Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War

by Taomo Zhou

Migration in the Time of Revolution examines how two of the world's most populous countries interacted between 1945 and 1967, when the concept of citizenship was contested, political loyalty was in question, identity was fluid, and the boundaries of political mobilization were blurred. Taomo Zhou asks probing questions of this important period in the histories of the People's Republic of China and Indonesia. What was it like to be a youth in search of an ancestral homeland that one had never set foot in, or an economic refugee whose expertise in private business became undesirable in one's new home in the socialist state? What ideological beliefs or practical calculations motivated individuals to commit to one particular nationality while forsaking another? As Zhou demonstrates, the answers to such questions about "ordinary" migrants are crucial to a deeper understanding of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Through newly declassified documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archives and oral history interviews, Migration in the Time of Revolution argues that migration and the political activism of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were important historical forces in the making of governmental relations between Beijing and Jakarta after World War II. Zhou highlights the agency and autonomy of individuals whose life experiences were shaped by but also helped shape the trajectory of bilateral diplomacy. These ethnic Chinese migrants and settlers were, Zhou contends, not passively acted upon but actively responding to the developing events of the Cold War. This book bridges the fields of diplomatic history and migration studies by reconstructing the Cold War in Asia as social processes from the ground up. Honorable mention for the Harry J. Benda Prize (Southeast Asia Council, Association for Asian Studies)A Foreign Affairs "Best Books of 2020"

Genres: History, China, Politics, Asia, Nonfiction

318 pages, Hardcover

Published October 15, 2019

About the author

Taomo Zhou is an Assistant Professor at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She specializes in modern Chinese and Southeast Asian history. In particular, her teaching and research interests focus on the nexus of geopolitics and migration in the twentieth-century. Taomo received her B.A. from Peking University and Waseda University, M. Sc. with Distinction from the London School of Economics and Ph.D. in History from Cornell University.

Reviews

[The Conspiracy is Capitalism · Rating 4 out of 5]

Contradictions of Diplomacy and Migration:

Preamble
--As the 4th book I read for a class project on the 1965-66 Indonesian genocide (see review: The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade and the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World), this one was less featured in my project…
…I was hooked instead by personal interest: Chinese diplomacy and migration.

The Good:

--Let’s first distinguish the following actors (first 2 = Chinese diplomacy, last 2 = Chinese-Indonesian migrants):
a) ROC = “Republic of China” until losing the Chinese Civil War and becoming Taiwan.
b) CPC = “Communist Party of China” winning to establish PRC (“People’s Republic of China”, today’s China)
c) “Blue” = pro-ROC/Taiwan Chinese-Indonesians
d) “Red” = pro-CPC/PRC Chinese-Indonesians

1) ROC/Indonesia:
--Overseas Chinese are stereotyped similar to Jews, as there has been a visible group of capitalist merchants, thus having a middle-class status (it should be noted that this omits large lower-class groups, i.e. farmers/workers).
--European colonialism perfected divide-and-rule especially based on detailed (note: disturbing co-evolution with Western science) definitions of social identities (ethnicities/“race”/caste/religion etc.), using certain groups for colonial administration (ex. colonial tax collection). We can see the legacies in post-colonialism’s “communal violence” (social identity hostilities, esp. South Asia, as British colonialism was particularly proficient).
--In Indonesia, Chinese merchants were used as colonial mediators by the Dutch. As ROC was nationalist and pro-capitalist, they:
i) looked up to Western capitalism/imperialism
ii) looked down on Indonesian nationalism/independence as backward (which was reciprocated by prejudice/violence towards Chinese migrants)
…We can see the vicious cycle of communal violence: the ROC’s lack of respect meant supporting Dutch re-colonization (1945-49, after Japanese occupation ended from its WWII defeat) and boldly interfering with overseas Chinese. This compounded Indonesian distrust/violence towards Chinese-Indonesians during Indonesia’s tumultuous independence struggle/decolonization.
--As mentioned earlier, Chinese migrants were hardly homogenous, with various intersections between political vs. apolitical, Indonesian assimilation (which has its own political/class distinctions, esp. nationalist/religious/communist) vs. keep Chinese ties (Chinese nationalist ROC vs. Chinese communist CPC), etc.
--As CPC was not yet the ruling party in China, they relied on underground networks to spread their ideology and resist ROC. This book features Ba Ren, who tried to oppose the vicious feedback loop of communal violence. Ren cites Friedrich Engels supporting Chinese nationalist struggle during the 2nd Opium War as a progressive anti-imperialist struggle while critiquing those (I'm assuming this is especially relevant to European leftists believing in a crude stages of development) who saw it as backwards/barbaric.
…Thus, Ren focused on the anti-imperialist aspect of Indonesia’s nationalist struggle, recognizing the chaos of social revolution (including violence towards Chinese-Indonesians). Ren, a communist, wanted to build a working-class anti-imperialist alliance between Indonesian nationalist struggle and Chinese-Indonesians, to transcend the colonial legacy of communal violence.

2) PRC/Indonesia:
--Both CPC and Indonesia secured their national victories in 1949, with the CPC kicking out the ROC to establish the PRC (today’s China) and Indonesia preventing Dutch recolonization.
--Unlike the ROC, the PRC pursued a pragmatic non-intervention relationship with Indonesia, by:
i) relying on formal diplomacy (state-to-state)
ii) shutting down overseas CPC branches
…this was PRC’s foreign policy given isolation as Western imperialism sought to suffocate the new communist state (ex. US’s total trade embargo 1950-1972; keep in mind the US dominated global food grains after WWII, while China had great sacrifices during WWII and a massive agrarian population seeking rapid industrialization).
…Thus, PRC pursued a “united front” supporting neighboring sovereignty (in hopes of anti-imperialism) even if they were not communist. As Indonesia achieved sovereignty under nationalist (not communist) Sukarno, PRC respected this by pulling out their CPC branches so there would be a single communist party, Indonesia’s home-grown communist party PKI. Crucially, state-to-state diplomacy meant going through the nationalist president Sukarno, rather than the non-ruling PKI.
--Ren was assigned PRC’s ambassador to Indonesia, creating a personal tension he was never able to resolve between his prior revolutionary underground activism and his new diplomatic boundaries.
--Despite PRC’s diplomatic efforts building trust with Sukarno/Indonesian nationalism, the hands off approach with Chinese-Indonesians meant a lack of control over their communal battles between “Blue” (pro-Taiwan) and “Red” (pro-PRC) which were ideologically fought in civic organizations, newspapers and schools.
--Anti-Chinese ethnic tensions continued; such visceral prejudice bypassed logic, where the “Chinese” remained homogenous and were now both capitalist (middle-class self-interested profiteers with no interest in Indonesia’s national development) and communist (deviously plotting with the PKI for a communist coup).

3) Sukarno and Cold War polarization:
--The “Cold War” was always hot in the Global South (decolonization). As Sukarno spread his global influence with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM: The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World), the US (keen to prevent any successful alternatives even if they aim for “capitalist” reforms, since global capitalism is built on imperialism: Capital and Imperialism: Theory, History, and the Present) tried to split up Indonesia by covertly supporting regional rebellions (Permesta/PRRI, 1957-61).
…This failed and US support was exposed, with nationalist Sukarno shifting further towards anti-imperialism. As Taiwan was also part of the imperialist support, Sukarno finally banned ROC/Taiwan-affiliation in Indonesia. Unfortunately, given the crude anti-Chinese prejudice, this spread to laws and public violence against all “Chinese” Indonesians (note: European elites with the greatest share of wealth somehow always avoid communal violence), with Indonesian anti-communists trying to further spread this onto the local PKI as well (i.e. all communism = Chinese plot).
--At the same time, PRC also moved closer to Sukarno after the Sino-Soviet split 1961, sharing the PKI’s oversight in building too much dependency on Sukarno’s popularity to hold off Indonesia’s anti-communists (esp. in the army, whom the US shifted towards after their failed regional rebellions).
…Meanwhile, facing economic turmoil with the IMF at the door, Sukarno relied on PKI’s mass organization and tried to keep unity with the army through anti-imperialist military campaigns. The contradictions culminated in the Confrontation campaign against Malaysia, seen as a British imperialist project, with PKI/China supporting Sukarno while the army’s anti-communists were hostile to Chinese-Indonesians' participation and began to sabotage Sukarno. The book highlights the lack of planning in PRC and Sukarno’s alliance.

…See comments below for rest of review (“Indonesian genocide and aftermath”, and “The Missing”)…

[Ann T · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very well researched and written book. I bought the book with the hope to understand better the reason behind Indonesian’s discrimination against its ethnic Chinese minority. While it was not really about that, it was nonetheless very educational. I was completely oblivious to this part of the history, never heard anybody talked about it, including my parents.

[Steven · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author caught an interesting and often ignored connection between China and Indonesia, of what goes on politically between the two countries during the period of 1945-67, the pivotal independence struggles of the two countries and both's attempt to navigate the treacherous waters of the cold war, especially in the 1965 massacre happening in Indonesia where many ethnic Chinese are raped, murdered. It brought the message of a dream of a Marxist Chinese that both countries' working class could unite together in a struggle against global imperialism. While the united front has failed as of 1967, the history has revealed many missed angles. Take an example of Ba Ren, a PRC activist who attempted to awaken the working class consciousness of Indonesians and the possibility of two races working together. He was a pioneer in that he saw that Overseas Chinese who lived in Indonesia will become Indonesians. At the time, the Chinese in Indonesia were mostly of merchant class, serving as middlemen between the First class Dutchmen and the rest, which brought them untold envy and suspicion by the Indonesians. This fact will become an influential factor later on in the relationship between the two countries as world politics become the background of the changing of relationship. The PRC was supportive of the Indonesian revolution although it tried to plant agents to shift the whole country slowly to a direction beneficial to the former, which happened until 1952 when PRC stopped all such efforts. Added to the complexity is the competition between ROC (Taiwan) and PRC. ROC was anti-Indonesian independence due to its Chinese Nationalist pro-Allies orientation during World War II. This changed after Indonesian independence as PRC was viewed as too leftist and dangerous. The Bandung conference (and ROC's attempt to murder Zhou Enlai) changed this somewhat, as Soekarno allied with PKI against the right wing army and religious factions. In fact, Taomo argued that Soekarno's guided democracy was inspired by his state visit to China when he was astonished by China's growth, the autocratic one party system enabling rapid decision making (little did he know of the famine of the great leap forward which was hidden from the worldwide press). There is also that whole complexity of Sukarno's Ganyang Malaysia campaign, in which plenty of ethnic Chinese participated. China viewed Indonesia as very important for its geopolitics, which made it very cautious, even more than Sukarno. Sukarno, in China's view, wanted to expand Indonesia's territory and influence following his success at gaining Irian from the Dutch, this it viewed as double dealing and dangerous since it invited too much condemnation and isolation (LKY advised China to not be too involved with the Malaysia affair since it might bring ethnic tension in the region).

What I find most interesting of this book is Taomo's documentation of the political scene between the 2 countries in Chapter 7-8. He documented the frequent business trips of PKI and Indonesian statesmen to China, some of which are missed by many historians, most important of which is Aidit's meeting with Mao a couple of months before the September 30 coup, of which Mao expressed the worry that Indonesian right wing was planning immediately to seize power, although Aidit was more calm (he thought that the Americans advised Nasution to wait and see). Taomo gave evidence that if true, it meant:

1. John Roosa's thesis that Aidit was behind G30S is largely correct, although the coup was not privy to the entire PKI establishment.
2. Aidit wanted a committee to prepare for a left-wing coup, which consisted of largely left wing elements of the armed forces and some moderates to hide the aim of this committee to outsiders. This is largely consistent with the reading that the Revolutionary Council which started G30S is a pro-left faction of the armed forces allying with PKI.
3. The PKI and PRC (and to some extent Sukarno himself) planned an import of a solid amount of light arms to arm left wing elements in Indonesia (the plan is to arm activists in 50 km in the radius of the Halim Airport during the event of a coup). However, in 1965 this was not achieved.
4. Most importantly, Beijing was not involved. It had limited knowledge and control of the events after 30 September. The subsequent discourse against PRC is largely a Suharto propaganda, although seeing the intention of the PRC and PKI, it is understandable to guard against PKI in such a way.

Of Suharto, it did not say enough, so some questions remained unanswered, but I think this is a dimension that I have not seen before, so this is a great contribution. If this is all true, then:

1. Aidit blinked first, he should have waited. Maybe in 1966-67 PKI would be more ready. Maybe he put too much trust in the Cakrabirawa, he was probably confident that the surprise element is enough to do the job. Even in the scenario that he did it in 1966-67, the odds are not good. It might have been a messy guerilla affair, unless the revolutionary ideas spread to the armed forces, or if the discontent with regards to the economic condition worsened. But for sure, the chances would have been better, he should have waited and see.
2. This gambit proved to be a collosal mistake, which wiped out the entire Indonesian left. In that case he can be categorized with Yamamoto and Yahya Sinwar, more recently, for having started an asymmetric war due to some grave miscalculations, with dire consequences for his people or organization.
3. Of the massacre, no one can deny the crime against humanity. However, I need to say that the attack against PKI is absolutely necessary. Even as far as a few months after September 1965, the Vice Premier Chen Yi was suggesting that there will be a civil war between PKI supporters and its opponents, and that the PKI is well placed due to its control of grass root elements and the countryside. The massacre is too much, but of the decision to erase PKI I have no doubt it is the right one given the context.

The book stopped shortly after, discussing the fate of people who came back to the mainland due to the false promise of the bountiful food and material in the mainland (this included my uncles and aunts).

I highly recommend this to anyone interested in the 1965 massacre. The rest of the book is interesting but not too revelatory.

[Aye · Rating 5 out of 5]

Memang benar kata Socrates bahwa semakin kita banyak tahu, yang lahir hanyalah ketidaktahuan. Hidup manusia memang terlalu singkat untuk mengetahui banyak hal. Pengetahuan yang kita miliki sekarang hanyalah setetes dari samudra lautan ilmu Tuhan. Lewat buku ini, Taomo Zhou berhasil memberi tetesan pengetahuan baru sehingga mampu menyegarkan dahagaku akan ketidaktahuanku perihal Tiongkok-Indonesia.

Taomo Zhou dalam bukunya ini menjelaskan tentang awal terbentuknya RRT dan Tiongkok Nasionalis (Taiwan), kemudian merambah ke masalah dua Tiongkok yang saling berebut dukungan dari diaspora Tionghoa di seberang lautan. Bagaimana hubungan diplomasi RRT-Indonesia di tengah ombak permasalahan kewarganegaraan Tionghoa. Sepak terjang Tiongkok-Indonesia dalam menyikapi perang dingin, melawan pengaruh Amerika-Soviet di Asia-Afrika. Diskriminasi Tionghoa di Indonesia. Peristiwa G30S di Indonesia dan dampaknya terhadap hubungan dengan Tiongkok. Revolusi Kebudayaan Tiongkok dan sebagainya.

Terjemahan buku ini menurutku enak dibaca. Buku ini adalah disertasi dari Taomo Zhou di Cornell University. Adapun sumber dari buku ini gak main-main, yaitu berasal dari arsip Kementrian Luar Negeri RRT, arsip Academia Historica dan Partai Nasionalis Tiongkok di Tapei, arsip ANRI Jakarta, IISG Amsterdam, dan berbagai wawancara di Tiongkok-Indonesia.

[Miko · Rating 4 out of 5]

Tionghoa perantauan yang saat ini menjadi kelas sosial eksklusif ternyata memiliki perjalanan sejarah yang tidak mudah. Diantaranya Benturan politik antara Taiwan dan Tiongkok pasca perang Saudara serta kondisi sosial politik ekonomi dan budaya di dalam negeri Indonesia terutama era Orde Lama yang menganut garis keras konfrontasi kiri turut menyumbangkan kondisi dimana masyarakat tionghoa perantauan di Indonesia dalam posisi terjepit. Namun sekali lagi sejarah membuktikan kaum tiongha perantuan di Indonesia mampu bangkit dan kini menjadi kelas yang sangat menentukan dalam negara Indonesia.

[Hëb · Rating 5 out of 5]

5/5 untuk buku yang sangat well-researched ini. Pembahasannya lengkap dan menyeluruh meskipun tidak disusun secara diakronis, melainkan dalam tema tertentu. Sangat aku rekomendasikan untuk siapapun yang ingin mengetahui tentang sejarah, politik, hubungan bilateral, maupun kondisi sosial yang berkaitan dengan Indonesia, Tiongkok, dan etnik Tionghoa dalam rentang 1945 (pasca kemerdekaan) hingga 1967 (pembekuan hubungan diplomatik Indonesia-Tiongkok).

[Naj · Rating 4 out of 5]

My suggestion: Read the original version in English Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia and the Cold War.

This translated version removes the Chinese feeling and understated the anti Chinese facts that is very blatant in its original version. This Indonesian version contains the translator's concept which in some parts he deleted, changed and altered from the original version.

[Andrew Liu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Estrangement from both sides. "distant dream"

[Jonah Lo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Comprehensive history of the Chinese in China-Indonesia relations during Old Order and early New Order.