1941: The Year Germany Lost the War

by Andrew Nagorski

Bestselling historian Andrew Nagorski “brings keen psychological insights into the world leaders involved” (Booklist) during 1941, the critical year in World War II when Hitler’s miscalculations and policy of terror propelled Churchill, FDR, and Stalin into a powerful new alliance that defeated Nazi Germany. In early 1941, Hitler’s armies ruled most of Europe. Churchill’s Britain was an isolated holdout against the Nazi tide, but German bombers were attacking its cities and German U-boats were attacking its ships. Stalin was observing the terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and Roosevelt was vowing to keep the United States out of the war. Hitler was confident that his aim of total victory was within reach.But by the end of 1941, all that changed. Hitler had repeatedly gambled on escalation and by invading the Soviet Union and committing a series of disastrous military blunders; by making mass murder and terror his weapons of choice, and by rushing to declare war on the United States after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Britain emerged with two powerful new allies—Russia and the United States. By then, Germany was doomed to defeat.Nagorski illuminates the actions of the major characters of this pivotal year as never before. 1941: The Year Germany Lost the War is a stunning and “entertaining” (The Wall Street Journal) examination of unbridled megalomania versus determined leadership. It also reveals how 1941 set the Holocaust in motion, and presaged the postwar division of Europe, triggering the Cold War. 1941 was “the year that shaped not only the conflict of the hour but the course of our lives—even now” (New York Times bestselling author Jon Meacham).

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Germany, Politics, Military History, War

401 pages, Kindle Edition

First published June 4, 2019

About the author

From back cover:
Andrew Nagorski, award-winning journalist, is vice president and director of public policy at the EastWest Institute, a New York-based international affairs think tank. During a long career at Newsweek, he served as the magazine's bureau chief in Hong Kong, Moscow, Rome, Bonn, Warsaw, and Berlin. He lives in Pelham Manor, New York.

Reviews

[Pam · Rating 4 out of 5]

A number of reviewers are bothered by the lack of new information here. True to an extent but it has been 80 years since the time in question and WWII remains an extremely popular subject for historians.

By later 1941 Hitler and his war waging began to show some cracks. The myth of an unstoppable, novel war became a rigid belief for Hitler. He refused to listen to experts. They had had early successes and luck. Britain hung on. Nagorski shows Hitler as his own worst enemy.

The book is interesting and very well researched. I’d love to have the time to read all the diaries, letters and primary research Nagorski cites. One interesting tidbit mentioned was the fact that Stalin liked to doodle during meetings with Westerners. He drew countless pictures of wolves and then filled in the backgrounds with red pencil. How telling!

[Boudewijn · Rating 3 out of 5]

1941 was the year where Germany still seemed invincible, basking in the glory of its recent European conquests. However, the seeds of defeat were already sown and would blossom near the end of the year. With Hitler's decision to invade Russia and the German declaration of war against the United States Germany would be utterly defeated in may 1945.

The Holocaust also gets its share and rightly so: once Hitler realised the war was lost his only life mission was to destroy the Jews, which he regarded as the cause of the war.

This book is a classic example how wrong a dictator can be when planning and waging war. It reminded me of Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iraq or - more recently - perhaps Putin's invasion of Ukraine. Andrew Nagorski does a good job explaining Hitler's thought process in his decision to invade Russia while at the same time focussing on the grander picture.

For the World War II buff this might not hold any suprises but for someone who wants to understand how and why Germany lost this is a good introduction.

[Elizabeth George · Rating 5 out of 5]

I wish there was something between "really liked it" and "it was amazing." This is a terrific book. The author lays out the history of the fateful year--1941--in which Hitler, believing he knew more than his generals, decided to invade Russia. Before reading the book, I knew how that invasion ended, but what I didn't know was how successful it was initially. Nor did I know that the German army was told to defy all "rules of war" (what an oxymoron that is) and to murder noncombatants outright, to kill surrendering soldiers, and to rape and pillage at will. The descriptions of both Hitler and Stalin as individuals with a frightening psychopathology that is all too familiar were particularly disturbing. In school, unless we major in history, we learn so little about our nation's wars. This book is a compelling look at how and why the US got involved and how Great Britain fought essentially alone from 1939 until December 1941. It also unveils the great leaders of the period: Roosevelt and Churchill.

[Porter Broyles · Rating 4 out of 5]

The fun thing about reading a topic from the perspective of a single year is that while you may know the facts, you sometimes forget the time frame in which they occur.

This book highlights the speed with which the events of 1941 happened.

Germany could feasibly had won a war against England and the US. It could have possibly have forced a British surrender and forstalled the US involvement in WWII. But when it decided to go after Russia, it was all over.

But Hitler (and Stalin) refused to listen to their advisors. The dictators knew better and for the most part surrounded themselves with yes men. A dangerous proposition.... and in Germany's case, disasterous.

[Maine Colonial · Rating 4 out of 5]

I received a free digital review copy from the publisher, via Netgalley.

It must be frustrating to be an expert advisor to an impetuous and power-mad leader who thinks he knows better than the experts in any field. Nagorski gives the example of the military and financial advisors who told Hitler in the late 1930s he shouldn’t be aggressive, because France, Britain, the USSR—and the US if it came to that—would be able to come up with greater sustained military resources in the future. But did this egomaniac who knew nothing about economics and had been a corporal in the army listen? Of course not. Instead of taking the advice, Hitler decided that he needed to strike immediately, while the other powers hadn’t yet built up their armaments.

So yes, Germany cruised to easy victories in 1940, but Hitler made a series of delusional decisions in 1941 that Nagorski argues doomed the Third Reich not to a 1,000-year reign, but a few at best. First, Hitler decided to invade the USSR, thinking he could do what Napoleon had failed to achieve. But did he start in, say, April, so he’d have a good long stretch of time before winter set in? No. He was angry at Yugoslavia after it rejected the Tripartite Pact, so he decided he needed to punish them, which delayed his invasion of the Soviet Union until late June of 1941.

When Germany invaded, many civilians and even Russian soldiers were welcoming, figuring the Germans would save them from the starvation and collectivization forced on them by Stalin. But the Germans were under orders to treat the conquered harshly, and they did—with rampant murder of civilians and soldiers alike. Nagorski argues that Germany might have been more successful in the USSR had it treated the conquered better; soldiers might have joined them and civilians willingly fed, quartered and clothed them.

Much of the book focuses on Hitler’s misadventures in the USSR. It’s only the last 25 pages or so that he turns to Hitler’s final big blunder of the year. After the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and the US declared war on the Japanese, Hitler decided it would be a good idea to declare war on the US. In short order Germany was facing foes that vastly outweighed it in population, territory and resources.

Although Nagorski’s thesis is focused on Hitler and the German military, he also provides a lot of information about Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and their governments’ plans and actions. Although it’s well-known that Stalin rejected intelligence that told him the the German invasion would be coming in the spring of 1941, it’s interesting to read Nagorski’s description of just how deeply in denial was; to the point of insisting that there must be a mistake when news began to pour in that the Germans were actually invading in overwhelming numbers and causing catastrophic damage to the USSR.

Scholars and longtime readers of WW2 history won’t be surprised by anything in Nagorski’s book, but this is a good, readable popular history of a pivotal year of the war.

[Liviu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent nonfiction book on the title topic that reads like a novel.

[Dimitar Angelov · Rating 3 out of 5]

Поредна книга за Втората световна война, която щеше да спечели от малко по-добра вътрешна структура. Написаното от Нагорски изобилства от интересни факти, цитати и коментари, но аз лично не можах да хвана аргументационната нишка, която би трябвало да ги свързва. Често авторът прескача от сюжет в сюжет, окрасявайки разказа си с някой и друг пикантен детайл, но не останах особено убеден в тезата му, която е записана още в заглавието, а именно, че през 1941 г. в общи линии се решава изходът на войната. Според мен Нагорски попада в клопката, за която предупреждава Ричар Оувъри в "Why the Allies Won" - да бъркаме потенциала (военен, технически, дипломатически, идологически и т. н.) с неговото реализиране. Нагорски ни убеждава, че след като САЩ влизат във войната през декември 1941 г. везните, коефициентите и каквото още щете се накланят необратимо в полза на "Съюзниците" и краят на войната е предрешен. Това обаче, струва ми се, е позиция, която се осланя повече на знанието какво реално се случва, отколкото на анализ на възможните развои на войната от гледището на самата 1941 г. Според мен никой през тази възлова година не би заложил парите си изцяло на Съюзниците.

[Ebb · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well-researched and thoroughly interesting read. I learned a lot from this book. Normally when I read WWII books I mostly focus on topics such as the Holocaust as well as how everyday people lived during the war throughout the various countries involved. I usually get lost with books that focus on the logistics of warfare during WWII. Nagorski presents this information but also ties it into Hitler and Stalin's mindset during this period and what decisions they chose to make. The book also focuses heavily on Britain's need for the US to enter the war and Roosevelt's struggle with the strong isolationist movement in the United States. I think that this book did a great job covering all the aspects of the war in 1941, both politically and militarily, and highlighting the ways in which all of these things helped changed the course of the war during that period.

Thank you to Netgalley and the publisher for sending me a copy of this book in exchange for an honest review.

[Stephen Selbst · Rating 2 out of 5]

Nagorski argues that the seeds of Germany's defeat in World War II were inevitably sown in 1941 when Hitler attacked Russia and was unable to complete his planned conquest in a matter of months. Nagorski's argument builds on Tooze's economic analysis to say that once the US had entered the war, the combined materiel might of the US, Britain and Russia could not be overcome. But I am not convinced. In 1942 the Germans came very close to taking Stalingrad. Had they done so, the war in the East, which was by far the most important combat theater, might have been different. Given that, it simply fails logically to argue that Germany irretrievably lost the war that year. Without question, the seeds of defeat were planted, but the overall thesis just isn't proved.

[Pak455 · Rating 3 out of 5]

Wszystko OK, tyle że w zasadzie nic nowego. Analizy gospodarcze, to cytaty z Tooze'a; wielka polityka? -- wszyscy o niej piszą. Tak samo jak i o Holokauście. Wojna, bitwa pod Moskwą? -- może ciut lepiej, bo Nagorski spotykał weteranów, ale i to właściwe echa jego książki na ten temat.

W zasadzie... jest jeden punkt zaczepienia, który Nagorski mógł wykorzystać lepiej -- losy jego ojca, a polskiego żołnierza. Wiem, w zalewie turbopatriotyzmu to brzmi może też powtarzalnie, ale jest to historia, której odniesienia do wielkiej polityki stanowią intrygujący kontrapunkt. To jest materiał na wielka historię. Ale cóż, ta z 1941 jest tylko "w porządku".

[Melinda Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book is a narrative history of the year 1941 and what makes it special is the level of detail. Nagorski's father was a Pole who was close to the action and had inside information on the major players, having known or interviewed many of them. The stories of these people, including former Nazis, are fascinating. I wish we could have heard more from the top Bolsheviks in Stalin's circle, but he had almost all of them shot! Only Generals Zhukov and Molotov lived to tell their tales.
One thing that stands out is how the level of narcissism and sheer hubris made both Stalin and Hitler so blind and stupid. Insights into the minds of Roosevelt and Churchill were also interesting. Roosevelt kept waiting for public opinion to catch up with him before acting. I wish he would have lead from the front. Churchill was magnificent. He was the true hero in the whole of the war.

[Kico Meirelles · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an amazing book. It does not only cover the pivot year of 1941, but also their impacts and what lead to it. Great details about the wrong assessments from Stalin and Hitler and how Churchill was the main figure of this War. A must read for those who are interested in this relevant period of our history.

[Amber Leigh · Rating 4 out of 5]

An extremely in depth and interesting view of 1941 which truly changed the war in so many ways.

[Frank Privette · Rating 2 out of 5]

I took a two-year, higher level International Baccalaureate Twentieth Century History course in the mid nineties. And sat through, and successfully passed, several standard European History university classes in the late nineties. That was twenty odd years ago.

Which, one supposes, is quite a long time for Andrew Nagorski to have researched for, and found, compelling -and new- evidence to support his main claim: that Hitler lost the war in 1941 and not at any other time during the Second World War. That is why I picked this book up. Not actually being an historian myself, but certainly loving the study of history, my curiosity was piqued. I wanted to read about all of the new archives and new footage and discovered diaries and oral histories and proof that had been unearthed in the last two decades. Again, not being a historian, I set the bar low. But I was hardly surprised at any point while reading Nagorski’s book.

Of course Hitler, and his many blunders, caused his downfall. Just like he caused the Second World War. It’s hardly controversial, or new, to afirm this. Even logically, rationally, one could say in hindsight that any racist and violently exclusive ideology has failure in its DNA. But do we need a new book point this out and, furthermore, insisting Hitler lost it all in one year?

Which begs the question. Why is it important, even interesting, to determine a “pivotal year” for such a momentous event?

At best, this book is not any more compelling than a plethora of other historiography on that global war. At worst, it comes close to reductionism, without really providing compelling evidence. And even if the author provided this new, compelling evidence, so what? Can it be asserted, with any degree of validity, that such a conflict can be lost in one year? Should we care? Multiple others have provided multiple, seminal tomes on the war in different levels. Thus, honestly, the reader of this book is left a bit confused as to why it exists at all. I’m sure Nagorski’s other books are much more compelling and fresh and rigorous. But this history feels like an aged rock band coming back for “one last tour”. It feels like an academic money grab.

[Scott Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

(Audiobook) This work takes the premise that Germany, while it held a very strong strategic position in 1941, was sowing the seeds of its eventual downfall. This work mainly focuses on Germany's campaign against the Soviet Union, pointing out that even with all the initial military successes, Germany put itself on a losing path, primarily since it had not defeated England before turning to the USSR. Additionally, the work notes that England, and to an extent, the USSR, worked with the US to try to get them into the war, which finally happened with the attack on Pearl Harbor. This work, while offering some personal accounts not previously discussed, is mainly a synthesis of previously written/analyzed material. Not a bad work, but not a great must-read.

[Bill Manzi · Rating 4 out of 5]

A nice look at what author Andrew Nagorski considers to be the pivotal year of World War II, 1941, where the tide of war turned against the German war machine. Hard to argue that 1941 saw the events and decisions made on all sides that led to the eventual defeat of Germany and the destruction of Hitlerism.

For those that have studied the war there is not much new here, but despite that the book is a good read that brings some excellent perspective to the war. That perspective does include the difficulties faced by Churchill, as well as by FDR, in trying to keep the British afloat as they battled alone against Nazi Germany. We get the flavor of the political difficulties faced by FDR in trying to help the British without formally entering the war, with a good look at some of the diplomacy involved, including the very interesting interactions between British, American, and Soviet diplomats before the German invasion of the U.S.S.R.

Despite the broad look at the U.S. and British the main focus, as it should be, is on the decision by Hitler to invade the Soviet Union in 1941. It was arguably the worst decision of the war by Hitler, but it was most certainly not the only strategically flawed decision he made. The book looks at the run-up to that decision, including the German-Soviet treaty that allowed the invasion of Poland to proceed by both Hitler and Stalin. Hitler’s move was tactically and strategically brilliant, allowing him to concentrate his military power to the west to face the French and British threat without having to worry about the Soviets. The book gives us a look at the mindset of Stalin in this period. Stalin essentially waived off the crescendo of warnings on the true intentions of Hitler, even shipping supplies called for under the treaty right up to the point of the German invasion. This is the true crux of the book and it offers a great overview of the central players in that tragedy.

Most everybody agrees that Hitler’s decision to invade the Soviet Union was a strategic blunder, but we also get a look at the tactical errors that sealed the Germans fate. Hitler delayed the invasion to deal with a government coup in Yugoslavia that enraged him, and while some have downplayed the military significance of that delay I am not in that group. It was a major error. The initial vast military success of the German invasion brought to Hitler some tactical choices about the deployment of forces that he handled poorly, breaking off the drive to Moscow to lend support to military efforts to capture economically important areas to the South. Hitler’s indecision on goals, and his overriding of his generals strong objections to delaying the drive to Moscow while he had the strategic initiative doomed the Germans to ultimate defeat. I believe the author did a very good job of covering this critical period, with a strong overview of the decisions that ultimately determined the course of the war.

Hitler, in addition to the ample errors of 1941, simply ignored the pre-war warnings of German economists, who informed him that a long war would simply not be sustainable for Germany. Hitler ignored those warnings, and in fact the author shows us that Hitler turned those arguments on their head, arguing that fast and decisive action was needed to avoid economic calamity for Germany. He was wrong on that score right from the start. From the book:

“In Mein Kampf, Hitler unwittingly identified another one of his failings that manifested itself in his preparations for war: his disregard for the economic underpinnings needed for a successful military strategy. “Economics is only of second- or third-rate importance, and the primary role falls to factors of politics, ethics, morality, and blood,” he wrote. Hermann Göring, the head of the Luftwaffe, who was already considered the second most powerful man in the country, echoed those sentiments in a meeting with army officers in the summer of 1938. “The armed forces should not concern themselves with the fate of the economy,” he told them, since he had “sole responsibility” for such matters. “The collapse of parts of the economy was irrelevant. Ways will be found.” Both before the outbreak of the war and in its early days, other members of Hitler’s entourage, including within the military, attempted to warn the German leader that he was charting a dangerous course. They feared that his dismissing economic considerations, along with underestimating the strength and political will of Germany’s likely opponents, could prove to be a fatal combination. Even Göring expressed similar concerns on occasion. But all of them would be overruled again and again.”

Nagorski, Andrew. 1941: The Year Germany Lost the War (p. 21). Simon & Schuster. Kindle Edition.

Hitler’s disregard of economics was not consistent, but when he did show concern it was on a tactical level, with not nearly enough concern or understanding of the strategic disaster awaiting Germany from a long war. This refusal to consider economics or figures not to his liking was shown when Hitler was faced with numbers indicating a very large Soviet military production capacity. He simply refused to accept numbers on Soviet tank and airplane capacity that cut against his own thoughts on the matter. His own thoughts were badly misinformed.

Nagorski has produced a very interesting book, especially for those who are approaching the subject for the first time. The war, and Hitlerism, have begun to fade in our collective memory. I hope that never happens, as the lessons learned and the human disaster that unfolded from the Nazi drive for world domination should never be forgotten. I have begun to re-read, after many years, the William Shirer epic, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.

[Richard · Rating 4 out of 5]

Enjoyable and informative, this is one of the better books to come out recently on WWII. At times it gets a bit bogged down in anecdotal narrative, however there are many little stories that are interesting that were new to me. And that made the book even better.

The narrative is mostly on a high level looking at the key decisions that lost the war for Hitler, not just those on the German side, but the Allies as well. Little things like Stalin deciding not to leave Moscow at the last moment and its positive impact on Soviet morale.

This a fresh perspective on mostly known facts and as such is a worthwhile read.

[Alan Carlson · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good synthesis. I think for a 2019 book, it doesn't reflect the latest scholarship on Dunkirk, Richard Sorge, or the "Siberian" reinforcements before Moscow in December 1941. I also get the feeling that Nagorski just got to November 1941 after the Hitler's halt order, and said "and that was that!" Very little on efforts by Germany to get Japan to go after USSR, which meant have posed an intolerable strain on Russia.

[Batavian · Rating 2 out of 5]

Good book for those with little to no knowledge of the period. But it adds nothing new to those who have read about the era.

[Brian · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very good book on how the Germans made major mistakes from the invasion of the Soviet Union, not concentrating on taking Moscow, the declaration of war against the U.S., and other reasons as well.

[Matt · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great use of detail and primary source documentation to describe how 1941 really led to the downfall of the Third Reich.

[Nipun Khanderia · Rating 5 out of 5]

Intricate detail to Operation Barbossa

[Jose Bonifaz · Rating 4 out of 5]

When I picked up this book a few months ago I expected it to be similar to Peter Clarke's "The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire", which provided a thorough financial and economic analysis of the reasons why the British Empire was doomed to collapse after entering into the lend-lease agreements with the US and its inability to defend its overseas territories from the Japanese invasions. Clarke's work was informative and thoroughly-researched, but I cannot say it was an entertaining book. I expected Nagorski's "1941" to be of a similar vein; however, I'm glad to say it turned out to be a real page-turner, both enthralling and equally informative.

Pros:
- The author sticks to his set of players and provides and in-depth look on their ways of thinking, their actions and, most interestingly, how their private correspondence sometimes betrayed their public statements.
- Nagorski's tone and sense of humor were delightful throughout.
- The author's attention to detail and research is noteworthy. For instance, I had never read Hitler's casus belli for attacking the USSR, which was eerily like Putin's in 2022. Moreover it was refreshing to read a more positive take on Roosevelt and Churchill's relationship, as Clarke's book offers a different, less sympathetic viewpoint on the same subject by claiming that dealing with Churchill turned out to be tiresome for the US President.

Cons:
- I would have expected a more profound analysis on the economic factors that led to Germany's downfall, particularly the effects of a shift to a wartime economy during the early stages of the war. The author does compare Germany's GDP and production to that of the Allies once the USA entered the war, but I believe his thesis would be greatly supported by the hard numbers that prove Germany just wouldn't have been able to keep up after failing to achieve its initial objectives against the Soviet Union.
- The author centers his argument around the two main events which happened during 1941: Hitler's aforementioned invasion and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. By now it seems rather obvious to pinpoint those two moments as the War’s defining turning points, as many scholars have agreed that Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union brought about or at the very least precipitated his downfall, and that Japan’s attack was never going to result in a negotiated peace with the US as expected. Therefore, I got the sense that a book written in 2019 could hardly provide a fresh or different take on a subject that most scholars and ordinary people agree upon anyway, as what lies in the center of Nagorski’s book is that those two specific turning points spelled Germany’s doom. Well, of course!
You could however make the argument that Hitler's 1939-40 conquests directly led to the events that took place in 1941, as his control of Europe and subsequent need for oil and resources meant that the Reich's very existence while "only" waging war against Britain was threatened to a degree that an invasion of the Soviet Union was virtually the only option available to Hitler at that point (though Nagorski brilliantly compares the benefits Germany would've ultimately gained had it stuck to its initial trade agreement with the USSR). Let us remember that by 1941 Hitler controlled most of Central and Western Europe but, without oil supplies from colonies, the Reich had to feed and provide energy for all the territories it had conquered or annexed. Other scholars are of the idea that Hitler could never have won the war. Though Nagorski does center his thesis around the two "obvious" moments, I do not believe the war was lost in a single year, as the events that led to those two specific turning points naturally required a specific set of previous events in order for them to occur.

[Adam · Rating 4 out of 5]

A quick read about WWII, which limits it's scope to the year 1941. Nagorski makes the point that this was a pivotal year in the war, the year when the tide definitively turned. Nagorski is at his best when he describes the modus operandi and thought processes of the two monsters involved: Hitler and Stalin. It is a tale of decisions -good and bad- made at the highest levels. Among them: Hitler's decision to turn away from the Battle of Britain and attack Russia instead. His idea was that the Soviet Union would be easy pickings (yeah, sure), and could be an endless supply of resources for the Reich. As he spelled out in Mein Kampf, Hitler thought that Germany could control a European Empire, while allowing Britain to continue controlling an international empire. Stalin helped him for a while by refusing to believe reports that the Germans were massing for attack - he thought the reports were provocations and disinformation by agents who wanted to undermine the pact he had with Hitler. When Stalin finally rose to the occasion - his decision to stay put in Moscow despite what appeared to be imminent collapse galvanized the population- Hitler obliged by refusing to understand that conquering Russia might not be as easy as, say, conquering France, neglecting to supply even warm clothing to his troops. At the same time, the Japanese ignored Hitler's request to attack Russia from the East. Instead they decided to attack America's naval base at Pearl Harbor and England's colonies in Malaysia. We all know how that worked out for them.

This is basically a story of the axis powers making bad decisions due to hubris, mania, and inflexibility, while Churchill and Roosevelt confronted reality, cooperated and began to win the war. On the other hand, to the author's telling they committed a major error in judgement by coddling Stalin. Stalin was up front from the beginning that he wanted to hold onto all the territory that Hitler had granted him according to their pact (mainly Eastern Poland and the Baltic states), and continually held out the threat of going back and negotiating a peace with Hitler that would allow Russia to keep that territory. Churchill and Roosevelt -ignorant of the degree to which Hitler was committed to his idea of slaughtering every Communist and enslaving the "racially inferior" population of Russia- took Stalin's threats seriously, gave him everything he asked for, and put off discussions of the fate of Eastern Europe until after the war. By showing weakness to Stalin and not taking his stated ambitions more seriously, they did little to stop the post-war Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

There is not much that is new here, but it is a good read, and Nagorski does present some interesting information gleaned from interviews with Russian and German eye-witnesses.

[David Corleto-Bales]

A brilliant book about all the mistakes Hitler made during 1941, chief among them his decisions to invade the Soviet Union and provoke war with the U.S. Hitler squabbled with his generals and ignored their advice, relieving them when they failed at the impossible tasks they were given. The biggest mistake after invading Russia to begin with was dividing the invasion force into three parts instead of concentrating on Moscow. The book is presented in three different modes, usually in alternating chapters: what was Hitler doing, what were Churchill and Roosevelt doing, and what was Stalin doing. A lot of historical figures who have been mostly forgotten in the narrative are included here, including the very good U.S. ambassador in London, John Winant, who succeeded the disliked Joe Kennedy at the beginning of 1941. Mentions of German field marshals, American, British, German, and Soviet diplomats and journalists had me googling numerous people after each chapter. Nagorski doesn't get bogged down in excruciating details but has produced a highly readable and entertaining book that gives a lot of facts that I had never come across before: Stalin's meetings with diplomats, the chaos in Moscow as the Germans approached, and the diary entries of German generals who realized by the end of the year that they were in big trouble. Well-recommended.

[Tracy Upchurch · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is largely a diplomatic history of 1941, the year the United States declared war but almost two years after the war began between the British, France, Germany, and other nations. Nagorski argues that Hitler lost the war in 1941 with the invasion of Russia and the subsequent declaration of war on the United States in the days after Pearl Harbor. By doing so, Hitler escalated a largely European war into a worldwide conflict that Germany and its allies could never win.

Nagorski is an accomplished journalist, having worked for Newsweek across Europe. During World War II, his grandfather was a member of the Polish government in exile, and his father was a member of the Polish army. As we would expect from a journalist, his writing is clear and precise, a style I appreciate. This book is deeply researched and includes a bibliography.

While not a devotee of diplomatic history, I learned a great deal about Germany, the Soviet Union, and the nature of the war prior to America's entry in December 1941. Americans can easily fall under the spell that World War II began at Pearl Harbor and ended at D-Day. Nagorski pushes us to recognize the war was about much more than simply the American experience, that extensive suffering, death, and destruction occurred long before the Yanks took up arms against Hitler and his allies.

[Carlos · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was really impressed with this book. Nagorski chronicles the events of the tumultuous year of 1941 in such a way that although readers never forget what happens later on in the war, they are gripped by the intensity with which each event shifted the ultimate balance of the war. I was amazed with how well Nagorski was able to communicate the evolving mood in Germany, the US, the UK and the USSR, from the dogged isolationists in the US, the inspiring resistance of the British people and the difficult position of Hitler’s and Stalin’s followers in dealing with their leaders’ self-sabotage. Lastly, as someone who normally run away from WWII histories, since they always appear so intense and over-detailed, I was pleased to find the book eminently readable and marveled as Nagorski’s ability to introduce just enough information from the beginning of the war without overburdening the reader. Definitely recommend it as a relatively short and lay-friendly overview of the shift that ultimately gave the Allies the victory in WWII.

[Peter P. Bernard · Rating 5 out of 5]

1941

There are so many parallels between the thinking and action of Hitler and Trump that either the author intended the parallels or that they are real. In either case, the book offers some guidance in understanding the behavior of Trump.

The book serves as a warning as to where the policies of Trump could lead.

Observations drawn from the book are not instructive if either Amazon or Goodreads refuses to print them. We've already seen how so-called "leaders" have caved. This book shows the consequences.

The book also shows how just on leader like Churchill refused to succumb to Hitler and helped to bring him down. Amazon has already caved as have the other tech leaders.

At least print this review and let other would-be readers decide for themselves!

Print a warning disassociating yourselves from this review. You could have--but didn't--not sold the book. After all, the writer never made any comparison between 2024 and 1933. Trump probably can't read and will never know the book existed.

[Stacy · Rating 3 out of 5]

I really struggled with this book. First of all, I'm not a historian, nor history student, just a history buff and hadn't read a lot on reasons Hitler lost the war before this, so much of it was new information, but I struggled more with the book writing style. There were sections that were of interest and sections that really dragged and made it less accessible I think to the average layperson without as much breadth of knowledge in this aspect of WWII. There was also a ton of jumping around both forward and backwards in time such that I would have to place an event in history, then realize the author had jumped back into 1941 again which made it an uphill battle to read. I would not recommend for the average reader, it was too dry at times and jumps around too much, but it did appear to be well researched and I came out with more information on the pivotal decisions of Hitler and Stalin as well as Roosevelt and Churchill than I went into it with.

[J. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Nagorski’s book is tightly written and very readable, despite a mountain of research distilled into it. All the scholarly elements are included, along with engrossing text. The primary Allied and Axis leaders are presented in depth: Hitler and his megalomaniac anti-Semitism and lust for Lebensraum (or Totensraum); Stalin and his two front war against (1) Germany and (2) every Russian he even imagined might be a traitor; Roosevelt dancing skillfully around America’s isolationism; and Churchill, with the morale of an Empire on his shoulders. Some of the most interesting passages describe the incredible blunders of Stalin and Hitler as they, in the author’s words, competed “for the title of ‘the world’s most willfully blind dictator.’” A brief but crucial moment shows Stalin, pacing up and down on the platform beside a train waiting to take him to safety. An impressive book.