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336 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2019
Syrian Kurds were oppressed under the Assad dynasty, which viewed them as potential separatists. For decades, the regime had carried out campaigns of forced assimilation and ethnic cleansing against its Kurdish citizens...When the Kurds had protested over their treatment a decade earlier, they were killed in Rojava's streets. Many had been wary of participating in Syria's Arab Spring uprising, understanding the kind of suffering the regime was capable of inflicting. Instead, when the civil war erupted, Kurdish leaders made a deal with their longtime enemy in hopes of keeping Rojava out of it.One of the many ideas Giglio explores is how the Syrian revolution went wrong- hijacked by extremists (as revolutions often are) from the very beginning, when Assad opened the regime's prisons to create chaos and discredit the revolution, as well as, Giglio contends, shortchanged by the U.S. under the Obama administration. I've been trying to get myself out of the habit, especially as the spectacle of the presidential election year approaches, of thinking that there are only two ideas in the world, and Giglio's analysis throughout is evenhanded, reserved and nuanced. I've often thought that the moment when Obama decided not to attack Syria- when he allowed the Pentagon generals and the foreign-policy establishment and Hillary Clinton and John McCain to think of him as weak- was one of the stronger moments of his presidency. It was a decision that seemed reasonable in the aftermath of the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq. Then again, maybe that was a crucial window of time when moderate rebels could have been, should have been, supported. I don't know enough to say for sure, but Giglio seems to think so:
The rebels we met were a mix of soldiers who had defected, first-time fighters, and Islamists. Those who'd left the Syrian military had mostly joined the Free Syrian Army, an alliance of rebel groups that were more professional and moderate than their counterparts...they wanted U.S. backing. In August 2011, Obama had stated that Assad should step down, leaving many Syrians to wonder what America might do to make it happen. Rebels could take encouragement from the fact that so many representatives of the U.S. government were in southern Turkey...we also learned that CIA officers were holding meetings with rebel leaders, asking what kind of weapons they needed. Yet, as summer turned to fall, the factions gaining strength in the rebellion were not the moderates who sought to be U.S. allies but the hard-line Islamists, many of whom had established steady sources of support via backers like the Gulf financiers...When Giglio talks to one ex-Syrian Army officer, the man tells him that
...even the lighter weapons he did receive [from the U.S.] were in short supply- just enough, in his estimation, to keep the balance from tipping to either side...it was a line I would hear again and again from the CIA's rebel allies over the years as America kept them alive but made sure they never got too strong, wary of what might happen if Assad were defeated.The reaction among ISIS's leaders to Trump's election a few years later is telling, if not especially surprising. Every morning within the territory of the caliphate, apparently, imams would meet with fighters assigned to them, to lead them in prayer and issue instructions. "One morning in November" however, as an ISIS defector later explains to Giglio, the men
...found their imam unusually excited. There was no discussion of doctrine or strategy. Instead, he delivered news. Donald Trump had just been elected U.S president. This was a great gift to ISIS, he said. In the days that followed...ISIS leaders in Raqqa hailed Trump's win as divine intervention. "They told us that victory is at hand and that God has sent the pig Trump as clear evidence of this", [the defector] said. "And they said that now God will make the Americans start fighting amongst themselves..."Which is to say that the U.S. had dropped its veneer of respectability. Muslims everywhere would finally see that assimilation was impossible (I suppose ISIS has skilled enough propagandists that they didn't show their men any clips of the protests in response to Trump's proposed travel ban a few months later). In other words, "ISIS was eager to show that Trump's rhetoric- from his call for a travel ban against Muslims to his promise that the airstrikes he ordered against ISIS would pay far less heed to civilian harm- meant that ISIS had been right about America and its Western allies." Meanwhile, the Russian bombing campaign since 2015 had been even more indiscriminate than America's, sending greater numbers of refugees abroad and thereby lending greater rhetorical firepower to the Islamophobic and right-wing politicians that both Putin and ISIS, however at odds they might be otherwise, would prefer to succeed in Europe and the U.S.
...when a country was at war for so long but only a select few ever waged it, the rest of society began to go...crazy. Some played at civil war while others vowed to flee to Canada as political refugees, and too many Americans seemed to want to pull a bit of conflict into their lives just when so many people around the world were risking everything to escape from it.I notice that Mike is around my age, which means he must have been around 18 in 2003, at the beginning of the invasion of Iraq. Members of our generation went off- some killed, some maimed, some ending up with PTSD- essentially so Cheney could make money and Bush could resolve his Oedipus complex. Mike didn't go, as he notes in the book, neither did I (I fell for a different swindle and ended up more than $100,000 in debt, but that's another story), and so this detachment from our own history applies to us as well.
"No matter what they do, the Americans, they're not going to bring them back", said the man who'd lost six family members. "Even if the strike killed one or two ISIS guys, does it make sense?"Now to play devil's advocate, it's conceivable that such tragedy is still part of the best overall possible solution, at least conceivable that every other solution is even worse. Mike Giglio is wise enough not to tell the reader what to think, but what seems notable to me is that we're generally happy in the U.S. to not even entertain these incredibly difficult moral questions. Entertain these questions however, allow yourself a sense of the arbitrariness of time, place and identity, and the picture starts to flicker again, between us and them. But while you can find manufactured controversy on TV any time of day or night (is it okay for Colin Kapernick to kneel during the anthem?), there's almost no cultural discussion at all about the fact that when we bomb ISIS-held cities, or use drones, or supply weapons to the Saudis, civilians in faraway places die. Dots.
He pulled out his phone. "Do you want to see a picture of my dead brother?"
...The Obama administration had sold the American public on a certain kind of war. It was meant to be guilt-free. Keeping in line with that aim- and with no NGOs or journalists on the ground in ISIS territory to challenge the narrative- the United States insisted that its air attacks almost never killed civilians. As Munzer and I sought out victims and witnesses of those attacks, we saw that this was obviously not true. Over the course of a month, we documented about a dozen cases where U.S. strikes had killed civilians but the official U.S. line was that only ISIS members had died. We knew there must be many more, and even U.S. diplomats privately told me the numbers were much higher.
...while al-Qaeda had focused on sophisticated, high-profile operations, ISIS embraced the ordinary. Shooting up random office parks and driving trucks through crowds were the kinds of attacks that made it seem like anyone could be a threat. They were designed to get people to turn their suspicions on each other.And in that way, ISIS on one hand and the far-right in the U.S. and Europe on the other are mutually reinforcing. Trump's decision to withdraw troops from Northeastern Syria happened too recently to be included here, but it seems to provide a devastating epilogue. Over 10,000 Kurds died in the years-long fight against ISIS, many more wounded and crippled, and now we've left them, for seemingly no particular reason, to be murdered by Erdogan, or to initiate an uneasy alliance with Assad. Assad benefits, Erdogan benefits, and ISIS benefits. The Kurds lose, as do any Syrians who wanted to create a decent country...or any country at all, really.