Double Truth

by John Sallis

This is an anthology of deconstructive writings on the doubly difficult theme of truth by the foremost American philosopher of postmodernity.

230 pages, Hardcover

First published December 1, 1994

About the author

John Sallis was an American philosopher well known for his work in the tradition of phenomenology. From 2005 until his death, he was the Frederick J. Adelmann Professor of Philosophy at Boston College. He previously taught at Pennsylvania State University (1996–2005), Vanderbilt University (1990–1995), Loyola University of Chicago (1983–1990), Duquesne University (1966–1983) and the University of the South (1964–1966).

Reviews

[Tijmen Lansdaal · Rating 2 out of 5]

The godfather of postmodernism is associated with phenomenology for adopting the Heideggerian strain of its geneticism. With a pretty nifty interpretation of Heidegger's truth-theory at its core this work pursues the usual endless questioning of the philosophy tradition. Like all postmodern works, it fluently speaks in obscurity by feigning ambiguities. Most importantly it name-checks the heroes of philosophy and incorporates quotes from writers far better than John Sallis. Sallis admittedly makes a number of very interesting comments on many of the authors (for instance on the Derrida of Of Spirit), probably cementing his position as the one-eyed king of the conties, but its argument as a whole falls flat.

Ultimately, Sallis is one of the few pomo's that make evident why exactly so little sense emanates from their pleas. The Heideggerian idea of concealment and the implied annulment of the Law of Non-Contradiction are undertaken to dodge the presentism of philosophy, which is the quite large body of beliefs held by No Wan Evah, but which might go unopposed by philosophers like Derrida and Heidegger (?). Although one may argue that such an account of the state of philosophy is in some way commendable, it really is too bad the main inspiration, Heidegger, quickly falls down the wayside. Some of the main directives of Being (Man and self) remain completely unaddressed, which is typical for Sallis' selective approach to philosophical history.

Also: what the fuck is Husserl doing here? Not even going to begin whining about that.