Fire and Fortitude: The US Army in the Pacific War, 1941-1943

Pacific War Trilogy #1

by John C. McManus

An engrossing, epic history of the US Army in the Pacific War

"Out here, mention is seldom seen of the achievements of the Army ground troops," wrote one officer in the fall of 1943, "whereas the Marines are blown up to the skies." Even today, the Marines are celebrated as the victors of the Pacific, a reflection of a well-deserved reputation for valor. Yet the majority of fighting and dying in the war against Japan was done not by Marines but by unsung Army soldiers.

John C. McManus, one of our most highly acclaimed historians of World War II, takes readers from Pearl Harbor—a rude awakening for a military woefully unprepared for war—to Makin, a sliver of coral reef where the Army was tested against the increasingly desperate Japanese. In between were nearly two years of punishing combat as the Army transformed, at times unsteadily, from an undertrained garrison force into an unstoppable juggernaut, and America evolved from an inward-looking nation into a global superpower.

At the pinnacle of this richly told story are the generals: Douglas MacArthur, a military autocrat driven by his dysfunctional lust for fame and power; Robert Eichelberger, perhaps the greatest commander in the theater yet consigned to obscurity by MacArthur's jealousy; "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell, a prickly soldier miscast in a diplomat's role; and Walter Krueger, a German-born officer who came to lead the largest American ground force in the Pacific. Enriching the narrative are the voices of men otherwise lost to history: the uncelebrated Army grunts who endured stifling temperatures, apocalyptic tropical storms, rampant malaria and other diseases, as well as a fanatical enemy bent on total destruction.

This is an essential, ambitious book, the first of two volumes, a compellingly written and boldly revisionist account of a war that reshaped the American military and the globe and continues to resonate today.

Genres: History, World War II, Military History, Nonfiction, American History, Military Fiction, War

624 pages, Hardcover

First published July 30, 2019

About the author

John C. McManus is an author, military historian and award-winning professor of military history at the Missouri University of Science and Technology. He is one of America’s leading experts on the history of modern American soldiers in combat.

Reviews

[happy · Rating 4 out of 5]

With this book, Dr McManus has delivered an excellent look at the US Army’s war in the Pacific. Most casual readers of World War II don’t know much about the Army’s efforts in that theater of the War. In this book and its sequels, Dr McManus sets out to rectify that lack. In the prefix, the author makes the statement that by the end of the war; the US had 6 Marine Divisions in the Pacific while the Army had 21 Infantry/Airborne Divisions and enough independent Infantry Regiments and Armor Battalions to make up 3 or 4 more. He also states that the Marines made 15 opposed landings during the war. In the Philippines alone the 8th Army made 35 landings - obviously the Marines had better PR :)

Dr. McManus not only looks at combat operations, but the logistical support the Army provided. In looking at the logistical support he looks at the affect all those Americans, more than 1 million passed through, had on Australia. Most of the time relations were good, but there were some bumpy spots. The author even covers one of the black eyes the Americans suffered in Aussie/American relations – the Battle of Brisbane when US and Aussie troops rioted.

In this narrative – the first of a purposed series – Dr McManus covers operations from Pearl Harbor through Operation Galvanic – the invasion of the Gilberts. Of course most know this from the invasion of Tarawa and the 2nd Marine Division, but the Army also played a role with the invasion of Makin Atoll – more on this later.

The author has some opinions on McArthur and his leadership/management as well as other senior Army leaders. To put it mildly he doesn't think much of McA as a human being. He states bluntly the McA did not deserve his MOH he received for his actions in the defense of the Philippines and later prevented its award to two of his subordinates, Wainwright for Bataan and Eichelberger for Buna, so they wouldn't upstage him. The author is also very critical of McA’s performance during the early stages of the war both for his defense of the Philippines/Bataan and his handling of Austrailian troops during the defense of New Guinea. In spite of the fact McA rarely visited the front lines; the author doesn’t discount his personal courage. He relates the story of McA leaving the tunnels on Corregidor every evening during the heaviest shelling a watch the explosions. IMO his main criticism of McA has to do with his overwhelming ego – he couldn’t stand anyone to get more or better press coverage than he did. Almost all the news coming out of the SW Pacific Theater was “McArthur’s troops…” no mention at all of subordinate commands or commanders. In fact when Eichelberger was mentioned in the press by name for actions at Buna – McA threatened to have him relieved if it ever happened again!

On a positive note, most of the other senior leaders of the Army get high praise. These individuals include the afore mentioned Wainwright and Eichelberger plus "Lightening Joe" Collins and "Sandy" Patch on Guadalcanal. Both Patch and Collins went on to much more fame and notoriety in Europe - Collins as VII Corps CG and Patch as 7th Army CG.

In this narrative, Mr. McManus covers the events from the Army’s involvement at Pearl Harbor, the Philippines/Bataan, New Guinea/Buna, the beginnings of the Solomon’s/Guadalcanal, Alaska and lastly the 27th ID's assault on Makin Atoll during Operation Galvanic/Tarawa.

In telling the story of the Army’s contributions at Pearl Harbor, Dr. McManus makes the comment that since the Japanese targets were the Navy and Air Fields, the Army’s contributions were incidental. That said he does praise the performance of those soldiers who were incidentally involved including the medical personal. One story that I found fascinating is that there was a medical conference occurring in Honolulu at the time of the attack and one of presenters at the conference happened to be one of the leading trauma surgeons in the US, who also happened to have served as a Army surgeon in France in WW I. After the attack he went to Trippler Medical Center and offered his services, which were gratefully accepted and after 72 straight hours of surgery, the commander of the hospital came to him and told him, welcome back to the Army, you are now a Col.

In discussing the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, Dr. McManus really brings a spot light to McA’s strategic failings. Retreating into the Bataan Peninsula had long been the plan when the Japanese invaded. Upon assuming the Generalissimo role of the Philippine Army, McA changed the plans to defend the beaches. He had neither the men nor material to undertake such a strategy. The Philippine Army while having an end strength of 10 divisions, those divisions were barely equipped and trained. In some cases, units had weapons and no ammo while other units had ammo and no weapons. In other words it was an invitation to disaster. After the invasion, it became obvious that the "defend the beaches" strategy was flawed, to put it mildly. McA reverted to the Bataan strategy. However by then there was not enough time or rolling stock to get all of supplies needed, esp food, to Bataan – leading to the largest surrender in US military history.

McA’s arrival in Australia and the jolt it gave to the morale of the population as well as Australia’s importance as a staging area/logistics hub are well done.

The coverage of Guadalcanal mainly covers the Army’s contributions and the final expulsion of the Japanese from the Island. The contributions Gen Collins and the 25th ID, as well as are those 23rd ID (Americal Div). The US commander in the final stages of campaign, Gen Patch also receives praise for his actions. Both Collins and Patch will go on to Europe and receive much more notice and fame in the press.

The author also gives a pretty good look at the early Army operations in New Guinea and specifically the 32nd ID who was tasked to take Buna. When things don’t go well McA sends the Corps Cdr, Gen Eichelberger up to relieved the 32nd’s CG, which Eichleberger doesn’t want to do. What Eichelberger finds is a dispirited division and the author actually agrees the relief was justified. Under Eichelberger’s leadership – the 32nd regains momentum and captures Buna. Gen Marshall wants to award Eichelberger the MOH for his action – including borrowing a rifle and taking out a sniper, but as mentioned, McA kills the award. The author relates another story involving McA’s deceit towards Eichelberger. According to Dr. McManus, McA had promised Eichelberger that he would not stand in his way if greater opportunities came along. Eisenhower wanted Eichelberger to command the US 1st Army at D-Day and McA told Marshall he couldn’t spare him and then never told Eichelberger about it.

The last actions in the book are the 27th ID’s invasion of Makin in November 1943. This action in some way foreshadows what would happen on Saipan some 9 mths later. The Corps commander, Marine Gen H.M. Smith extremely displeased with the 27th’s performance, thinking they are taking way, way too long and almost relieves the CG then. On Saipan the same thing happens and the Smith does relieve the CG and it poisons Army/Marine relations for generations.

I’ve gone on way too long – to sum it up, this a well written, well researched look at the early war contributions of the US Army to the war in the Pacific. I would rate this 4+ stars in GR allowed.

[Eric Wishman · Rating 3 out of 5]

John C. McManus' Fire and Fortitude: The US Army in the Pacific War, 1941-1943 provides a different perspective of war in the Pacific Theater which is typically dominated by Navy/Marine accounts (at least from what I've read).

McManus covers Army engagements from Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Guadalcancal, China, New Guinea, the Aleutians, and the Gilbert Islands. He describes military operations without delving into too many details. The books covers non-military action just as much as the actual battles. For example, it covers experiences of those stationed in Australia, POW treatment, frontline conditions from the terrain to the food they ate as well as the conditions when out of the line like how they kept themselves entertained. Through the different operations, he also covers the logistical challenges of fighting in the South Pacific.

I appreciated the background and character studies of some of the lesser known commanders like Robert Eichelberger, Alexander "Sandy" Patch, and Oscar Griswold. Most course, MacArthur plays in prominent role throughout the narrative.

By the way, the maps in the book are lousy.

If I could, I would give this book 3.5 stars. It was a good introduction to the Army's activities in the Pacific Theater but if you're looking for company by company account of the action, you'll have to look elsewhere.

[Mike Kershaw · Rating 2 out of 5]

The US Army in the Pacific needs to be written about but unfortunately this author doesn't seem to capable of doing it objectively. While he's to be commended for including the Army's defense of the Philippines in the opening chapters (often skipped over), he concludes this chapter of his promised series on the subject somewhat arbitrarily without apparent reason -- other than length of text, in the Gilberts. He suffers a somewhat schizophrenic view of MacArthur -- alternatively damming and praising him without trying to bring him into perspective as others, such as Richard Frank, have done. He's to be commended for pointing out that this American Army was the third largest of the expeditionary era (after the WWII ETO Army and the AEF of WWI) and that America's ground conflict post war would be largely centered in the Pacific (Korea and Vietnam) -- additional material justifying his efforts. His political correctness seems hamfisted and his characterization of the Army befitting someone often stereotyped in academia today, not one who served himself.

[Sleepy Boy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent human military history here.

[Casey · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author has written  books detailing World War II  with this one addressing  the role the Army played in during the first half of the war. It is well researched and written and is an interesting read. He points out, as many authors have, the self-centered ineptitude of Douglas McArthur which caused a much higher loss of life than necessary in the demise of the Phillipines. I found the section about americans in Austraila an interesting chapter in dealing with understanding the english language as used by the Aussies. He also describes the problems the Austrailians had in understanding those soldiers from the deep south.

I recomend this book for those looking for a better understanding of the role the Army played in the war with Japan during the first half of the conflict.

I received a free Kindle copy of this book courtesy of NetGalley and the publisher with the understanding that I would post a review on Net Galley, Goodreads, Amazon and my fiction book review blog. I also posted it to my Facebook and Twitter pages.

[Ron · Rating 4 out of 5]

“And on the American side, the land war was fought primarily by the Army, though popular memory has focused almost exclusively on the comparatively smaller Marine effort.”

A corrective for the incomplete and Marine Corp-centric detailing of the other half of World War Two. Based on original sources from dairies of dead Japanese and American soldiers to those of the three-stars. Excellent context for American involvement in subsequent Southeast and Southwest Asia conflicts.

"The Death March was not an organized, calculated atrocity, in the manner of the gas chambers at Auschwitz or the cold-blooded executions in Katyn Forest. Instead, it was the product of chaos, poor planning, command confusion, inertia, disorganization, and dismissive cruelty. The ubiquitous cruelty of many Japanese guards and their propensity toward mindless violence was another matter altogether."

Probably more than the average reader wishes of the brutality of war, especially of the inhuman treatment of the survivors Bataan. Repetitious and slow moving. McManus repeats whole paragraphs and pages of previous material.

“He was . . . the only commander I recall who used the heading bearing his own name for official messages and communiqués,” Eisenhower later said. Of 142 communiqués dispatched by USAFFE headquarters during this period, 109 mentioned only MacArthur.

Exhaustive detailing of the leadership foibles which helped and hindered the Allied effort in the Pacific and Asia. Probably only needed to be told once what an egomaniac MacArthur was. He was not alone. That the Army, Navy and Marines fought their own intercollegiate war is not news either.

"One soldier, writing to his mother late in 1943, expressed a fairly typical sentiment. 'I guess everyone back home thinks MacArthur is some swell fellow. But the boys in the Southwest Pacific have another idea. He doesn’t do anything but ride around in his big car and live in a Hotel. He doesn’t know how it is up here in the jungle.'"

Much has been written, then and now, about the huge materiel advantage of the United States, but having all that stuff and getting it to the soldiers at the front are two different things. Over and over the United States flunks logistics. In Vietnam, in the Gulf War and (I suspect) since we ship piles of stuff to the warfighters, the medics, the cooks, and much of it ends up rotting on some beach. (I was at Dhahran in 1990; the desert next to the cargo ramp was filled with hundreds on pallets (big, modern pallets) of stuff and nobody knew where it was or who it was for. My aircraft maintainers searched it for pallets for other maintainers throughout Arabia, but the war was practically over before that backlog got cleared away.

“The true determining factor in this conflict’s outcome, as with nearly all wars, was human will. In the Pacific, the Americans would be determined to fight to the finish with all weapons at their disposal, while observing only the rules that led to survival and victory. This has not been true in the decades since.”

This book ends with Tarawa in November 1943.

"Though none of the soldiers could have known that the reversal at Moresby foretold the future pattern of the war, when the Japanese would seldom again advance strategically, at least on land, they did sense that a terrible moment had come. 'We never knew how to retreat because we had never done it before,' one [Japanese] NCO later said."

[Yair Zumaeta Acero · Rating 5 out of 5]

Cuando se menciona a la "Segunda Guerra Mundial", el imaginario colectivo inmediatamente asocia el concepto con ejércitos nazis, Hitler y batallas sobre tanques de guerra en suelo europeo. Rara vez se piensa inmediatamente en teatros de operaciones como el norte de África y mucho menos, el lejano Océano Pacífico - salvo quizás el ataque japonés a Pearl Harbor-. Visto casi siempre como una guerra aislada y casi independiente, la llamada "Guerra del Pacífico" es asimilada por muchos historiadores como un tronco derivado pero casi autónomo de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, con antecedentes y causas distintas a las del conflicto europeo y que sólo en ciertos momentos terminaron entretejiéndose. Es así como el profesor de historia militar de la Universidad de Missouri y experto en historia militar moderna de los Estados Unidos profesor John C McManus nos trae la primera entrega de una trilogía sobre el ejército norteamericano en la Guerra del Pacífico, comprendiendo en este tomo titulado "Fire and Fortitude" los preparativos, las batallas, operaciones y maniobras militares hechas durante los años 1941 a 1943 en el teatro del Pacífico (Muy al estilo de lo que hizo Rick Atkinson con su "Trilogía de la Liberación" con el ejército americano en el la guerra del norte de África y Europa.)

Con una maravillosa prosa, una capacidad narrativa impecable y una destacada manera de organizar y transmitir los eventos, McManus nos brinda un grandioso libro de historia militar que equilibra tanto lo operativo y organizativo del ejército, la intensidad de las batallas y la narración de primera mano de quienes protagonizaron los combates. Desde los días previos al ataque japonés a Pearl Harbor el 7 de diciembre de 1941; pasando por la invasión a las Filipinas y los combates en Bataan y Corregidor; la campaña de retirada en Birmania, los desembarcos anfibios en Nueva Guinea; la sangrienta batalla de Guadalcanal; la olvidada invasión japonesa de la isla de Attu en Alaska y su sangrienta expulsión de suelo norteamericano; los combates en las islas Salomón y Nueva Georgia; la dolorosa construcción de la carretera de Ledo que unión a la India con Birmania o el asalto al atolón de Makin; son narradas con absoluta pericia donde se hace énfasis en la evolución de un ejército bisoño y mal preparado que arrancó la partida con derrotas y librando una guerra defensiva y de retirada (Pearl Harbor, Filipinas y Birmania), para irse convirtiendo poco a poco en una potencia militar y económica que empezaría a dar vuelta a las tornas en la guerra contra Japón. Al final de este tomo es imposible no recordar las palabras de Churchill luego de la victoria en El Alamein: "Esto no es el fin, ni siquiera el comienzo del final. Es, tal vez, el final del principio."

Resulta vívidamente descriptivo el capítulo dedicado a los prisioneros de guerra norteamericanos capturados en Bataan y Corregidor y las penurias que tuvieron que afrontar no sólo en campos de prisioneros miserables sino también en la llamada "Marcha de la Muerte de Bataan", una de las marchas forzadas más inhumanas y mortales de la historia moderna. Tampoco queda bien parado el famoso (o infame) general Douglas MacArthur a quien McManus no deja bien parado, retratándolo como un ego maníaco, envidioso, intrigante e insaciablemente codicioso de poder. Curiosísimos los apartes investigativos sobre la fallida carrera a la presidencia de Estados Unidos de MacArthur, algo que estaba (y está) prohibido a miembros en activo de las fuerzas armadas norteamericanas, que no tuvo antecedentes en la historia de dicho país y que además, se mantuvo en secreto durante mucho tiempo para evitar empañar la figura de "héroe de guerra" que MacArthur y el ejército se encargaron de forjar.

Un grandioso libro de historia que encantará a quienes ya hayan tenido la oportunidad de leer a su más famoso colega Rick Atkinson, pues ambos comparten ese asombroso y adictivo estilo narrativo; recomendado además para todo aquel que busque un texto completo y asequible sobre la Guerra del Pacífico. El único contra: Aún no ha sido traducido al español.

[Mac · Rating 3 out of 5]

Borrow.

I was really looking forward to this series but after reading the first volume, my excitement has faded a bit. Everything is here to make a great history book, it is well researched, well structured, etc.

But McManus lacks that final touch that elevates a historian to greatness. Each chapter feels like its own thing, giving me direct insight into his research and writing process. This segmentation deprives the reader of the overall arc of a connected series of events.

[T. Fowler · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very good book that gives an overall description of the US Army's first years of battle in the Pacific War. Well-written and well-researched, it gave me a good understanding of the battles, the strategy and the personalities of the key American military leaders, which had been lacking in my previous readings. While the book does not provide daily details of the tactics of the battles, it gives enough to allow the reader to understand how these battles progressed and, in particular, what horrible conditions the troops had to endure. It takes a very good historian to avoid getting bogged down in too much detail while still allowing the reader to understand the point of the book; John McManus does this while covering a wide scope of history that includes the loss of the Philippines, the struggle for islands like New Guinea, Guadalcanal and New Georgia, the horrible battle at the top of the word for Attu, General Stillwell's difficulty in dealing with Chiang Kai-shek and his return to Burma, and the plight of American prisoners of war.

[Craig Pearson · Rating 4 out of 5]

McManus is an excellent writer and through extensive research has crafted a detailed and enjoyable read about the history of the Army in the Pacific conflict. This book does not tell the full story of the Army in the Pacific, jusdt through 1943. With some tightening of biographies and some reduction of personality conflicts I think this coulod have told the story of the whole war. I do not understand why no maps were included. Fire and Fortitude gets a 4.5 for not being perfect.

[John Robinson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Top notch companion to Ian W. Toll's Pacific War Trilogy (also top notch on its own merits).

[Travis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Superb narrative on everything about the US Army in the Pacific theatre of World War 2, covering the bombing of Pearl Harbour, until the taking of the Gilberts (Makin / Tarawa atolls). McManus' research is truly top-drawer, and his attention to detail is up there with the best of them.

His take on Dugout Doug was typical of what I read lately, in that MacArthur was a vainglorious arsehole, only out for #1 - himself. I also enjoyed McManus' take on the Australians, very interesting.

All in all, a great read.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

An eminently readable account of the battles and campaigns fought by the US Army in the war against Japan in its first two years. The Navy and Marines often get top billing in World War II vs Japan, and they certainly more than carried their weight, but most of the fighting (and dying) was done by the soldiers. The Army in the Pacific was unlucky in its battlefield locations, to put it mildly. More to the point, the battles were fought in true sh!tholes: the stinking jungles of New Guinea, the Solomons, and Burma. Just to make things interesting, add the freezing muskeg of the Aleutians. Of course, the GIs who surrendered at Bataan went through their own special Calvary of the Death March and then the inhuman conditions of Japanese captivity. Add to this mixture a large dose of personality on the part of Douglas MacArthur and a dash of inter-service rivalry and you have an epic, and it's well-told here. I look forward to the next volume.

[patrick Lorelli · Rating 4 out of 5]

A book that takes you through the beginnings of the war in the Pacific. What the author focuses on is the Army's role and though most people think of the Pacific being fought by the Marines and the Navy the Army had a role in it as well. You are brought through the fall of the Philippines, Bataan, Corregidor, though the 4th Marines would be the first-ever to surrender they inflicted enough damage to the Japanese had to commit another division to the invasion and this would later delay their invasion of Guadalcanal, and New Guinea. Not in the book the 4th Marines commander burned the regimental flag before surrendering so the enemy would not have it.
The author brings up General MacArthur and all of his dealings with other generals and how he would get rid of them if they got better press than he did. He would even deny medals. In my own personal opinion, I felt he should have been court-martialed like other leaders because he disobeyed direct orders and had all planes lined up in a row instead of being apart the day of the attacks. Yet nothing happened to him. Then throughout the Pacific, he would continue to send men into battle without a thought of the men or the men leading them. When the battle was over, he would take credit without ever stepping foot out of Australia.
The author also does a good job of showing was the reader what it was like for the troops in the Pacific. For the people that had never read anything about it, they come to find out that they were fighting with World War one type weapons and ammo. That they made it work knowing that the people in Washington were more worried about Europe than they were about them, though they were sending them into battle as well. The men on Wake island fought with WWI weapons and lasted until the last man. The author leads you up to the Island of Tarawa and though I had only ever read the Marines story. The Army story is just as devastating as the Marines and that Island was a horrible loss of life that most people don’t know about. Overall a good book, like any history book a few parts, dragged but I got what the author was putting across. Some of the other though I read about them before it was good to see them from a different point. A very good book. I received this book from Netgalley.com I gave it 4 stars. Follow us at www.1rad-readerreviews.com

[Ron · Rating 4 out of 5]

When most readers think of World War II in the Pacific Theater, they think of Pearl Harbor, Midway, and Guadalcanal which star the US Navy and Marines. But the war would not have been won with out the US Army. Fire and Fortitude tells the story of the US Army in the Pacific from the time of Pearl Harbor to the beginning of the march on Japan.

John McManus divides the book in two sections - Onslaught and Turnabout. In Onslaught, the reader finds chapters on the Pearl Harbor attack, the invasion and fall of the Philippians, the war in China and Australia, and a chapter on the prisoner of war (POW) camps. In Turnabout, the reader sees the US Army and its Allies striking back in New Guinea, Guadalcanal (the US Army played a crucial role there), Burma, China, and the invasion of Makin where the Army fared better than the Marines at Tarawa. There is also another chapter on the changing conditions at the POW camps in Philippians and Japan.

John McManus has done a credible job of presenting the role of the US Army in the Pacific Theater of WWII. He works to provide details from both combat and other aspects of Army life. It is interesting that he provides details on the US Army POWs in the Pacific. The book breaks off abruptly after the Makin invasion, but that is due to the scope of the book. In tone Fire and Fortitude reminds the reader of the Official Histories put out by the US Army that are available in US Government Repositories. But if you are looking for a one volume introduction to the role played by the US Army in the early part of WWII, Fire and Fortitude will work.

Thanks Netgalley for the opportunity to read this title.

[victor harris · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent narrative that captures both the strategy and tactics in detail with clear, concise writing. Biographical portraits of many of the key military figures add to the richness of the account. It shows how flawed MacArthur was in preparation and how it contributed to the debacle in the Philippines. Equally impressive when the author turns to the combat action as it shows the tremendous obstacles both sides had to confront in dealing with jungle warfare. An added feature is the journal entries of many soldiers, again from many sources including the Japanese who endured tremendous suffering when they tried to repel the Allied advances.
Quality work on all fronts and I look forward to the sequel.

[Jeff Cherpeski · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good book that shined a light on the US Army's contribution in the Pacific. The Marines get all the glory, but the Army did most of the fighting and dying.

[Zeb Kantrowitz · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is not just a war history, it contains the opinion of the author of each of the generals (from all sides) who fought the battles in the Pacific Area of Operations. He starts by describing the military situation in the Pacific just before the attack on Pearl Harbor, including how it was decided how to staff the Phillipine Islands, and the placement of the US Pacific Naval forces.

He does his best (but biasly) to tell the actual history of General MacArthur as he described him as a megalomanical personality who was more interested in how he was perceived by the public as opposed to taking the best care of his soldiers. Having been given a Medal of Honor early in the war, he personally convinced authorities not to give the award to others under him so as to not devalue the MoH he had.

MacArthur was never happy to have to share the accolades with anyone, and found the idea of the Navy and Marines island hopping so as to bring the Army Air Corp closer to the Home Islands of Japan. Mac wanted to be the only main thrust through New Guinea, the Dutch East Indies, then the Phillipines and finally through Taiwan and then the Ryukyu Islands and onto the Home Islands. Admiral Halsy proved him wrong by finding a faster way to get up to the Home Islands by moving up through the outer rim of Pacific Islands.

McManus does a great job of first describing the area that will become the battlefield, then the number of Japanese, then the climate and other natural obstacles; then he goes on the describe the Allied forces, and how the Army planned to attack the area and the strategy and where it worked and why it didn't. It's interesting to see how many members of the military wasted the lives of the men under them to satisfy their own egos, using strategies that didn't work but made them look as if they were 'aggressive' leaders. Many times the leadership ordered offensives that had no chance of succeeding, because they made determination based on maps and not directly viewing the battlefield.

I'm looking forward to the second volume of this history which will be more of the fighting by the US Marines and Naval Forces.

[Liz · Rating 4 out of 5]

An ambitious undertaking to give a deep look at the Pacific theatre of World War II. But McManus has written an intense and thorough book covering the first two years of the Pacific War to be completed in a second volume. Warning: it is a long book and almost too detailed so it is a lot of absorb. Despite that, it actually reads fairly easily. I like the author’s inclusion of different points of view, aspects of military history (who knew that MacArthur was almost a recreation of George McClellan of the American Civil War in their pursuit over personal glory), and I especially liked his placing of military tactics then in relation to later efforts in Korea and Vietnam—where it is all to evident in so many ways that Americans are not good at learning from history.
Definitely would recommend this to anyone into serious military history or just history in general—just block out the time needed to do it justice.

[Greg Jablonski · Rating 3 out of 5]

I wanted to like this book which is the first volume of a U.S. Army history in the WWII Pacific campaign 1941-43 but was a little disappointed. It did have nice maps, a fast moving narrative and coverage of battles not normally seen in standard histories of WWII: Bouganville, Makin etc. I did learn about these campaigns but that positive was counter balanced by tedious put downs of MacArthur and POW coverage.

[Jwt Jan50 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well written. Well researched. Volume 2 is on my night stand. Is it as good as Toll? Morison? So far he's been dismissive of the intelligence work and little to no mention of NISEI who worked for both Halsey and MacArthur. And, while I think he's spot on about the weaknesses of MacArthur and Sutherland - that's a formidable staff/team that develops after Buna. I've got the download of the chief engineers memoir yet to read. And one of the references in his bibliography deals with the staff - which I haven't read yet. There are 32 works on my 5th AF shelf - I recommend starting with Indestructible, then Ghost Mountain Boys, then Bloody Buna, then The Battle of the Bismarck Sea and then MacArthur's Ultra. It's unfortunate that there isn't an O'Brian to write a series to cover say the 32nd and one of the converted B25 squadrons from Port Moresby through the PI. There's some heart rending stuff.

[Lee · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good detail and not difficult to read. Lots of coverage of Philippines and New Guinea as well as Australia, Pearl Harbor, China, Attu and Makin; battles and logistical lines both.

There were 5 pages on MacArthur's hopes for a Presidential candidacy in 1944, more than I've seen for a long time.

[Richmond Vernon · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excited for Volume 2.

[Peter Goodman · Rating 5 out of 5]

“Fire and Fortitude: the US Army in the Pacific War, 1941-1943,” by John C. McManus (Caliber, 2019). There are loads of books, and movies, about the American war in Europe, the US Navy in the Pacific and Atlantic, and the Marines. I have read many of them. And for all of them, the experiences of the Army in the Pacific is either an afterthought or no thought at all. Guadalcanal? That’s about the 1st Marine Division. Pearl Harbor, Coral Sea, Midway, etc: Navy all the way. When the Army is mentioned, it is often to indicate incompetence: they need the Marines to move forward, to charge ahead, etc. McManus sets out to change that. After all, he points out in the Prologue, by far most of the ground fighting in the Pacific was fought by the doughfaces. For example, he says, the Marines made 15 amphibious landings during the war. Lt. General Robert Eichelberger’s 8th Army alone carried out 35 amphibious landings over a five-week period in the Philippines. So. But much of the early war in the Pacific was about retreat and defeat; it was fought in the most difficult terrain in the world; and as lot of its image was controlled by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, whom McManus depicts as a vainglorious, publicity-minded, egotistical, delusional, back-stabbing, duplicitous, manipulative villain with, to the end of 1943, at least, showed no signs of military competence. Anyway. McManus uses all the resources a modern military historian has available; he is a distinguished military historian who has written a dozen books already about the European war. He uses diaries, notes, letters, official reports, newspaper accounts, etc. He first describes what everyone was doing before the combat (as in, the last night before Pearl Harbor, and the hungover soldiers when the attack began); then he describes, in excruciating detail, the fighting itself; and then the aftermath. After Pearl Harbor, the first third, if not half, of the book, is taken up with the loss of the Philippines. The troops were driven back and back and back---not so much because the Japanese had them outnumbered, because they didn’t. But because MacArthur had made no real plans for defense, and then spent essentially no time at the front. IN fact, the Japanese attackers were as bungling as the defenders, who often fought them to a standstill. But the Americans were terribly unprepared, and on Bataan began to starve---something that was carried to its most awful extreme during the notorious Bataan Death March. McManus pulls no punches in describing this and the rest of the physical horrors of the fighting and the living. He shows that the combat here was by far the most vicious of the war: often hand to hand, confused, small-unit actions in jungle so dense you couldn’t see the man next to you. The Japanese culture was completely alien to the Americans. The Japanese were exceptionally brutal---to each other and to the enemy. They paid almost no attention to prisoners, or civilians. They too often starved. I can’t go into all the elements of the book. But McManus pays attention to the role of women, of African-American troops, of the racism shown both by Americans and Japanese. The Americans did not win just because they outproduced the Japanese. In the first year of the war, that was not clear. But the Americans outfought them; they killed as viciously; they had just as much will to win as the Japanese. The story ends with the brief fighting over Makin Atoll, in which the military finally had gotten most of its lessons in amphibious warfare out of the way. McManus similarly pulls no punches about the character of the troops and their leaders. As mentioned above, MacArthur is shown to be vile; among other things, he actively prevented Eichelberger, one of the best fighting generals, from getting a combat command in Europe, and from being awarded the Medal of Honor. And he talks frequently of the American unwillingness to fight at night: it was actually Army policy to tighten up and shut down operations when the sun went down. Not a good thing. A powerful book.

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[Luke Shaffer · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the best books I have ever read. I started it after just finishing McCullough’s John Adams and a Star Wars series. This book had storytelling more compelling than Star Wars but with all the depth I’d found in McCullough’s writing. In my book, that makes this a masterpiece. I’ve never had such a hard time putting down nonfiction.

[David Shaffer · Rating 4 out of 5]

General Claire Chennault as well as the relationship between each of these parties and Chiang Kai Shek.
The book covers action in the Philippines, the Aleutians (Alaska), The battle of Guadalcanal and the Solomon’s at large, and the CBI theater. It covers the hardships of POW's held by the Japanese and the uneven treatment of the POW's. It illustrated the issues of jungle warfare and prevalent problems in these areas, lack of mobility, and disease to highlight a few. An interesting line attributed to General Brehon Somervell head of the Army Service Forces is "The Army is really fighting two battles: one against the enemy and the other against the jungle. At time the second battle seemed even more challenging than the first"
For those interested in the Pacific I would recommend this first of 2 volumes on the U.S. Army in the Pacific and definitely recommend.

The book also covers the the multiple theaters in the Pacific and cooperation and lack thereof with different allies and entities. Highlighted is the relationship between General Joe Stillwell and General Claire Chennault as well as the relationship between each of these parties and Chiang Kai Shek.

The book covers action in the Philippines, the Aleutians (Alaska), The battle of Guadalcanal and the Solomon’s at large, and the CBI theater. It covers the hardships of POW's held by the Japanese and the uneven treatment of the POW's. It illustrated the issues of jungle warfare and prevalent problems in these areas, lack of mobility, and disease to highlight a few. An interesting line attributed to General Brehon Somervell head of the Army Service Forces is "The Army is really fighting two battles: one against the enemy and the other against the jungle. At time the second battle seemed even more challenging than the first"

For those interested in the Pacific I would recommend this first of 2 volumes on the U.S. Army in the Pacific and definitely recommend.
The book also covers the the multiple theaters in the Pacific and cooperation and lack there of with different allies and entities. Highlighted is the relationship between General Joe Stillwell and General Claire Chennault as well as the relationship between each of these parties and Chiang Kai Shek.

The book covers action in the Philippines, the Aleutians (Alaska), Guadal Canal, the Solomons, and the CBI theater. It covers the hardships of POW's held by the Japanese and the uneven treatment of the POW's. It illustrated the issues of jungle warfare and prevalent problems in these areas, lack of mobility, and disease to highlight a few. An interesting line attributed to General Brehon Somervell head of the Army Service Forces is "The Army is really fighting two battles: one against the enemy and the other against the jungle. At time the second battle seemed even more challenging than the first"

For those interested in the Pacific I would recommend this first of 2 volumes on the U.S. Army in the Pacific and definitely recommend.

[Elgin · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the top five WWII books that I have read. The book focuses on a two year period of the Pacific war. It does not try to "tell it all" but rather gives a detailed into several important battles, personalities, and social circumstances related to the war effort. McManus did a wonderful job of describing the relationships between US servicemen and the Australian military and civilian societies. Also interesting were accounts of General Stilwell's relationships with Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese army. I felt these analyses added a lot to overall story of the War. It was not just fighting and battles but also dealing with new cultures and peoples.

McManus also did a masterful job in describing some key battles and the personalities involved: Makin, Bataan/Corrigedor, New Georgia,Guadalcanal, and some of the New Guinea conflicts. His descriptions of moving through and fighting in jungle against well fortified and concealed enemys really communicated the horror of being involved in such operations. For most of the battles there were very good maps and identified important landmarks and towns and also indications of the flow of battle and the evolution of developments through time.

Equally enthralling was the account of building the Burma road. Road building through jungle during the monsoon season while working through thousands of dead bodies of refugees.

McManus had access to several documents, dairies, oral histories from GIs, nurses, and officers. These added a lot to the history and feel of what these people were enduring.

McManus also did a lot to reinforce my nekgative feeling about McAurthur. Like our orange-haired president he seems to have been a megalomaniac, far more concerned with his own stature and ambitions than the welfare of the people in his charge and in fact working hard to deny others the recognition they deserve for fear of draining attention from himself. And like Dumb Donald, a need for yes men to supply constant flattery and no tolerance for anyone with another opinion.

Indications are that this might be one book in a multivolume history. I hope so. In particular I would love to read what McManus writes on some of the naval battles. However the purpose of this book was to focus on the Army, who I agree deserve a boatload of thanks and appreciation for all they accomplished in this most difficult of circumstances.

[Nick Frazier · Rating 5 out of 5]

A book about the first half of the U.S. Army's participation in the Pacific Theater during World War 2.

The book goes a fantastic job of bringing to light the massive effort of the U.S. Army - an effort often overshadowed by the Army's role in the European theater or the U.S. Marine's media machine highlighting the devil dog's valor in the Pacific.

However, this isn't a love letter. The reader gets a good look at the entirety of the U.S. Army - good and bad. Starting with the failure of discipline, warning, and response at Pearl Harbor along with the collapse of the U.S. effort in the Philippines, the book covers topics like the undertrained citizen soldiers, the massive egos of the senior leaders, and the struggle to establish massive logistical lines over half of the Earth to support the expeditionary commands. Often times, the green soldiers struggled to maintain combat fitness in the inhospitable, disease-prone jungle environments throughout the Southwest Pacific Areas of Operations. The book draws upon private letters from both sides, unit histories, and newspaper articles to provide a nuanced look at the herculean war efforts that failed to find purchase in U.S. pop culture in the following 70 years.

The book covers the first 2 years of the war to include chapters on Pearl Harbor, Australia, Japanese Prisoner of War camps, China, Burma, New Guinea, Guadalcanal, and the Gilbert Islands.

If you have any interest in an under-told history of the U.S. Army or want to glean lessons for future military issues in the Pacific, this is a great read.

[Mike Stewart · Rating 4 out of 5]

McManus has done for the US Army in the Pacific what Rick Atkinson did for it in Europe and Ian Toll has done for the Navy in the Pacific. And for me, this is very high praise. He has created a highly readable, entertaining and vivid picture of the ground war in this theater and reminded us that while the Marines played an important role in the Pacific, it was the Army who did the bulk of the fighting and dying - mainly because there were 1.8 million soldiers in the Pacific vs. 256,000 Marines. While highly critical of McArthur, and rightly so, I find him even-handed in his treatment of this still controversial figure. Very good account of Bataan and its horrendous aftermath. I think readers may be shocked to learn that army on Bataan did not surrender to overwhelming numbers of Japanese; starvation, disease (an ever present factor in this theater) and lack of supplies brought about the capitulation. Maps are adequate, but the Table of Contents lacks a map list which is inconvenient for the reader.

[Steve · Rating 5 out of 5]

A two-volume series about the U.S. Army in the Pacific Theater of World War II. Most of the headlines went to the Marines as they invaded Japanese held islands in the Pacific, but the Army was there, also, from the beginning. McManus takes us through the excruciating loss of the Philippine Islands, the Bataan Death March and POW internment and MacArthur's escape to Australia. He examines the leadership style of MacArthur and how it affected the SouthWest Pacific Theater of operations. As the United States begins the long road back to final victory, McManus takes us to the jungle hellholes of New Guinea, Burma and Guadalcanal and all the natural elements the Army had to fight along with the Japanese. Before ending the book with the invasion of Tarawa (Marines) and Makin (Army) in the Gilbert Islands, he even delves into the soldiers training and social life in Australia and how the unskilled soldiers fresh of the boats became veteran fighters in the jungles of the Pacific Islands.