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Cyprus
Analyzes the 1974 crisis in Cyprus which resulted in its division, looks at the role Kissinger played, and discusses the incident's effects on Greece and Turkey
192 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1984
12 people are currently reading
968 people want to read
About the author
Christopher Hitchens
163 books7,894 followersChristopher Hitchens was a British-American author, journalist, and literary critic known for his sharp wit, polemical writing, and outspoken views on religion, politics, and culture. He was a prolific essayist and columnist, contributing to publications such as The Atlantic, Vanity Fair, Slate, and The Nation.
A staunch critic of totalitarianism and organized religion, Hitchens became one of the most prominent public intellectuals of his time. His book God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007) became a bestseller and solidified his place as a leading figure in the New Atheism movement. He was equally fearless in political criticism, taking on figures across the ideological spectrum, from Henry Kissinger (The Trial of Henry Kissinger, 2001) to Bill and Hillary Clinton (No One Left to Lie To, 1999).
Originally a socialist and supporter of left-wing causes, Hitchens later distanced himself from the left, particularly after the September 11 attacks, when he became a vocal advocate for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. His ideological shift, combined with his formidable debating skills, made him a controversial yet highly respected figure.
Hitchens was also known for his literary criticism, writing extensively on figures such as George Orwell, Thomas Jefferson, and Karl Marx. His memoir, Hitch-22 (2010), reflected on his personal and intellectual journey.
In 2010, he was diagnosed with esophageal cancer but continued to write and speak publicly until his death in 2011. His fearless engagement with ideas, incisive arguments, and commitment to reason remain influential long after his passing.
A staunch critic of totalitarianism and organized religion, Hitchens became one of the most prominent public intellectuals of his time. His book God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2007) became a bestseller and solidified his place as a leading figure in the New Atheism movement. He was equally fearless in political criticism, taking on figures across the ideological spectrum, from Henry Kissinger (The Trial of Henry Kissinger, 2001) to Bill and Hillary Clinton (No One Left to Lie To, 1999).
Originally a socialist and supporter of left-wing causes, Hitchens later distanced himself from the left, particularly after the September 11 attacks, when he became a vocal advocate for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. His ideological shift, combined with his formidable debating skills, made him a controversial yet highly respected figure.
Hitchens was also known for his literary criticism, writing extensively on figures such as George Orwell, Thomas Jefferson, and Karl Marx. His memoir, Hitch-22 (2010), reflected on his personal and intellectual journey.
In 2010, he was diagnosed with esophageal cancer but continued to write and speak publicly until his death in 2011. His fearless engagement with ideas, incisive arguments, and commitment to reason remain influential long after his passing.
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Displaying 1 - 19 of 19 reviews
April 13, 2013
Thirty years ago...
...based in Washington D.C., but having not yet deeply inhaled the corrupting gases produced by the seat of the American government...
...having not yet been granted American citizenship in a private ceremony presided over by a former director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security...
...radical journalist Christopher Hitchens turned his poison pen to a major miscarriage of justice. A divisive issue that was nevertheless shrouded in confusion as to its origins.
Before he wrote about God, Christopher Hitchens wrote about Cyprus. Specifically, the events leading up to and following the Turkish invasions of 1974.
This is a fascinating book, though in style it reads as a series of articles. Plaudits should be given to Hitchens for what is quite obviously a herculean effort of research and interviewing on a subject that the many have forgotten.
Not being particularly well acquainted with all the actors, bit players, and offstage handlers, I found parts rough-going and will probably have to revisit Cyprus at some point before I can completely grasp everything. Hitchens's impartiality is commendable--though at the time of writing married to a Greek Cypriot--Eleni Meleagrou--he sympathizes deeply with the island's Turkish minority, and this book is not an attack on the Turks by any means.
Essentially, Hitchens's argument is a refutation of the then received idea that the Turkish invasion was an inevitable result of impending enosis, that is, union with Greece. There were Greek Cypriots who supported enosis, and those who didn't. In 1967 a coup in Greece resulted in the installation of a military junta, and the junta subsequently attempted a coup in Cyprus and the assassination of Makarios III, ruler of independent Cyprus. They installed, faute de mieux, an anti-Turkish thug named Nicos Sampson. The junta planned to planned to divide Cyprus with Turkey--but it had no policy for Turkish Cypriots. Hitchens seems to think that even after the Sampson coup there could still have been coexistence. He even quotes a "naively pro-Turkish" account to the effect that relations between the two communities had been improving and that the fault lies with the junta's determination to achieve enosis. The first Turkish intervention was on 20 July 1974.
"Negotiations were underway, and relations between the communities were stable if nervous. The pretext for the original invatios had eased to exist, and if Mr. Evecit had withdrawn his forces he would have been remembered as the man who rid Greece of the junta, saved Cyprus from its designs, and rebuilt the image of Turkey in the West."
Rather than that, on 14 August, Evicet and the generals began a bloody conquest. Rape and killing prevailed. The Orthodox church relaxes restrictions on abortion because of the high incidences of the former. Over 180,000 Greek Cypriots flee their homes. Disaster.
In my humble opinion, Hitchens falters when he brings in the outsiders--it seems at times that he overstates their roles. His bête noire Kissinger is taken to task over and over again. Clearly, Kissinger is shady and evasive about Cyprus in his memoirs. But to give you an example of some of the invective:
"...the figure of Henry Kissinger has been decisive. It was Kissinger who decided to let the coup against Makarios go ahead, Kissinger who tried to screen the Greek junta from the fatal consequences of that policy, Kissinger who engineered and led the switch to Turkey wne both of these expedients failed, and Kissinger who persuaded the British government to renege on its treaty obligations."
It is now clear why Michael Dukakis lost the 1988 election--Americans cannot be expected to pronounce even a simple Greek name. In 1964, after the Greek and Cypriot governments (the Turkish government never gave its endorsement as well) rejected the Acheson plan for the partition of Cyprus, Lyndon Johnson suggested to Greek PM George Papandreou that NATO aid to Greece might possibly be withdrawn. Papandreou hinted that Greece might rethink NATO membership. Johnson responded to the Greek ambassador thus:
"Fuck your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these to fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good...If your Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his parliament and his constitution may not last very long. Don't forget to tell old Papa-what's-his-name what I told you--you hear?"
And there is the great Hitchens style, pithy and definitive, that shines out occasionally from all the politicking:
A writer should be careful about using the well-worn metaphor of 'Greek tragedy'. Many superficial accounts of the Cyprus crisis have used the term ineptly or incorrectly, satisfied with the resonance of the word in any Hellenic context and glad of the opportunity to employ it. The coup in Cyprus was not a 'classic' tragedy. It was not the outcome of rash human acts, misunderstood by their authors but monitored by the Fates. It was the result of human design, the consequences of which were perfectly understood by at least some of the actors. But it is true to say that, from the moment the first salvoes were fired at the Presidential Palace, every other 'tragic' consequence was more or less assured."
Highly recommended.
...based in Washington D.C., but having not yet deeply inhaled the corrupting gases produced by the seat of the American government...
...having not yet been granted American citizenship in a private ceremony presided over by a former director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security...
...radical journalist Christopher Hitchens turned his poison pen to a major miscarriage of justice. A divisive issue that was nevertheless shrouded in confusion as to its origins.
Before he wrote about God, Christopher Hitchens wrote about Cyprus. Specifically, the events leading up to and following the Turkish invasions of 1974.
This is a fascinating book, though in style it reads as a series of articles. Plaudits should be given to Hitchens for what is quite obviously a herculean effort of research and interviewing on a subject that the many have forgotten.
Not being particularly well acquainted with all the actors, bit players, and offstage handlers, I found parts rough-going and will probably have to revisit Cyprus at some point before I can completely grasp everything. Hitchens's impartiality is commendable--though at the time of writing married to a Greek Cypriot--Eleni Meleagrou--he sympathizes deeply with the island's Turkish minority, and this book is not an attack on the Turks by any means.
Essentially, Hitchens's argument is a refutation of the then received idea that the Turkish invasion was an inevitable result of impending enosis, that is, union with Greece. There were Greek Cypriots who supported enosis, and those who didn't. In 1967 a coup in Greece resulted in the installation of a military junta, and the junta subsequently attempted a coup in Cyprus and the assassination of Makarios III, ruler of independent Cyprus. They installed, faute de mieux, an anti-Turkish thug named Nicos Sampson. The junta planned to planned to divide Cyprus with Turkey--but it had no policy for Turkish Cypriots. Hitchens seems to think that even after the Sampson coup there could still have been coexistence. He even quotes a "naively pro-Turkish" account to the effect that relations between the two communities had been improving and that the fault lies with the junta's determination to achieve enosis. The first Turkish intervention was on 20 July 1974.
"Negotiations were underway, and relations between the communities were stable if nervous. The pretext for the original invatios had eased to exist, and if Mr. Evecit had withdrawn his forces he would have been remembered as the man who rid Greece of the junta, saved Cyprus from its designs, and rebuilt the image of Turkey in the West."
Rather than that, on 14 August, Evicet and the generals began a bloody conquest. Rape and killing prevailed. The Orthodox church relaxes restrictions on abortion because of the high incidences of the former. Over 180,000 Greek Cypriots flee their homes. Disaster.
In my humble opinion, Hitchens falters when he brings in the outsiders--it seems at times that he overstates their roles. His bête noire Kissinger is taken to task over and over again. Clearly, Kissinger is shady and evasive about Cyprus in his memoirs. But to give you an example of some of the invective:
"...the figure of Henry Kissinger has been decisive. It was Kissinger who decided to let the coup against Makarios go ahead, Kissinger who tried to screen the Greek junta from the fatal consequences of that policy, Kissinger who engineered and led the switch to Turkey wne both of these expedients failed, and Kissinger who persuaded the British government to renege on its treaty obligations."
It is now clear why Michael Dukakis lost the 1988 election--Americans cannot be expected to pronounce even a simple Greek name. In 1964, after the Greek and Cypriot governments (the Turkish government never gave its endorsement as well) rejected the Acheson plan for the partition of Cyprus, Lyndon Johnson suggested to Greek PM George Papandreou that NATO aid to Greece might possibly be withdrawn. Papandreou hinted that Greece might rethink NATO membership. Johnson responded to the Greek ambassador thus:
"Fuck your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these to fellows continue itching the elephant, they may just get whacked by the elephant's trunk, whacked good...If your Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his parliament and his constitution may not last very long. Don't forget to tell old Papa-what's-his-name what I told you--you hear?"
And there is the great Hitchens style, pithy and definitive, that shines out occasionally from all the politicking:
A writer should be careful about using the well-worn metaphor of 'Greek tragedy'. Many superficial accounts of the Cyprus crisis have used the term ineptly or incorrectly, satisfied with the resonance of the word in any Hellenic context and glad of the opportunity to employ it. The coup in Cyprus was not a 'classic' tragedy. It was not the outcome of rash human acts, misunderstood by their authors but monitored by the Fates. It was the result of human design, the consequences of which were perfectly understood by at least some of the actors. But it is true to say that, from the moment the first salvoes were fired at the Presidential Palace, every other 'tragic' consequence was more or less assured."
Highly recommended.
July 7, 2011
After holidaying in Cyprus I'd heard a few different views on the partition of Cyprus and its causes. As I'd only been to the Southern part of Cyprus this mainly went along the lines that the Turks suddenly invaded and took the island's wealth. When discussing this back home it became clear that there was far more to the story than that. Hence the search for an unbiased book on the subject. This was no easy job.
First of all I read Bitter Lemons of Cyprus by Gerald Durrell. This gives a good look at Cyprus towards the end of British rule but finishes long before the Turkish invasion. Rooting around various online booksellers brought me no fruits. Nothing looked at the lead up to the invasion. Then, searching for something else entirely, this book popped up. It seemed to tick all the boxes. So I oredered it.
The book was first written in 1984, 10 years after the invasion. It has been updated more than once, the final update in 1997. Unfortunately this was prior to the Republic of Cyprus being accepted into the EU. It would be nice to see if that has caused any shifting in policies. From my untrained eyes I can't see any.
It seems to be an unbiased, well researched look at Cypriot history from the time it was leased, by the Ottoman Empire, to Britain in 1878. It describes the changes that had gone on throughout this period until 1974. Filling in enormous gaps in my knowledge. I won't go on and on with my views here but it does make it blatantly clear that 'Turkish and Greek Cypriots were unhappy living together' is an outright distortion of the truth. Without Greece, the US and Turkey fiddling in things they had no reason to, whilst the British stood back and let their responsibilities slide Cyprus could have been a happy, strong independent state for the first time in thousands of years.
If you do go to Cyprus take the propaganda with a little touch of salt. No one group came out of the book with a halo but it seems the people who actually lived on the island suffered greatly because no-one allow them the democracy they wanted. Mr Kissinger comes out of this book very badly. I doubt whether EU membership will make much of a difference unless Turkey get any closer to joining. Visiting the 'Green Line' it isn't nice to see people still hurting because they can't return home. The UN keeps the peace but could it not have prevented the problem in the first place?
First of all I read Bitter Lemons of Cyprus by Gerald Durrell. This gives a good look at Cyprus towards the end of British rule but finishes long before the Turkish invasion. Rooting around various online booksellers brought me no fruits. Nothing looked at the lead up to the invasion. Then, searching for something else entirely, this book popped up. It seemed to tick all the boxes. So I oredered it.
The book was first written in 1984, 10 years after the invasion. It has been updated more than once, the final update in 1997. Unfortunately this was prior to the Republic of Cyprus being accepted into the EU. It would be nice to see if that has caused any shifting in policies. From my untrained eyes I can't see any.
It seems to be an unbiased, well researched look at Cypriot history from the time it was leased, by the Ottoman Empire, to Britain in 1878. It describes the changes that had gone on throughout this period until 1974. Filling in enormous gaps in my knowledge. I won't go on and on with my views here but it does make it blatantly clear that 'Turkish and Greek Cypriots were unhappy living together' is an outright distortion of the truth. Without Greece, the US and Turkey fiddling in things they had no reason to, whilst the British stood back and let their responsibilities slide Cyprus could have been a happy, strong independent state for the first time in thousands of years.
If you do go to Cyprus take the propaganda with a little touch of salt. No one group came out of the book with a halo but it seems the people who actually lived on the island suffered greatly because no-one allow them the democracy they wanted. Mr Kissinger comes out of this book very badly. I doubt whether EU membership will make much of a difference unless Turkey get any closer to joining. Visiting the 'Green Line' it isn't nice to see people still hurting because they can't return home. The UN keeps the peace but could it not have prevented the problem in the first place?
December 6, 2025
This book was written 36 years ago, and is still relevant. Sad.
May 22, 2020
Hostage to History by Christopher Hitchens
Related books I reviewed previously:
Bitter Lemons of Cyprus by Durrell
The Cyprus Conspiracy by O'Malley and Craig
The Cyprus Emergency: Divided Island by Van Der Bijl
The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know by Ker-Lindsay
Authors like Ker-Lindsay treat Hitchens' work very cautiously, if not dismissively, as biased and unhelpful. Hitchens, almost comically, found Durrell's book biased and fanciful. Hitchens has his definitive, rather caustic, style but to his credit he at least presents original sources in both Greek and Turkish to make his point; a careful reader need only to consult the source to see if it is misquoted. This book encouraged me to order former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State George W. Ball's memoir, as well as download and read the 1975 European Commission of Human Rights report. Hitchens' essential thesis is that Cyprus was doomed to fail in the hands of its three Guarantor Powers-- the U.K., which has sovereign territory on the island; Greece, whose undemocratic military junta had the explicit backing of the United States; and Turkey, who has generally pushed boundaries in the Mediterranean with its broad view of what its "interest" entails. Many of the events leading up to 1974, such as Turkey's drilling and exploration in Cyprus' EEZ, are similar to today's news stories, along with the accompanying rhetoric from Greek and Turkish sides.
Hitchens perceived bias is because he is perhaps one of the few people who is sympathetic to Archibishop Makarios and unwilling to give him the bulk of the blame. While Makarios governed Cyprus as both president and pontiff, he was at least both Cypriot and democratically elected. Thus Hitchens takes umbrage with Greece's attempts to overthrow him, and the U.S. using a backchannel with Col. Grivas' (per George Ball's memoir) to undermine him. Hitchens is correct that Ball and others plainly wrote back in 1964 that the U.S. preferred a settlement involving a divided island and saw Makarios as the ultimate hindrance to any arrangement. Hence, even Ball admits that the outcome in 1974 looked much like what had been drawn up at 1964 but at a price "unfair" to the Greek Cypriots, for which Ball blames both Makarios and Henry Kissinger.
Perhaps the greatest strength of the book is Hitchens' drawing on Turkish sources to illustrate how even Turkish Cypriots lament the loss of what happened to the Kyrenia and other places they once knew, and their Greek Cypriot neighbors, due to Turkey's intervention and ultimate occupation. Sometimes the sources are very left-leaning newspapers in Turkey have since been closed by the government. Hitchens details the history of action by undemocratic characters in Turkey's military and the tragic result for Turkey's then-politicians who were pushed into a conflict they may not have necessarily wanted or needed. One need only read the authoritative human rights reports, or visit the modern ruins of what would otherwise be preserved UNESCO World Heritage sights in the current "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," or read a history of Turkey from 1974-1984 to see the damage done. One can read Ker-Lindsay's book to see what attempts have been made since 1984 to bridge the great divide. Recent events in the relative neighborhood, such as Russia's annexation of Crimea, which the U.S. does not recognize, are a similar challenge. Anyone with an appreciation for rule of law, and logical consistency, is unable dismiss events 50 years ago simply in order to push for a peace that legalizes the status quo.
A couple great appreciations I have from the book is a greater understanding of how difficult it must feel to be a refugee in one's own land, to see the mountains of the North taunting you as you live across the barbed wire in the South. I also appreciated Hitchens' detailed timeline of ancient Cypriot history in the appendix. For Hitchens, the result is the same as Durrell. He leaves the beautiful land he is fond of frustrated with the powers that have brought misery to its people.
I give the book four stars out of five.
Related books I reviewed previously:
Bitter Lemons of Cyprus by Durrell
The Cyprus Conspiracy by O'Malley and Craig
The Cyprus Emergency: Divided Island by Van Der Bijl
The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know by Ker-Lindsay
Authors like Ker-Lindsay treat Hitchens' work very cautiously, if not dismissively, as biased and unhelpful. Hitchens, almost comically, found Durrell's book biased and fanciful. Hitchens has his definitive, rather caustic, style but to his credit he at least presents original sources in both Greek and Turkish to make his point; a careful reader need only to consult the source to see if it is misquoted. This book encouraged me to order former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State George W. Ball's memoir, as well as download and read the 1975 European Commission of Human Rights report. Hitchens' essential thesis is that Cyprus was doomed to fail in the hands of its three Guarantor Powers-- the U.K., which has sovereign territory on the island; Greece, whose undemocratic military junta had the explicit backing of the United States; and Turkey, who has generally pushed boundaries in the Mediterranean with its broad view of what its "interest" entails. Many of the events leading up to 1974, such as Turkey's drilling and exploration in Cyprus' EEZ, are similar to today's news stories, along with the accompanying rhetoric from Greek and Turkish sides.
Hitchens perceived bias is because he is perhaps one of the few people who is sympathetic to Archibishop Makarios and unwilling to give him the bulk of the blame. While Makarios governed Cyprus as both president and pontiff, he was at least both Cypriot and democratically elected. Thus Hitchens takes umbrage with Greece's attempts to overthrow him, and the U.S. using a backchannel with Col. Grivas' (per George Ball's memoir) to undermine him. Hitchens is correct that Ball and others plainly wrote back in 1964 that the U.S. preferred a settlement involving a divided island and saw Makarios as the ultimate hindrance to any arrangement. Hence, even Ball admits that the outcome in 1974 looked much like what had been drawn up at 1964 but at a price "unfair" to the Greek Cypriots, for which Ball blames both Makarios and Henry Kissinger.
Perhaps the greatest strength of the book is Hitchens' drawing on Turkish sources to illustrate how even Turkish Cypriots lament the loss of what happened to the Kyrenia and other places they once knew, and their Greek Cypriot neighbors, due to Turkey's intervention and ultimate occupation. Sometimes the sources are very left-leaning newspapers in Turkey have since been closed by the government. Hitchens details the history of action by undemocratic characters in Turkey's military and the tragic result for Turkey's then-politicians who were pushed into a conflict they may not have necessarily wanted or needed. One need only read the authoritative human rights reports, or visit the modern ruins of what would otherwise be preserved UNESCO World Heritage sights in the current "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus," or read a history of Turkey from 1974-1984 to see the damage done. One can read Ker-Lindsay's book to see what attempts have been made since 1984 to bridge the great divide. Recent events in the relative neighborhood, such as Russia's annexation of Crimea, which the U.S. does not recognize, are a similar challenge. Anyone with an appreciation for rule of law, and logical consistency, is unable dismiss events 50 years ago simply in order to push for a peace that legalizes the status quo.
A couple great appreciations I have from the book is a greater understanding of how difficult it must feel to be a refugee in one's own land, to see the mountains of the North taunting you as you live across the barbed wire in the South. I also appreciated Hitchens' detailed timeline of ancient Cypriot history in the appendix. For Hitchens, the result is the same as Durrell. He leaves the beautiful land he is fond of frustrated with the powers that have brought misery to its people.
I give the book four stars out of five.
August 12, 2013
This volume focuses on the events that led up to the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. The blame rests squarely on Washington's meddling with the island but some blame can also be placed on London's doorstep. The US backed the Greek junta, which included some ultra-nationalists. The junta was useful to the US in suppressing the left in Greece. Cyprus was led at the time by Makarios, who was a thorn in the side of the US because he was non-aligned. There were a large percentage of communists on the island (30-40% of the electorate voted communist). The thought in the US was to get rid of Makarios. So it was desirable to divide the island, crush it - at the same time throwing this bone to Turkey, considered a key US ally. The ideal excuse was the coup attempt by elements of the junta to overthrow Makarios, and supposedly unite the island with Greece. This was the excuse or reason for Turkey to invade. The US and Turkey got what they wanted and since then Cyprus has remained divided. The problem has never been resolved. This book was written in 1984 and updated in 1997. Not much has happened since then in terms of reunification although periodically there are attempts to hold elections, negotiations etc. The fate of Cyprus remains a sad testament to the Kissinger era.
September 28, 2016
A very informative book on Cyprus! Recommended if you are interested in the history of Cyprus!
June 18, 2025
“In a decade or so, if things go on as they are, it may well be possible for a visitor ignorant of history to arrive and to imagine that there have always been two states on the island. So thorough has been the eradication of Greekness in the north that, if one were not the prisoner of one’s knowledge, one could relax very agreeably”
Decent book covering the modern history of Cyprus, specifically the Turkish invasion. I read this because, for many years, my family regularly crossed an active UN demilitarized zone to go on holiday and never questioned how weird that is. We were ignorant of history and relaxed very agreeably. We have frequently stayed in a village called Karaoğlanoğlu, and not only did none of us ever find out how to pronounce it, but we never knew that it was renamed for a Turkish colonel that died (likely from friendly fire) during the ‘peace operation’ in 1974, when Turkey invaded, and that that invasion force landed at a beach 3km from our villa. There is a monument there, with a ship and a fighter plane and a helicopter, a graveyard of rusting tanks and armoured vehicles, a military cemetery and a pro-Turkish museum exhibit.
“The argument of this book is that the Turkish invasion was not ‘the climax of the struggle for union with Greece’, but the outcome of a careless and arrogant series of policies over which Cypriots had little or no control”
Summarising:
— Cyprus probably would have gotten on okay, as a country with a Greek majority and Turkish minority, living relatively peacefully side-by-side, if it weren’t for involvement from four powers that fomented intercommunal violence for their own ends and treated Cyprus as a bargaining chip: the US, UK, Greece and Turkey
— The Greek junta supported violent enosis (union with Greece) movements within Cyprus and led a coup to install a pro-enosis thug as president, who then proceeded to oppress the Turkish minority
— Turkey invaded in 1974, ostensibly to rescue the besieged Cypriot-Turk enclaves from persecution; this led to the collapse of the Greek junta. Had they left at this point and held up the 1960 treaty guaranteeing Cypriot independence, they would have been fairly blameless. Instead they doubled down, captured a third of the island, arguably the best bits with respect to agriculture and tourism (for an 18% Turk minority), kicked out 180,000 people and handed over their homes and land and businesses to Turks imported from the mainland
— The US (read: Kissinger) were happy to fuck Cyprus over repeatedly to appease alternately Greece and Turkey, both NATO allies. They looked the other way from both Greek and Turkish aggression, and supported whatever thugs worked against the democratically elected and popular president, because they worried that he was a communist (he wasn’t, but communism was also pretty popular)
— The UK, having held Cyprus as a colony since WWI, washed their hands of it and basically let the US take over the handling of Cyprus, going along with whatever they wanted. “She made every effort, as she had done in India and Palestine, to employ intercommunal differences as a means of control”
October 19, 2022
4.5
Well researched and written in Hitchens’ inimitable style.
Well researched and written in Hitchens’ inimitable style.
Read
April 8, 2009http://nhw.livejournal.com/1041920.html[return][return]Hitchens is of course a provocative and controversial writer. His main line of argument, once you cut through the rhetoric, is that uncritical American support for the Greek military junta - going right to the top, particularly Kissinger but also Nixon - emboldened the colonels to move against Makarios, and while Washington at best ignored the warning signs and at worst encouraged them. And when the colonels' rule collapsed along with their Cyprus adventure, US policy switched to a similarly uncritical enorsement of Turkey.[return][return]That much is clear. But I think Hitchens makes the classic mistake of enthusiasts for a particular country in assuming that there really was a US strategy. He says several times that partition had been the US policy on Cyprus since the Acheson plan of 1963. But the evidence he presents, particularly from the Johnson administration, makes it appear more likely that once it had become clear that the Acheson plan wasn't going anywhere, it was dropped as a policy objective; I don't believe that Kissinger especially cared whether Cyprus was partitioned or not.[return][return]While some of his details are questionable, Hitchens is right to castigate external actors for looking at Cyprus solely through their own selfish strategic lenses. But he doesn't spare the Cypriot leaders from criticism either. It seems to me that all actors are culpable for failing to put intercommunal relations on the island at the top of the agenda. If the international community as a whole had put a tenth of the effort into preserving the 1960 Cyprus constitution as it has put into preserving the 1995 Dayton Agreement in Bosnia, we would be looking at a very different story.
January 31, 2016
Very perceptive and honest recitation of the events leading to the cleaving of this nation by the predatory states involved in its history. Few authors could have stayed in the right frame of mind for delivering a treatment to all the necessary actors.
September 8, 2016
A good example of explaining how external forces exploit intercommunal quarrels to their advantage
June 29, 2021
a must-read for anyone who is interested in the cyprus issue or thinks that this issue is originated from intercommunal hatred
"Those who believe that the Cypriots ‘brought it on them selves’ have a duty to explain away the known facts of British colonial policy; the intrusion of the Greek junta and its backers; the creation by Ankara of an armed movement in favour of partition; and the declared desire of the United States government to ‘remove’ Makarios. These pressures, exerted on
a small people with almost no defences of their own, were the major determining causes of the present misery."
"Those who believe that the Cypriots ‘brought it on them selves’ have a duty to explain away the known facts of British colonial policy; the intrusion of the Greek junta and its backers; the creation by Ankara of an armed movement in favour of partition; and the declared desire of the United States government to ‘remove’ Makarios. These pressures, exerted on
a small people with almost no defences of their own, were the major determining causes of the present misery."
January 31, 2023
A great piece of research on the Cyprus situation, primarily ten years on from the Turkish invasion and land grab. There were a couple of updates since then but sadly the author has passed on so the mantle will need to be taken up by someone else.
The author takes an impartial and factual perspective from all parties, then lays it on strong where severe weaknesses lay (and he really takes no prisoners).
Well worth the read to get a good account of the lead up and result of the land split in the island of Cyprus.
The author takes an impartial and factual perspective from all parties, then lays it on strong where severe weaknesses lay (and he really takes no prisoners).
Well worth the read to get a good account of the lead up and result of the land split in the island of Cyprus.
August 17, 2019
Informative and enlightening read, but I'm used to being much more engaged by the writing in books about history. I thought this was a bit of a slog to read through even as I was engaged by the ideas. I'm still on the market for additional books about Cyprus if anything written since 1984 exists.
September 22, 2024
Hitchens does a great job dissecting the lead up and consequences that created the Cyprus we see today. Very to the point and yet conversational in tone so I found myself flying through the pages. Fuck Kissinger.
October 24, 2025
On the outside, the book laments the partition of Cyprus that, unfortunately, continues to this day, though with more ease at the border crossings. What is ineradicable is the borders buried in the hearts of Cypriots. If you look around the world, a similar mood has reverberated in many post-colonial settlements. In common, they had all seen their peoples divided, borders redrawn, both in an irresponsible manner that sowed the seed of discord.
The tricky part of reading Hitchens is that you are not exposed to a single issue, but a chance to reflect on rhymed instances. I could almost hear the undertones that ring true in other nations, where the division could be described as ‘internal’: Rwanda, Nigeria, British India, and Sri Lanka. There is the ironic coincidence in those internal conflicts, because most of the players were external. The Anglo-American author did not hide his contempt for the habitual partner-in-crime, the US and the UK.
It is equally understandable and unacceptable if you ask online for the root cause for carving up Nicosia, only to be told that two NATO members nearly went to war over a deep-seated dispute that searched its roots back in Ottoman rule. For one, you are forgiven to say so, as the fundamentals had been rewritten since the mass expulsion happened under the Ecevit administration, and the silent approval of Nixon and Kissinger. However, the private correspondence between the opposite numbers behind the US, Greece, the Greek Junta, Cyprus and Turkey, that were to be had in the book by dint of Hitch’s reputation, only make sense if the disaster had been orchestrated, whether it be accidental.
The worst outcome was not directly caused by meddling but a series of misfires, when insiders clearly knew what it had in store was a catastrophe. Like the machinated oppression sustained by the Turkish Cypriots, the overwhelming minority, about which Hitchens quipped, ‘Where the British had made an opportunistic use of Greek-Turkish rivalry and distrust, the United States and its proxies made an instrument out of it.’
‘One has to wage a battle against amnesia,’ pre-empting the fallibility of our memories, Hitchens decided to write it down. Hostage to History is a precious work. If you look at the eternal line to time appended to the book, Cyprus may be rightly called a hostage, who had been at the mercy of, successively, Phonecian, Assyrian, Egyptian, Persian, Roman, Goth, English, Venetian, Turkish, and American.
The tricky part of reading Hitchens is that you are not exposed to a single issue, but a chance to reflect on rhymed instances. I could almost hear the undertones that ring true in other nations, where the division could be described as ‘internal’: Rwanda, Nigeria, British India, and Sri Lanka. There is the ironic coincidence in those internal conflicts, because most of the players were external. The Anglo-American author did not hide his contempt for the habitual partner-in-crime, the US and the UK.
It is equally understandable and unacceptable if you ask online for the root cause for carving up Nicosia, only to be told that two NATO members nearly went to war over a deep-seated dispute that searched its roots back in Ottoman rule. For one, you are forgiven to say so, as the fundamentals had been rewritten since the mass expulsion happened under the Ecevit administration, and the silent approval of Nixon and Kissinger. However, the private correspondence between the opposite numbers behind the US, Greece, the Greek Junta, Cyprus and Turkey, that were to be had in the book by dint of Hitch’s reputation, only make sense if the disaster had been orchestrated, whether it be accidental.
The worst outcome was not directly caused by meddling but a series of misfires, when insiders clearly knew what it had in store was a catastrophe. Like the machinated oppression sustained by the Turkish Cypriots, the overwhelming minority, about which Hitchens quipped, ‘Where the British had made an opportunistic use of Greek-Turkish rivalry and distrust, the United States and its proxies made an instrument out of it.’
‘One has to wage a battle against amnesia,’ pre-empting the fallibility of our memories, Hitchens decided to write it down. Hostage to History is a precious work. If you look at the eternal line to time appended to the book, Cyprus may be rightly called a hostage, who had been at the mercy of, successively, Phonecian, Assyrian, Egyptian, Persian, Roman, Goth, English, Venetian, Turkish, and American.
November 23, 2025
Hitchens exposes the skullduggery of outside powers (first the British, and then the Americans, as well as the Greeks and Turks) in creating and escalating ethnic conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with lamentable consequences. The author lays out the compelling case that while Cypriot actors bear some of the blame for the conflict, foreign powers were most at fault. Henry Kissinger and Undersecretary of State George Ball, sometimes lauded for his opposition to escalation in Vietnam, are revealed to have colluded with far-right terrorists under General George Grivas to topple President Makarios, setting the stage for unrest, ethnic cleansing, destruction of heritage sites, and the violence of the Turkish intervention. Shouldn't be surprising after all this time, but Kissinger's a bastard, and an incompetent one at that whose chief skill is avoiding blame for the effects of his frequent screw-ups.
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July 28, 2011An interesting and comprehensive look at the 1974 troubles in Cyprus, although the slightly right-wing beliefs of the author and his presumptuous prose can be a bit grating.
July 25, 2021
A history of the campaigns to take over Cyprus from different organizations over time and the persistent absence of peace.
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