Since man's earliest days there has been conflict and, also from that point, unconventional forms of action where the norm was abandoned and the unorthodox employed. Here, David Rooney selects examples of the leaders who, for personal, religious, tribal or national ambitions, have been trailblazers in this form of warfare. Tracing the origins of guerrilla theories back to the Maccabees, the author moves on through the Napoleonic Age and the Boer Wars before considering Michael Collins, Mao Tse Tung, T. E. Lawrence, Castro and Guevara, and the Guerrillas of World War Two before considering the current situation with Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. The irregularity of this form of military action seems so pertinent in an age where convention and tradition in all walks of life is quickly abandoned in search of fast results; the warrior of the 21st century is more likely to adopt unconventional strategies than ever before. The topic is one of public debate and this explanation of its evolution can only increase our understanding and awareness of the topic. THE AUTHOR David Rooney has taught in many important institutions including the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Amongst his previously published titles are the popular Wingate and the Chindits, Burma Victory and Military Mavericks. He lives in Cambridge.
David Rooney is a historian and has taught in many important institutions, including the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Amongst his previously published titles are Wingate and the Chindits, Burma Victory, and Military Mavericks. He lives in Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Rooney jumps enthusiastically among stories of history's underdog warriors. His bias is for success, so the book becomes a galley of winners, from King David to Che Guevara. Rooney also has an Anglo-centric slant, so a lot of chapters concern guerrillas of the English colonial world: Wellington's forces against Napoleon in Spain, South Africa's Boer rebels, Michael Collin's Irish revolt, Lawrence of Arabia, and the chapter on guerrillas of WWII focuses on British special forces such as the SAS and the Chindits in Burma. This leaves out some of the biggest anti-colonial guerrilla movements like those of Vietnam or Algeria, but Rooney gives balance with chapters on Garibaldi, Mao, Tito, Che Guevara, and even a bit on Bin Laden.
Rooney tries to describe each guerrilla in terms of their battle tactics, but fortunately he gets carried away telling their life stories. As for the causes they fought for, these are mentioned with uncritical affirmation, much as the guerrillas spoke of themselves.
Naturally, people who take up the sword are an abnormal set of human beings. And as Rooney tries to convey these people's personalities, the effects range from disconcerting to hilarious. Concerning Spain's guerrillas against Napoleon he notes:
"Although many were supported by patriotic fervour, the lasting image of the guerrillas' activities was of horror and brutality. One gang, which was not in any way unique, was led by a sergeant who had deserted from the French forces and was known as Marshal Stockpot. He and his followers gained a widespread reputation for savagery and butchery. Wellington said, 'When inflamed, the Spaniard is an undisciplined savage', although this remark must be balanced against his other comment that his own troops were the scum of the earth" (p.34).
He describes British WWII Commando leader Mike Calvert's ongoing lust for battle long after the age of retirement:
"In looking at modern society he [Calvert] saw it as a grave disadvantage that so many men were tied down by their wish for a safe job, a home, and the need to pay their mortgage and work for their pension. Calvert tended to see an antagonism with the female sex and criticized wives who shackled their husbands to a safe routine life instead of 'the glorious uncertainty of guerrilla life'" (p. 197).
And perhaps most disturbing of all,
"Today, there is great interest in the ideas and philosophy of Sun Tzu, not only in military circles, but also in business schools and the development of corporate management. It is disconcerting to think that modern management is, perhaps, being trained with an emphasis above all on deception and spying" (p. 22).
I like history books with no footnotes. History books with forests of footnotes and meticulous citations might be technically better history, but I think "certainty" and "accuracy" are overrated priorities for authors of books. And (to some unknowable extent) illusory whenever you're telling stories about the world that you weren't physically present to witness. All this is to say: people hung up on whether or not they are reading the Green-Metacritic-Number Most-Accurate-According-To-The-Most-Venerable-Professors-Possessing-The-Most-Contemporary-Facts are going to detest this book (or I guess love it, in that it will give them lots of grist for the snoot mill)--But if you're into stories about stuff human beings did before we were born, this book is cool, kind of like a more casual Froissart or Dio or old-timey history book like that.
This is an interesting assessment of the efficacy of irregular forces applied using universally accepted theories of violence. He starts the history looking at Judah and the Maccabees, and moves through to the present day insurrections fought by Osama bin Laden.
He criticized Che Guevera for ignoring "his own criteria for guerilla warfare." Elsewhere he praised Michael Collins for the invention and utilization of the "Flying Columns" during the IRA's heyday in the 1920's.
When thinking about the concepts of asymmetrical warfare, it is helpful to have a guide to the principles that would make one insurrection more successful than another. Rooney's catalog of historical insurgencies is a very enlightening place to start.