Evil and Omnipotence

by J.L. Mackie

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

Unknown Binding

Published January 1, 1955

About the author

John Leslie Mackie was an Australian philosopher, originally from Sydney. He is perhaps best known for his views on meta-ethics, especially his defence of moral skepticism. However, he has also made significant contributions to philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and philosophy of language.

Reviews

[L · Rating 3 out of 5]

A decent text on omnipotence and the problem of evil. Mackie presents one of the most common arguments against omnipotence.

[Robbie Claravall · Rating 4 out of 5]

A

Does God allow suffering?
My Personal Thoughts on the Existence of God and Evil

This question assumes the existence of God, and with such existence must come the assumption that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect. Suffering, as well, is a loaded term, so to define the motion, suffering is caused from evil. Evil, in turn, can either be moral (caused by humans) or natural (caused by nature), and evil in itself is a nebulous term because we personally are the ones who define evil based on (1) ethical or (2) religious standards. Since we presuppose the existence of God, then evil in this sense will be defined on the way we logically (and religiously) see evil today.

The question, now, of whether God allows suffering, based on my motions defined above, is in turn metamorphosized into a question of "How can evil exist if there is an omnipotent God that is all-knowing and powerful?" The question now doesn't cater to whether God would allow such suffering to occur, since the use of the verb "allow" would ask us to peek into the mind of God, and since such a God is a divine being, then that is, from the motion above, logically impossible. Now, this alternative question asks three possibilities: (1) both God and such an evil exists, (2) God exists yet evil doesn't, and (3) God does not exist, but evil does.

Let's go into this with further depth. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn't have the power to eliminate all evil, doesn't know when evil exists, or doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil. Considering our definition of God as omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect, then (1) God must have the power to eliminate all evil, (2) that God must know when evil exists, therefore with this case, our only option left is that God doesn't have the desire to eliminate all evil. In a way, this makes sense if we see suffering as a means to an optimal end, now, in the Biblical sense, being heaven and divine freedom. Yet does the end justify the means?

In this case, it is important to consider the existence of evil. If evil exists, then we must assume that good exists as well because, just like yin and yang, they act as counterpoints to each other. Here, evil is necessary as a means to bring out goodness because it shows that there is an option and a capacity to do the greater good (certain kinds of evil are necessary for certain kinds of good, e.g. without disease, medicine wouldn't have advanced). Now, since we have brought about the existence of suffering as a common phenomena, then we have also brought about the existence of evil as well as the good that must trump it in the end. In the argument that humans are the ones who cause the suffering (speaking of moral evils), then this assumes that human beings are free—and this freedom is given by God, because of course, evil is necessary for free will. My question here is, if God has made men such that they are free agents, then why could he not have made men such that they always freely choose good? If the answer here was that it's done as a means for men to do good for them to go to heaven, then this objectifies God's omnipotence because if something is omnipotent and wholly good, then it will eliminate as much evil as it can. The basic idea here is that God could not have made a world which had any good without allowing some evil, since it is impossible for goodness to exist without evil. This scraps the second possibility aforementioned because we already have brought up the existence of evil.

Adding the concept of natural evil makes the matter more complex, since if, for example, a family dies from a typhoon, then that eliminates the family's agency of freedom. This type of nature now, is caused not by freedom, but by design—the cruel nature of the natural world, in fact, isn't evil—it just is like that, and we have subsequently called it as evil because of the risk it poses to humanity. For instance, animals such as lions and hyenas were designed to survive in a way that requires for them to tear off the flesh from another being, causing suffering in the process. This is how they live, and considering God as an omnipotent being, then this is so because it is by way of design. This also applies to pathogens, disease, natural disasters, and so on. If an all-loving God used these as a means to reinforce the "evil" and strengthen the "good" engraved in his divine plan, then it wouldn't make sense for natural disasters to exist because human beings have no choice in this matter, similar in the case if they get scavenged by crocodiles.

Moreover, we have to bring up the topic of heaven and whether free will exists in it, because the concept is that heaven is devoid of suffering, and if we frame the ontological argument that suffering is justified for people to realize the greater good and to do good deeds that will bring them everlasting divinity, then this must assume that people go to heaven because they are inherently good. This thinking, however, is problematic in relation to my reasoning above because this precisely removes the concept of free will, caused by the capacity to choose between good and evil. If this everlasting paradise removes the concept of evil, then it is incoherent because good cannot exist without evil, and if God purposefully did this for us to do the "good" deeds that will bring us to heaven, then the existence of natural disasters objectifies that claim, and, last, if a paradise with an infinite timeline and 100% blissfulness exists, then the idea of an omnipotent God that creates life to be lived in a finite time which will thus be returned to him is circular and incoherent. This leaves the third possibility open: God does not exist, but evil does.

[char · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very interesting look at the traditional problem of evil. This is a problem that will keep you up at night thinking (which is why I recommend against reading it at 1am for your philosophy class). Mackie proposes detrimental questions to the problem, and explains the different solutions that have been proposed in response. Even though this philosophical problem is extremely paradoxical it opens a very interesting dialogue about the relationship of God, evil, and good.

[Eduardo Ferrer · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tal vez algunos de los argumentos en este ensayo no son tan útiles después de 40 años de la muerte de Mackie, sin embargo, es Literatura fundamental y sienta las bases del ateísmo hoy. No digo que los argumentos hoy sean inválidos, siguen siendo funcionales, pero sí hay otras implicaciones que tendrían que ser aceptadas.

Gran ensayo, de unas 15 páginas solamente, resuelve muchísimas de las clásicas respuestas al problema del mal como "El mal se debe al libre albedrío" o "El mal es necesario como medio para el bien" y nos hace claras las serias implicaciones de algunos otros argumentos como "El bien no puede existir sin el mal", etc.

Simplemente es Literatura fundamental dentro de la filosofía.

[Linda · Rating 4 out of 5]

This essay is well worth reading but it’s absolutely a brain breaker. I admit that I’ll have to reread it before I can say that I understand everything that was stated.