America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, is a thorough exploration of the Vietnam War and its legacy on the American and Vietnamese people. Presenting the latest research and scholarship, this clear, readable textbook discusses the historical reasons for America's lengthy involvement in Vietnam and the continued effects of the Vietnam War today. Students of this text will come away with a deeper understanding of this hotly-contested conflict and its long-lasting impact on the United States and the world.
A specialist in the history of American foreign relations, George C. Herring was Alumni Professor of History Emeritus at the University of Kentucky. Herring received a bachelor's degree from Roanoke College and after service in the U.S. Navy he earned both master's (1962) and doctorate (1965) degrees in History from the University of Virginia. After teaching for four years at Ohio University, Herring joined the faculty of the University of Kentucky in 1969, where he taught until his retirement in 2005.
This may be the best single-volume general history of the Vietnam War I've read. Herring's achievement here in compressing the war's complex diplomatic, military, political, and social issues into such clear analysis in a mere 321 pages is nothing short of remarkable. Its coverage of every aspect of the war is complete. Reading historian John Lukacs this year has taught me that we understand things before we know their truths. So with Vietnam. I've long understaood ways of looking at the motivations for our commitment in Vietnam that are counter to conventional or correct perceptions. Herring clearly states some of those views exactly as I understand them, so it's no wonder I like the book. For one thing, he details the perceptions of the security threat to the U. S. posed by the loss of Indochina to the communists and explains our responses based on those assessments. One of the strongest parts of the book, I think, is the explanation of U. S. attitudes in the global competition with the Soviets and how this affected our diplomatic strategies in southeast Asia. Herring's history of the earliest phases of the war is an excellent overview of the thinking governing our decisions during the French phase of the war and our own later military buildup. The damage to the war effort I thought the print and broadcast media caused by negatively influencing public opinion and positively encouraging the enemy's will to resist has always been one of primary interest to me. He convincingly argues that media coverage reflected public opinion rather than influencing it. Because I find wisdom in the rest of the book I accept his analysis, the only argument in the many books on Vietnam I've read in the past 3 years to make me think the media didn't do our country a disservice. I believe this may be one of the definitive histories of the Vietnam War.
This brick of a book it's so much, I wonder why it's not much more well known. Basically, a textbook on the Vietnam war, it covers everything from the First Indochina war, Diem regime, Geneva Accords to americanization, Watergate etc. It doesn't linger on well known aspects of the international and wider US situation, which might confuse some, yet what takes it out of the usual Cold-War mold is its stark objectivity. You can't really hold to one position (for or against the war as "just") that this huge work will not derail or at least cast significant shadows over. Nothing is really whitewashed or washed in any ideological color. I might call it a very historical history book.
Yes... I know I call it huge while there are so many books on the subject with triple the amount of pages..
Also, on objectivity, ofc it would be great to have a work that covers both sides of the conflict in-depth, yet let's not forget that Vietnam does not really provide a "liberal and transparent" access to its archives.
Herring's spare, US foreign-policy-focused account of the Vietnam War is the standard text used in many undergraduate courses. While it was an informative, more-or-less unbiased account of the foreign policy failures that informed the conflict, from its origins in the clumsy French decolonization following WW2 to its ignoble and tragic conclusion in 1975, it read rather like an encyclopedia article--dry and to the point. This is just as well, if you are looking for just the facts and high-level analysis.
For me, Herring's book was helpful in understanding the critical factors which led to the series of incompetent decisions (or rather non-decisions) that was US SE Asia policy in the 50's and 60's. One of the key initial factors that really set things on the wrong course was the US wish to placate the French in the face of fears about the USSR-- because Europe was viewed as the primary battleground in the fight against Communism, and the French seen as key allies there, the US chose not to pressure them to free Indochina in 1945, thus making an enemy of Ho Chi Minh, who was always more of a nationalist than a Communist (and who, by the way, quoted the US Declaration of Independence on V-J day). If the US had made friends with the Viet Minh early on, it seems likely (from Herring's account, at least) that Vietnam would ironically have been a democratic ally of the US in its confrontation with Communist powers. In retrospect, US involvement in Vietnam tragically takes on the look of a rearguard action for 19th cent. imperialism, paying for the Asian sins of the retreating French as the price of victory in Europe.
Aside from the Cold War group-think mentality among the hyper-educated brain trusts in the State and Defense depts at the time, it seems to have been domestic considerations--a charitable way to describe bureaucratic paralysis in the face of moral cowardice--that led the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations to make a series of half-assed non-decisions, effectively passing the buck to the next set of blind oracles. After reading Herring's account it is difficult not to come to the conclusion that US policymakers' avoidance of making the hard choices led to the worst of all possible outcomes. Irrespective of moral considerations, if the US had either focused efforts on thoroughly and decisively destroying and occupying North Vietnam, or pulling out and making nice with Ho as early as possible, it seems that there would have been considerably less human suffering than in what actually happened. This begs the classic question on whether outwardly democratic polities are suited to prosecuting wars of choice, the success of which typically require cold, dispassionate, decision making and occasionally morally reprehensible actions. Herring's account provides as good raw material as any to meditate on this question.
It's nice that Herring covers the first half of the war, when the United States merely backed the French colonial forces, but even with all that it's a very short work with a narrow focus on the US side of a multifaceted conflict.
It's the kind of book you'd be assigned in a high school or undergraduate 101 level history or political science course, and if you've ever read any more comprehensive work on the war in Viet Nam, this can be safely skipped.
These three stars represent my reading journey more than the quality of the book. It took a lot to get through this one. It is undeniably a concise, effective, and straightforward history of the Vietnam War. Focusing on military and political issues, Herring effectively makes nods to the deep social and cultural history going on underneath the surface. The early Chapters covering the final years of the First Indochina War were illuminating and the author does a good job setting up the more familiar historical era of 1965-1968 in the context of the 1950s.
This book is pretty dry though. At a certain point I wish it had been written more like a textbook, with subheadings, maps, charts, and columns of FYI type info. I would feel lost in chapters that were more or less recitations of facts. It is effective, but a blunt way to write history that no matter how many pages of it I have forced my way through is compelling, but not compelling enough to get to the end of a monograph. I burned through the first hundred or so pages, and then it was small sips till the end.
For someone who wants a basic understanding of the conflict in Vietnam and America's role in it, this is a good place to start. Approach it as a way to scaffold your understanding on to the huge and diverse literature of history and fiction that comes from the experience of Vietnam. This will provide a good base, but it might not be the most exciting read.
While I appreciate Herring's immense knowledge about the Vietnam War and his aspirations to give a thorough yet broad overview of the events surrounding the war (not simply list the military victories and major events), I did not enjoy reading this book. I found his prose style to be cumbersome at best. For example, he would begin a chapter by giving an overview or thesis. Then, he'd go into the specifics and details and I would assume that he would follow the natural timeline of events--but then he would add in his own observations about the meaning of the events at the end of a paragraphs before jumping back into the explanation. The switching between timelines made understanding the overarching meaning of the events difficult for someone who did not have much knowledge of the war prior to the book. I didn't appreciate his insertion of his personal views and interpretation of the war into the text--at least, I didn't appreciate how often he did it. I would have been fine with his observations if he had saved them for the end of each chapter. The cadence of his sentences were often awkward, as well: phrases attached in odd places, multiple sentences in a row that were structured the same way, overusing big words.
In short, I would have enjoyed this book a lot more if Herring had done more editing to his prose and exercised restraint in peppering in his personal opinions in sections where plain facts were more useful. Again, I do admire his knowledge. He clearly knows more about the Vietnam War than I ever will. The subject matter of the book is also incredibly interesting and I did learn a lot. But even so, I can't bring myself to give it more than 2 stars. History does not need to be this hard to understand. People who don't mind his writing style will probably enjoy this book a lot more than I did.
The Vietnam War was an unconventional war that lasted, as many believe, for ten years. The case can be made that the war started much earlier than that and for the American government it was a slow increase in military activity and military spending over decades rather than a explosive beginning to a long war. How could America have such heavy involvement in a war that took decades to develop? Would American leaders have not seen the coming problems that would entrap them? In the second edition of America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975 by George C. Herring it is these questions that are directly addressed. George C. Herring is an Alumni Professor at the University of Kentucky. The bulk of his academic career has focused on political history with America's foreign policies and relations with other states during the Cold War era being the focus. In between 1982 and 1986 he served as the editor of the scholarly publication of Diplomatic History as well as the President of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1990. His other works include The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers (1983) and Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War (1973). The scope of this text is quite large, one might think overwhelming. Herring covers twenty-five years, with six different Presidential administrations, of history between America and Vietnam in roughly under three hundred pages. However, out of those six the focus rests on the administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. The recognition of the administration in question is important for Herring deals directly with the policies of these administrations. For example, Herring spends a good amount of text on the Eisenhower administration and the policies developed during it's run under the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. This includes the acceptance of the 'domino' theory and the aid giving to the French in their attempts to hold on to Vietnam as a colony or a member of their Union. Herring looks directly at the effectiveness of Johnson's decisions to escalate the war effort and how they play out on the ground in Vietnam as well as the congress floor. Herring of course deals with Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's plans to bring about an 'honorable peace' and the backdoor talks with North Vietnam and the Soviet Union to achieve this goal. All in all quite a bit to stuff into three hundred pages. The thesis of Herring's text can be found in three main threads of thought. First, America's extended involvement in Vietnam stemmed from the fear of America's place in the balance of power during the Cold War. This is about the 'domino theory' which suggested that when a non-Communist country got a Communist next door neighbor they would soon become Communist themselves. In the case of Vietnam this also suggests that the American government believed that Third World states were incapable of resisting this ideology. A second thread is the political and military decisions made during this period that were based on incomplete, misunderstood or exaggerated information and views, which led to deepen America's involvement in Vietnam, or in the later years escalating the war effort, all to contain Communism or to keep American foreign policy promises. The last thread is how the distinct personalities involved guided these decisions. In short, one bad choice after another kept digging the hole that the United States government was standing in deeper and deeper. Even though Herring is covering twenty-five years of history in a small volume he is focused on the political decisions that led directly to America's involvement in Vietnam. He covers the policy formed during the Eisenhower administration by Dulles to help the French retain their claim in the name of containment. Herring covers the aid given, the military advisers helping the French and how the failure of the French to achieve their goals leads to America's increasing nervousness over the Communists in North Vietnam. This leads to the coverage of the escalation of violence during the Johnson administration. Herring makes a clear case of how much politics in America went into the decisions concerning Vietnam. For example Johnson's decision increasing the number of bombing targets in North Vietnam to appease the pro-war faction in Washington. Herring also follows the twisted path of the Machiavellian peace efforts made during the Nixon administration and how they continued the war longer than necessary to gain political advantages in Washington. Herring clearly discusses what the decisions were, why they were made, who was involved and how that decision played out. Herring stresses the importance of not just the policy itself but the people, like Kissinger and Dulles as well as leaders in South Vietnam who had a hand in how the policy effected all concerned. Herring's work is pure political history. This is all about the elite political players, with the focus being the Americans, and their world views. This text is an over view of the Vietnam War and not an in depth look into any one aspect. Essentially, this text is to help answer why America was involved in the war and what should be taken away as the lesson for being involved in the war. He addresses America's leaders and their world view of American exceptionalism and their own individual quirks and concern for their careers as the driving force behind the mistakes made during the twenty-five years of America involvement with Vietnam. As Herring points out at the end of this edition American politicians were taking in the view from the 'city on the hill' and were not seeing an accurate picture of the reality of the world they were operating in and how America really fit in to that reality. Herring says, 'the United States must recognize it's vulnerability, accept the limits to its power, and accommodate itself to many situations it does not like. Americans must understand that they will not be able to dictate solutions to world problems or to achieve all of their goals.' Herring's text is about the pitfalls of over extending a states power for unrealistic goals based on overly simplistic ideologies and world views.
Herring condenses the chronology of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, analysis of U.S. decision making and the geopolitical context, and references to recent scholarship on the war and yet manages to clock in under 400 pages with prose that never feels dense. It's a major achievement. This is not a book to inspire passion- no The Best and the Brightest or A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam- and it's all the better for it given its purpose, namely teaching undergraduates. I benefited enormously from its clarity, and it's an informational spine off of which other Vietnam-related tangents could easily sprout in a classroom setting. Herring's work would not make a dove or a hawk happy, and thus has the blessed feeling of consensus arrived at through time and the slow accumulation of access to primary sources.
A. Synopsis: The American entry in Vietnam was the logical culmination of the containment policy set forth by Truman in the 1940s. Successive administrations never questioned the assumption made by containment theory that the national interest required the denial of Communism in South Vietnam. The result was a gradual, yet inescapable intervention in a local civil conflict. At first the US sought only to uphold French control. Then we took over ourselves and tried to build South Vietnamese independence. Finally we tried to defeat North Vietnam. Five presidents struggled with Vietnam, and for 2 Johnson and Nixon it proved politically disastrous. The ultimate failure resulted from the inherent flaws in a policy of global containment, B. The US, France, and the first Indochina war, 1950-54 1. Ho Chi Minh proclaims independence of Vietnam from the French in 1945 with words taken from the Declaration of Independence. From 1950-54 the US supported French efforts to suppress Ho and the Vietminh. The fear was that the Soviet Union had grown too large and the spread of Communism had to be contained. The “domino theory” is embraced. This was the belief that the fall of Indochina would bring the collapse of other nations in Southeast Asia. France supports Bao Dai in South Vietnam. The IKE administration accepted the Truman policy without alteration. After giving up hope that the US could control all of VN, Ike lay the plans for the defense of Southern VN. C. Nation building in SVN, 1954-61 1. The US National Security Council sought to weaken the Vietminh as much as possible in the wake of the defeat in Geneva in 1954. The key to this new initiative was to build a nation in SVN. Ngo Dinh Diem was chosen as leader. The US set up economic aid programs. The commercial-import program had built in weaknesses. It financed artificially high standards of living without contributing to development. SVN became dependent not independent. D. Limited partnership: Kennedy and Diem 1961-63 1. Pressures mounted for JFK to increase the commitment to VN. The Cold War was intensifying. His aids wanted him to send troops to VN. Other aids advised him to negotiate a settlement. JFK faced a choice and opted for a middle of the road answer. The US entered a “limited partnership” with VN. The US increased the numbers of advisors and aid sent to VN. This was called “Project Beefup.” Mounting criticism of the VN policy began at home. In SVN itself there was resistance as exemplified by the Buddhists setting themselves on fire in 1963. There was a coup in SVN, and the US conspired not to thwart it. Diem was overthrown. E. Enough but not too much: Johnson’s decisions for war 1963-65. 1. Between these years LBJ transformed a limited commitment to an open-ended commitment to preserve an independent, non-Communist SVN. Gulf of Tonkin problem when US ships were attacked gave LBJ the ability to increase military support. FLAMING DART was ordered to make air strikes against NVN. ROLLING THUNDER intensified these attacks. A great deal of US an international criticism mounted over Johnson’s escalation of warfare. To avoid further criticism LBJ deliberately misled both congress and the public. LBJ miscalculated the costs of the war and the willingness of the American people to pay for it. F. On the Tiger’s back: The US at war, 1965-67 1. The US improvised rather than carefully designed their war plan. The US relied heavily on air attacks of NVN industrial and transportation systems. NVN demonstrated ingenuity and perseverance in coping with the bombing. The ground attacks also increased. CEDAR FALLS sent 30,00 troops into a Viet Cong stronghold. “Attriting the enemy” was the major goal and the “body count” was the index of progress. The SVN people began to resent the Americanization of the war. Thus progress in the area of nation building was more limited than the area of warfare. 2. At home right-wing Republicans and conservative Democrats (the Hawks) viewed the conflict as essential. The Doves, a heterogeneous group opposed the war. Most Americans rejected these polar extremes, but support for the war dropped by 1967. This conflict paralleled divisions within the government. G. The Tet Offensive and after, 1968 1. January 30, 1968, Viet Cong attackers blasted a hole in the US Embassy in Saigon. All 19 of the attackers were killed but a symbol of America in VN was hit. This was just a small part of the large coordinated attack called the Tet Offensive aged by the Viet Cong against the urban areas in SNV. Tet was the beginning of the lunar new year in VN, their most festive of holidays. It sent instant shock waves across the nation. LBJ adopts a more conciliatory tone and claims he will only bomb just north of the DMZ. US begins Vietnamization of SVN, to get them ready for their own defense. H. A war for peace: Nixon, Kissinger, and VN, 1969-73 1. The policies of this administration suffered the same problems as their predecessors. The result was 4 more years of war, an increase in domestic strife, and a peace settlement that permitted American extrication but was neither honorable nor lasting. In 1969 these men realized that the war must be ended, but it must be ended honorably. As a signal that they meant business they increased the bombing in NVN and Cambodia. After some years of secret diplomacy and intensive fighting Nixon was worse off than when he started. Nixon goes back to the bargaining table and employs a Christmas Bombing to try to convince NVN to settle. The US accepted an offer that they had previously rejected, and only narrowly escaped with “peace with honor.” I. The “postwar war” and the legacy of VN 1. The 1973 peace agreements merely established a way to continue the war without direct American participation. SVN collapses in 1975. In VN the principle legacy of war has been continued suffering and economic deprivation. In America the legacy was that this was a dark moment in our history and has brought lasting distrust of government.
George Herring's history of the Vietnam war is arguably the best. George Herring, as a historian, can be included with the very finest, like Daniel Howe, James McPherson, Gordon Wood, John Ferling. Herring's magisterial history of America's foreign policy ("From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776") should be required reading for anyone interested in the subject. In "America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975", Herring offers a meticulously researched and lucid history of the Vietnam war; there is not a single wasted word. Yes, there have been far more detailed and granular descriptions, for example, Henry Kissinger's depiction in his weighty tome "The White House Years" of the protracted, grueling negotiations with Le Duc Tho to end the Vietnam war. And, that war is no longer America's longest war. Herring's history is highly recommended for anyone who wants to know what Vietnam was all about.
A wonderful companion to Ken Burn’s epic 18-hour documentary on the Vietnam War is “America’s Longest War’’ by George C. Herring.
Herring ushers readers through a well-developed historical kaleidoscope of the origins of the conflict, how America became involved in the region, LBJ’s reckless decision to Americanize the conflict, his repeated escalation, despite mounting evidence the war was unwinnable, all of which led to pools of blood on the battlefield, and sparked a culture and generational division within the United States, leading to years of social unrest.
The greatest lesson of the Vietnam War, as Herring superbly tells it, is the painful tragedies that can happen when major decisions are made without vigorous debate, ample discussion from both points of view, and when hard clear evidence is kept from the public.
The gateway drug into American Vietnam War scholarship. Absolute efficiency in history spinning. Herring is clearly going for a one volume overview for lay readers, and he does that about as well as you can. I really appreciate the added flavor he tosses in talking about the deep personal insecurities of LBJ and Nixon—they wanted to be cool and jocky, respectively!
Yes, it’s first and foremost about US forces in and US policy around the war, but for all the basic scholarship I’ve come across it stays Vietnam focused instead of spinning into how Vietnam affected the US domestically. He also gives a great runway in with French involvement in the 40s and 50s, and doesn’t glance over Dien Bien Phu. Really thorough, easy to read, and like Wikipedia deluxe (note: I love Wikipedia).
Overall a superb, concise introduction to the Vietnam War. Includes a history of the pre-war, American and French involvement, and the military/political undercurrents of the war. My only complaint would be that the author does not focus enough on the military aspects of the war. He also spends an inordinate amount of time on diplomacy, etc. concededly, diplomacy and international relations during the war are important, but the author focuses on these to the detriment of explaining what was actually happening on the ground in Vietnam. The author touches military history but really only scratches the surface. 5 stars in the end because of the books accessibility, yet in depth nature.
This book is a comprehensive study of they Vietnam War from the position of the United States. Herring does a great job in telling the narrative of the War and raising further questions of what the reasons and causes and consequences of the war were. This book is also easy to follow and, though long, keeps the reader entertained. It is a very informative read and I would recommend it for anyone that is a serious scholar on the Vietnam War or would like to understand more about it (or anything since I was one that didn't really know anything about it).
I admire the amount of information offered in this book; it was very informative for the assignments in my class, though the reading was long and dry for me. I wish the chapters had been shortened or divided into smaller chapters---it would've made it easier for me to find the specific subjects I needed to read for papers.
That said, it definitely wasn't the worst history book I've cracked open. Again, extremely informative and very detailed---I'm just not terribly interested in studying more modern wars in-depth.
This book was assigned reading in college in 1986 (the second edition). I held onto it for 35 years until I finally read it. It wasn’t a boring book or especially difficult, but it was rather dry. It seemed told from the view of the US president of the time. I guess I can’t blame the book for being much like the war— not sure why I started, it meandered along, thought about just abandoning it a few times, read it in spurts, and just finished it for the sake of finishing it.
This is an excellent concise history of the Vietnam war from 1950 - 1975. The book discusses the war at a very high level. There are no heroics only the various troop levels, the intensity of bombings runs and of course body counts.
A comprehensive overview of “America’s Longest War” which does justice to its murky origins, its consistent escalations and its persistent legacy in the American psyche as it conducts its foreign affairs and weighs the morality and merits of interventionism.
An easy read on the political history of the Vietnam War focusing on the American perspective. I feel it downplays the intentionality off the conflict on the American part. Playing heavily into the stumbling empire trope.
My father died at age 47 from the effects of agent orange. What a waste of so many lives and for what. I love and respect all vets. Those in charge were overcome with pompous pride and couldn't see the forest for the trees.
As a class textbook, this was written in an engaging manner as to not bog down its fact-heaviness. The author truly is an expert on the Vietnam War and offers a balanced perspective.