SHAFER-LANDAU:MORAL REALISM:DEFENCE PAPER: A Defence

by Russ Shafer-Landau

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

335 pages, Paperback

First published June 19, 2003

Reviews

[Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a very detailed and fresh defense of moral realism - the position that there is a moral reality that people are trying to represent when they issue judgments about right, wrong, good, bad, etc., and is stance-independent, i.e., truths that obtain independently of a preferred perspective. Stated another way, there are moral truths that are true independent of what anyone happens to think of them.

Shafer-Landau offers some very good critiques of various non-realist positions and also a popular realist position - ethical naturalism (moral facts are just like, in kind, all other kinds of facts). Shafer-Landau defends ethical non-naturalism, i.e., moral facts are different in kind from natural facts (e.g., the rock is heavy). Ethical principles have a normativity about them such that they cannot be reduced to natural facts.

Shafer-Landau discusses moral metaphysics and looks at various arguments that purport to show that non-naturalism is metaphysically problematic. That is, the universe doesn't contain that kind of furniture. He also discusses moral motivation and the argument that only desires can motivate so ethics must be in some sense subjective. He also argues that moral obligations provide us with reasons for action, and he argues against the claim that this commits us to relativism since you can't divorce the reasons from commitments. He concludes with looking into how we can have knowledge of moral truths. He combines a view of moral truths as self-evident with a reliabilist epistemology in order to formulate an ethical epistemology whereby we can know what morality obligates us to do and not to do.

This book is not for beginners. I definitely need to give it another read or two. But I think Shafer-Landau advances very good arguments against non-cognitivist (i.e., we can't have knowledge of moral facts because there are no moral facts to be known). As well as good arguments against constructionists (i.e., various forms of relativism, for example). He interacts (briefly) with arguments that moral realism commits him to the existence of God, the law-giver. His main rebuttal to this is that those who reason this way are assuming the premise:

[P] Laws require a law-giver.

His says that when it comes to laws of nature, no one reasons this way there. Well, perhaps the non-cogs who proffer this argument don't, but there is a tradition within theism that makes this argument (cf. John Foster, The Divine Law Maker, for an argument that laws of nature require or presuppose the existence of something like the Judeo-Christian God). He also thinks the Euthyphro dilemma a good reason to reject a view where God is required for morality. He briefly tosses this out there and no theist will be impressed with his claims. His goal wasn't to interact with theism here and so his inadequacies can be ignored for the most part.

As I said, this is a good book and a valuable addition to the broader literature, but it is definitely not for the beginner.

[Διόνυσος Ελευθέριος · Rating 1 out of 5]

If there is an aspect to contemporary metaethics whose prospects are especially hopeless and unconvincing, and if you want to read a book that can help you to make a conclusion about the antecedent of that opening conditional, then you should read this book. Shafer-Landau’s defense of moral realism is as flaccid as the moral realism he tries to defend. The many deep wounds I received from reading this book are still too fresh to allow me to face them in too much detail here, but the primary grounds for his defense of the truth of moral realism are by way of an analogy to the contemporary philosophy of mind; Shafer-Landau’s real moral properties are ontologically analogous to consciousness. And if that dubious enterprise isn’t enough to fill you with the kind of total despair that you’ve been searching for, then by all means, dive into this sea of argumentative retreat yourself, for I can assure you that your thirst can be slaked many times over in these 302 pages of delicate and sophisticated maneuvering. The two most prominently disagreeable features of this book, for me, are these. First, aware of the profound (if not even disturbing, I would add) difficulties that arguing in favor of moral realism’s realism entails, Shafer-Landau opts for the far less satisfying strategy of insisting on the difficulties of proving moral realism false. Did you hear that? Instead of squarely arguing for the truth of his moral beliefs, much of the book is devoted to undermining arguments against moral realism: thus, moral realism could be true because it’s hard to prove that it’s false. One wonders: why doesn’t he simply face the facts? Second, although he says early on “that [he] came to these views by way of argument, rather than (as is usual) by way of rationalizing preexisting convictions...” (8-9), don’t believe him. The entire work is an obvious rationalization of preexisting convictions. This book is a manifest example of the theological nature of (at least) some of modern philosophy. Nietzsche’s conviction that modern philosophy has—despite its profession to the contrary—inherited basic elements of Christianity will find strong support in this book.

[Filos · Rating 4 out of 5]

Still a strong introduction to Moral (nonnatural) Realism. For good or ill, the field is moving rather fast, and this book is a bit "dated" in some regards. Still, you'd be hard-pressed to find a better introduction that is accessible but without sacrificing nuance and rigor.
Perhaps a more recent alternative is _Ethical Realism_ by William Fitzpatrick. Who also defends a form of non-naturalist moral realism, though with a different flavor than Shafer-Landau.

[William · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very much 'normal science' rather than 'scientific revolution'. Shafer-Landau presents a good critique of most of the criticisms of moral realism to be found within the literature, satisfying the "defence" part of the title, though offering very little in the way of positive argumentation.

I found the book interesting, and I think it works as a good introduction to the arguments making the rounds in the field, but ultimately not very moving. I did like the parts of the book on reasons externalism, motivational Humeanism, and constructivism. I think he argues very effectively for the first two and very interestingly against the latter (while also articulating it in a novel and interesting way). I found myself agreeing with Shafer-Landau more often than not about his criticism of the arguments he attacks, and I'd like to read more of his work.

Some readers might have found the work 'fishy' - he seems to mostly address his criticism of other views in terms of plausible approaches to countering his objectors rather than taking a firm stance, for instance when he addresses moral rationalism. It comes across as blindly defending a thesis without care for how one does so. This I think is more than made up for by the quality of the arguments made from this starting point.

I also wish he had taken the time to address more thoroughly moral error theory or other cognitivist versions of anti-realism. He presents plenty of good criticisms of other theories, but without a satisfying reason for asserting there are moral facts, all he seems to get us is a version of moral realism without too many theoretical costs associated with it but very few points in its favour over alternative cognitive anti-realist viewpoints.

[Chunyan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Chinese ：作为导论很好，但是分析略有不足，比如说对自然主义的反驳，从物理学的本体论承诺的空虚当然可以，但是吧，另一方面，我们的道德仍然可能被科学解释，如果不承认这一点，而直接走向实在论式的，不算很宽厚的对待自己的对手。
English: It's good as an introduction, but the analysis is slightly lacking, e.g. the rebuttal of naturalism from the emptiness of the ontological commitments of physics is certainly fine, but barring that, on the other hand, our morality could still be explained by science, and it's not exactly treating one's opponents with generous if one doesn't recognize that and goes straight to the positivistic style.

[Soha Bayoumi · Rating 3 out of 5]

Probably a fair assessment of moral realism, but the author sometimes keeps ruminating about the same argument for pages, without an actual added value... Some of the arguments are not perfectly convincing!