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Army University Press Large-Scale Combat Operations Series #1
Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations
This book is from Army University Press and is Volume 1 in it's Large-Scale Combat Operations Series. It has footnotes, maps, and pictures, and was originally published in 2018.
“Since the Soviet Union’s fall in 1989, the specter of large-scale ground combat against a peer adversary was remote. During the years following, the US Army found itself increasingly called upon to lead multinational operations in the lower to middle tiers of the range of military operations and conflict continuum. The events of 11 September 2001 led to more than 15 years of intense focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entire generation of Army leaders and Soldiers were culturally imprinted by this experience. We emerged as an Army more capable in limited contingency operations than at any time in our nation’s history, but the geopolitical landscape continues to shift and the risk of great power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.
“While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scrutinized US military processes and methods and adapted their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and become accessible in even the most remote corners of the world, the US military’s competitive advantage is being challenged across all of the warfighting domains. In the last decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and aggressive Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cavalier Iranian regime. Each of these adversaries seeks to change the world order in their favor and contest US strategic interests abroad. The chance for war against a peer or regional near-peer adversary has increased exponentially, and we must rapidly shift our focus to successfully compete in all domains and across the full range of military operations."
Includes:
Introduction: Multi-Domain Deception (Christopher M. Rein, General Editor);
Chapter 1: The Belfort Ruse the American Deception plan for the battle of st. Mihiel, 1918 (Mark E. Grotelueschen);
Chapter 2: From Beersheba To Megiddo British Deception Operations During The Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918; (Major Brian J. Drohan);
Chapter 3: Operation Bertram British Deception At El Alamein (Gary W. Linhart);
Chapter 4: Operations Barclay, Cascade, And Mincemeat Allied Deception In The Mediterranean, 1943 (Gregory S. Hospodor);
Chapter 5: Operation Kreml German Strategic Deception On The Eastern Front In 1942 (Alan P. Donohue);
Chapter 6: Red Star Resurgent Soviet Deception Operations At Stalingrad, 1942-1943 (First Lieutenant Kyle B. Vautrinot);
Chapter 7: Operation Bagration Maskirovka At Its Height, Summer 1944 (Curtis S. King);
Chapter 8: Deceive, Divert, And Delay Operation Fortitude In Support Of D-Day (Scott C. Farquhar);
Chapter 9: Chinese Deception And The 1950 Intervention In The Korean War (Joseph G.D. Babb);
Chapter 10: From Maneuvers To War The Egyptian Deception Plan On The Eve Of The Yom-Kippur War (Tal Tovy);
Chapter 11: Target San Carlos British Deception During The Repossession Of The Falkland Islands (Steven Paget);
Chapter 12: Deception In The Desert Deceiving Iraq In Operation Desert Storm (Donald P. Wright);
Conclusion: The Future Of Military Deception Operations (Conrad C. Crane)
“Since the Soviet Union’s fall in 1989, the specter of large-scale ground combat against a peer adversary was remote. During the years following, the US Army found itself increasingly called upon to lead multinational operations in the lower to middle tiers of the range of military operations and conflict continuum. The events of 11 September 2001 led to more than 15 years of intense focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. An entire generation of Army leaders and Soldiers were culturally imprinted by this experience. We emerged as an Army more capable in limited contingency operations than at any time in our nation’s history, but the geopolitical landscape continues to shift and the risk of great power conflict is no longer a remote possibility.
“While our Army focused on limited contingency operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, other regional and peer adversaries scrutinized US military processes and methods and adapted their own accordingly. As technology has proliferated and become accessible in even the most remote corners of the world, the US military’s competitive advantage is being challenged across all of the warfighting domains. In the last decade, we have witnessed an emergent China, a revanchist and aggressive Russia, a menacing North Korea, and a cavalier Iranian regime. Each of these adversaries seeks to change the world order in their favor and contest US strategic interests abroad. The chance for war against a peer or regional near-peer adversary has increased exponentially, and we must rapidly shift our focus to successfully compete in all domains and across the full range of military operations."
Includes:
Introduction: Multi-Domain Deception (Christopher M. Rein, General Editor);
Chapter 1: The Belfort Ruse the American Deception plan for the battle of st. Mihiel, 1918 (Mark E. Grotelueschen);
Chapter 2: From Beersheba To Megiddo British Deception Operations During The Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918; (Major Brian J. Drohan);
Chapter 3: Operation Bertram British Deception At El Alamein (Gary W. Linhart);
Chapter 4: Operations Barclay, Cascade, And Mincemeat Allied Deception In The Mediterranean, 1943 (Gregory S. Hospodor);
Chapter 5: Operation Kreml German Strategic Deception On The Eastern Front In 1942 (Alan P. Donohue);
Chapter 6: Red Star Resurgent Soviet Deception Operations At Stalingrad, 1942-1943 (First Lieutenant Kyle B. Vautrinot);
Chapter 7: Operation Bagration Maskirovka At Its Height, Summer 1944 (Curtis S. King);
Chapter 8: Deceive, Divert, And Delay Operation Fortitude In Support Of D-Day (Scott C. Farquhar);
Chapter 9: Chinese Deception And The 1950 Intervention In The Korean War (Joseph G.D. Babb);
Chapter 10: From Maneuvers To War The Egyptian Deception Plan On The Eve Of The Yom-Kippur War (Tal Tovy);
Chapter 11: Target San Carlos British Deception During The Repossession Of The Falkland Islands (Steven Paget);
Chapter 12: Deception In The Desert Deceiving Iraq In Operation Desert Storm (Donald P. Wright);
Conclusion: The Future Of Military Deception Operations (Conrad C. Crane)
255 pages, Kindle Edition
First published August 1, 2018
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October 25, 2023
Volume 1 in the Army series addressing Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO). The chapters are a series of historical case studies highlighting military deception operations in the greater context of LSCO.
May 22, 2019
WHAT IS THIS BOOK?
- This book is part of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series
- these twelve case studies also ought to provide us with some “universal truths” regarding deception operations.
WHAT ARE SOME OF THE BIG TAKE-AWAYS?
- One of the first is the importance of coordination in deception campaigns,
- Another “principle” that emerges from the narrative is that of the “Magruder Principle,” the idea that it is easier to convince an adversary to hold on to a pre-existing belief that to convince them of a new one.
- Careful readers of the accounts in this volume will notice that weaker powers tend to favor the use of deception to overcome a stronger opponent.
WHICH CASE STUDIES IN DECEPTION ARE COVERED?
- Chapter 1: The Belfort Ruse: The American Deception Plan for the Battle of St. Mihiel, 1918
- Chapter 2: From Beersheba to Megiddo British Deception Operations during the Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918
- Chapter 3: Operation BERTRAM British Deception at El Alamein
- Chapter 4: Operations BARCLAY, CASCADE, and MINCEMEAT Allied Deception in the Mediterranean, 1943
- Chapter 5: Operation KREML German Strategic Deception on the Eastern Front in 1942
- Chapter 6: Red Star Resurgent Soviet Deception Operations at Stalingrad, 1942-1943
- Chapter 7: Operation BAGRATION Maskirovka at Its Height, Summer 1944
- Chapter 8: Deceive, Divert, and Delay Operation FORTITUDE in support of D-Day
- Chapter 9: Chinese Deception and the 1950 Intervention in the Korean War
- Chapter 10: From Maneuvers to War: The Egyptian Deception Plan on the Eve of the Yom-Kippur War
- Chapter 11: Target San Carlos British Deception during the Repossession of the Falkland Islands
- Chapter 12: Deception in the Desert Deceiving Iraq in Operation DESERT STORM
MASKIROVKA
- Soviet doctrine has defined maskirovka as: The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various military objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the plans of the command… maskirovka contributes to the achievement of surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation of combat readiness, and the increased survivability of objectives.
DECEPTION TO BE INTEGRATED AT ALL LEVELS
- In the end, deception cannot just be a paragraph in a plan, it must be emphasized, integrated, and resourced across all levels of the joint force in order to help achieve the desired effects.
FACTOIDS
- TITANIC I dropped dummy paratroopers inland from the Pas-de-Calais “invasion” beaches to simulate an entire Allied airborne division landing in the dark. The dummies (called “Ruperts”) contained pyrotechnic firefight simulators while two SAS teams engaged the responding Germans troops to add realism.
- Article on 'Ruperts': https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles...
HAHA
- For instance, Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt, commander of the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division, still believed in 1951 that “approximately 50 enemy divisions [were assembled] in the area of Algiers-Tunis” when the Allies possessed far fewer.
- This book is part of The US Army Large-Scale Combat Operations Series
- these twelve case studies also ought to provide us with some “universal truths” regarding deception operations.
WHAT ARE SOME OF THE BIG TAKE-AWAYS?
- One of the first is the importance of coordination in deception campaigns,
- Another “principle” that emerges from the narrative is that of the “Magruder Principle,” the idea that it is easier to convince an adversary to hold on to a pre-existing belief that to convince them of a new one.
- Careful readers of the accounts in this volume will notice that weaker powers tend to favor the use of deception to overcome a stronger opponent.
WHICH CASE STUDIES IN DECEPTION ARE COVERED?
- Chapter 1: The Belfort Ruse: The American Deception Plan for the Battle of St. Mihiel, 1918
- Chapter 2: From Beersheba to Megiddo British Deception Operations during the Palestine Campaign, 1917-1918
- Chapter 3: Operation BERTRAM British Deception at El Alamein
- Chapter 4: Operations BARCLAY, CASCADE, and MINCEMEAT Allied Deception in the Mediterranean, 1943
- Chapter 5: Operation KREML German Strategic Deception on the Eastern Front in 1942
- Chapter 6: Red Star Resurgent Soviet Deception Operations at Stalingrad, 1942-1943
- Chapter 7: Operation BAGRATION Maskirovka at Its Height, Summer 1944
- Chapter 8: Deceive, Divert, and Delay Operation FORTITUDE in support of D-Day
- Chapter 9: Chinese Deception and the 1950 Intervention in the Korean War
- Chapter 10: From Maneuvers to War: The Egyptian Deception Plan on the Eve of the Yom-Kippur War
- Chapter 11: Target San Carlos British Deception during the Repossession of the Falkland Islands
- Chapter 12: Deception in the Desert Deceiving Iraq in Operation DESERT STORM
MASKIROVKA
- Soviet doctrine has defined maskirovka as: The means of securing combat operations and the daily activities of forces; a complexity of measures, directed to mislead the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of forces, various military objectives, their condition, combat readiness and operations, and also the plans of the command… maskirovka contributes to the achievement of surprise for the actions of forces, the preservation of combat readiness, and the increased survivability of objectives.
DECEPTION TO BE INTEGRATED AT ALL LEVELS
- In the end, deception cannot just be a paragraph in a plan, it must be emphasized, integrated, and resourced across all levels of the joint force in order to help achieve the desired effects.
FACTOIDS
- TITANIC I dropped dummy paratroopers inland from the Pas-de-Calais “invasion” beaches to simulate an entire Allied airborne division landing in the dark. The dummies (called “Ruperts”) contained pyrotechnic firefight simulators while two SAS teams engaged the responding Germans troops to add realism.
- Article on 'Ruperts': https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles...
HAHA
- For instance, Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt, commander of the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division, still believed in 1951 that “approximately 50 enemy divisions [were assembled] in the area of Algiers-Tunis” when the Allies possessed far fewer.
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