In 1947 Harvard president James Conant awarded George Marshall an honorary degree with the citation “To George Catlett Marshall, an American to whom Freedom owes an enduring debt of gratitude, a soldier and statesman whose character and ability brook only one comparison in the history of this nation.” Why would Conant compare Marshall to George Washington? Roll answers this question in his penetrating look into Marshall’s fifty-year career, his personal life and his character. Marshall was an icon of his era, respected and consulted by world leaders. He served in WWI and was Army Chief of Staff during WWII becoming the first five star General. He was Time magazine’s person of the year in 1943 and 1947. He served as Secretary of State and was the driving force behind the European Recovery Program popularly known as the Marshall Plan. He was president of the American Red Cross and then Secretary of Defense during the Korean War. But Roll offers us more than a chronology of Marshall’s achievements; he shows us the traits that made Marshall one of the most admired leaders of his time. First and foremost, Marshall had presence. Marshall was always composed. He had a temper, but controlled it with remarkable self-discipline. He was always respectful and extraordinarily patient. He was direct, never self-promoting, with a well-deserved reputation for honesty. He had an insightful intelligence that allowed him to see the bigger picture, the implications of proposed actions. His hallmark as a soldier was his planning and organizational ability. He built strong friendships with leaders in the U.S and abroad. He was excellent at nurturing alliances.
Roll does a masterful job of analysis using materials not available when prior biographies were written. Roll relies heavily on firsthand accounts and presents all sides when as is often the case, they don’t agree. We see the imprecision of history as Roll lays out the conflicting accounts giving us the opportunity to decide for ourselves before telling us his own take. Roll shows us how decisions were made between the Americans and British in WWII with Marshall at the nexus of the military and political. Since FDR typically backed Marshall’s recommendations and Churchill initiated his own, policy conflicts were often Churchill’s ideas vs Marshall’s with FDR chiming in to reach a final decision or compromise. Some condensed notes follow.
21-Year-old George Marshall entered the US Army as a 2nd Lieutenant in 1902. In WWI he planned and carried out the 60-mile nighttime movement from one front line to another of half a million US troops with their guns and equipment and got them in battle position on time and ready for the Meuse Argonne offensive that ended the war. Then Colonel Marshall worked with General Pershing as well as aligning American movements with the allies. This experience and the relationships he developed in WWI with American, British, and French officers would serve him well later. Pershing became his mentor and in 1919 selected Marshall to be his aide de camp.
Pershing delegated much to Marshall and he learned firsthand top-level management and the Army’s intersection with politics and government. In 1924 Marshall served a three-year stint in China amidst constant fighting among Chinese warlords, another experience that would prove important. In 1927 Marshall chose a position as Assistant Commandant of Fort Benning in Georgia. This put him in charge of the training of junior and senior officers. He replaced the teaching of lengthy procedures for processing and giving orders with ones that facilitated the quick implementation of decisions which he found to be imperative on the battlefield in WWI. He kept notes on those he trained which would help him placing officers in WWII. Marshall handpicked his instructors, 50 of whom became WWII generals along with 150 of his students. People willingly accepted Marshall's leadership.
In 1938 Brigadier General Marshall was put in charge of War Plans at the War Department. In November with war on the horizon FDR assembled his senior military leaders to float his plan to build 10,000 aircraft. Only Marshall objected to what he saw as an unbalanced and amateurish plan. Despite this confrontation in April 1939 FDR selected Marshall to be the Army chief of staff starting in September. Marshall’s very strong relationship with FDR’s closest adviser Harry Hopkins had to help. In the face of Germany’s 100 infantry divisions and Japan’s 40, Marshall took over a tiny ill-equipped American army that could at best field 4 divisions.
In May 1940 with Germany crushing France Marshall teamed up with another FDR close friend Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau to convince the president to expand the army. FDR went before a joint session of Congress to secure funding. In June FDR selected the highly capable Henry Stimson to be Secretary of War. The Stimson-Marshall pairing would prove to be very effective. According to historian Mark Stoler “their collaboration would be one of the closest and most important in Washington during the war.” With Congressional testimony by Marshall and Stimson a draft was approved. Marshall would have 1.4 million men by the middle of 1941.
On August 8 Marshall was on the Augusta with Roosevelt when he met Churchill. Marshall met his counterpart, British Field Marshal Sir John Dill, forming another close relationship that would prove important to maintaining the alliance through WWII. On July 16, Marshall recalled Douglas MacArthur to active duty to lead Army forces in the Far East. FDR was squeezing Japan with an oil embargo and Marshall feared Japan would attack the Philippines to gain access to oil in the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese had a much bigger plan attacking Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on December 7.
On December 12 Marshall selected General Dwight Eisenhower to join his War Plans team in Washington. Marshall was impressed by Eisenhower. Another important partnership began. On Dec 22 Churchill and his military leaders arrived in Washington for the three-week long Arcadia conference. Marshall was adamant about two issues: a Germany first strategy and a unified command with broad powers. Churchill was opposed to a single command. Marshall spent hours with Churchill and others making his case and threatened to resign without it. But as Lord Moran, Churchill’s physician wrote, “Neither the PM or President can contemplate going ahead without Marshall.” He emerged as the dominant force among allied commanders. On March 25, 1942 Marshall presented a plan drawn up by Eisenhower to FDR and Hopkins. It called for a cross channel invasion in 1943. FDR, Hopkins, Stimson, and Navy agreed and Marshall flew to London to present it to Churchill. The British disingenuously accepted planning to get it changed.
In July 1942 FDR sent to Britain “the three musketeers” as he called them, Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King, and Hopkins. Marshall’s assignment – reach consensus with the British which he did in the end. Churchill wanted a North Africa campaign to save his army bloodied by Rommel. King wanted to focus on the Pacific. Marshall wanted a cross channel invasion even if it had to be modified. The debate and maneuvering were intense. Churchill rejected the cross-channel invasion plan. Marshall was disappointed. Eisenhower was “despondent.” Invasion of North Africa won which allowed Marshall to send more troops and planes to the pacific.
In August 1943 another contentious conference between the Americans and the British took place in Quebec. Marshall was adamant about a cross channel invasion. Churchill wanted to focus on Italy and the Balkans. The US demanded an American lead. British Chief John Dill was critical in bringing the two bitterly opposed sides together. Dill and Marshall had a trusting and close relationship sharing their honest opinions with each other. Dill routinely shared confidential communications between Churchill and FDR with Marshall. Commitment to a cross channel invasion was finalized at the Tehran conference in November 1943 with Stalin, Churchill, FDR, Marshall and his counterparts. Stalin demanded the cross-channel invasion be the priority and wanted Marshall to lead it. But others wanted Marshall in Washington to lead global strategy, coordination, and planning. Pershing wrote FDR that it would be a great mistake to assign Marshall to a tactical theater. Admirals King and Leahy wanted Marshall in Washington telling FDR it would be a demotion to appoint him to the European invasion. In Tehran FDR pulled Marshall aside and asked him directly what he wanted. Marshall, never self-promoting, told FDR to do what he thought was best. FDR chose Eisenhower. America’s most read magazine, Time, named Marshall 1943’s “Man of the Year” headlining “He armed America”.
On June 6, 1944 the invasion took place at Normandy. Churchill wanted to get to Vienna before the Russians. Marshall wanted to “keep to the main thing,” the defeat of the German army. On the 10th, Marshall spent the evening with Churchill at Chequers. Marshall held firm. On December 16 Marshall became the first five star general. That same day the Battle of the Bulge began, catching the allies by surprise. British General Montgomery questioned Eisenhower’s management of allied forces suggesting he should be put in charge of all allied ground troops. Marshall cabled Eisenhower not to do so under any circumstances and congratulated him “You are doing a grand job…give them hell.” Eisenhower showed Monty’s chief of staff Marshall’s cable and gave him an ultimatum. Monty apologized.
Marshall resigned as chief of staff at the war’s end. Shortly after Truman called and asked him to go to China as special ambassador. Marshall asked for detailed instructions to govern his mission. He rejected it as unclear and not understandable by the public. He revised it himself then worked out acceptable language with Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, who wrote that Marshall possessed “the art – of judgement in its highest form. Not merely military judgement, but judgement in great affairs of state, which requires both mastery of precise information and apprehension of imponderables.” Marshall was assigned to unify China, an impossible task. Marshall spent 1946 meeting again and again with Chiang Kai-shek, Chou En-lai, Mao and many others before admitting failure. He realized the two sides were intractable and that ultimately the communists would win the war. In January 1947 he returned to Washington to take over as Secretary of State, a job Truman had offered him months earlier.
As Secretary of State Marshall immediately created a planning function (none existed!) to anticipate future possibilities and identify responses. Marshall put Soviet expert George Kennan in charge. Marshall went to Truman and congressional leaders to support aid to Greece and Turkey against communist threats, then went to a foreign minister’s meeting in Moscow with Soviet expert Chip Bohlen. Months of meetings to reach agreement on the demilitarization of Germany and Austria went nowhere. Marshall met with Stalin and realized that negotiating with the Soviets was useless and Europe was facing economic collapse. Upon his return to America, he addressed the nation on radio saying Europe was facing “disintegrating forces” and that “Action…must be taken without delay.” The following day, April 29 Marshall gave George Kennan and his staff two weeks to prepare a plan to save Europe. This would lead to the European Recovery Program, aka the Marshall Plan. Marshall, not perceived as partisan and held in high regard by the public congressional leaders, was the ideal person to take the plan to Congress and the American public. He worked tirelessly with congressional leaders to gain bipartisan support for a large-scale comprehensive aid program. On May 28 Marshall and his key advisors (Kennan, Acheson, Bohlen, and others) hammered out the elements of the plan. He outlined them in a speech he gave at Harvard on June 5th. It became known as the Marshall Plan speech. British Foreign secretary Bevin later called it “a life-line to sinking men.” It gave “hope where there was none.”
The Marshall Plan required the European countries to issue a single joint request for funds. They had to decide among themselves how to allocate the funds. This process of negotiation and cooperation led to a new reality of working together to manage their economic needs foreshadowing the European Union. Stalin rejected the plan. The plan helped unite the free European countries and set the stage for NATO. In September 1947 Marshall began the work of getting it through Congress. Marshall cemented another close relationship, this time with Republican Senator Vandenberg who became an important ally. On December 19 after attending the foreign minister’s meeting in London Marshall addressed the nation on television and radio. He reported that Germany would remain divided and that the Soviets were looking to take advantage of a weakened Europe. He reiterated the need for the European Recovery Program to thwart the Soviets. Marshall never referred to the program as the Marshall Plan. He didn’t claim authorship and as always didn’t seek credit. But he was again Time’s person of the year noting “one man symbolized US action. He was Secretary of State Marshall…a man of stubborn unswerving honesty – a good man.” Marshall continued lobbying for the plan, speaking before Congress and barnstorming the country with speaking engagements to secure public approval. In April 1948 Truman signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 authorizing the funds for the Marshall Plan. Marshall had assembled a talented team to create the plan then saw it through its development in Europe and passage in Congress. His amazing ability to collaborate and work harmoniously with others just as in WWII was at the fore.