Bargaining over the Bomb: The Successes and Failures of Nuclear Negotiations

by William Spaniel

Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. William Spaniel explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by Spaniel serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.

224 pages, Paperback

Published April 4, 2019

Reviews

[Nate]

After one semester of game theory/crisis bargaining theory, I think I understood about 1/3 of this book. Is comprehension a necessary condition to log on Goodreads?