Newton urged scientists never to speculate, only to prove by establishing experimental facts. By contrast, Einstein urged scientists to speculate freely, since only daring speculations, not experimental facts, can advance science. Who, if either, is right? Is speculation a legitimate part of science, even in the absence of testing? If so, can speculations be evaluated without testing? How?
To answer these questions it must first be determined what counts as a speculation, a task not usually investigated by those who express strong views about speculation. In Speculation , Peter Achinstein develops the basic idea that speculating involves introducing assumptions, under certain "theorizing" conditions, without knowing that there is evidence for those assumptions. This idea is made precise by utilizing a concept of "evidence" Achinstein has introduced in previous writings and also explains here. With this concept, Achinstein defends a view according to which, by contrast with Newton, speculations are crucial in science, and by contrast with Einstein, they are subject to constraints. The latter include pragmatic ones, reflecting the particular aims of the scientist in speculating, and epistemic ones that are subject to a different standard then "evidence sufficient for belief." This viewpoint is illustrated and evaluated by critically examining historical and contemporary speculations in fundamental physics as well as more general speculations within or about science, including nature is simple, and simplicity is a sign of truth (Newton, Einstein); a theory can only be tested "holistically" (Duhem and Quine); and there is, and must be, a "Theory of Everything" (string theorists and reductionists).
Achinstein clarifies and argues for the possible value of speculation within the field of science. In general, we view science as an endeavour perpetuated by fact and evidence, but it's also an area of speculation: making predictions about what might be true, then going on to confirm or deny that, is also a major part of scientific endeavours. In great detail, Achinstein draws out the history of speculation in famous scientific figures, and applies the concept of speculation and its value in three specific areas. First, he explores the idea that scientific theories are better when simple, and where speculation can fit in aiding or clarifying that simplicity, arguing that most versions of simplicity fall apart under examination. Then he looks into holism vs particularism, whether you can better view science as key ideas that explain specific events, or specific events that build to larger ideas, and where speculation fits within those approaches. And finally, he uses speculation as he defines it to argue against the idea of a theory of everything.
I don't think I did a perfect job of explaining that, and to Achinstein's credit, the final chapter of the book is a summary of his main arguments, which is a much more thorough account of his points. It's a really laudable chapter too; a lot of books have conclusions that feel more like afterthoughts, but Achinstein recognizes the complexity of his thought and uses the section well to draw everything together. To be honest, the book wasn't quite what I hoped it would be. First, I was hoping for at least a nod to speculation in a more science fiction sort of sense. And, failing that, an emphasis on the historical use of speculation in science, and what that use meant socially. The social part is less Achinstein's interest, but there is a lot of history there. But the real focus of his book is a series of logical propositions towards his arguments. The propositions individually make sense, but they sometimes went over my head as I was reading in a more casual way. That's not Achinstein's fault, of course. For someone interested in speculation and science in a more logic-centric way, this would be an excellent source.