The Histories of Polybius

by Polybius, Evelyn Shirley Shuckburgh (Translator), Friedrich Hultsch (Translator)

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The Histories is a multi-volume work written by Polybius who was taken as a hostage to Rome after the Roman defeat of the Achaean League, and there he began to write an account of the rise of Rome to a world power. Polybius' Histories begin in the year 264 BC and end in 146 BC. He is primarily concerned with the 53 years in which Ancient Rome became a dominant world power. This period, from 220–167 BC, saw Rome subjugate Carthage and gain control over Hellenistic Greece. Volume I of the Histories contains the first nine Books. Books I through V cover the affairs of important states at the time (Ptolemaic Egypt, Hellenistic Greece, Macedon) and deal extensively with the First and Second Punic Wars. In Book VI he describes the Roman Constitution and outlines the powers of the consuls, Senate and People. He concludes that the success of the Roman state was based on their mixed constitution, which combined elements of a democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy.

Genres: History, Classics, Nonfiction, Ancient History, Ancient, Roman, Roman History

1576 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 171

About the author

Polybius (ca. 200–118 BC), Greek Πολύβιος) was a Greek historian of the Hellenistic Period noted for his book called The Histories covering in detail the period of 220–146 BC. He is also renowned for his ideas of political balance in government, which were later used in Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws and in the drafting of the United States Constitution.

Reviews

[Jan-Maat]

Polybius' account of the rise of Rome, from city on seven hills to world power, has great vigour, reading book one which deals with the first punic war when Rome leapt out of Italy into conflict with Carthage for control over Scilly I had the sensation that the narrative was pursuing me like an elephant, bearing down on me as I fled before it. Although I remembered the injunction to either come home with my shield or on my shield, I cast it away the better to escape unencumbered, some Carthaginian has it now.

Polybius is also one of the hugely unlucky authors of antiquity, as only the first five books of his universal history survive along with fragments of the rest, in this translation we get the remaining bits of book six - discussing constitutions, part of Polybius' thesis is that it was Rome's distinctive mixed constitution that propelled the city state to dominance, and book twelve which deals with how unreasonably stupid other historians are, admittedly in his august opinion.

The other part of Polybius's thesis is that the world is so interconnected in the second century BC and experience so globalised that we need a universal history - one can no longer , if one ever could look at a historical event as a discrete, disconnected happening, no, everything is interconnected, the rustling of a foot soldier's wolf skin in Italy has a bearing on events in Egypt. Therefore Polybius' history proceeds in parallel, we must understand Philip V of Macedon's politics to appreciate how and why he got involved in the Hannibalic war, and how Philip V's activities interlinked with those of the other Macedonian dynasties in Asia and Egypt to realise how the Romans were drawn east to become masters of the universe, unfortunately because nobody in the medieval period had the sitzfleisch to copy out the whole of his history, it cuts out awkwardly after the battle of Cannae in Italy, which rather spoils the effect and leaves us with Livy, who saw the war with Hannibal, if not the whole of Roman history, as a great moral drama in which Hannibal wins for a while because of his low tricks, like ambushes and having tactics generally. Polybius by contrast is analytical and thoughtful - his theme was thrust in his face, on the loosing side against Rome, the question of how this mysteriously warlike people came out of nowhere and conquered everywhere and took him as a hostage to an alien country was unavoidable.

The reason for this success for Polybius lay in Rome's constitution. Polybius has a Buddenbrooks view of constitutions, Kingship tends towards tyranny, aristocracy to oligarchy, democracy to mob rule, though not like some poncy optimist might think, over three generations, but immediately from one generation to the next. The best constitutions however escape this by being mixed, with each element balancing the other out & preventing, or at least holding off the inevitable decline. In his view the Athenian constitution was ok but like a ship without a captain and so doomed, Plato's constitution had never been tested in practise, Sparta with its equal division of land the best at achieving stability but did not provide the basis for massive expansion, the Roman constitution through trial and error however allowed the achievement of empire and if that is what you want, then it is the model to follow, he doesn't care for the Carthaginian constitution as they practised bribery, not as in promising greatness or tax cuts, but as in literally handing out coins for votes. Polybius's vision of history is cyclical, so everything tends to decay, he came from Acadia and as he says the Arcadian tends to be dour, unless they practise dancing and music (which presumably in exile he didn't, allowing his dourness to flourish and flower like a thistle), still I think there can be no doubt what lies in the future for Rome, When a state has warded off so many serious threats, and has come to attain undisputed supremacy and sovereignty, it is easy to see that, after a long period of settled prosperity, lifestyles become more extravagant and rivalry over political positions and other such projects becomes fiercer than it should be. If these processes continue for very long, society will change for the worse. The causes of the deterioration will be lust for power combined with contempt for political obscurity, and personal ostentation and extravagance. It will be called a democratic revolution, however, because the time will come when the people will feel abused by some politicians' self seeking ambition and will have been flattered into vain hopes by other's lust for power (p412) however just as you think he was bang on the money it turns out he thinks it will all end in mob rule rather than in tyranny and dictatorship and the rule of one man calling himself Augustus.

The other factor in Roman success is personal risk, the Carthaginians hire mercenaries and so in Polybius' opinion have no stake in their wars, while the Romans send out their sons and will not ransom them either - you either fight to the death or fight to victory, third ways are not Roman. His account of the First Punic war shows how extreme this was with Rome consecutively constructing three fleets - loosing the first two in storms, while all the rowers had to be trained on land as they had no maritime tradition to draw on. They even invent a boarding plank with a barb to be able to storm enemy ships - this such a good bit of equipment that it has never become an established part of naval architecture. They fight with no sense that compromise might be an option. There is also a discussion of how the Romans constructed their camps, and organised their army, down to the details of the curvature of their shields, although this isn't all positive, Polybius believes that the Roman emphasis on discipline made it difficult for the soldiers to fight back independently when ambushed at Lake Trasmene.

Full of insight and vigour, but tragically incomplete.

[Smiley · Rating 4 out of 5]

I think reading this book by Polybius (c. 200-118 B.C.) is simply fascinating, informative and rewarding since, I think, we can learn and better understand the Roman Empire from the Greek statesman and historian's views as supported by written and oral sources.

I think, posting a review for this book needs time and ideas for my Goodreads friends, therefore, its scope will include a few topics worth mentioning and elucidating (probably more details for future inclusion):
1) How Hannibal crossed the Alps,
2) How Archimedes' contribution defended Cyracuse, and
3) How Scipio saved his father's life & his character.

Moreover, the section on Roman constitution compared to the others is also interesting.

However, before I forget, I'd like to reveal a section that needs improving for its next revised edition (again, if I don't forget I would inform those in charge at Penguin Books soon). I encountered such a problem when I read the footnote on page 527 as follows:

I. In Book XVIII. 35.

From my note there: I can't find any to read in this Book, i. e. p. 513 (?).

In other words, Book XVIII was ended by chapter 32, therefore, I can't find chapter 35 to read as suggested there! It's a bit disappointing for me, would some Penguin Books people in the UK see to the matter, please?

In brief, this book by Polybius is highly recommended to any interested reader of ancient history and you can't help admiring his god-like narrative of war engagements here and there.

[Lou · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book in this collection of books on Roman constitution and government was super interesting, and the way it was written was super easy to read. The battles in the other books were fascinating, but they sometimes just bled together and there were those books that just dragged on... I may have skim read those ones...

Obviously I'm not rating this on the content, just on how it was set out and my enjoyment (which wasn't much because I had to rush read for school)

[Baal Of · Rating 4 out of 5]

Knocking out another of my yearly history picks from the library of my friend David. Though not quite as good as Herodotus, this one had some entertaining moments, especially when Polybius takes Timaeus to task, which he does frequently and with vigor. Some of the descriptions of troop deployment were tedious. The sheer number of names in this history is overwhelming, but I still managed to learn something. I'm just glad I don't have to take a test.

[شمس · Rating 4 out of 5]

To herald the opening of the sixteenth century, from the little Venetian printing press came forth all the great authors of antiquity, each bearing on the title-page the words Ἅλδος ὁ Μανούτιος Ῥωμαῖος καὶ Φιλέλλην [Aldus Manutius, a Roman and a lover of Greece]; words which may serve to remind us with what wondrous prescience Polybius saw the world’s fate when he foretold the material sovereignty of Roman institutions and exemplified in himself the intellectual empire of Greece.

Polybius is the last scientific historian of Greece. The writer who seems fittingly to complete his progress of thought is a writer of biographies only.

—Oscar Wilde, The Rise of Historical Criticism

__________
I read Polybius for a first-hand account of the period of the History of Rome he discusses in his work, and did not do so with an especially analytical or critical eye.

So in lieu of my own thoughts, I thought I would share some more learned ones; below are some extracts from Oscar Wilde's Essay, The Rise of Historical Criticism. After finishing it, I do look forward to enjoying Polybius' work once again, and reading with a more analytical eye.
__________
He starts by accepting the general principle that all things are fated to decay (which I noticed in the case of Plato), and that ‘as iron produces rust and as wood breeds the animals that destroy it, so every state has in it the seeds of its own corruption.’

. . . Born in the serene and pure air of the clear uplands of Arcadia, Polybius may be said to reproduce in his work the character of the place which gave him birth. For, of all the historians—I do not say of antiquity but of all time—none is more rationalistic than he, none more free from any belief in the ‘visions and omens, the monstrous legends, the grovelling superstitions and unmanly craving for the supernatural’ (δεισιδαιμονίας ἀγεννοῦς καὶ τερατείας γυναικώδους [Polybius, xii. 24]) which he himself is compelled to notice as the characteristics of some of the historians who preceded him. Fortunate in the land which bore him, he was no less blessed in the wondrous time of his birth. For, representing in himself the spiritual supremacy of the Greek intellect and allied in bonds of chivalrous friendship to the world-conqueror of his day, he seems led as it were by the hand of Fate ‘to comprehend,’ as has been said, ‘more clearly than the Romans themselves the historical position of Rome,’ and to discern with greater insight than all other men could those two great resultants of ancient civilisation, the material empire of the city of the seven hills, and the intellectual sovereignty of Hellas.

Before his own day, he says, the events of the world were unconnected and separate and the histories confined to particular countries. Now, for the first time the universal empire of the Romans rendered a universal history possible. This, then, is the august motive of his work: to trace the gradual rise of this Italian city from the day when the first legion crossed the narrow strait of Messina and landed on the fertile fields of Sicily to the time when Corinth in the East and Carthage in the West fell before the resistless wave of empire and the eagles of Rome passed on the wings of universal victory from Calpe and the Pillars of Hercules to Syria and the Nile.

. . . Herodotus, while believing on principle in the supernatural, yet was sceptical at times. Thucydides simply ignored the supernatural. He did not discuss it, but he annihilated it by explaining history without it. Polybius enters at length into the whole question and explains its origin and the method of treating it. Herodotus would have believed in Scipio’s dream. Thucydides would have ignored it entirely. Polybius explains it. He is the culmination of the rational progression of Dialectic. ‘Nothing,’ he says, ‘shows a foolish mind more than the attempt to account for any phenomena on the principle of chance or supernatural intervention. History is a search for rational causes, and there is nothing in the world—even those phenomena which seem to us the most remote from law and improbable—which is not the logical and inevitable result of certain rational antecedents.’

Some things, of course, are to be rejected a priori without entering into the subject: ‘As regards such miracles,’ he says, ’as that on a certain statue of Artemis rain or snow never falls though the statue stands in the open air, or that those who enter God’s shrine in Arcadia lose their natural shadows, I cannot really be expected to argue upon the subject. For these things are not only utterly improbable but absolutely impossible.’

‘For us to argue reasonably on an acknowledged absurdity is as vain a task as trying to catch water in a sieve; it is really to admit the possibility of the supernatural, which is the very point at issue.’
What Polybius felt was that to admit the possibility of a miracle is to annihilate the possibility of history: for just as scientific and chemical experiments would be either impossible or useless if exposed to the chance of continued interference on the part of some foreign body, so the laws and principles which govern history, the causes of phenomena, the evolution of progress, the whole science, in a word, of man’s dealings with his own race and with nature, will remain a sealed book to him who admits the possibility of extra-natural interference.

. . . in the case of the wonderful rise of the Roman Empire—the most marvellous thing, Polybius says, which God ever brought about—are to be found in the excellence of their constitution (τῇ ἰδιότητι τῆς πολιτείας), the wisdom of their advisers, their splendid military arrangements, and their superstition (τῇ δεισιδαιμονίᾳ). For while Polybius regarded the revealed religion as, of course, objective reality of truth, he laid great stress on its moral subjective influence, going, in one passage on the subject, even so far as almost to excuse the introduction of the supernatural in very small quantities into history on account of the extremely good effect it would have on pious people.

But perhaps there is no passage in the whole of ancient and modern history which breathes such a manly and splendid spirit of rationalism as one preserved to us in the Vatican—strange resting-place for it!—in which he treats of the terrible decay of population which had fallen on his native land in his own day, and which by the general orthodox public was regarded as a special judgment of God sending childlessness on women as a punishment for the sins of the people. For it was a disaster quite without parallel in the history of the land, and entirely unforeseen by any of its political-economy writers who, on the contrary, were always anticipating that danger would arise from an excess of population overrunning its means of subsistence, and becoming unmanageable through its size. Polybius, however, will have nothing to do with either priest or worker of miracles in this matter. He will not even seek that ‘sacred Heart of Greece,’ Delphi, Apollo’s shrine, whose inspiration even Thucydides admitted and before whose wisdom Socrates bowed. How foolish, he says, were the man who on this matter would pray to God. We must search for the rational causes, and the causes are seen to be clear, and the method of prevention also. He then proceeds to notice how all this arose from the general reluctance to marriage and to bearing the expense of educating a large family which resulted from the carelessness and avarice of the men of his day, and he explains on entirely rational principles the whole of this apparently supernatural judgment.

. . . Having now examined Polybius’s attitude towards the supernatural and the general ideas which guided his research, I will proceed to examine the method he pursued in his scientific investigation of the complex phenomena of life. For, as I have said before in the course of this essay, what is important in all great writers is not so much the results they arrive at as the methods they pursue. The increased knowledge of facts may alter any conclusion in history as in physical science, and the canons of speculative historical credibility must be acknowledged to appeal rather to that subjective attitude of mind which we call the historic sense than to any formulated objective rules. But a scientific method is a gain for all time, and the true if not the only progress of historical criticism consists in the improvement of the instruments of research.

Now first, as regards his conception of history, I have already pointed out that it was to him essentially a search for causes, a problem to be solved, not a picture to be painted, a scientific investigation into laws and tendencies, not a mere romantic account of startling incident and wondrous adventure. Thucydides, in the opening of his great work, had sounded the first note of the scientific conception of history. ‘The absence of romance in my pages,’ he says, ‘will, I fear, detract somewhat from its value, but I have written my work not to be the exploit of a passing hour but as the possession of all time.’ Polybius follows with words almost entirely similar. If, he says, we banish from history the consideration of causes, methods and motives (τὸ διὰ τί, καὶ πως, καὶ τίνος χάριν), and refuse to consider how far the result of anything is its rational consequent, what is left is a mere ἀγώνισμα [Barren exercise], not a μάθημα [Significant piece of thought], an oratorical essay which may give pleasure for the moment, but which is entirely without any scientific value for the explanation of the future. Elsewhere he says that ‘history robbed of the exposition of its causes and laws is a profitless thing, though it may allure a fool.’ And all through his history the same point is put forward and exemplified in every fashion.

. . . He thus may be said to have anticipated one of the most important truths of the modern methods of investigation: I mean that principle which lays down that just as the study of physiology should precede the study of pathology, just as the laws of disease are best discovered by the phenomena presented in health, so the method of arriving at all great social and political truths is by the investigation of those cases where development has been normal, rational and undisturbed.

The critical canon that the more a people has been interfered with, the more difficult it becomes to generalise the laws of its progress and to analyse the separate forces of its civilisation, is one the validity of which is now generally recognised by those who pretend to a scientific treatment of all history: and while we have seen that Aristotle anticipated it in a general formula, to Polybius belongs the honour of being the first to apply it explicitly in the sphere of history.

I have shown how to this great scientific historian the motive of his work was essentially the search for causes; and true to his analytical spirit he is careful to examine what a cause really is and in what part of the antecedents of any consequent it is to be looked for. To give an illustration: As regards the origin of the war with Perseus, some assigned as causes the expulsion of Abrupolis by Perseus, the expedition of the latter to Delphi, the plot against Eumenes and the seizure of the ambassadors in Bœotia; of these incidents the two former, Polybius points out, were merely the pretexts, the two latter merely the occasions of the war. The war was really a legacy left to Perseus by his father, who was determined to fight it out with Rome.

Here as elsewhere he is not originating any new idea. Thucydides had pointed out the difference between the real and the alleged cause, and the Aristotelian dictum about revolutions, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ’ ἐκ μικρῶν [Not about trivial issues but arising from trivial causes], draws the distinction between cause and occasion with the brilliancy of an epigram. But the explicit and rational investigation of the difference between αἰτία [Origin], ἀρχὴ [Cause], and πρόφασις [Pretext] was reserved for Polybius. No canon of historical criticism can be said to be of more real value than that involved in this distinction, and the overlooking of it has filled our histories with the contemptible accounts of the intrigues of courtiers and of kings and the petty plottings of backstairs influence—particulars interesting, no doubt, to those who would ascribe the Reformation to Anne Boleyn’s pretty face, the Persian war to the influence of a doctor or a curtain-lecture from Atossa, or the French Revolution to Madame de Maintenon, but without any value for those who aim at any scientific treatment of history.

. . . One of the greatest difficulties with which the modern historian has to contend is the enormous complexity of the facts which come under his notice: D’Alembert’s suggestion that at the end of every century a selection of facts should be made and the rest burned (if it was really intended seriously) could not, of course, be entertained for a moment. A problem loses all its value when it becomes simplified, and the world would be all the poorer if the Sibyl of History burned her volumes. Besides, as Gibbon pointed out, ‘a Montesquieu will detect in the most insignificant fact relations which the vulgar overlook.’

Nor can the scientific investigator of history isolate the particular elements, which he desires to examine, from disturbing and extraneous causes, as the experimental chemist can do (though sometimes, as in the case of lunatic asylums and prisons, he is enabled to observe phenomena in a certain degree of isolation). So he is compelled either to use the deductive mode of arguing from general laws or to employ the method of abstraction, which gives a fictitious isolation to phenomena never so isolated in actual existence. And this is exactly what Polybius has done as well as Thucydides. For, as has been well remarked, there is in the works of these two writers a certain plastic unity of type and motive; whatever they write is penetrated through and through with a specific quality, a singleness and concentration of purpose, which we may contrast with the more comprehensive width as manifested not merely in the modern mind, but also in Herodotus. Thucydides, regarding society as influenced entirely by political motives, took no account of forces of a different nature, and consequently his results, like those of most modern political economists, have to be modified largely 20 before they come to correspond with what we know was the actual state of fact. Similarly, Polybius will deal only with those forces which tended to bring the civilised world under the dominion of Rome (ix. 1), and in the Thucydidean spirit points out the want of picturesqueness and romance in his pages which is the result of the abstract method (τὸ μονοειδὲς τῆς συντάξεως [Uniformity of structure]) being careful also to tell us that his rejection of all other forces is essentially deliberate and the result of a preconceived theory and by no means due to carelessness of any kind.

. . . Now, Polybius points out that those phenomena particularly are to be dwelt on which may serve as a παράδειγμα [Example] or sample, and show the character of the tendencies of the age as clearly as ‘a single drop from a full cask will be enough to disclose the nature of the whole contents.’ This recognition of the importance of single facts, not in themselves but because of the spirit they represent, is extremely scientific; for we know that from the single bone, or tooth even, the anatomist can recreate entirely the skeleton of the primeval horse, and the botanist tell the character of the flora and fauna of a district from a single specimen.

Regarding truth as ‘the most divine thing in Nature,’ the very ‘eye and light of history without which it moves a blind thing,’ Polybius spared no pains in the acquisition of historical materials or in the study of the sciences of politics and war, which he considered were so essential to the training of the scientific historian, and the labour he took is mirrored in the many ways in which he criticises other authorities.

. . . But the chief object of his literary censure is Timæus, who had been unsparing of his strictures on others. The general point which he makes against him, impugning his accuracy as a historian, is that he derived his knowledge of history not from the dangerous perils of a life of action but in the secure indolence of a narrow scholastic life. There is, indeed, no point on which he is so vehement as this. ‘A history,’ he says, ‘written in a library gives as lifeless and as inaccurate a picture of history as a painting which is copied not from a living animal but from a stuffed one.’

[Scipio Africanus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Hannibal, Scipio, The Punic Wars. Dramatic and interesting history with in depth character analysis and description of the time's political and military machinations

[Caroline · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thanks to Jan-Maat for bringing this to my attention. I have read quite a bit set during the Roman Empire, or shortly before it, and wondered about all the references to the glories of the republic. And I knew Hannibal had taken his army and his elephants over the Alps, but had no context for the feat. Polybius filled in lots of holes in my knowledge of the history of Rome.

[Andrew Reece · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Greek Chronicler Polybius' Histories Narrate Rome's Dramatic Rise To Power Over The Mediterranean, From 264-146 BCE.

The Greek historian Polybius was born in Megalopolis sometime near the end of the third century BCE, in Greece's Achaea region, which was located in the northern portion of the Peloponnese. He was the son of a wealthy aristocrat, and during his formative years he took a special interest in studying history and political theory. Very little is known of Polybius' early life and career, other than his being chosen in 181 BCE to carry the ashes of one of Hellenistic Greece's last great heroes, Philopoemen, and his election in 170/69 to the military rank of hipparch, or cavalry leader. These early experiences undoubtedly left an impression on the future historian and likely inspired him later in life to write two works which unfortunately have been lost, the Life of Philopoemen and the Tactics.

Following Greece's loss to Rome in the Third Macedonian War in 168 BCE, Polybius fell victim to the declamations of one Callicrates, a Greek politician with Roman sympathies, and he was thrown into prison for sixteen years without juridical procedure of any kind. After being transported to Rome, he experienced a fortuitous change of circumstance by meeting the son of Lucius Aemilius Paulus, the famous Scipio Aemilianus, and the two developed a lifelong friendship. The terms of Polybius' prison sentence were drastically reduced, and he was permitted to stay with Scipio at his home in the capital, where he met and became acquainted with many notable Roman dignitaries.

He later accompanied his patron on various military campaigns, among them the sack of Carthage during the Third Punic War and Greece's final defeat at the Battle of Leucapetra, both occurring in the year 146 BCE. Although little is known for certain of Polybius' later life, it is possible that he served as Scipio's military advisor during the Numantine War, which lasted from 144-133. While the date and manner of his death are not definitively known, there is a short excerpt from a dubious historical source, a 'Pseudo-Lucian', which states that, "[Polybius] fell from his horse while riding up from the country, fell ill as a result and died at the age of eighty-two".

This selection of Polybius' Histories is published by the Penguin Classics, featuring translation work by Ian Scott-Kilvert and an introduction by F.W. Walbank. The 541-page main text is split into nineteen 'books' which equate to chapters of varying length and are accompanied by nine maps of various regions in Europe and the Mediterranean. The text is annotated with notes on each corresponding page and there is also a chronological table of events in Greek, Roman, Carthaginian and Seleucid history from 280-146 BCE, and an index at the back of the volume.

F.W. Walbank's introduction covers a broad range of related topics which include a summary of events from Polybius' historical era, a short biography and an intriguing discussion on the Histories' composition and his particular style of writing, which also featured entertaining digressions on a number of topics, as well as Polybius' own opinions on what activities a prospective historian must engage in to become successful at their craft.

As Walbank observes, "The good historian should study and compare memoirs and other writings; but he must also make himself familiar with cities, districts, rivers, harbours and geographical features generally, and above all he must have personal experience of political life (pp. 442-3). It is these last two activities - knowing the country and practicing politics (which in ancient times included warfare) - that Polybius rates highest. Real history cannot be properly written in a library. The historian must get about; he must visit sites, test the various accounts of the battle on the spot and cross-question those who took part in it. This, says Polybius (p. 431), is the most important part of history."

He also emphasizes the role that Fortune, the Greek term Tyche, plays in the Achaean historian's writing. In the Histories, Polybius utilizes Tyche when it becomes necessary to explain uncontrollable events, such as famines, floods or earthquakes, or when people act in a peculiar way that makes their behavior illogical. "Tyche features frequently in his pages, and not always after other attempts at explanation have been exhausted. In particular, he calls in the aid of Tyche in situations where two lines of development, each in itself explicable in rational terms, intersect to produce a new, quite unforeseen situation." Another of Polybius' concepts, anacyclosis, is associated with the evolution and gradual regression of political institutions, and is an eight-part circular process that begins with monarchy, proceeding to tyranny, then to aristocracy, to oligarchy, to democracy, to mob rule and finally anarchy, before beginning anew with a monarchy.

Polybius' Histories were originally intended to encompass thirty volumes, spanning the period from 264-168 BCE - their purpose was to demonstrate "..by what means and under what system of government the Romans succeeded in less than fifty-three years in bringing under their rule almost the whole of the inhabited world, an achievement which is without parallel in human history." This era's chaotic chain of events combined with the fact that Polybius' relationship with Scipio Aemilianus allowed him to be a direct observer to many of them, elicited him to add one final stretch of years, 167-146 - enough material for ten extra volumes, bringing the total to forty. Of those forty volumes, a mere five remain in their entirety.

The Histories are considered to be pragmatike historia, or 'pragmatical history', which is a political and military history that is meant to be used for a didactic, or moral purpose. While composing the work Polybius was distinctly attuned to the type of audience he believed would be reading his chronicle. He intended it to be read by a mostly Greek clientele, and he differs from many classical historians in that he is very direct in the manner he expresses his moral lessons or advice - they are not embedded, veiled or implied - he tends to eschew high drama and theatrical speeches in favor of a straightforward, factually driven narrative that relies on objectivity and clear elucidations of what is considered to be 'good' behavior to be emulated or 'bad' behavior to be avoided at all costs.

Polybius' Histories is the main surviving account for the First Punic War, which was fought between Rome and Carthage from 264-241 BCE, and early on he makes the decision to discuss his own primary source for the war, the lost history of Philinus of Agrigentum, where he provides comparisons with his own account to demonstrate where his chronicle reflects the correct chain of events. Polybius was serious about getting the most accurate testimony from his eye-witnesses, and when the events occurred within his lifetime, while living in Rome he would often solicit multiple informants to choose what he would include in his chronicle. Otherwise, he would consult the available historical sources and make his own conclusions.

Although Polybius' totals differ greatly, modern estimates place the number of Roman and Carthaginian naval vessels involved in the maritime Battle of Cape Eknomus at 230 and 200, respectively. There was a tactical element to the conflict which involved the Roman ships, commanded by the consuls Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius, arrayed in a wedge-shaped formation appearing similar to a battering-ram, and the Carthaginians assembled in three formations, two arranged in a straight line and the third skewed in a direction angling toward the Romans.

During the engagement the Romans attempted to break through the thinly held center formation, while the left and right wings, which were led by Hamilcar the Great and, Hanno, respectively, rushed ahead only to sail back in a flanking maneuver which sought to envelop the Romans. But the Romans had developed an apparatus called a corvus that Polybius refers to as a 'raven', which was a massive hinged ramp with handrailings that was attached to a bow-mounted mast on a warship that could be sent crashing down onto the deck of an enemy ship, allowing the Romans to easily board and engage in hand-to-hand combat. This tactic proved devastating to the Carthaginian navy, whose ships were built for ramming, not close-quarters engagements. Walbank's notes inform the reader that "The sea-battle at Ecnomus has been described as 'Cannae with the result reversed'. On this occasion the Punic centre proved too weak to hold the Romans."

It is difficult to overstate the importance of naval combat in any discussion on the First Punic War - the fact that Rome emerged as the victor despite their numerous losses throughout the course of the campaign is a testament to their determination to succeed, no matter the cost. The Battle of Drepana was a decisive Carthaginian victory that resulted in 93 Roman ships being captured and an unknown amount sunk, and according to Polybius' numbers, between the disasters at Camarina and the Strait of Sicily, the Romans lost a staggering 344 warships and 400 supply transports to shipwrecks arising from inclement weather conditions. The Romans simply trained more troops, constructed more ships, and maintained their supply lines more effectively than their Carthaginian foes. Carthage's generals were experienced naval commanders able to successfully gauge weather conditions and counter Roman surprise attacks, but they grew complacent at the end of the war, and according to Polybius, they allowed the strength of their navy to slip.

In Book II Polybius discusses Roman affairs in Illyria, Spain and Greece, also summarizing a period of the intermittent Roman–Gallic wars that spanned 390-222 BCE. The First Illyrian War was waged from 229-8 BCE between the Roman Republic and the Kingdom of Illyria during the reign of its queen, Teuta, and began primarily due to the Romans' apprehension over trade in the Adriatic region and the Illyrian ruler's edict allowing her naval fleets to openly engage in piracy and pillage. The Illyrians were hired by the Epirote town of Medion to protect it from the army of the Greek Aetolian League, which was forcefully attempting to annex the settlement, and in a pitched battle they defeated the League in what Polybius claimed to be a single charge, during which the heavily-armed-and-armored Illyrians proved to be unstoppable against the Aetolians' comparatively lightly-equipped skirmishers.

Book III - The Second Punic War concerns Rome's sixteen-year campaign waged from 218-202 BCE against the Empire of Carthage, when the brilliant Carthaginian general Hannibal Barca achieved his stunning victories at the River Trebbia in 218, Lake Trasimene in 217 and Cannae in 216, bringing the Roman Republic to the brink of extinction. The Romans staged a dramatic resurgence in the campaign's later years by winning decisive encounters at the River Metaurus in 207 and Ilipa in 206, followed by Hannibal's final defeat at Zama in 202. Prior to reading the Histories, the reviewer had read Livy's account of the Second Punic War, whose primary source material was the work of the third century BCE historian Quintus Fabius Pictor, and the two historians' prose styles are very different. Livy's writing is florid and eloquent, with the morality it seeks to impart resting just beyond the reader's periphery, while his predecessor's is by comparison much more utilitarian, almost mechanical in its tone and manner of delivery. The didactic nature of Polybius' work is very straightforward, and he always mentions and discusses what he aims to teach his audience.

Book IV - Affairs in Greece contains Polybius' discussion of a civil war in the Arcadian city of Cynaetha, which originates when a group of political exiles receive clemency from the Cynaethan government and then betray the city to the Aetolian League, who lay waste to its environs and occupy it in defiance of Aratus of Sicyon's rival Achaean League. Byzantium and the Black Sea is a narrative exposition on the prosperous Greek settlement of Byzantium and the Pontus (Black Sea) regions. Polybius delineates his own theories, many of which are incorrect, on what will become of the Propontus (Sea of Marmara) and Maeotic Lake (Sea of Asov) in the aftermath of thousands of years of water flow and alluvial detritus. He also evaluates Byzantium's advantages and disadvantages in regard to its geographic and nautical situation, which range from a discussion of the Propontus' powerful marine currents to a description of the Thracian tribes inhabiting the area adjacent to Byzantium.

Polybius provides a brief description of the ascension of the Egyptian King Ptolemy IV, who assumed power in 221 BCE following the death of his father, Euergetes, and of the events leading to the demise of the Spartan King Cleomenes III, which involved a sinister plot hatched by Ptolemy's minister Sosibius, in Book V - The Death of Cleomenes. In Philip and the Greeks, the Macedonian King Philip V receives a missive with news of the Romans' ignominious defeat at the hands of Hannibal Barca in the Battle of Lake Trasimene, and after receiving counsel from Demetrius of Pharos, Philip sends envoys to several Greek towns, culminating in the conference at Naupactos, where he entreats them to put aside their differences and join him in conducting a unified assault on Rome.

Perhaps the most significant section of Polybius' Histories can be found in Book VI, which canvasses a host of political topics such as the different forms of states (kingship, aristocracy, democracy, tyranny, oligarchy and mob rule), and a comparison between the Roman Republic and other states' governments, but it mostly discusses the Roman constitution and the republic's military organization. Polybius contends that the Roman constitution's three component parts - the consuls, the senate and the people - each worked together to provide a series of checks and balances upon one another which prevented one entity from becoming too powerful. For example, the consuls possessed the supreme power of command over the Roman military, but the senate controlled the shipment of grain to keep the soldiers fed, and the consuls, upon relinquishing their command, were constrained to account for their actions taken while in office to the Roman people. The power to make treaties and ratify laws also rested with the people, but they were obligated to the senate under contract to perform tax and revenue collection for a variety of different government transactions.

In Book XII - Criticisms of Timaeus and His Approach to History, Polybius furnishes an assortment of literary critiques delineating what he believed to be glaring examples of subpar research and poor overall veracity that appear in the written works of the fourth-century Greek historian, Timaeus of Tauromenium. He provides a relentless stream of arguments which speak volumes in regard to the traits and practices he believed to have made a good chronicler. "It is clear from the evidence I have quoted that Timaeus' descriptions of Africa, of Sardinia, and above all of Italy are unreliable, and that speaking generally he has quite neglected the business of making first-hand inquiries, which is the historian's most important duty..Yet although Timaeus dwells at great length upon the need for accuracy, he seems to me to fall a long way short of the truth. So far from making a thorough investigation of the facts by questioning others, he cannot give us reliable information even about things which he has seen with his own eyes.."

Polybius' Histories is classified as a 'universal history', meaning that its narrative is concerned with world-spanning occurrences often transpiring at great distances from one another that are not always interrelated. The later books discuss a series of disparate events occurring at different locations throughout Italy and the Mediterranean. They concern major Roman political and military campaigns in the Second Punic War, the First and Second Macedonian Wars, fought from 214-196 BCE, and the Antiochal succession in 164, including key engagements such as Rome's Siege of Syracuse, which lasted from 213-212, as well as Hannibal Barca's treacherous seizure of the wealthy Roman city of Tarentum, also in 212.

These later books also contain Polybius' signature critiques on the classical historians who had predeceased him, analyzing topics such as Timaeus' remarks on Agathokles the Sicilian, and contrasting them with Theopompus' withering commentary regarding the vices of Philip II of Macedon. He provides his reader with brief character profiles of the famous rival generals, Hannibal and Scipio Africanus, and includes an intriguing short essay, On Generalship, that is believed to have been a companion piece to his lost military treatise, Tactics. It addresses the importance of the general possessing intimate knowledge of the terrain, and his ability to correctly calculate the time of day, among other topics related to leadership and strategy.

On Treachery serves as a cautionary tale that explores the deeds of a band of conspirators who betray King Philip V of Macedon, and On the Phalanx uses Polybius' own extensive military expertise to help ascertain the Macedonian phalanx's effectiveness when compared to the traditional Roman maniple. On Fate and Chance juxtaposes man's ability to avoid misfortune arising from events outside his control against his limited powers to affect the factors which lie within it.

This edition of Polybius' Histories is an outstanding translation of an authoritative literary work that has influenced historians and political writers throughout the ages. F.W. Walbank's introduction is invaluable as the reader progresses through the book, discussing the distinct characteristics and societal impact of Polybius' writing, including a selection of recent scholarly works. Polybius unabashedly allows his analytical personality and deep sense of morality to shine through in the pages of the Histories, demonstrating a considerable attention to detail and a profoundly ingrained sense of right and wrong through his spirited critiques of other historians and clearly elucidated moral lessons which accompany the main text. Thank you so very much for reading, I hope you enjoyed the review!

[Yann · Rating 5 out of 5]

Polybe, grec envoyé comme otage à Rome au deuxième siècle était devenu l'ami des puissants de la plus célèbre des cités Latine. Il entreprit de rédiger une histoire universelle des événements récents qui avaient vu l'essor inexorable de l'influence romaine sur les affaires du monde méditerranéenne. Les événements relatés vont des prémisses de la première guerre punique (laquelle fait défaut dans Tite-Live) jusqu'à la destruction finale de Carthage lors de la troisième guerre punique. Les théâtres d'opération vont de l’Espagne à la Mésopotamie, et Polybe rentre dans force détails pour saisir l'enchainement des causes et des conséquences.

Malheureusement, malgré ses mille cinq cent pages, l'ouvrage devient rapidement un vrai gruyère, et on est réduit à se contenter d'une myriade de morceaux éparts qui bien que ne manquant pas d'intérêt individuellement, nous privent de la vision d'ensemble à laquelle l'auteur voulait donner vie. La lecture préalable de Tite-Live permettra de ne pas être trop désorienté. Si on retrouve le souci d'exactitude de Thucydide, on note que Polybe ne manque aucune occasion d'égratigner les historiens qui l'ont précédés lorsqu’il juge qu'ils ont manqué d'esprit critique ou d'objectivité, mais lui même n'est pas exempt de critiques.

Il marque sa personnalité dans le livre, préférant toujours le parti du plus fort, le plus raisonnable à ses yeux. L’intérêt l'emporte sur la justice. Il méprise les causes perdues, quelque soit les ressorts de justice qui les animaient, ce qui l’amène à prononcer des jugements parfois désagréables à lire.

L'édition est agrémentée de nombreuses notes qui préviennent le lecteur, lorsque Polybe prend des libertés avec la vérité. On regrette quand même l’absence totale de cartes, ce qui réduit souvent le lecteur à contempler des suites de syllabes là où il devrait concevoir des noms de villes, de peuples ou de pays.

[Bradley Brincka · Rating 5 out of 5]

“It is when the Romans stand in real danger that they are most to be feared, and this principle applies both to their public and to their private life.”

Polybius chronicles how Rome transformed from an Italian city state to the superpower of the Ancient Mediterranean. His story chiefly concerns the titanic, generational struggle for supremacy between Rome and Carthage.

Polybius expounds on his own theories of historiography and how historians should judge famous characters from the past. Particularly interesting was his digression complaining about overly-academic treatments of subjects. In his view, only men of action—those with experience in war and politics—have anything useful to say on the issues. His diatribe on the subject raises interesting questions about to what extent good writing—historical or otherwise—depends on personal experience in the subject matter.

[Beauregard Bottomley · Rating 5 out of 5]

“A pretty face is better than recommendations,” that’s a quote from the book, and it’s a very Roman (or conquered Greek who thinks they are Roman) thing to say.

Old history books transcend the history they are writing about and always give the reader two things: (1) the history they are writing about, and (2) a meta-history (a history about the history) that is often more interesting than the history they are telling. This book gives the reader both.

Polybius gives the reader the ‘character’ for what the Romans really believed. The mien (person’s look or manner) of the individual is a pre-requisite for effective leadership at least that’s how Polybius tells the story. For Polybius appearance is as important as reality, and I would say that appearances can be deceptive.

Polybius is aware of Machiavellian duplicity and warns his readers to the absurdness of trusting others words when duplicity will suffice. Friends are friends when they need you, but will turn on you when they can. Polybius is never at a wont to warn the reader about the real of the world.

Polybius writes a universal history that shows how Rome flourished and probably needed Carthage to awake them ultimately leading to the decimation of the Greeks and the mastering of the Romans over the whole world. Polybius ignores the pretexts and focuses on the real causes of events while realizing nothing ever happens in a vacuum, and assumes the greatness of Rome for the final reel in the movie.

Geography, astronomy, and science are necessary for understanding history. Polybius educates the reader in all three as he lets his history unfold.

Judea is mentioned in passing and he mostly comments how in a later chapter he will talk about the riches within their holy temple. Unfortunately, that chapter no longer seems to exist and wasn’t in this version of the book.

Polybius documents particularities about the Roman Legions and why they are so formidable as matter-of-fact asides within his history telling. Josephus did the same and both make for some of the most fascinating looks at the might of the Roman Legions and why they were destined to take over the world.

At times this book is painful to read but one knows that they must finish the excruciatingly detailed descriptions of the Greeks being duped by the Romans who want what’s best for themselves while the Greeks are wasting themselves fighting the Anatolians. The names never stop coming, and a gold-star is deserving for anyone who does finish this book, because the reward is embedded within Polybius’ narratives and his asides are worth the trouble.

The Punic War descriptions and Hannibal’s wreaking havoc on the Roman People (can’t yet call them an Empire) are some of the best descriptions I’ve read.

With this book, one gets a great history and, in the process, how a Roman (or conquered Greek) sees the world as nothing but a vassal state for the manifest destiny inherent in the superior mind set of the Roman people (at least according to Polybius), and Polybius realizes that without a great enemy such as Hannibal, Rome might never have thrived, because it took an existential threat to focus Rome towards its eventual hegemony of the known world.

[Peter]

I have put this aside for now. Polybius's history is said to be important to our understanding of the formation of the Roman Empire. This I cannot dispute. But there is no art to description of events, and little analysis. It is basically one damn thing after another, which is principally, one damn battle after another, with no reflection on whether any of this is good. Turncoats and killing without sympathy or apparent need are denounced, but the general continuous war and carnage are treated as normal.

[TG Lin · Rating 4 out of 5]

1. 這本書已經買了超過十年，但到這幾天才把它讀完一遍。

2. 記得當年入手本書時，我按步就班地從頭開始翻閱。沒想到前面竟有一百廿頁的中譯者「搗毒／導讀」，不久便失興趣且放回書櫃。後來自己生活中發生了一堆事，本書在書櫃裡愈埋愈深。今年五月心血來潮再度把它挖出，便直接跳過那堆冗長的中文搗毒，從正文開始把這本有名的作品給看完了。

3. 由於我沒有歷史的專科背景，一直都靠亂讀雜書來認識這段古羅馬的歷史。於是重讀波利比烏斯描寫的這段迦太基戰爭，恰好又在前一陣子看了羅胖《文明之旅．1060年》，才體會到這些「古典作家」的歷史寫作目的。過去我曾經幻想的「歷史科學」是不存在的——科學的狹隘定義是「任何人照著做，都可以獲得相同的結論」。然而真實的現象，幾乎所有的歷史寫作者，都是帶著各自的目的，把人類社會所發生過的事件加以剪裁，最後才轉化為作者本人想表達的成品。因此，不論是本書作者波利比烏斯，或者過去自己所讀過的李維、塔西佗、蘇維托尼烏斯、色諾芬，他們寫歷史的目的都是「道德」。（相較之下，希羅多德的目的是瞎扯淡、凱撒則愛講他的行軍組織能力。）

4. 波利比烏斯是希臘人，因此他寫羅馬–迦太基戰爭時，可以保持在第三者的旁觀角度，不會像許多現代英美作者在情感上一面倒地偏向羅馬共和政權——同時也讓我看懂「費邊戰術」主角「Fabius vs Minucius」當中精心安排的戲劇元素。但正因為波利比烏斯是「阿凱亞聯邦」的重要成員，所以當他在寫希臘事務時，總是把阿凱亞領袖講得像英雄，而與其敵對的「伊托利亞（Aetolia）」則是一群不折不扣的盜賊團夥。惹得本書英譯者會在邊條附注時加以「更正」。

5. 在讀過這幾部古典作者的歷史著作之後，我才領悟到「自由」這個詞的用法，在這裡的意義與我們今天並不相同，那比較像是特指該共同體（國家、城邦、民族、whatever……）能否按其自身的利益，來進行他們的公共事務。換句話說，在某種程度上所締結的「國家同盟」，該群體差不多就等同於「失去自由」了。（嗯……差不多像今天的「日米同盟」。）

6. 這本《波利比烏斯歷史》的寫作方式，有點像是現代的「紀錄片（Documentary）」，而且是主持人（即波利比烏斯本人）會站在鏡頭前向觀眾直接講述的那種表現類型。兩相比較之下，中國史書，主持人（作者）一向是隱藏在幕後，只有在正片播放完畢後出來講述簡單總結（太史公曰、臣光曰）的傳統，完全不一樣。

7. 承前。波利比烏斯的文風非常「聒噪」，一個意念常常要用大段長句翻來覆去來加以解釋。而且他還會趁機夾雜許多對其它同時期的歷史寫作者的批評。

8. 本書最常被人引用的觀點，也就是波利比烏斯論「羅馬憲政」（主要在第六書）的優點，可以克服「王權–貴族–民主」的惡性循環。雖然最後結果我們現代人都曉得並不成立，但這種論點至今仍具有相當的啟發意義，特別是今日島民把民主當成咒語不斷叨唸的情況下。

[Marcos Augusto · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Histories, on which Polybius’ reputation rests, consisted of 40 books, the last being indexes. Books I–V are extant.

Polybius’ original purpose was to narrate the history of the 53 years (220–168 bce)—from Hannibal’s Spanish campaign to the Battle of Pydna—during which Rome had made itself master of the world. Books I–II form an introduction covering Roman history from the crossing into Sicily against the Carthaginians in 264 and including events in various other parts of the world (especially Achaea) between 264 and 220. In Book III, Polybius sketches a modified plan, proposing to add an account of how the Romans exercised their supremacy and to extend coverage to the destruction of Carthage, in 146.

The events of 168–146 were related in Books XXX–XXXIX. Polybius probably conceived his revision after 146, having by this date completed his narrative down to the end of the Second Punic War. At least Books I–VI seem to have been published by about 150; there is no information as to when the rest of the work, including the revised plan in Book III, appeared.

[J · Rating 4 out of 5]

Polybius blends the retelling of the events with his own philosophy about the nature and goals of historical study in addition to his ruminations about the future of Empire (which are pretty much spot on), which can make the text feel a bit uneven at times. That being said, the chapters concerning Hannibal and his campaign against Rome are probably some of the most epically rendered set pieces in written antiquity. And they really help to show how Rome, after vanquishing an enemy this determined and this smart, set its sights on the broader goal of taking over the known world. Best read in small snippets as it can be kind of dry at times.

[Steve Groves · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dry in parts, but overall Polybius seems to have a balanced approach to his recording and reporting of the history. His descriptions of the Carthaginian wars and his impartially in praising Hannibal argues strongly to make his account of the era and battles one of the preferred.

I’ll have to read Livy to compare the two.

[Teri-K · Rating 3 out of 5]

I don't really know anything about Ancient Rome and this is the first Ancient History text I've read; I wasn't expecting much, but actually it surprised me. Polybius' personality comes through at times and I quite enjoyed it. He scorns other historians, informs the reader as to what he's doing and why, and generally enlivens the proceedings with his comments.

That's not to say that there weren't times when my brain glazed over a bit, especially in the sections where the Romans are fighting a seemingly endless procession of tribes I've never heard of before. But I did learn a fair amount, including why in the world that guy Hannibal crossed the Alps with elephants, and what happened next.

I do plan on following this up with some more reading about early Rome, and I'm glad I gave this a try. It wasn't as intimidating as I expected it to be.

[Ariq Hatibie · Rating 5 out of 5]

Polybius taught me the word “vicissitude” and after that I just felt like my friends liked me a lot more

[Dylan · Rating 5 out of 5]

*DISCLAIMER* I have not read this entire text; I didn’t think it prudent to, and have skimmed over about 30 percent of it. My review is based off what I read thoroughly (with notes), which I can say firmly is at least 60 percent.

[Mete Oguz · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a sweeping account of the time period of about 260 - 150 BC or so, by the Greek/Roman historian Polybius - who lived during this time period and accompanied the great Roman general Scipio on many of his campaigns.

It had really interesting parts that were very enlightening and intriguing to read. It goes into a lot of detail but in my opinion the beauty of history frequently lies in those details that would be lost if we read a summary or commentary of the work.

He starts of with the First Punic War and describes its culmination. Then he goes onto trace the rebuilding of the Carthaginian Empire in Spain by Hamilcar and then Hasdrubal - he frequently analyses their tactics and thinking. When Hannibal takes command we have a nice and detailed account of the different communications he has with the Celts and Gauls living South of the Alps and also East of the Ebro river, we see the genius tactics of Hannibal in subduing or persuading to get these tribes to join him against Rome.

Especially interesting was certain specific details - such as the crossing of the Alps with Hannibal's huge army containing many animals, horses, mule-trains etc. The way Polybius describes the snow-laden mountainside and the difficulties and tactics employed by the Carthaginians really makes you imagine and think about it. Also I loved the different river crossings that were attempted with elephants etc and how with amazing tactics Hannibal manages to transport his entire army across a raging river with a huge barbarian army waiting on the opposite bank - you should read to find out - I won't spoil it.

There are frequently very exciting events happening such as the betrayal of the Romans by certain Celtic garrisons, massacring the Romans while they sleep and defecting to the Carthaginians - and then we have the amazing Scipio and his great tactics - especially his sack and massacre of the city of New Carthage (Hannibal's main base in Spain) and the way in which he evades the tide through an amphibious assault is really amazing to learn about.

The story is both a story of heroism and of backstabbing and cunning guile. Both the Romans and the Carthaginians are the protagonists and the antagonists simultaneously. Polybius obviously really admires Hamilcar and Hannibal, and Scipio. He tells an amazing tale while frequently side tracking to comment and analyse different decisions taken and events that unfold.

His amazing descriptions of the phalanx formation and its genius logic were also very memorable, as he really seems quite knowledgable about the details of ancient warfare. We even get to learn about Roman soldier uniforms and how colourful they actually were (not just red and gold like they're in films) - and how they had colourful feathers etc poking 1.5 feet out of their helmets etc. The book is full of stuff which seem insignificant but which are very interesting in my opinion.

He relies a lot on 'tyche' or fate/fortune/luck as a causality in certain events which he cannot find a way of explaining in human terms, such as natural events such as bad weather turning the tide of a battle etc.

All in all this is a pretty fun book to read for anyone interested in the rise of Rome, the period in which Rome really consolidates its power around the Mediterranean basin, that is around 250 - 150 BC or so. It is also interesting to see a contemporary outlook of these times, and seeing certain subtle references to daily life in those times just makes the book even more immersive.

As I'm not a historian of Rome, some parts of the book such as the excessively detailed descriptions of Rome's constitution and political transformations etc did bore me a tiny bit - on the whole it was insignificant though, so I give this ancient book a solid four stars - and that is me using a 2016 benchmark point scale.

[Toren Spencer-Gray · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Rise of the Roman Empire
Polybius

1. The rulers had to rule over a country that was a large territory with a large population.
2. The study of history is good because it enables us to look at the past.
3. The element of the unexpected plays an important part in Polybius' approach to history...Aristotle defines its function as the arousing of fear and pity.
4. The Persians for a certain period exercised their rule and supremacy over a vast territory, but every time that they ventured to pass beyond the limits of Asia they endangered the security not only of their empire but of their own existence.
5. Later, by overthrowing the Persian Empire, they also became the rulers of Asia; but although they then obtained a larger number of states and territories than any other people before them, they left the greater part of the world in the hands of others. They did not even once attempt to dispute the possession of Sicily, Sardinia or Africa, and the most warlike tribes of Western Europe were, to speak the plain truth, unknown to them.
6. The Romans, on the other hand, have brought not just mere portions but almost the whole of the world under their rule, and have left an empire which far surpasses any that exists today.
7. Some events in history are unrelated to other events, and some events are closely related to each other.
8. Fortune has steered almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and forced them to converge upon one and the same goal.
9. As it is I notice that while various historians deal with isolated wars and certain of the subjects connected with them, nobody, so far as I'm aware, has made any effort to examine the general and comprehensive scheme of events, when it began, whence it originated, and how it produced the final result.
10. Polybius' conception of Fortune is of a force in the universe which takes note of change for its own sake...
11. The image of a man is worth more than the man himself. A sportsman's aura and mystique are more impressive than the sportsman in real life.
12. The same is true for a country. A country is greater in image than it is in real life.
13. In studying history, focus less on the dates, locations and events themselves, and focus more on the principles and themes behind the events.
14. Still however, the facts can be important.
15. In one event, the Romans were able to negotiate a peace on terms which were acceptable to the Gauls.
16. They insinuate themselves into the city under the guise of friendship, and then at once took possession of it. Once they had so quickly and so easily appropriated such a fine city and its adjoining territory, others were quick to imitate them.
17. During one event, the Syracusans lost the support of their allies and were quickly compelled to take refuge within their city.
18. When one ruler came into power, because he was young, he was watched closely so as to not abuse his power.
1. He therefore made a family alliance with Leptines by marrying his daughter, so that whenever he had to go away on active service he could count on leaving Leptines behind as the guardian of his interests at home.
2. His battle order was so arranged that the infantry and cavalry which consisted of Mamertine citizens were grouped under his personal command and held in reserve, as if he intended them to attack from another quarter.
3. Conflicts existed between the army and the domestic police.
4. Thus the Mamertines after losing the support they had enjoyed, next suffered a crushing defeat on their own territory for the reasons that I have described.
5. Only a little while before, the Romans had inflicted the death penalty on a number of their fellow citizens because they had broken faith with the people ofRhegium.
6. The object of the Romans was to capture and acquire as much territory as possible -- world domination.

1. Then, when he had effectively achieved his purpose and rid the army of its unruly and seditious elements, he proceeded to enrol a considerable body of mercenaries whom he picked himself, and thereafter continued in secure control of affairs.
2. Even after long consideration, the Senate did not approve the proposal to send help to Messana; they took the view that any advantage which could result from relieving the place would be counterbalanced by the inconsistency of such an action.
3. However, ultimately a resolution in favour of sending help was carried out.
4. The army marched onto enemy territory.
5. He ordered his troops to stand to at an early hour and at first light led them out to battle. He engaged the enemy, killed large numbers of their troops, and forced the rest to retreat in disorder to the towns in the vicinity. These successes enabled him to raise the seige of Messana and then to move over to the offensive, ravging the territory of the Syracusans and their allies and scouring the country without meeting any resistance.
6. This then, was the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea with an army, and it was for these reasons and in the context which I have described that they did so.
7. In other wors, they must acquaint themselves with the period and with the process whereby the Romans began to advance towards better fortunes after the defeat they had suffered on their own soil, and with the details of how and when, after becoming the masters of Italy, they applied themselves to the conquest of countries further afield.
8. There is no need for me to relate all these developments in detail, nor would this be useful to my readers; my plan does not require me to record them in full, but merely to refer to them in passing by way of introduction to those events which form my principal theme.
9. I shall, however, try to give a rather fuller account of the first war which was fought between Rome and Carthage for the possession of Sicily. This is because it would be difficult to find any contest which was longer in its duration, more intensively prepared for on both sides, or more unremittingly pursued once begun, or one which involved more battles or more decisive changes of Fortune.
10. I have already mentioned the fact that the historians who are reputed to be the most expert authorities on the subject, have failed, in my opinion, to report the truth as they should have done.

11. So if history is deprived of the truth, we are left with nothing but an idle, unprofitable tale.
12. At the beginning of his second book Philinus tells us that the Carthaginians and Syracusans made war against Messana and laid siege to the city; that the Romans then arrived by sea, entered the town, and promptly made a sortie to attack the Syracusans, but that after suffering heavy losses in the fighting, they fell back upon Messana.
13. But he then goes on to say that after the battle Hiero, the ruler of Syracuse, completely lost his head, that he not only set fire to his camp and his tents and hurried back to Syracuse the same night, but also abandoned all the forts which had been built to threaten the territory of Messana.
14. The senators had to assess how powerful their country's army was.
15. They concluded that their own numbers must be reinforced if they were to be strong enough to confront their opponentsand maintain control over affairs.
16. The army is a masculine field.

1:00pm - 2:00pm
17. But so long as the Carthaginians held unchallenged control of the sea, the issue of the war still hung in the balance.
18. The Romans repeatedly raided and devastated the Italian coasts.
19. The Carthaginians had for generations enjoyed an unchallenged supremacy at sea.
20. When they first ventured to transport their forces to Messana, not only had they no decked ships, but no warships at all, not so much as a single galley.
21. For skill at sea, one army built simple boats and constructed gun turrets on them.
22. They steered and then attacked in formation.
23. Instead they relied on their speed and circled round the enemy, hoping that they could safely ram them either broadside or astern.
24. In all they lost fifty ships.
25. His squadron included beaked vessels which could ram the enemy and also had the speed required for an outflanking manoeuvre.
26. The senator said, “Most of the decisions that I have to make are based on personal experience and judgment.”
27. The generals accepted his criticisms and decided to follow his advice
28. The army was stationed in the country to display its military might.

1. One army was not friendly to reporters trying to get information and report the news about the war.
2. One army rode elephants for transportation. The elephants, however, were prone to stampede and trample people, and turn on their masters.
3. The enemy's soldiers had orders to shoot the army's elephants in an engagement.
4. One army attacked the enemy's boats while they were still in the harbor.
5. The people greeted the army with loud cheers and clapping of hands.
6. The general promised generous bounties to soldiers who performed individual acts of bravery, and he assured them that the whole army would be treated with favour and handsomely rewarded by the government.
7. All army's are essentially equal, with minor differences.
8. Since the army's ships were so fast, they could use their superior speed to retreat safely.
9. One army attacked the enemies corn supply, to lessen the amount of food they had.
10. The army attacked the towers with battering rams.
11. The general had knowledge of how the enemy's army was entering the country: from the ports or from the land.

1. At about the same time one of the consuls, Gnarlus Fulvius sailed from Rome with a fleet of 200 ships, while the other, Aulius Postuminius, set out with the land forces.
2. There is a difference between a war with the army of a country and a war with the people of a country.
3. To describe their situation I must go back to the period when they first took possession of these regions.
4. The summits of the Alps are completely uninhabited on account both of their rugged character and of the depth of the snow which covers them all the year round.
5. The inhabitants wore black clothes to signify mourning for the leader Phaeton.
6. To learn something about the history of the region, examine inhabitants of the region to the north.
7. As they slept on straw and leaves, ate meat and practised no other pursuits but war and agriculture, their lives were very simple and they were completely unacquainted with any art or science.
8. The people and animals slept on hay and leaves.
9. The army made raids on their territory when they saw what prosperity the enemy had achieved.
10. The Celts made another attempt to invade in force, and this time the Romans had intelligence of their attack.
11. This was the first place in Gaul where they planted a colony, and they named it Sena after the Gallic tribe which had previously inhabited it.
12. When they had to meet a second time, they came to the contest like trained and seasoned athletes in military operations.
13. They took count, and made lists of men military age who were capable of bearing arms.
14. Their goal in one sequence of attacks was to disrupt the peace and comfort of the enemy.

1. One country refused to make an open declaration of war.
2. After some reflection, he understood why the course of events unfolded as they did.
3. Along with senator Antigonus, Acornorinth was a great leader. Related to the Corinthians and Macedonians.
4. The King took personal command of the operations, and ranked Acrocorinth beneath him.
5. Military life in general is difficult.
6. The signal for action for the army and the cavalry was to be a red flag which would be raised by the general.
7. His action created a diversion. He blew up a truck, and then the guards went to deal with the truck, and then he entered the gates of the palace.

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The Rise of the Roman Empire, Polybius
1. The soldiers dressed in the uniform of the enemy, and then went to the enemy base and attacked.
2. He then ordered Hasdrubal to supervise the passage of the army, whilst he himself crossed the river at once and proceeded to give audience to the envoys who had arrived from neighbouring districts.
3. All ranks within the entrenched camp had taken their evening meal and retired to rest; the Celts then waited for the greater part of the night to pass, siezed their arms about the time of the morning watch, and fell upon the Romans who were quartered near them.
4. Generally speaking, so long as their infantry forces were still intact, the people's confidence in the ultimate success of the Roman arms remained unaffected.
5. Longus' men then assembled at Ariminium in fulfilment of the oath they had taken, and their general led them out with all speed to join forces with Scipio.
6. In a war, there have to be a moderate amount of soldiers, too many soldiers is just unrealistic.
7. After this he discovered that some of the Celtic tribes who lived between the valleys of the Trebbia and the Po had made a treaty of friendship with him, but were at the same time negotiating with the Romans, believing that in this way they would make themselves safe from both Romans and Carthaginians alike; and so he sent a force of 2,000 infantry and about 1,000 Celtic and Numidian horsemen with orders to raid the district.
8. And so, since the time he chose for the engagement was dictated not by the facts of the situation but by his personal motives, his judgement was bound to be at fault.
9. He was anxious to draw the enemy into battle, first to exploit the warlike spirit of the Celts while they were still active, secondly to engage the Roman legions while they were still raw recruits and had little battle experience, and thirdly to come to grips before Scipio had recovered.
10. "The Sicely Sicilians."

11. When they saw this, they abandoned hope of restoring the situation or of returning to their camp; they were deterred from this partly through their fear of the enemy's cavalry, and partly by the storms of rain which continued to pour down and increased the difficulties of recrossing the Trebbia.
12. Meanwhile Hannibal, who was passing the winter in Cisalpine Gaul, kept the Romans he had captured in the battle under guard and gave them only just sufficient rations to keep them alive; the prisoners taken from the allies, on the other hand, he treated with great kindness, and later summoned them to an assembly and made a speech to them.
13. Their cities and harbours had suffered decline as a result of Roman rule.
14. He therefore had a number of wigs made, each of which created the impression of a man of a different age, and these he constantly changed, while at the same time dressing in a style which matched the wig.
15. The soldiers took familiar paths to their base.
16. The whole army was affected above all by lack of sleep, since they were obliged to keep moving for four days and three nights, during which time they were continuously marching through water, but the Celts suffered far more from fatigue than the rest and lost many more men. Most of the pack animals fell and perished in the mud.
17. Hannibal's first action was to pitch his own camp at the edge of the swamps, his object being to rest his troops while they reconnoitred the region in front of him and collected intelligence about the enemy.
18. In the same way the commander must train his eye upon the weak spots of his opponent's defence, not in his body but in his mind.

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1.The general thought that they could carry off their plunder without a battle, without suffering any casualties of war.
2. He constantly disparaged Fabius for his feeble and dilatory conduct of the campaign.
3. The Roman general had several character flaws, which influenced his actions in the war.
4. According to one source, a vulnerability in a long wall divided by tall posts is to put a tool to screw and stretch or widen the space between the two posts, thus allowing people to fit through and access the protected territory.
5. In summertime, the army had summer uniforms, and in wintertime, the army had arctic uniforms.
6. Please visit my blog, www.scholarlyinformation.com for more university-level book reviews, food ideas, and more.

Thank you,
🌹🌹Toren Spencer-Gray

[Bill P. · Rating 3 out of 5]

Having a guilty pleasure that includes reading roman adventure novels of carnage and conquest, not to mention modern historians takes on the conflicts and events of the ancient world, I feel compelled to occassionally take on the guys that tend to be the source materials. These can seem pretty forbidding at the outset, but contemporary translations of Herodotus and Polybius made them both pretty easily digested. I really enjoyed David Anthony Durham's take on the Second Punic War (Prince of Carthage) and I have started a series from a UK writer whose characters are in the midst of the first punic war (both of which gain some modern relevance with todays events in Tunisia where the original Carthage was located). Polybius' The Rise of the Roman Empire may not be a page turner, but it is loaded with historical detail and speculations about motivations of individuals and societies and tangents about conflicts in other parts of the world that set the stage for the rise of the Roman juggernaut. Good stuff.

Next up, Plutarch.

[Rick · Rating 4 out of 5]

After Herodotus’ Histories and Thucydides’ History of the Peloponesian wars, this book logically follows the genre. The book is very readable and well written. The level of detail of the narrative differs greatly, probably because of parts that were lost in time.
I especially enjoyed reading Hannibal’s journey through the mountains and subsequent battles in Italy.

[Andrew Foote · Rating 3 out of 5]

I have been reading this book very gradually for several months, so at the point I'm writing this review, the whole of the text is not particularly fresh in my mind.

The reason I started reading this book was that I started reading Salammbô, Flaubert's novel set in Carthage during the Mercenary War. From the introduction to the translation of Salammbô I was reading, I learned that Flaubert mostly used Polybius as a source. Then when I was in a bookshop, I saw a copy of Polybius for sale, and bought it. Since it was a physical copy rather than an e-book I ended up returning to it often enough that I actually managed to finish it eventually---unlike Salammbô, which I still haven't finished. In fact it's now been long enough since I read any of Salammbô that if I want to start reading it again, I'll probably just restart from the beginning of the book.

That's the proximal cause for me reading this book anyway. I guess if you want to go into deeper motivations, I think the main reason I kept reading is that I'm curious about what people were like and how they thought during antiquity. What kept me reading it was not so much the history being told, but the character of Polybius as revealed in the text.

I was interested in *some* of the history, like the story of the First and Second Punic Wars. I had the advantage of knowing the basic outline of the story beforehand, in those cases. But the rest of the book is about what was going in Greece during this time (Polybius was a Greek, not a Roman), and that all kind of went over my head. In principle, there should be an interesting story about how Greek was incorporated into the Roman world. But Polybius's account of it was, for me, a bit too disjointed; it came across as a series of disconnected stories about Greeks feuding with one another, with Rome as an outside power who got dragged in every now and then. To be fair, that might have been how it came across at the time to the Greeks as well.

The disjointedness might also be a side-effect of me only reading the book every now and then over several months. And also, the fact that substantial portions of the story were cut out obviously didn't help either. Actually this is one of the disappointing things about this book. A lot of what Polybius wrote has been lost to history, unfortunately. He divided the text into thirty nine books, but apparently only the first five survive in full, with the rest surviving only in fragments. The Penguin edition which I was reading has been abridged, on top of that.

Anyway, with regard to the character of Polybius, it's strikingly different from the other ancient historian I've read, which is Herodotus. For me, Polybius is rather less likeable. His approach to writing history is more "scientific" and "rational"; he's less of an entertainer than Herodotus. I guess he's following the tradition of Thucydides in this (unfortunately I haven't read Thucydides, so can't compare). Also, while Herodotus comes across as quite genial, IIRC, Polybius is rather curmudgeonly. He likes to criticise rivial historians and to pontificate about morality, and a lot of the statements he makes about human nature or the nature of history or whatever come across as questionable and a bit dumb or naive, rather than wise. But it's still interesting to get to know such a character; it's not something that I would necessarily count as a negative aspect of the book. It's possible that these differences in the character of Polybius and Herodotus reflect something about the changes between the Greek and Roman "character" in general; that would accord with my impression of what those changes were. But it could of course also just be individual personality differences.

What else? Oh, one thing I think I learned from this book is that the expansion of Rome was not justified simply as a matter of raw might-makes-right style conquering all available neighbours just because they can, at least not at this stage of their history during the 2nd century BC. The way Polybius tells it, they just interacted with neighbouring powers as peers, helped resolve conflicts, stood up for themselves when necessary, and just managed to end up in a place where they had total dominance over everyone else because of that. Kind of like how people sometimes say (quite controversially) that the British empire was basically an accident. This might not be a really accurate view of what they were doing (Polybius wrote the Histories while living in Rome, and was generally strongly pro-Roman) but even then it's interesting to see it could be portrayed that way, since I think there are certainly other empires in history which did openly conquer just because they could without feeling that they needed to justify it.

[Athena of Velaris]

”I think there can be no doubt what lies in the future for Rome. When a state has warded off many serious threats, and has come to attain undisputed supremacy and sovereignty, it is easy to see that, after a long period of settled prosperity, lifestyles become more extrava-gant, and rivalry over political positions and other such projects becomes fiercer than it should be. If these processes continue for very long, society will change for the worse. The causes of the deterioration will be lust for power combined with contempt for political obscurity, and personal ostentation and extravagance. It will be called a democratic revolution, however, because the time will come when the people will feel abused by some politicians' self-seeking ambition, and will have been flattered into vain hopes by others' lust for power.

Under these circumstances, all their decisions will be motivated by anger and passion, and they will no longer be content to be subject or even equal to those in power. No, they will want everything, or almost everything, for themselves. When this happens, the new constitution will be described in the most attractive terms, as 'freedom' and "democracy', but in fact it will be the worst of all constitutions, mob-rule.”

Prophetic in Roman times and hopefully not our own.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

I loved this book for passages such as the following:

"In my opinion, nature has proclaimed to men that truth as the greatest of gods and has invested her with the greatest power. at least, when all are trying to suppress her and all probabilities are on the side of falsehood. she somehow finds her own means of penetrating into the hearts of men. and sometimes shows her power at once sometimes after being darkened for years. Alas, by her own force prevails and crushes falsehood." Voila un homme!

Much of the criticism of his writings I found unwarranted. I like that he goes into major digressions on his process and how various authors failed. Its good for future historians and readers to understand these things. I appreciate even more is musings on various events. There are so many passages where he is giving the reader the wisdom of the ages from one who lived through incredible times.

Sadly, much of his work is missing but this also may have redeeming aspects. The reason this is 4 and not 5 is he is long winded and to his credit, admittedly so. He also dwells too much on Greek affairs for my taste. Its actually a 4.5ish but we do not have that option now do we?

[Matt McCormick · Rating 4 out of 5]

I enjoyed this contemporary account of the Punic Wars. True to his word Polybius describes “world” history of the time touching on events in Byzantium, Spain, Greece, Egypt and Syria. Especially enjoyable was his discussion of various constitutional structures. His argument for a mixed design with coequal constituencies checking each other’s authority seems obviously superior but only because of modern day use. After the fall of Republican Rome and for the next 1,500 years, such a government has seldom found. One of Polybius’s tenants was that the “people” had a special obligation to hold the aristocracy ( Executive and Senate) accountable for their individual character. It was through public honors and punishments that the right type of person was motivated to lead justly and unselfishly.

[Lysergius · Rating 4 out of 5]

A fascinating account of the Punic wars and contemporary events in Greece by a Greek historian.

[Charles Hull · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid history, felt like a combo of Thucydides and Tacitus' Annals but with a far sassier narrator. I will say I wish this volume translated the fragments of book 9 or any other besides book 12. Book 12 (save one comparison between the art of history and medicine) is just complaining about other historians, though Polybius gets some entertaining jabs in.

[Dylan Jones · Rating 3 out of 5]

Often clear-eyed and insightful into world politics circa 250-146 BC, I can't say this was a page turner