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Chamberlain and the Lost Peace
The 257 page book includes notes, bibliography, list of main characters and an index.
- GenresHistoryWorld War II
257 pages, Hardcover
First published December 19, 1989
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About the author
John Charmley
21 books6 followersJohn Denis Charmley was a British academic and diplomatic historian. From 2002 he held various posts at the University of East Anglia: initially as Head of the School of History, then as the Head of the School of Music and most recently as the Head of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Humanities. From 2016 he was Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Academic strategy at St Mary's University, Twickenham. In this role he was responsible for initiating the University's Foundation Year Programme, reflecting Professor Charmley's commitment to widening educational access.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
May 31, 2024
This is a detailed examination of the turmoil the Chamberlain government went through in attempting to avoid a war with Hitler’s Germany in 1938 and ’39. Charmley, in his usual stellar prose, relates the workings of Chamberlain’s policy of ‘appeasement’ regarding Hitler and how it eventually unraveled due to the fact that Hitler simply believed that he could only accomplish his vision of Germany’s future through war – but not with the United Kingdom.
Chamberlain and Lord Halifax labored mightily in their efforts to avoid what they knew would be a devastating war, Chamberlain taking the nearly unprecedented step of meeting face-to-face with Hitler on his turf in 1938 (and flying for the first time in his life). But there were many factors in the U.K. working against his efforts, not the least of them Churchill who was aligned with a ‘shadowy’ well-financed Jewish group known as The Focus, described by Churchill himself as being organized over ‘Jewish resentment at their abominable persecution.’ “That British Jews should have wished to help their co-religionists in Germany is understandable, but it inevitably aroused in others a feeling of ‘why should Britain fight for the Jews?’ – especially at a time when Jewish activities in Palestine were causing the Government a great deal of trouble.” (55) Churchill was also vocal about his professed ability of dragging America into any eventual conflict.
Reluctant to look to Russia for a defensive pact (Stalin’s purging of some 65 percent of his officer corps was not unknown) and uncertain (rightfully so) of the stability of French society and politics, Chamberlain eventually succumbs to Churchill’s lust for war after Hitler proves untrustworthy.
Most of the Government, and a good number of the public, felt that Hitler’s wishes for repatriating Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland were not entirely unjustified under the onerous conditions of Versailles. And Hitler had made it very clear he desired friendship with Great Britain if they would give him a free hand in Eastern Europe. But Chamberlain’s government was wary of upsetting the ‘balance of power’ as it existed in Europe and refused to be a party in making Germany a ‘major power’ on the Continent.
Chamberlain has been ridiculed for attempting to ‘appease’ Hitler. But his observation that it was “horrible, fantastic, incredible” that Britain should be preparing for a war “because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing” was prescient, for what Chamberlain feared most, in fact, came to pass. Great Britain lost any claims to ‘greatness’ as a result of being on the winning side of the war against the Nazis, eventually becoming ‘America’s street walker’ as so aptly put by the character of Bill Haydon in the 1979 BBC production of John LeCarre’s classic of the Cold War “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy”.
“The venom of his opponents pursued him long, but his was the only policy which offered any hope of avoiding war – and of saving both lives and the British Empire,” Charmley writes.
At the end of the book Charmley quotes ‘Rab’ Butler, who served in the Foreign Office under the Chamberlain government. “I looked upon him (Chamberlain) as the last leader of the organization in the State which I joined very late in its life, but which had been responsible for so much of England’s greatness.”
“Under his successor the ‘greatness’ would be lost,” Charmley writes, “and the Party was never the same again – but that is another story.” (212)
Chamberlain and Lord Halifax labored mightily in their efforts to avoid what they knew would be a devastating war, Chamberlain taking the nearly unprecedented step of meeting face-to-face with Hitler on his turf in 1938 (and flying for the first time in his life). But there were many factors in the U.K. working against his efforts, not the least of them Churchill who was aligned with a ‘shadowy’ well-financed Jewish group known as The Focus, described by Churchill himself as being organized over ‘Jewish resentment at their abominable persecution.’ “That British Jews should have wished to help their co-religionists in Germany is understandable, but it inevitably aroused in others a feeling of ‘why should Britain fight for the Jews?’ – especially at a time when Jewish activities in Palestine were causing the Government a great deal of trouble.” (55) Churchill was also vocal about his professed ability of dragging America into any eventual conflict.
Reluctant to look to Russia for a defensive pact (Stalin’s purging of some 65 percent of his officer corps was not unknown) and uncertain (rightfully so) of the stability of French society and politics, Chamberlain eventually succumbs to Churchill’s lust for war after Hitler proves untrustworthy.
Most of the Government, and a good number of the public, felt that Hitler’s wishes for repatriating Germans in Czechoslovakia and Poland were not entirely unjustified under the onerous conditions of Versailles. And Hitler had made it very clear he desired friendship with Great Britain if they would give him a free hand in Eastern Europe. But Chamberlain’s government was wary of upsetting the ‘balance of power’ as it existed in Europe and refused to be a party in making Germany a ‘major power’ on the Continent.
Chamberlain has been ridiculed for attempting to ‘appease’ Hitler. But his observation that it was “horrible, fantastic, incredible” that Britain should be preparing for a war “because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing” was prescient, for what Chamberlain feared most, in fact, came to pass. Great Britain lost any claims to ‘greatness’ as a result of being on the winning side of the war against the Nazis, eventually becoming ‘America’s street walker’ as so aptly put by the character of Bill Haydon in the 1979 BBC production of John LeCarre’s classic of the Cold War “Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy”.
“The venom of his opponents pursued him long, but his was the only policy which offered any hope of avoiding war – and of saving both lives and the British Empire,” Charmley writes.
At the end of the book Charmley quotes ‘Rab’ Butler, who served in the Foreign Office under the Chamberlain government. “I looked upon him (Chamberlain) as the last leader of the organization in the State which I joined very late in its life, but which had been responsible for so much of England’s greatness.”
“Under his successor the ‘greatness’ would be lost,” Charmley writes, “and the Party was never the same again – but that is another story.” (212)
February 3, 2026
I was prompted to read this book as a result of the early death of John Charmley last year. I have read a few of his other books over the years. In terms of Winston Churchill, his attitude is best characterised as negatively "revisionist". That comes across too in this work from the late 1980s. It is a narrative-based account of the complexities that faced Neville Chamberlain in dealing with foreign policy in 1937-39. It makes a reasonable case that Chamberlain did the best that he could from practical motives. Charmley draws out the problems that other actors in British and overseas politics presented. In particular, I was struck by how difficult a character Lord Halifax proved to be in the UK Foreign Office. However, I think the Charmley case does not really stack up in terms of looking at other options. He also misses a trick by not stressing enough the fact that while seeking to reach accommodations with the Germans and Italians, Chamberlain was rearming. Simon Heffer's more recent work on inter-war British history brings this out well.
In summary, this book is well written and argued but it is, I fear, now largely superseded by works that both stress the other choices that were available and the actions which the Government took, alongside appeasement, to enable Britain to defend itself in the conflict that all saw was coming.
In summary, this book is well written and argued but it is, I fear, now largely superseded by works that both stress the other choices that were available and the actions which the Government took, alongside appeasement, to enable Britain to defend itself in the conflict that all saw was coming.
April 1, 2021
A charming defense of Neville Chamberlain’s policy of “appeasement”. Interspersing clever asides, Charmley argues that Chamberlain was driven by an almost overwhelming desire to avoid the horror of another Great War. Almost overwhelming, for in the end he submitted to the demand for an armed response to Germany coming from, among others, his Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax.
Besides his aversion to war, Chamberlain was motivated by two factors. In its current state, Britain did not have the military strength to confront Germany, and so he pursued a policy of rearmament. Perhaps more importantly, Chamberlain felt that Germany’s demands were mainly just. The Versailles treaty had violated its own principals of national self-determination in its treatment of Germans placed under foreign (Czech and Polish) rule. In the end, Hitler’s practice of pushing the limits left Chamberlain without the ability to resist the push for war.
Besides his aversion to war, Chamberlain was motivated by two factors. In its current state, Britain did not have the military strength to confront Germany, and so he pursued a policy of rearmament. Perhaps more importantly, Chamberlain felt that Germany’s demands were mainly just. The Versailles treaty had violated its own principals of national self-determination in its treatment of Germans placed under foreign (Czech and Polish) rule. In the end, Hitler’s practice of pushing the limits left Chamberlain without the ability to resist the push for war.
June 16, 2025
god does history make me angry
November 1, 2025
Slay 🛷
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews