What do you think?
Rate this book
Die politische Ökonomie des Populismus
Populismus ist ein vielgestaltiges Phänomen. Mal ist er rechts, mal links; mal artikuliert er Protest gegen offene Märkte, mal wendet er sich gegen Migration. Auch in der geografischen Verteilung zeigt er sich variantenreich: In Südeuropa dominiert der Links-, in Nordeuropa der Rechtspopulismus. Philip Manow entwickelt eine vergleichende Erklärung für dieses zunächst widersprüchlich erscheinende Bild. Den Ausgangspunkt bilden die jeweiligen wirtschaftlichen Wachstumsmodelle, die Verfasstheit von Arbeitsmarkt und Sozialstaat, kurz die jeweiligen Politischen Ökonomien. Es zeigt sich: Wer vom Populismus reden will, aber vom Kapitalismus nicht, landet immer nur bei Identitätspolitik – und wird dann unweigerlich selbst Partei im Streit.
160 pages, Paperback
Published November 12, 2018
7 people are currently reading
99 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
November 12, 2019
I could not agree more with the book’s “The Political Economy of Populism” (Suhrkamp, 2018 - German original) core argument: if you talk about populism without talking about capitalism, you’ll end up with identity politics. As such, the book is part of the wider critique of my pet peeve identity politics and progressive neoliberalism, I guess Nancy Fraser is the best read on this.
The book then kind of empirically unpacks this broader theoretical framework and argues that there is no universal explanation for the current rise of populism (eg standard explanations such as globalization losers, the uneducated ‘deplorables’, cultural rejection of cosmopolitanism ) but that there are different populisms (left and right) which can be explained by the specific capitalisms in which contexts they exist. The book develops a comparative model of four types of (European) capitalisms and related labour market and welfare models and argues that these particular political economies bring about specific types of populisms as ‘protests against globalization’. Specifically, the book proposes that there are political economies where people reject globalization’s free movement of capital and goods (‘left-wing populism’) and those where people reject the free movement of people (‘right-wing population’).
Say, in Southern Europe, which is less export oriented and where both the formal labour market and welfare system are relatively clientelist (rather than universally accessible), the ‘conflict’ with globalization lies less in the form of the free movement of people but more in the form of rejecting free trade and incorporating their economies into the world market and related pressures on welfare (austerity) and labour market (deregulation) reforms. Hence, the predominant form of populism in the political economies of Southern Europe is left-wing (e.g., Syriza, Podemos). On the other hand, in the case of northern Europe, with export oriented economies and universally accessible (more generous) welfare systems, globalization’s conflict is experienced primarily as a redistributive struggle in the sense of a reaction against the free movement of people (while the free movement of goods and capital are not opposed) - hence, a predominantly anti-immigrant, right-wing populism in the northern European political economies. In the case of the UK (and US), with deregulated labour markets and weak social welfare systems, the free movement of people is creating a competition in the labour market (not so much for social welfare).
Of course, the movement of people also varies across these types. In stronger and more accessible welfare states (eg Norway or Germany) the per capita number of refugees is higher than in countries with less accessible welfare systems (eg UK). On the other hand, the per capita number of labour migrants is higher in deregulated labour markets (eg UK) than in restricted labour markets (Norway). Together, the political economy and related type of movement of people (refugees versus labour migrants) also have an effect on who actually supports the various populisms in the first place. The book distinguishes between ‘labour market insiders’ (those with secure employment) and ‘labour outsiders’ (those currently unemployed or under-employed). Contrary to the assumption that it’s always the socially most marginalized (and unemployed) who tend to vote right-wing populist, in the case of Germany (AfD), for instance, a regression analysis of some fairly solid statistical data shows that it’s actually the ‘insiders’ who are voting for the far right (including those who thanks to social democracy’s neoliberal reforms of the welfare state fear that a sudden job loss could put them in the same economic situation as migrants, regardless of education or previous employment history.) So, yeah, it’s capitalism but it depends on the specific political economy (plus of course historic and culturally specific contingencies).
The book – which is courageously brief (130 pages) – concludes with a chapter on the EU, arguing that the EU, which is massive force behind the EU’s global integration over the past 30 years or so, is itself causing the rise of various anti-EU populisms among its member states and is increasingly losing political support (think Brexit).
There’s not much of a proposed political strategy in the book but I guess this is not the point of the book which is explicitly trying to be very scientific and non-partisan. I think it’s clear that the culturalist and elitist response to the rise of far-right populism (‘uneducated social scum’) is going nowhere. Globalization, including the movement of people, is a key concern for large parts of the population. Every time the left is trying to address the issue of migration beyond the slogans of ‘refugees welcome’ and ‘open borders’ by highlighting the political economy, including structural causes for redistribute struggles that may arise from migration (labour market and social policies), they are being accused of using anti-immigrant or racist tropes to lure away voters from the far-right (think Sahra Wagenknecht). Similarly, we must not leave the critique of the EU to the far-right for fear of being accused of being nationalist. The left needs to insist on real global solidarity (beyond empty slogans) and provide an answer to the contradictions of globalization, which of course, is democratic socialism 😊
The book then kind of empirically unpacks this broader theoretical framework and argues that there is no universal explanation for the current rise of populism (eg standard explanations such as globalization losers, the uneducated ‘deplorables’, cultural rejection of cosmopolitanism ) but that there are different populisms (left and right) which can be explained by the specific capitalisms in which contexts they exist. The book develops a comparative model of four types of (European) capitalisms and related labour market and welfare models and argues that these particular political economies bring about specific types of populisms as ‘protests against globalization’. Specifically, the book proposes that there are political economies where people reject globalization’s free movement of capital and goods (‘left-wing populism’) and those where people reject the free movement of people (‘right-wing population’).
Say, in Southern Europe, which is less export oriented and where both the formal labour market and welfare system are relatively clientelist (rather than universally accessible), the ‘conflict’ with globalization lies less in the form of the free movement of people but more in the form of rejecting free trade and incorporating their economies into the world market and related pressures on welfare (austerity) and labour market (deregulation) reforms. Hence, the predominant form of populism in the political economies of Southern Europe is left-wing (e.g., Syriza, Podemos). On the other hand, in the case of northern Europe, with export oriented economies and universally accessible (more generous) welfare systems, globalization’s conflict is experienced primarily as a redistributive struggle in the sense of a reaction against the free movement of people (while the free movement of goods and capital are not opposed) - hence, a predominantly anti-immigrant, right-wing populism in the northern European political economies. In the case of the UK (and US), with deregulated labour markets and weak social welfare systems, the free movement of people is creating a competition in the labour market (not so much for social welfare).
Of course, the movement of people also varies across these types. In stronger and more accessible welfare states (eg Norway or Germany) the per capita number of refugees is higher than in countries with less accessible welfare systems (eg UK). On the other hand, the per capita number of labour migrants is higher in deregulated labour markets (eg UK) than in restricted labour markets (Norway). Together, the political economy and related type of movement of people (refugees versus labour migrants) also have an effect on who actually supports the various populisms in the first place. The book distinguishes between ‘labour market insiders’ (those with secure employment) and ‘labour outsiders’ (those currently unemployed or under-employed). Contrary to the assumption that it’s always the socially most marginalized (and unemployed) who tend to vote right-wing populist, in the case of Germany (AfD), for instance, a regression analysis of some fairly solid statistical data shows that it’s actually the ‘insiders’ who are voting for the far right (including those who thanks to social democracy’s neoliberal reforms of the welfare state fear that a sudden job loss could put them in the same economic situation as migrants, regardless of education or previous employment history.) So, yeah, it’s capitalism but it depends on the specific political economy (plus of course historic and culturally specific contingencies).
The book – which is courageously brief (130 pages) – concludes with a chapter on the EU, arguing that the EU, which is massive force behind the EU’s global integration over the past 30 years or so, is itself causing the rise of various anti-EU populisms among its member states and is increasingly losing political support (think Brexit).
There’s not much of a proposed political strategy in the book but I guess this is not the point of the book which is explicitly trying to be very scientific and non-partisan. I think it’s clear that the culturalist and elitist response to the rise of far-right populism (‘uneducated social scum’) is going nowhere. Globalization, including the movement of people, is a key concern for large parts of the population. Every time the left is trying to address the issue of migration beyond the slogans of ‘refugees welcome’ and ‘open borders’ by highlighting the political economy, including structural causes for redistribute struggles that may arise from migration (labour market and social policies), they are being accused of using anti-immigrant or racist tropes to lure away voters from the far-right (think Sahra Wagenknecht). Similarly, we must not leave the critique of the EU to the far-right for fear of being accused of being nationalist. The left needs to insist on real global solidarity (beyond empty slogans) and provide an answer to the contradictions of globalization, which of course, is democratic socialism 😊
April 4, 2021
Eine neue Perspektive auf das Auftreten der verschiedenen Populismen, welche besonders die Struktur des Sozialstaats und die darauffolgenden Reaktionen in den Blick fasst. Top.
May 4, 2025
super schwierig das runterzubrechen, grob gehts darum die ökonomischen Ursachen bei der Entstehung des Populismus nicht zu vernachlässigen und daraus auch Gründe für die Entwicklung eines linken oder rechten Populismus abzuleiten. Das Argument ist hier v.a. dass ein großzügiger und zugänglicher Wohlfahrtsstaat tendenziell einen rechten Populismus begünstigt und ein nicht vorhandener bzw. großzügiger und wenig zugänglicher Wohlfahrtsstaat eher einen linken Populismus begünstigt. Auch Deutschland wird in seinen regionalen unterschieden beim AfD-Erfolg 2017 untersucht und festgestellt, dass Regionen in denen vor 20 Jahren Arbeitslosigkeit vorherrschte eher rechts wählen (der Zusammenhang besteht bei aktueller Arbeitslosigkeit nicht!). Zudem unterscheidet Manow, ob die Wähler populistischer Parteien Arbeitsmarkt-Insider oder -Outsider sind und erklärt das über die Problematisierung von Migration (Arbeits- oder Fluchtmigration) oder Außenhandel. Insgesamt sind super viele spannende Punkte dabei (z.B. dass in der deutschen Debatte kaum beachtet wird, dass Merkel 2015 nicht rein aus Menschlichkeit die Grenzen geöffnet hat, sondern auch weil andernfalls voraussichtlich Griechenland (noch in der Schuldenkrise) mit dem Grexit die gesamte Eurozone gefährdet hätte), von denen ich leider das meiste schon wieder vergessen hab oh man, aber ich würde gerade wenn man sich für Populismus interessiert sehr empfehlen das Buch zu lesen; allerdings ist das Buch von 2018 und gerade die aktuelleren Entwicklungen der AfD werden obviously nicht analysiert
//vllt kommt hier nochmal ne ausführlichere Rezension mir mehr inhaltlichen Punkten//
//vllt kommt hier nochmal ne ausführlichere Rezension mir mehr inhaltlichen Punkten//
December 1, 2021
Sehr wissenschaftlich, es wird immer wieder ein Zusammenhang zwischen der Erscheinungsart des Populismus und den Systemen des Arbeitsmarktes und des Sozialstaat hergestellt. Es werden keine politischen oder gesellschaftlichen Lösungsansätze vorgestellt.
January 22, 2020
Wiederholt sich oft, keine großen Analysen, sondern oft nur die Frage nach ökonomischen Auswirkungen. Keine tiefen Analysen. Sehr wissenschaftlich und volkswirtschaftlich geschrieben.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews