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Ukraine and the Art of Strategy
The Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014, subsequent war in Eastern Ukraine and economic sanctions imposed by the West, transformed European politics. These events marked a dramatic shift away from the optimism of the post-Cold War era. The conflict did not escalate to the levels originally feared but nor was either side able to bring it to a definitive conclusion. Ukraine suffered a loss of territory but was not forced into changing its policies away from the Westward course adopted as a result of the EuroMaidan uprising of February 2014. President Putin was left supporting a separatist enclave as Russia's economy suffered significant damage.In Ukraine and the Art of Strategy, Lawrence Freedman-author of the landmark A History-provides an account of the origins and course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict through the lens of strategy. Freedman describes the development of President Putin's anxieties that former Soviet countries were being drawn towards the European Union, the effective pressure he put on President Yanokvych of Ukraine during 2013 to turn away from the EU and the resulting 'EuroMaidan Revolution' which led to Yanukovych fleeing. He explores the reluctance of Putin to use Russian forces to do more that consolidate the insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, the failure of the Minsk peace process and the limits of the international response. Putin's strategic-making is kept in view at all times, including his use of 'information warfare' and attempts to influence the American election. In contrast to those who see the Russian leader as a master operator who catches out the West with bold moves Freedman sees him as impulsive and so forced to improvise when his gambles fail.Freedman's application of his strategic perspective to this supremely important conflict challenges our understanding of some of its key features and the idea that Vladimir Putin is unmatched as a strategic mastermind.
243 pages, Kindle Edition
Published January 7, 2019
54 people are currently reading
345 people want to read
About the author
Lawrence Freedman
96 books252 followersSir Lawrence David Freedman, KCMG, CBE, PC, FBA is Emeritus Professor of War Studies at King's College London.
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
May 4, 2022
Putin is no strategic mastermind. He’s the opposite. Judo fighter. Not chess master. Immediate tactics, not long term strategy.
This book does a decent job explaining Russia’s misadventures in Ukraine 2013-2017, what strategy means, and Putin’s repeated missteps. Well worth a read.
This book does a decent job explaining Russia’s misadventures in Ukraine 2013-2017, what strategy means, and Putin’s repeated missteps. Well worth a read.
April 2, 2025
This is a very good book, published right on the eve of the 2020s and right before the world was turned on its head by Covid and the subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia. Some aspects are touched upon a little cursorily, but this is meant to be digestible and it is. If you want to learn about Ukraine through the lens of strategy, or vice versa, this is a nigh flawless book. For me, I found it very compelling as an addendum of Freedman’s excellent “Strategy” and an invaluable refresher on the origins of a war I’ve been following with extreme closeness since the 2014 Crimea annexation.
June 30, 2020
Derived from a series of articles and lectures, Freedman presents an overview of the fundamental strategy and miscalculation from all sides, while steering clear of the inflammatory politics found in much contemporary history and analysis.
July 27, 2022
Ukraine and the Art of Strategy by Lawrence Freedman is a tight, analytical commentary on the strategies at play in Ukraine as an independent case study. The book came out well before Russia's decision to invade in February, so its utility is best applied to the early phase of the conflict. It is a good book, one with helpful nuggets here and there. Its short length is also an asset, as it is not out of the question for the entire volume to be read within a single, if lengthy, sitting of a few hours. It is rather interesting that he penultimately concludes the book with a brief discussion on a power trying to engineer a decisive first strike and why that may not work.
September 18, 2022
This was a great book! I feel smarter having read it -- ha! The book does NOT go into the current 2022 war; it is all about the long lead up to it. It provides a summary of the conditions, reviews events in some detail from the 1990s through 2016/17, and provides commentary throughout before ending in a few pages of analysis and bottom line points. I learned a fair amount about formal strategy -- defeat, exhaustion, attrition, etc., -- and feel like this is a great warm up for the Freedman book on strategy that people seem to love.
November 11, 2022
This book was published in 2019 and is mostly an exploration of strategy as the acquisition and use of political power toward a long term set of objectives.
Discussion of Ukraine relates to the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and Vladimir Putin's subsequent 2014 destabilization of Ukraine's southeastern Donbas region through military sponsorship of Russian elements who wanted to rejoin Russia.
Author Freedman reveals Putin as more of a tactical judo fighter, who seeks to keep opponents off balance, than a visionary strategist. Putin's priorities are staying in power, keeping all the money he and his oligarchs have looted, messing with neighbours who show any signs of weakness and striving to annoy democracies whenever he can.
Putin in 2014 re-took Crimea, territory that had been Russian between 1783, when the Czar took it from the Ottomans, and 1954, when Soviet dictator Nikita Khruschev, who had been head of the Ukrainian Communist party in the 1930s, gave it to Ukraine. Crimea, whose population has long been mostly Russian, provides warm water Black Sea naval bases for Putin's fleet. He considers it crucial for Russian sovereignty.
The Donbas is different, in that there is a significant (40%) Russian minority population but not a majority. Putin could have launched an invasion of the Donbas in 2014 but didn't. Instead, he chose to send massive military materiel support to separatist Russians there, as well as troops in unbadged uniforms.
Preposterously, Putin's Kremlin insisted that it wasn't Russian troops fighting there. The accidental shooting down of a Malaysian airliner over Ukraine by a Russian missile fired by Donbas separatists or their "little green men" Russian allies led to more ridiculous denials from Team Putin, which extinguished whatever credibility Putin had in the West.
Russians in the Donbas hoping that Donetsk and Luhansk would join Russia were disappointed, as Putin preferred to let Ukraine keep the Donbas, as an economic and political irritant to the elected Zelensky government in Kiyiv.
Today, almost a year after he invaded Ukraine in early 2022, Russian troops retreat, while Putin desperately tries to hang onto territory he's taken in the Donbas. He's used rigged referenda that he thinks legitimizes calling them Russian territory. He continues to employ the salami approach, carving off slices of neighbours and destabilizing them, then slicing off more later, as he did in Georgia and elsewhere.
Like Hitler, Putin is not much of a strategist. He's just an amoral opportunist who calculated that nobody in the West would stop his invasion, fearful of his nuclear weapons. Putin was, sadly, right about that, but his invasion is not going according to plan for him and could cost him his job, his stolen fortune and perhaps his life when the oligarchs and generals who prop him up see their own positions and lifestyles threatened by his failure.
The content of this book is timely, but I give it only three stars because it is neither very well written nor well edited. The paragraphs are needlessly long and there's a lot of turgid passive voice.
I would recommend readers follow Russian Chess Grand Master Garry Kasparov, who is an eloquent critic of Putin and wrote an excellent book called "Winter is Coming". Kasparov argues that, like Hitler, Putin needs to be stopped before he goes further. That book predates the invasion of Ukraine but Kasparov is active on Youtube and is published frequently in the media.
Also very good on Putin is Edward Lucas' 2008 book "The New Cold War".
David Satter's "It Was A Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway" examines Russia's failure to come to terms with its horrific, murderous Communist past.
Mark Galeotti's "A Short History of Russia" surveys how Russia came to be the way it is: Vast, authoritarian, corrupt and always badly governed.
To understand how much Putin is motivated by money, read "Red Notice" and "Freezing Order" by Bill Browder, a former hedge fund manager who spent years fighting Putin's kleptocracy via courts and anti-money laundering legislation.
Discussion of Ukraine relates to the 2014 Russian seizure of Crimea and Vladimir Putin's subsequent 2014 destabilization of Ukraine's southeastern Donbas region through military sponsorship of Russian elements who wanted to rejoin Russia.
Author Freedman reveals Putin as more of a tactical judo fighter, who seeks to keep opponents off balance, than a visionary strategist. Putin's priorities are staying in power, keeping all the money he and his oligarchs have looted, messing with neighbours who show any signs of weakness and striving to annoy democracies whenever he can.
Putin in 2014 re-took Crimea, territory that had been Russian between 1783, when the Czar took it from the Ottomans, and 1954, when Soviet dictator Nikita Khruschev, who had been head of the Ukrainian Communist party in the 1930s, gave it to Ukraine. Crimea, whose population has long been mostly Russian, provides warm water Black Sea naval bases for Putin's fleet. He considers it crucial for Russian sovereignty.
The Donbas is different, in that there is a significant (40%) Russian minority population but not a majority. Putin could have launched an invasion of the Donbas in 2014 but didn't. Instead, he chose to send massive military materiel support to separatist Russians there, as well as troops in unbadged uniforms.
Preposterously, Putin's Kremlin insisted that it wasn't Russian troops fighting there. The accidental shooting down of a Malaysian airliner over Ukraine by a Russian missile fired by Donbas separatists or their "little green men" Russian allies led to more ridiculous denials from Team Putin, which extinguished whatever credibility Putin had in the West.
Russians in the Donbas hoping that Donetsk and Luhansk would join Russia were disappointed, as Putin preferred to let Ukraine keep the Donbas, as an economic and political irritant to the elected Zelensky government in Kiyiv.
Today, almost a year after he invaded Ukraine in early 2022, Russian troops retreat, while Putin desperately tries to hang onto territory he's taken in the Donbas. He's used rigged referenda that he thinks legitimizes calling them Russian territory. He continues to employ the salami approach, carving off slices of neighbours and destabilizing them, then slicing off more later, as he did in Georgia and elsewhere.
Like Hitler, Putin is not much of a strategist. He's just an amoral opportunist who calculated that nobody in the West would stop his invasion, fearful of his nuclear weapons. Putin was, sadly, right about that, but his invasion is not going according to plan for him and could cost him his job, his stolen fortune and perhaps his life when the oligarchs and generals who prop him up see their own positions and lifestyles threatened by his failure.
The content of this book is timely, but I give it only three stars because it is neither very well written nor well edited. The paragraphs are needlessly long and there's a lot of turgid passive voice.
I would recommend readers follow Russian Chess Grand Master Garry Kasparov, who is an eloquent critic of Putin and wrote an excellent book called "Winter is Coming". Kasparov argues that, like Hitler, Putin needs to be stopped before he goes further. That book predates the invasion of Ukraine but Kasparov is active on Youtube and is published frequently in the media.
Also very good on Putin is Edward Lucas' 2008 book "The New Cold War".
David Satter's "It Was A Long Time Ago and It Never Happened Anyway" examines Russia's failure to come to terms with its horrific, murderous Communist past.
Mark Galeotti's "A Short History of Russia" surveys how Russia came to be the way it is: Vast, authoritarian, corrupt and always badly governed.
To understand how much Putin is motivated by money, read "Red Notice" and "Freezing Order" by Bill Browder, a former hedge fund manager who spent years fighting Putin's kleptocracy via courts and anti-money laundering legislation.
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January 29, 2024 (The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
Фактически, обычный пересказ российско-украинского конфликта. Да, в нейтральных тонах, т.е. не занимая, чью либо сторону, но всё же пересказ повторяемой истории. Уникального или просто авторского подхода я в этой книге не заметил.
И ещё. Если я не путаю книги, я перестал читать эту книгу, когда автор начал писать о знаменитой истории девочки Лизы, которую якобы похитили и изнасиловали мигранты в Берлине. Автор упоминает эту историю в контексте кибервойны между Россией и Западом, однако я воспринял включение этой истории в книгу желанием автора искусственно увеличить размер книги, а не в качестве важного элемента.
Вообще, до истории с Лизой, я читал очень краткий пересказ русско-украинского конфликта поэтому включение в книгу этой истории я воспринял как доказательство того факта, что по существу, автору сказать нечего и что главной целью всей книги является не предложение чего-то нового (нового взгляда) или собственной теории автора, а исключительно желание финансово нажиться на теме российско-украинского конфликта. Таких книг, в которых затрагивается тема Украины, вышло очень много, но лишь половина таких книг обсуждает саму Украину и пишется с целью анализа ситуации или с целью показать конфликт изнутри. Другая половина книг про Украину, как эта книга, пишется либо что бы заработать быстрые и лёгкие деньги, ибо в таких книгах просто пересказываются сообщения/колонки из СМИ, либо чтобы прорекламировать себя (т.е. автора).
It is a usual retelling of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Yes, in neutral tones, i.e., without taking sides, but still it is a retelling of a familiar story. I did not notice any unique or simply authorial approach in this book.
One more thing. Unless I'm mixing up books, I stopped reading this book when the author started writing about the famous story of the girl Lisa, who was allegedly kidnapped and raped by migrants in Berlin. The author mentions this story in the context of cyber warfare between Russia and the West, but I took the inclusion of this story in the book as the author's desire to artificially increase the size of the book rather than as an important element.
In general, before the story with Lisa, I read a very brief retelling of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, so I took the inclusion of this story in the book as proof of the fact that, in essence, the author has nothing to say (about Ukraine) and that the main purpose of the book is not to offer something new (a new view) or the author's own theory, but only a desire to profit financially on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. There are a lot of books about Ukraine, but only half of them discuss Ukraine itself and are written to analyze the situation or to show the conflict from the inside. The other half of books about Ukraine, like this book, are written either to make quick and easy money because such books simply retell media reports/columns, or to promote themselves (i.e., the author).
Фактически, обычный пересказ российско-украинского конфликта. Да, в нейтральных тонах, т.е. не занимая, чью либо сторону, но всё же пересказ повторяемой истории. Уникального или просто авторского подхода я в этой книге не заметил.
И ещё. Если я не путаю книги, я перестал читать эту книгу, когда автор начал писать о знаменитой истории девочки Лизы, которую якобы похитили и изнасиловали мигранты в Берлине. Автор упоминает эту историю в контексте кибервойны между Россией и Западом, однако я воспринял включение этой истории в книгу желанием автора искусственно увеличить размер книги, а не в качестве важного элемента.
Вообще, до истории с Лизой, я читал очень краткий пересказ русско-украинского конфликта поэтому включение в книгу этой истории я воспринял как доказательство того факта, что по существу, автору сказать нечего и что главной целью всей книги является не предложение чего-то нового (нового взгляда) или собственной теории автора, а исключительно желание финансово нажиться на теме российско-украинского конфликта. Таких книг, в которых затрагивается тема Украины, вышло очень много, но лишь половина таких книг обсуждает саму Украину и пишется с целью анализа ситуации или с целью показать конфликт изнутри. Другая половина книг про Украину, как эта книга, пишется либо что бы заработать быстрые и лёгкие деньги, ибо в таких книгах просто пересказываются сообщения/колонки из СМИ, либо чтобы прорекламировать себя (т.е. автора).
It is a usual retelling of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Yes, in neutral tones, i.e., without taking sides, but still it is a retelling of a familiar story. I did not notice any unique or simply authorial approach in this book.
One more thing. Unless I'm mixing up books, I stopped reading this book when the author started writing about the famous story of the girl Lisa, who was allegedly kidnapped and raped by migrants in Berlin. The author mentions this story in the context of cyber warfare between Russia and the West, but I took the inclusion of this story in the book as the author's desire to artificially increase the size of the book rather than as an important element.
In general, before the story with Lisa, I read a very brief retelling of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, so I took the inclusion of this story in the book as proof of the fact that, in essence, the author has nothing to say (about Ukraine) and that the main purpose of the book is not to offer something new (a new view) or the author's own theory, but only a desire to profit financially on the topic of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. There are a lot of books about Ukraine, but only half of them discuss Ukraine itself and are written to analyze the situation or to show the conflict from the inside. The other half of books about Ukraine, like this book, are written either to make quick and easy money because such books simply retell media reports/columns, or to promote themselves (i.e., the author).
May 15, 2025
3.5/5
uma breve exploração das estratégias russa e ucraniana no contexto da tomada da crimeia e a guerra no donbas, de 2014 a 2019 (data da publicação).
por um lado, a data do livro conduz a que esteja evidentemente desatualizado, dada a invasão russa em grande escala de 2022. compreende-se também alguma desorganização na estrutura, uma vez que é um conjunto de ensaios compilados num só livro.
por outro, não deixa de ser uma abordagem interessante sobre as origens da guerra russo-ucraniana e uma desmistificação do suposto poderio militar de moscovo e da figura de vladimir putin como grande estrategista, capaz de antever mil e uma jogadas adversárias estilo grande mestre do xadrez. na verdade, como o autor aponta no final, putin é judoca - cinturão negro aliás - cuja estratégia consiste em estudar as fraquezas do contrário e desequilibrá-lo rapidamente. táticas imediatas, pouca estratégia a longo prazo.
deste modo é compreensível o impasse da rússia na ucrânia desde 2022, conseguindo com a operação militar especial de três dias um total de 0 capitais regionais, unificar os ucranianos em torno de zelensky e do seu governo e aproximá-los da europa e da nato. hoje, tal como há 6 anos atrás, é a fraqueza ocidental que os mantém na luta.
uma breve exploração das estratégias russa e ucraniana no contexto da tomada da crimeia e a guerra no donbas, de 2014 a 2019 (data da publicação).
por um lado, a data do livro conduz a que esteja evidentemente desatualizado, dada a invasão russa em grande escala de 2022. compreende-se também alguma desorganização na estrutura, uma vez que é um conjunto de ensaios compilados num só livro.
por outro, não deixa de ser uma abordagem interessante sobre as origens da guerra russo-ucraniana e uma desmistificação do suposto poderio militar de moscovo e da figura de vladimir putin como grande estrategista, capaz de antever mil e uma jogadas adversárias estilo grande mestre do xadrez. na verdade, como o autor aponta no final, putin é judoca - cinturão negro aliás - cuja estratégia consiste em estudar as fraquezas do contrário e desequilibrá-lo rapidamente. táticas imediatas, pouca estratégia a longo prazo.
deste modo é compreensível o impasse da rússia na ucrânia desde 2022, conseguindo com a operação militar especial de três dias um total de 0 capitais regionais, unificar os ucranianos em torno de zelensky e do seu governo e aproximá-los da europa e da nato. hoje, tal como há 6 anos atrás, é a fraqueza ocidental que os mantém na luta.
August 21, 2024
It is extremely interesting to read this book in 2024, over two years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Freedman makes the argument that we arguably read Russia wrong since at least 2014 - that they were almost as likely to be caught off guard by their own actions as the West was, and that certain actions taken by Russia were more often than not mistakes made out of weakness that the West merely failed to capitalize upon. Putin has never been some mastermind - simply plodding his country along and getting away with whatever he can, and fooling a decent portion of people in the West that he is some archetypal masculine warrior against the nebulous forces of “degeneracy” along the way.
While being a strategy/IR book, it also serves as a very useful background on the recent history of the Ukraine conflict (which should have been called the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2014) leading up to 2019.
Certainly some interesting thoughts.
Freedman makes the argument that we arguably read Russia wrong since at least 2014 - that they were almost as likely to be caught off guard by their own actions as the West was, and that certain actions taken by Russia were more often than not mistakes made out of weakness that the West merely failed to capitalize upon. Putin has never been some mastermind - simply plodding his country along and getting away with whatever he can, and fooling a decent portion of people in the West that he is some archetypal masculine warrior against the nebulous forces of “degeneracy” along the way.
While being a strategy/IR book, it also serves as a very useful background on the recent history of the Ukraine conflict (which should have been called the Russo-Ukrainian War since 2014) leading up to 2019.
Certainly some interesting thoughts.
September 6, 2025
There's been so much written on the hot war period now that is enlightening to read a detailed study of the event preceding it. Two things I learned was how Russia initially showed no interest in annexing Donetsk and Luhansk seeking to have oblasts in the Ukraine federation with which to help guide policy. Also, how Russian and Russian-backed operations caught Ukraine unprepared and the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych caught Putin flat-footed as well as Europe and America were similarly unprepared for effective deterrence. This brings us to the Art of Strategy part, or at least failure of the art, as having failed to find deterrence the West is in the more difficult strategic position of seeking effective coercion.
December 10, 2022
Freedman's writing and analysis are impressive. Starting with his overview of strategies and explanation of coercive diplomacy, he builds a strong foundation for the reader. I found his chapter on the origins of the Russo-Ukraine conflict useful and concise (I plan to reference for term paper I am working on).
There are times, however, where the writing feels disjointed. Freedman points out that the book originally developed from independent essays, structurally this is observable. I did note some grammar errors here and there.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Freedman made efforts to deeply analyze and balance his argument.
There are times, however, where the writing feels disjointed. Freedman points out that the book originally developed from independent essays, structurally this is observable. I did note some grammar errors here and there.
Nevertheless, it is clear that Freedman made efforts to deeply analyze and balance his argument.
August 23, 2019
Solid primer on the arc of the Russia-Ukraine conflict over Crimea and portions of Ukraine. Lessons highlight the importance of context, the challenges of achieving political ends through limited means, and acknowledgement that strategy is more often then not a dynamic and evolving process and not a deliberate act. Worth the time for those seeking to understand how we got to where we are today in the Ukraine.
December 20, 2021
Obviously a very timely book both for US involvement in Ukraine and for our withdrawal from Afghanistan. I don't read a lot of military strategy books. Skimming through battle scenes in novels is pretty usual. This was certainly readable and the explanations were very clear. Some of the acronyms were under defined. But, that's just probably military jargon.
October 5, 2025
An expansion of a series of articles and lectures by the author, it expands on them some and does a relatively good job of talking about many of the key events between the fall of the Soviet Union and the early Russian incursions into Ukraine. Would be interesting to see an updated version after the full-scale invasion. Worth a read. (Audiobook)
May 24, 2020
BLUF: A great primer to understanding strategic theory and practice, with the conflict in Ukraine as the case study. Could easily be re-titled “Russia and the Art of Strategy” as it explores Russian actions outside of Ukraine (for context), notably in Syria and the United States. Direct and easy to read; meticulously cited, with useful references for additional study.
May 14, 2023
Подробное и довольно объективное описание украинского конфликта до 2019 года. Как уже замечено у Фридмана - нет каких то глубоких идей, выводов или рекомендаций. Если вы и так за ним следили - нового немного
March 22, 2022
Having paid zero attention to Ukraine in 2013, I’m now fully up to date on the crisis and this inevitable invasion.
November 26, 2022
An excellent concise overview of Ukraine's strategic situation up until 2019.
December 22, 2022
Tough patched together from three different articles and lectures the end result is a worthwhile and especially lucid account of the background and initial phases of the war in Ukraine.
February 3, 2024
Very good and informative. Events have gone beyond the book, but still very relevant.
March 1, 2024
Audiobook - Interesting read, good rundown on modern strategy
March 21, 2024
Really good lay down on Ukraine before the latest Russian invasion.
December 5, 2023
Still relevant little book, although events have past way beyond the described horizon. First part gives a general outline of relevant strategic topics and approaches, second is a historical overview of the events mainly between 2012-2017 and third and last part evaluates the strategic choices of both sides.
December 28, 2025
I listened to the audiobook of this work, and it was so good and so informative that I would buy the physical copy of it were it not for the price. It isn’t horrendously expensive… But I’ll have to wait for a used copy.
If you have any interest in political strategy or the events leading up to the current Ukraine conflict, I recommend this book. It is deeply researched, incredibly informative, and clearly written.
My guess is that Freedman will write a second edition or a sequel to it once the conflict is over. I hope so.
If you have any interest in political strategy or the events leading up to the current Ukraine conflict, I recommend this book. It is deeply researched, incredibly informative, and clearly written.
My guess is that Freedman will write a second edition or a sequel to it once the conflict is over. I hope so.
Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews