Islamic scriptural sources offer potentially radical notions of equality. Yet medieval Islamic philosophers chose to establish a hierarchical, male-centered virtue ethics. In Gendered Morality , Zahra Ayubi rethinks the tradition of Islamic philosophical ethics from a feminist critical perspective. She calls for a philosophical turn in the study of gender in Islam based on resources for gender equality that are unlocked by feminist engagement with the Islamic ethical tradition.
Developing a lens for a feminist philosophy of Islam, Ayubi analyzes constructions of masculinity, femininity, and gender relations in classic works of philosophical ethics. In close readings of foundational texts by Abu Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali, Nasir-ad Din Tusi, and Jalal ad-Din Davani, she interrogates how these thinkers conceive of the ethical human being as an elite male within a hierarchical cosmology built on the exclusion of women and nonelites. Yet in the course of prescribing ethical behavior, the ethicists speak of complex gendered and human relations that contradict their hierarchies. Their metaphysical premises about the nature of the divine, humanity, and moral responsibility indicate a potential egalitarian core. Gendered Morality offers a vital and disruptive new perspective on patriarchal Islamic ethics and metaphysics, showing the ways in which the philosophical tradition can support the aims of gender justice and human flourishing.
This review is a summary of just a few of many important points addressed in the book. The book discusses how Islamic philosophical ethics as propagated by prominent Muslim ethicists at different historical periods, despite their assumption of equality, were undeniably elite male-centered, prescribing for educated elite male audiences how they should respond to real or perceived moral threats by women and less intelligent/lower-class men. These male-centered notions in Islamic philosophical ethics are seen to carry on from Greek philosophy and ancient Mediterranean patriarchal traditions that are said to have influenced them. Such notions are characteristic of Jewish philosophy as well. Three ethicists’ main philosophical ethics texts are discussed – Ghazali’s (12th century), Tusi’s (13th century), and Davani’s (15th century). The ethicists seem to have been quite incognizant of the self-contradictions in their reasoning and circularity in their definitions, and also of the fact that their notion of justice based on societal patriarchy is “inherently unjust”.
The ethics traditions are shown to be not only gendered but also hierarchical in society. In defining hierarchy of social classes, women are altogether left out by the ethicists. While women are omitted from the societal structure, enslaved people (slaves) are not mentioned at all. Women of all classes, men of lower social classes, and enslaved people, are not considered capable of refining their souls, although the ethicists consider everyone to have a soul of equal status. The women in the texts are also said to be implicitly the wives and mothers of only the elite male audience of the texts.
All three ethicists’ texts are said to show blatant disapproval of the historical reality of women’s presence in the public space during their times. Despite this reality, the ethicists all present in their texts a conception of only male-male social interaction (homosocial relationships) excluding women, which seem to reflect their view that women should be shunned from public spaces. This included mosques and court – despite women’s active participation in mosques and in court, the ethicists as well as the ‘ulama’ class are said to have detested it. The ethicists are said to have no direct way of defining the borders of male-male homosocial relationships since there were “no clear concepts of homosexuality or normative heterosexuality”. Although sodomy was deemed abhorrent by religious scholars (throughout the 1500s to the 1800s), males’ being in love with other males and/or expressing love for other males didn't seem to be usually associated with sodomy. Elite men’s erotic relationships with teenage males was also not very uncommon, and seems to have been in practice even during the ethicists’ times, according to the author. The ethicists however try to set boundaries in the ethics texts on acceptable male homosocial/homoerotic behavior, discouraging sexual acts.
The book concludes with an introduction to likely helpful ways to a feminist philosophy of Islam – how the philosophical problems inherent in the ethics texts can be approached in present times by people of all class, race, and gender identity, although the ethicists’ views were historically bound by the male-centered notions of their times (i.e. the individual as male, the household as male-headed, and the society with men in charge). The reason for proper re-reading using a different framework, is that the texts continue providing value to a lot of readers, although even lay readers are said to recognize the highly exclusionary nature of the texts. The purpose of this book was not just to point out the exclusivity and sexism in the ethics traditions, but to show how such exclusionary ethics traditions have continued through the times, what kind of problems they pose for different readers in conceiving a more inclusive philosophy of the religion, and whether the philosophy can actually be redeemed from its exclusionary self.
Forty years ago, when studying Ancient Greek history and philosophy, I realised that the ethical "good life", as this was understood by the the Greek philosophers, was an aspiration addressed to, and limited to, wealthy elite males; women, lower-class males, and enslaved persons were described, in misogynistic and classist terms, as being incapable/unworthy of achieving it - their role in life was limited to doing necessary but unpleasant labour that supported the elite males and allowed them the leisure to pursue their "ethical" life.
Now, Professor Ayubi has shown in Gendered Morality that the Islamic akhlaq (philosophical ethics) tradition, represented by al-Ghazali, al-Tusi, and al-Davani, has inherited this elitist mindset along with Greek philosophy. The works she has examined are all addressed to wealthy elite males, guiding them in achieving "ethical" well-being in their personal life, family life, and public life, but a life that is dependent on the subordination of women and subordinates in the home and of lower class males in the public realm (deemed to be a "homosocial" world from which women are to be excluded). Although al-Ghazali, al-Tusi, and al-Davani do acknowledge, in a general, abstract way, that women and subordinate men are deemed by scripture (the Qur'an) to possess a fully human nafs (soul or self), these categories of persons are considered by the ethicists to possess only limited or deficient rationality (the ethicists' standard for being fully human), and therefore to be in need of the direction and stewardship of the (self-declared) fully rational elite males. Professor Ayubi develops her arguments carefully and clearly, and concludes with an examination of how Islamic feminist philosophical approaches could re-frame the akhlaq tradition in ways that remove its exclusionary and exploitive features, allowing all humans of whatever gender, class, or race, to pursue the goal of ethical self-improvement, while accepting that no human will achieve perfection. Fascinating read and very highly recommended for those interested in the Islamic ethical tradition.
Ayubi conducts a formidably intellectual analysis of classical Islamic philosophy. She closely examines the works of major medieval thinkers such as Ghazali, Tusi, or Davani, discerning the specific nature of their gender-biased perspectives on ethics, cosmology, spirituality, or refinement of character. She maps the blind spots or inconsistencies, pointing toward an Islamic philosophy that includes the experience of women. I give it three stars due to my personal tastes. Its focus on philosophical concepts is often highly abstract, and at least for me, mentally challenging.