects" in the Overlord plan. Marshall also argued that British foot-dragging made it imperative that the invasion of France have an American commander, stating that

We cannot now rationally hope to come to grips with our German enemy under a British commander.

At the Tehran Conference following Cairo, the Overlord vs. Mediterranean choice was finalized by Stalin, who stated that Overlord should override any actions elsewhere. He also argued that the commander of Overlord should be the man who led the planning.

At Tehran it was decided that Operation Overlord would be executed in May, 1944, with a secondary invasion in southern France (now called Operation Anvil), and that Eisenhower would command the invasions. Brooke was crushed and Churchill was unhappy to give up his Balkans ploy. The decision was finally made!

We know the rest: Overlord was a great success, attention turned to the Pacific and Japan surrendered in September 1945.

There is, of course, much more to Marshall's life—he would retire from the Army in 1945, serve as Truman's Envoy to settle the civil war in China, and serve as Truman's Secretary of State, during which the Marshall Plan would assist the recovery of the European economies. But space prevents attention to those important stages of Marshall's life.

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book, providing a detailed biography of General George Marshall, the WWII Military leader and early Cold War statesman. The author, David Roll, does a great job peeling away the myths behind Marshall as a dour but intellectual military generalissimo. Instead we are introduced to a very human military professional, whose superlative managerial abilities transformed the American civil-military establishment into what we have today. But, we also see a leader who made his fair share of mistakes in the very new ground of implementing America’s world-wide military commitment during and after WWII. The book felt like it rushed through Marshall’s pre-WWII years to get to the ~12 year period where he was a major player in the national security scene. Major moments in his earlier years are pointed out, but if you are looking for the philosophical underpinnings of Marshall’s military reforms other books provide more detail. Instead, this book concentrates on a regular stream of major events in which Marshall played a critical role from his time as Army Chief of Staff, Ambassador to China, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense. From the Europe First strategy of the US-UK Alliance through to the stabilization of the Korean War effort after China’s intervention, Marshall’s influence is explained in detail. The book follows Marshall closely, presenting each of these major events within his point of view and explaining the rationale for his actions. The result is a better appreciation of Marshall as a whole, vice the myth he has become. We get a good understanding of his successes in War and dealing with his many larger-than-life contemporaries. But we also see the areas he failed in or, at the least, was an impediment to success. It is a cliché to say Marshall and the senior leaders he worked with were more of the 19th century than the 20th. But Marshall definitely possessed a very republican version of this trait, probably emanating Cincinnatus more than any other American leader of his era. Highly recommended for those wanting to better understand the mindsets and conversations of the WWII and early Cold War leadership.

[Garrett · Rating 4 out of 5]

Plato said, “Only those who do not seek power are qualified to hold it.” This quote (mostly) applies to General Marshall. He was at the pinnalcle of military leadership, yet when offered the command of Operation Overlord (Normandy Invasion), he did not take it. While not refusing the position, he did not affirmatively accept it when offered. Instead, he deferred to the President’s discretion. The President ultimately gave the command to General Eisenhower and General Marshall fully supported the decision (although he was disappointed to not be the commander of the historic operation).

Throughout General Marshall’s career, he earned a reputation as being trustworthy and straight forward. This allowed General Marshall to have an influence on every major decision from WWII through Korea and beyond—serving as Army Chief of Staff, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.

Simply put, General Marshall is the Forrest Gump of the army. His story is the story of the twentieth-century American military. While he did not command troops in battle, he was the how, when, where, and why behind the U.S. Army’s successes (and failures) from WWII through Korea and beyond.

The book is a detailed look at General Marshall’s life and career. It is thorough, but apologetic. The author clearly had a desire to portray General Marshall as George Washington reincarnated (which has some historical merit according to some scholars). General Marshall did many great things (storied military career beginning in the Philippine-American war through WWII, and post-world war European recovery—AKA the Marshall Plan, etc.). He also had a hand in the worst failures of the twentieth century that continue to impact America’s strategic outlook (losing China to Mao, the Korean Conflict, opposing recognition of the Israeli state, etc.). General Marshall also likely influenced the Vietnam war considering the tremendous influence he had over the Department of Defense just prior to hostilities.

Overall, I highly recommend studying General Marshall as a template of success in servant leadership with the understanding that no role model is perfect. There are positive and negative lessons to be learned from this man—and any historical figure. Our country owes General Marshall a debt of gratitude, and future leaders must take notes from General Marshall’s life in order to improve upon the legacy he created in the United States military.

[Casey Kahsen · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fine piece that interlaces the history of GCM with major world events (WWI, WWII, Berlin air lift, Israel's statehood, and Korea) with his roles and responsibilities in each. While not a deep dive on historical concepts in any one area, the book does a great job contextualizing the events and how Marshall's leadership played a role. A main focus on the book is his role as Army chief of staff during WWII (I'd say ~50% of the book).

It is a great intersection of history, policy, and leadership and I definitely enjoyed the read.

The last sentence sums the book up perfectly "if you want to see a man's character, give him power".

[Tim Leone · Rating 5 out of 5]

A must read for any serious student of National Security looking to understand and participate at the Strategic level.

While remaining focused on its core project - to provide a seminal work on one of our Nation’s finest Leaders (a former CSA, SecState and SecDef) - this book provides an invaluable perspective on so many critical moments in our Nation’s History with effects that endure today: role in WWI, WWII Military buildup, The political orchestration of D-Day and ultimately its Command, critical decisions toward the end in Europe and Japan, Presidential transitions, Balfour Declaration, decisions thru the Chinese Revolution, the Korean War, and the firing of GEN Douglas MacArthur.

A must read for lifetime students in and out of uniform.

[Jim Kelsh · Rating 5 out of 5]

General of the Army George C. Marshall is one of my top three heroes of the 20th Century. Harry Truman is quoted as simply saying...” He won the war”...and he was right.
Someone had to hire the generals we all know...Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, Clark, Truscott; and Marshall as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did just that.
Already a hero in WW I, during the interregnum, he codified training, tactics, and fought for keeping the Army at strength.
A skilled and thoughtful tactician and ultimately a diplomat, he navigated Predisents, our services, the isolationist Congress, the British chiefs to insure an Allied Victory.
He also served as Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and initiated the Marshall Plan. An extraordinary man.
Roll wades into an already full shelf of books about Marshall and reintroduces him as well and tells a deeper story , and setting straights some of thought of theories about Marshall.
A tremendous read..well told...as the subject deserves.
Four and a half jimmys out of five.

[Daniel Parker · Rating 5 out of 5]

A big book full of American history from WWI through the Korean War. An inside look at how good leadership prevailed at times of crises, and the personal side of the man who was an eyewitness to all of it.

[Larry Schmitz · Rating 5 out of 5]

While this book is over 600 pages, I would recommend this book to all military officers. George Marshall was an amazing man who put his country above almost everything else. One of the greatest books I have ever read.

[Jer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Balanced, interesting (given the length and depth), and insightful as it pertains to matters both martial and diplomatic, I give this ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️ for anyone who thinks “Maybe I should check this out” (because you should).

[Joshua Van Dereck · Rating 5 out of 5]

David L. Roll's Marshall biography is a fantastic and extremely illuminating read. Roll tracks Marshall from WWI to his retirement, exploring his key actions, decisions, and heartfelt beliefs and aspirations, and uses Marshall's career as a prism through which to evaluate American military and foreign policy through the first half of the twentieth century. Moreover, with a refreshingly modern eye, Roll explores Marshall's interactions with the formation of the state of Israel, with segregation, and with other charged and complicated issues that might dint and scuff the general's reputation. While Roll finds little with which to conclusively undermine Marshall, this is not a hero-worshipping biography, but rather a thoughtful analysis that yields very positive conclusions.

George Marshall ranked among the most influential and successful political/military figures in United States history, standing alongside figures like George Washington, Ulysses Grant, and perhaps Dwight Eisenhower, although it would be hard to argue that anyone else had such an overwhelming impact on foreign policy with such sustained success for so long. And yet, history has almost entirely forgotten Marshall except for reference to the Marshall Plan. Roll's biography strives to set the record straight, and it makes a very compelling case.

If one were to take a critical eye to this book, I would say that it starts a little clumsily. Marshall was a taciturn person, and he never wrote a memoir, and much of his correspondence seems not to have survived. Hence, discussion of his childhood and family life is sparse. Once Marshall's military career picks up, the narrative finds its legs and begins to become engrossing. Similarly, near the end of Marshall's life, one has the sense that Roll was striving to conclude the narrative, and Marshall's extensive gardening enthusiasm and time spent working on military cemeteries goes virtually unmentioned. These are quibbles though. In all the ways that truly matter, Roll has gifted the world of history a spectacular biography of rich depth and scope that is at once profoundly educational and very thought provoking.

I would recommend this biography to any enthusiastic reader of United States history. Bravo!

[Nathan Eberline · Rating 4 out of 5]

Since reading From Colony to Superpower a few years ago, I’ve had an itch to know more about George Marshall. Particularly, I wanted to know more about his leadership in conjunction with the Marshall Plan. During my history classes growing up and my political-science classes in college, I repeatedly heard the gratitude that abounded in Europe because of the U.S. efforts to rebuild the countries after WWII. Yet when I first visited Europe in college, we had just invaded Iraq after the September 11 Attacks, and the pro-U.S. sentiment was nowhere to be seen.

Since then, I have been curious about the perception of the United States in relation to other countries. Despite the relative youth of the U.S. its rise to power was incredibly rapid. Prior to WWI, the U.S. standing army had 127,500 officers and soldiers. The navy was also undersized and outdated for a broad and modern conflict. U.S. production and strength tilted the balance in WWI and has continued since then. What I find most interesting is how we wield that power and the effect that it has. Because the Marshall Plan remains a highpoint for the United States, understanding the man behind the plan seemed like a subject worth exploring.

Fortunately, David Roll’s book, George Marshall: Defender of the Republic, offered a great deal of insight on both the Marshall Plan and George Marshall. I consumed the book quickly and give it a warm endorsement. There were some curious points that were glossed over, and I would have preferred greater exploration of Marshall’s childhood and his time at the General Staff College in Leavenworth. There seemed to be some gaps during the jump from Operation Torch to Operation Overlord in WWII, and I would have welcomed more insight—perhaps through recorded interviews of congressional reps and senators—about what Marshall was so effective at winning over Congress.

This final point is one that Roll certainly addressed, but I still found myself wanting more. This pining for more insight into Marshall may have more to do with Marshall’s reticence rather than a true shortcoming of the book. Marshall seems to have been a hard man to know, and Roll still managed to provide helpful insight into the man and he did so with crisp and engaging writing. Defender of the Republic is the first meaningful biography I have read about Marshall, not counting Marshall and His Generals, a book more about the men that Marshall led during WWII. Roll’s treatment of Marshall’s life, particularly after WWII was very well done and gave me just what I was seeking regarding the rise of the United States after the Paris Peace Treaties.

The small gaps are why I give Defender of the Republic four stars instead of five, and here are some of the interesting points I learned in Roll’s insightful book:

* It was an interesting choice to start with Marshall’s unexpected military leadership during war games in the Philippines. Marshall stood in to lead the white force in a mock attack of the capital instead of Colonel William Cathcart Buttler, who had lost the confidence of the war-games umpires. On one hand, this helped Defender of the Republic jump right into the action, but it made for an awkward transition to Marshall’s younger days. Recounting Marshall’s time at the Virginia Military Academy and his romantic interests after exploring WWI seemed less natural than a traditional, chronological approach.

* Early on in WWI, Marshall was a Lt. Colonel who planned the American strategy for the Battle of Cantigny. The victory was of small strategic importance according to Marshall’s own assessment. Yet it had a remarkable effect on establishing credibility with the English and French. It also had an important effect on morale in the United States. The battle seems to reflect an essential trait of being able to sacrifice soldiers for a larger objective. In Killer Angels by Michael Shaara, General Longstreet described certain men as unable to shoulder the responsibility of sending soldiers to their death. Marshall’s experience as a strategist required such an ability, but it prompts the question of what allows some individuals to see the action as chess pieces on a board versus those who only see the individuals who will die. That said, Marshall also described the intimacy and challenge of maintaining composure as the Big Red One Infantry departed after a year being together.

* As Germany began losing WWI, its conservative leaders began blaming socialists and Jews for stabbing Germany in the back—making a false claim that Germany had not actually lost the war. This narrative was backed by Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff. It then continued as the Nazi Party rose to power. Ironically, conservative House Rep. Marjorie Taylor Green spent this week claiming that the Nazis were socialists. The Nazi Party was nationalistic first and foremost with strong anti-Marxism and horrific anti-Semitism. Green’s claim is a playbook from the Nazis and smacks of ignorance in an effort to vilify her opponents. Her claims remind me of an excellent article I recently read called, “The Perils of 180ism: Stop blindly opposing your adversaries” by Yascha Mounk. It is dangerous for the strength of a nation when all opponents are evil, irrespective of the positions held.

* Roll echoed many of the traits that Stephen Taafe highlighted in Marshall and His Generals for what Marshall sought in the men he promoted: common sense, physical strength, energy, determination, and optimism. Marshall also desired generals who were character-filled, non-flamboyant, team-players who weren’t conformists—people who could take criticism and express dissent. The non-flamboyant trait makes me curious to learn more about Douglas MacArthur who was undoubtedly flamboyant. The biography, American Caesar, is high on my reading list after Roll’s description of the famous general.

* FDR had a remarkable and well-earned reputation as a charmer. When he met with Marshall to discuss his possible appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army, FDR did so with a smile and a question: “I have it in mind to choose you as the next Chief of Staff…What do you think about that?” Marshall coolly responded, “Nothing. Except to remind you that I have the habit of saying exactly what I think. Is that all right?” Marshall had a willingness to speak truth to power served him well with General Pershing first, and then to FDR. It seems to be an increasingly rare trait.

* Roll provided an insightful look at the series of unfortunate events that led to Pearl Harbor’s unreadiness for Japan’s attack. He gave a sober look at Marshall’s degree of responsibility for not correcting General Walter Short’s lack of preparedness for an attack.

* Marshall’s instructions to Lucian Truscott, who formed the first Army Rangers, is insightful and sound team building. Before Truscott trained under Britain’s Louis Mountbatten, Marshall made it clear that he wanted to quickly introduce American soldiers to raids that helped provide real combat experience. These individuals were then to be intermixed with green troops, so every unit had some battle experience. The raiding parties were supposed to continue growing in size to build experience. Truscott said he left his first meeting with Marshall holding complete clarity on his objectives. The combination of Marshall’s clear plan and clear communication make for an excellent method to distill confidence in an inexperienced team.

* I never before heard about the inadvertent torpedo fired by the USS William D. Porter, a WWII Destroyer. In November 1943, the ship escorted the USS Iowa, which was carrying FDR, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Army Chief of Staff of the Army General George C. Marshall, Navy Chief of Staff Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Naval Operations Ernest King, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Air Forces Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief emissary Harry Hopkins, and other military leaders for a conference with Churchill and Stalin. As part of a naval exercise, the USS Porter accidentally fired a live torpedo at the USS Iowa. Had the destroyer not immediately warned the Iowa and provided time for evasive measures, the president and all the military leaders would have died. It’s one of those blips of history that could have changed America in untold ways.

* Roll effectively fleshed out how Roosevelt initiated connections with China in hopes of developing a long-term ally and a short-term partner to defeat Japan. The Chinese Nationalist Party’s leader was Chiang Kai-shek, and he joined Roosevelt and Churchill in Cairo as part of a 1943 meeting of Allied representatives. Japan’s attacks against China made it appear that China may fall, so FDR committed to helping reopen the Burma Road, which was an essential supply line broken by Japan in 1942. This plan did not materialize, and the lack of a full air assault caused tension and suspicion that shaded American relations with China for years to come. It also burdened Marshall’s future roles in statesmanship with China and beyond.

* As the war progressed, one of Marshall’s great traits was never losing sight of the highest priorities—so much so that Toll named a whole chapter, “Keep the Main Thing.”

* Marshall arrived in China as special envoy with the goal of unifying the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists into one joint, non-communist country. He started at the end of 1945, and negotiations continued until 1947 when Marshall left China. The renewal of the Chinese Civil War and the assent of Mao Zedong and the formation of the People’s Republic of China factored into the Cold War and the Korean War. Later in the book, Roll’s analysis of the Korean War—in conjunction with Marshall’s experience in China—provided great context for the current situation of United States relations in Asia.

* Harry Truman declared that George Marshall was the great man of their age. That’s high praise given everyone Truman intimately knew and observed during WWII and after. Relatedly, Truman said Marshall was the one man you could count on to always give you the complete truth. This was the reoccurring theme that Roll connected to Marshall’s effectiveness in gaining the support of Congress. It makes me wonder what it was that made Marshall so trustworthy that those in his presence were assured of his honesty. One must suspect that he must have lived with such a degree of honesty that he never gave reason to doubt—a trait that is rare in politics. If this is indeed what made Marshall so effective, I would love to know more about his worldview that helped him commit steadfastly to honesty in a political environment that allowed shortcuts, fibs, and wholesale lies.

* The precursor to the Marshall Plan started with aid to Turkey and Greece, which were crumbling after WWII. Secretary of State Marshall and Undersecretary Dean Acheson met with Republican leaders to explain that supporting immediate aid to the countries was critical to contain the virus of the Soviet Union. Winning over the party leaders was an important first step for what was to come. It led the way for Truman’s eventual speech of providing economic and financial aid to free peoples anywhere who were resisting subjugation from outside forces. This veiled reference to the Soviet Union was a warning signal of the coming Cold War.

* When George Marshall gave his speech announcing the plan that would soon bear his name, he gave the core reasons why the United States needed to act. The lead points of the Marshall Plan Speech included the obvious: loss of life, destruction of communities, farms, factories, road-and-rail networks, and the effects of nations wholly devoting efforts to war led to scarcely a framework for a return to non-war life. But Marshall also noted the problems of broken currency systems and broken transportation systems. He explained the economic interest of the United States demanded action. There were suddenly thousands of military personnel returning from war and looking for jobs; the country needed markets for the goods these former GIs would produce. After stating his points, Marshall appealed to the role the United States could play in addressing these ills: “With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.” What is perhaps most interesting is that Marshall gave no mention of the security reasons for supporting Europe. Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union were already exerting influence on Eastern Europe. Its influence was looming large with Berlin looming as the epicenter. The United States foresaw the need for its allies to regain strength as partners against the spread of the USSR’s authoritarianism and cruelty. Yet Marshall disregarded this element when presenting his message to the public for the first time.

* British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin heard Marshall’s speech on the radio. He came to his office the next day and demanded the text of the speech, and his staff had no idea what he was referencing. Even in the moment, Bevin immediately recognized Marshall’s vision. He soon convened representatives from Paris and the USSR to work toward a joint European plan in response to Marshall’s speech.

* Roll’s book lent insight into a question I’ve long held about the Marshall Plan: why did we do it? The message I remembered from school is one of magnanimity—a point that Great Britain’s foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, saw at the plan’s heart. Yet pure generosity after a second World War seems unlikely to convince both houses of congress that such federal spending is necessary, particularly when the chambers both opposed President Truman. Marshall, however, made the point clear that rebuilding Europe served the United States at every turn. If Western Europe’s economy fell, it would be ripe for Soviet plucking. This prospect thus had a military interest that resonated: national security could not remain sound if America lost all of its allies. Finally, if the European markets resumed, it would be a fertile ground for America’s post-war production to thrive. So the U.S. would benefit financially, as well as militarily. This summary is not to say that European suffering and America’s kindness were non-factors—the historical record shows it was—but Marshall was successful in communicating all the factors at play to convince the majority of Congress that action was necessary. Truman, too, needed a dose of humility to advance the plan. Despite his administration shaping the Marshall Plan under the umbrella of the Truman Doctrine, the president insisted the plan use Marshall’s name and not his own: “We have a Republican majority in both Houses. Anything going up there with my name will quiver a couple of times, go belly up, and die.” He concluded the whole plan must be Marshall’s because “the worst Republican on the Hill can vote for it if we name it after the general.”

* It was also helpful to revisit how the Marshall Plan, in conjunction with the Soviet refusal to participate, contributed to the creation of the western bloc and that element of the Cold War. One final point I either did not previously know or had forgotten is that the Marshall Plan led to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The effects of America’s European aid had many far-reaching effects.

* Marshall’s growth at controlling his temper was best on display after Truman arranged for Supreme Court Justice Fred Vincent to visit Joseph Stalin amid the Berlin Blockade Crisis. Everyone on Marshall’s staff responded with outrage as Marshall was working in Europe. Marshall instead responded with magnanimity and grace—slow to anger. Marshall immediately came home to help Truman balance the considerations of the international crisis and his domestic considerations amid the election race against Governor Thomas Dewey.

* During the 1947 UN Assembly, as the nations debated the prospect of an independent Jewish state, one of the leading plans was United Nations Resolution 181, which passed in 1947. It called for a partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem to be governed by an international collective. Marshall was one of the lead negotiators in this process, and the United States had a larger role in the decision than I remembered. After the adoption of the resolution, a civil war broke out between the Arabs and Jews, which led to the United States soon recognizing Israel as an independent nation. Marshall opposed immediate recognition of Israel, which led to a label of anti-Semitism. In addition to David Roll, Dr. Gerald Pops—a professor of public administration at West Virginia University—makes the argument that this assessment is a mischaracterization of Marshall. There were numerous policy reasons to support delaying recognition. A most significant reason was his concern that recognition by the United States would undercut the United Nations, which was in its fledgling status. He was also concerned that recognition smacked of political gamesmanship by Harry Truman to secure the Jewish vote leading up to his election dogfight with Governor Dewey. There is no explicit record of Marshall harboring anti-Semitic views, but the label was extrapolated by his prominent position as Secretary of State and his arguments against immediate recognition of nationhood.

* The move from president of the Red Cross to Secretary of Defense was another period of Marshall’s life where I would have welcomed more development. As busy as Marshall remained, I think it would have also been a time of reflection and perhaps an opportunity to learn more about what Marshall thought as he looked back on an already impressive career.

This final hope for more information once again speaks to how much Marshall accomplished in his 78 years of life. It is likely too much to capture in one book. Given the expanse of Marshall’s career, David Roll’s captured much of what made the man such an impressive individual. While Eisenhower and Patton remain a bit more famous as we drift further in time from WWII, it is clear that George Marshall should not be forgotten. Even more than this, it is clear that Marshall should remain a model for service and leadership with lessons to learn sixty years after his death. Roll helped advance both the memory of Marshall and insight into what his brand of leadership looked like. My desire for more content is a minor quibble, and I recommend Defender of the Republic for anyone who enjoys international relations and military history.