'(...) on 4 December [2017], the day before Jooste resigned and the share price collapsed off a cliff, there were 17 analysts who covered Steinhoff, 11 of whom recommended that investors “buy” the share, 6 who recommended they “hold”, and exactly zero who called it as a “sell”.'
This was my next in queue following 'Bad Blood' by John Carreyrou, thus continuing with the seemingly new fashionable genre of corporate fraud literature. Yet in comparison between the two stories of fraud engineering, 'Bad Blood' was a child's game.
'Steinheist' is a fresher story, also somewhat more exotic (how often do we come around a detailed business saga from South Africa?!), and those in accounting/finance will enjoy both diving into technicality and being shown the wider implication. This also is a superb piece of corporate governance literature. Having been granted a front row seat part (or was it a role of some invisible fixer of notes for the orchestra?) in a twisted corporate maelstrom for almost two years, I surely appreciated the crude descriptions of how mergers and acquisitions happen in real life as opposed to the usual celebratory entries we get to read in the news.
Drawbacks: for someone risk-averse, it's a potentially anxiety-inducing cautionary story. Markus Jooste did it all – self-dealing, tax heavens, playing German GAAP concepts, non-disclosures, forgeries, 'accounting irregularities' and plain lies whenever and wherever – while Steinhoff’s board of directors, auditors, legal forensic teams, and banks' analysts were ignorant or even played along. Am I relieved about not joining the Big4 upon my graduation? Yes.
Lessons: lack of diversity in boards of directors' is asking for trouble (even Steinhoff's three PhDs in Accounting onboard was no insurance); corporate psychopaths thrive in change/growth/whatever chaos they can get into.
If anything, this gives hope for us-the-mavericks (let me leave this citation here, surely not to argument the point for misfits, but to reflect the scrupulous detail throughout the book):
'Take Barry Norris, an untypical fund manager, if ever there was one. Unlike the squadrons of blue chino accountants who leave university with commerce degrees, Norris graduated from Cambridge with a master’s degree in history in 1996. The year after, he added another master’s degree in international relations, which he later supplemented with the CFA qualification. He is predisposed to think of things a little differently.'
Overall, a very well researched work that also relies on the author's erudition and knowledge of how - in a 'perfect storm' of way - structures and networks are rigged to produce a 'black elephant'.