Be Strong and of Good Courage: How Israel's Most Important Leaders Shaped Its Destiny

by Dennis Ross, David Makovsky

Modern Israel's founding fathers provided some of the boldest and most principled leadership of any nation--now Israel needs their example more than ever.


Modern Israel's founding fathers provided some of the boldest and most principled leadership of any nation. Now Israel needs their example more than ever.At a time when the political destiny of Israel is more uncertain than at any moment since its modern founding, Be Strong and of Good Courage celebrates the defining generation of leaders who took on the task of safeguarding the country's future.

David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon were all present at the creation of the new nation in 1948. Over the next sixty years, each experienced moments when the country's existence was directly imperiled. In those moments, Israel needed extraordinary acts of leadership and strategic judgment to secure its future, and these leaders rose to the occasion. The strength they showed allowed them to prevail.

Today, Israel may be on the verge of sacrificing the essential character that its greatest citizens fought to secure. This is the story of that epic struggle.

Genres: Israel, Jewish, Politics, Nonfiction, Middle East, History

384 pages, Hardcover

Published September 3, 2019

About the author

Dennis Ross, Middle East envoy for George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, is now a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Foreign Affairs called his first book, The Missing Peace, a major contribution to the diplomatic history of the twentieth century. (from the publisher's website)"

Reviews

[Dave · Rating 5 out of 5]

Dennis Ross has resided in the US State Department as a Mideast negotiator through at least four different administrations and has played a major role in Middle East negotiations. Having a Ringside seat has allowed Ross and his cowriter Makovsky to produce a brilliantly written, well-researched book that provides great insights. That being said, the book's conclusions merit some criticism.

The book addresses the subject of Middle East negotiations through the lenses of four of the founding fathers of Israel who eventually became prime ministers (Golda Meir who would be considered a founding mother is not included), David Ben Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon, providing portraits of each of these men and the forces that shaped their approaches to Middle East negotiations. These are tightly-weaved mini-biographies which provide in short form considerable detail. Nevertheless, for those without sufficient background in the subject area, it might prove a difficult book to dive into. It is not designed for the casual reader.

Ben Gurion was the George Washington of Israel, the first prime minister, and the one who led the country through its war of Independence, attacked at once by massive armies from surrounding countries after the Mandate was divided and the Arab world refused to accept the Israeli state. Begin was early on the firebrand, the one no one thought would ever compromise until Camp David and each long fruitless day of those negotiations is drawn out here. Rabin saw new realities after the fall of the Soviet Union and the changing of the world order. And, Sharon attempted to deal with negotiations strategically, keeping the strategic high ground.

Ross and Makovsky have an agenda which becomes clearer as the book goes on. Putting moral and strategic needs aside, they see a ticking demographic time bomb in the population growth of Judea and Samaria (often referred to as the West Bank) and conclude that Israel, to keep its character, must withdraw from much of the area. They do recognize however that others disagree with the population projections and do not believe the numbers are accurate. Moreover, the conclusions here do not address the security needs of the dangerous neighborhood where rockets are often launched.

Many thanks to the publisher for providing a copy for review.

[Alan Zwiren · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dennis Ross and David Makofsky's basic premise of the book are the Prime Ministers who came from the era from the founding of Israel were willing and did take many risks to advance Israel's existence and peace with Egypt and the Palestinians. They make examples out of four Prime Ministers including David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon. With each, they showed how their leadership overcame resistance from their own political base to advance Israel.

Having read a fair amount on all these leaders, I believe the assessment was a fair one. They go into the personal histories leading up to the momentous historical event to demonstrate the resistance and challenges they had to overcome. Their treatment of Ben-Gurion and Sharon was accurate based on my knowledge. I was disappointed with the brevity of who I believe was one of the most important Prime Ministers, Yitzhak Rabin, and event, Oslo. To me, that chapter was incomplete and left many details out. From what I have read, Rabin had his doubts about Oslo and the primary driver, Shimon Peres. Yes, he did eventually sign it and shake hands with Arafat; however, even after the fact, everything I have read said he remained skeptical as to whether Arafat would hold up his end of the bargain and Rabin would have not taken the subsequent steps. So I believe there were many holes in the coverage of that tale that did not fit the author's narrative; however, as the biggest event in recent years, they had to include it.

Ariel Sharon was a much more compelling story to me. Here was the architect of the settlement movement who helped remove the settlers from the Sinai and from Gaza because he saw the need to make peace. The authors also make the assertion that Sharon recognized if Israel continues to go down the path it is currently on, it will no longer be a Jewish Nation, it will become bi-national.

Far be it from me to question the assertions, especially made by Dennis Ross since he was a person who had a front-row seat and participated in much of the most recent events. He and David Makovsky even impressed me when making an assertion that they understand the majority "Israeli" perspective. They are by far ignorant.

They use these historical venues to state that unless Israel takes action today it is headed down a path to become a bi-national state thus ending the Zionist dream. They take on the statisticians and census takers demonstrating that those who believe that the Palestinians could be absorbed are mistaken. They assert that Israel will either have to enable a two-state solution if they do not want to become a bi-national state. They outline things that could have been done in more recent times that have not been done, and they give several suggestions about how Israel while waiting for Palestinians to come to the table, can take several actions to move towards a solution. They even suggest how the US can become an important partner to assist in creating an environment for a solution. And there is recognition of mistakes and errors made by the author and the US in the past.

My issues are two-fold. Over many years, the US helped create some of the problems that exist today. In "The Missing Peace" by Dennis Ross he goes into how the US helped facilitate and encourage talks directly with the Yaser Arafat. Arafat had already been driven out of Jordan and Lebanon and was marginalized living and operating in Tunis. If it were not for the US pushing Israel, Israel may have been able to conduct elections in the West Bank and Gaza to elect leaders who would have been less focused on terrorism and more focused on a solution. But it was the US pressure that opened the door eventually to Israel dealing with Arafat.

US pressure has been something that Israel and it's Prime Ministers have had to deal with throughout its existence. In 1956 after the Suez Crisis President Eisenhower forced Israel to return the Sinai. In Operation Desert Storm President Bush pressured Prime Minister Shamir not to retaliate for Iraq Scud missile attacks in fear it would threaten the composition of the coalition. And that is just the point which Dennis Ross knows all too well. He wrote a book on the fact that the Arab nations do not act on the Palestinian's best interest, they act on their own best interest called, "Doomed to Succeed." And the US, as a sovereign nation acts the same. They do not act in Israel's best interest; they act in the US's best interest.

Once again we have well-meaning Americans, and I will also say lovers of Israel, defining what Israel should do in their own best interest. And because of their involvement and actions in the past, I believe it is worth listening and even heeding what they have to say; however, I think more is needed in this discussion.

The authors themselves point it out as the very first point on page 300, "Israel would not need to take any other or new initiatives, so long as Palestinians remain unable or unwilling to offer or make any concessions on peace." The authors even point out how this is unlikely to happen in the near future especially with an expected transition of power as Mahmoud Abbas loses his ability to rule either through illness or death. Any replacement will want to show strength against Israel and initially will not be willing to compromise. If that is the case, then how do the authors expect Israel to take the actions as defined on page 289. The list 5 specific points but again on 300 say do not start anything new until the Palestinians demonstrate they are ready to make real strides for peace.

Israel unilaterally left both Lebanon and Gaza. Much of this was again at the insistence and under pressure from the US. Both of these were real disasters for Israel. And yes, especially with the evacuation of Gaza, the authors point out the US's failings in the aftermath; however, that does not help the people in Israel that have been subject to thousands of projectiles since the evacuation.

I believe in a two-state solution. I also believe that the Arab states surrounding Israel that helped cause the refugee crisis have a role to play in absorbing those still in their countries. For a long time, I believed that Israel should keep the pressure upon the Palestinians until they were ready to come to the bargaining table. For me, this meant the continuing construction of settlements in Judea and Samaria. However, discussing the situation with my son-in-law, he has convinced me that even if there is no solution in sight, we still have an obligation to keep working to find one; and I agree with him whole-heartedly. If I want Israel to be a place where my grandchildren and their great-grandchildren can grow up in safety and security as Jews, we need to continue to work at finding a solution. This book may be the start of an answer. Perhaps it is Yossi Klein Halevi's "Letters to My Palestinian Neighbors." Perhaps it is one that has not been written yet or one I have not yet read; however, We must continue to work towards an answer. To me, that starts with understanding as much as possible. So I am going to continue to search out as many different and diverse opinions as possible to search for an answer.

If the answers were simple, there would be no more conflict or crisis. So I will continue to read and absorb as much as I can from people who I can respect such as Dennis Ross and David Makovsky. I will carefully study what they have to offer, challenge where I have differences and do my little part as a voting citizen of Israel to work daily for a solution and peace.

[Moran · Rating 3 out of 5]

Be Strong and of Good Courage is a book aimed at addressing Israel’s struggle with Palestinians through the proposal of a two-state solution. The book largely makes its case by documenting prior instances in Israel’s history when its leaders had to make big decisions. It looks at what factors went into these leaders’ decision-making process, what personal and national hurdles they had to overcome in their negotiations, and ultimately the courage they had to muster to guide the nation onto the right path.

I personally really enjoyed the format of the book. Each leader’s story is presented like a business case study: you learn about elements of the leader’s personal history, their military and political careers, as well as nuances of their negotiations. This format helps put you in the leaders’ shoes such that you can assess for yourself, as a reader, whether you would make the same decision or choose to go a different route. It makes for an extremely powerful narrative and one which encourages contemplation.

That being said, some elements of the book did seem too focused with aggrandizing these political leaders. What other reason is there for mentioning that David Ben-Gurion read The Peloponnesian Wars about a dozen times? Additionally, I have never encountered such a balanced presentation of Ariel Sharon’s involvement in the Lebanon War of 1982.

Beyond the book’s myth-making, some chapters were so detailed that they proved tedious to read. In particular, the final portion of the section about Menachem Begin detailed so much about the back and forth between him and Anwar Sadat that I found it difficult to make it to the end. I think this would interest political scientists and leaders, but felt like wasted pages to me.

Ross and Makovsky have a clear intention in writing this book: they want to see Israel’s modern leaders pursue a two-state solution with the Palestinians. They feel that it is the existential crisis facing Israel today. If not addressed immediately, it could lead to a bi-national country where Arabs outnumber Jews, thus leading to the eradication of Israel’s Jewish identity.

By the end of the book, I agreed with their argument, but felt less-than-optimistic with regards to a solution. In some ways, the problem in Israel feels similar to climate change: calamitous in every way but so slow-moving that nobody attends to it until it’s already too late. And why should they? The issue is politically divisive within Israel, requires unilateral efforts on the part of Israel, and does not seem pressing in the face of a booming economy that is being more and more readily accepted internationally.

Ross and Makovsky address many of these elements in their final chapter.

Something which the authors didn’t address as fully, but which I felt should have received some attention is the pain that might come with declaring a nation as Jewish, both for the departing Arabs and the remaining Jews. It seems like a relic of the old world to declare a national character by a nation’s primary religion. It also seems incongruent with the secular lifestyles of many Israelis. While declaring a nation as Jewish under the Zionist movement of the 1940s meant one thing, I feel that a growing and decisive majority of the nation has grown more conservative and that such a Jewish declaration nowadays would carry with it a different meaning.

Would such a divide, while securing Israel’s national character, also move it further towards religious fanaticism? And how do you go about creating and maintaining that religious separation? Do you limit immigration into the country by religion and treat non-Jewish citizens as second-class citizens? These are values that are incongruent with the Western world that Israel is simultaneously trying to embrace while maintaining its Jewish character.

At times, it feels like the book is written entirely for Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been Israel’s longest-serving prime minister and who currently holds the keys to pursuing a resolution. It’s like the authors are trying to reach out to him directly to illustrate the legacy he could create for himself if he were to pursue a peace option more meaningfully. Fortunately, the authors also provide action items for individuals to pursue, whether they be in Israel or the United States.

For readers with no stake in this conflict, the book may still provide an interesting take on history. Just be mindful that the focus of the leaders’ histories will be towards furthering the argument of a two-state solution.

The book was informative, thought-provoking, and encouraged direct engagement. I would recommend it for anybody seeking to learn about leadership principles, Israeli history, or the ongoing peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians.

[Nathan Albright · Rating 2 out of 5]

To be sure, it is worthwhile to praise leaders for their moral courage in resisting their evil times and popular pressure to do the wrong thing and to celebrate those leaders who rise above the level of mere politicians and become statesmen whose character can serve as a model for future leaders.  It is obvious that the writers of this book think that they are giving Israel's current leadership under Benjamin Netanyahu advice that would make him a statesman in their eyes.  Yet at the same time this book's agenda is so transparent and simultaneously so repellent that I cannot recommend the authors' counsel as being worth following.  I appreciate that the authors think that writing a book like this would appeal to Netanyahu's desire to make a mark in Israeli history, but this book is so devoted to the authors' mistaken ideas that it is hard to take their views on history and what makes an Israeli leader historically relevant seriously.  Indeed, this is the sort of material that gives historians a bad name when they try to rank leaders because they expose themselves and their biases and reduce their credibility in general.

This book is about 300 pages long and is divided into five chapters.  The authors begin with a note and an introduction that attempts to create a sense of crisis of the failure to resolve the Palestinian issue leading to a situation where Israeli's identity or democracy is threatened.  After that the author looks at David Ben-Gurion and praises his determination to achieve Israeli statehood (1), likely a necessary appeal to try to make their advice more palatable than it would otherwise be.  After that the author discusses Menachem Begin (2) and his Camp David Accords, praising the land for peace approach there, even though giving up the strategic depth in the face of Egypt's growing radicalism looks increasingly unwise.  After that the author discusses Yitzak Rabin and heaps praise on the Oslo Accords (3), demonstrating again the authors' preference for hype and folly and lack of commitment to what is in Israel's best interests.  After that the author discusses Ariel Sharon and praises him for telling the settlers to give up their dreams (4), demonstrating even more their failure to appreciate Israel's well-being and the role settlers have in it.  Finally, the authors conclude with a call to Netanyahu to provide a way for Palestinians to achieve statehood (5), after which the book ends with acknowledgements, notes, and a bibliography and index.

In our day and age, no matter how hard it is to find moral courage, there are many things to be morally courageous about.  The sort of moral courage that the authors urge is closer to national suicide for a nation like Israel, which is so much smaller than the nations around it that it cannot make the same sort of mistakes that its neighbors make.  The authors are clearly pushing a two-state solution and are willing to engage in dubious demographic arguments to bolster their claims and try to gain clout, which is lamentable but also all too predictable.  The end result of the authors' intellectual dishonesty and their conflation of their views with what is right and mistaking them as the same thing is a book that comes off as cloying and manipulative.  The authors should stick to writing fake news columns for those who are already committed to their narratives and try not to influence people who are not on the same wavelength as they are.  By and large, this book makes me think less of the leaders that the authors celebrate, and that is definitely not the sort of achievement the authors should want to achieve.

[Carly O'Connell · Rating 2 out of 5]

Dry but informative. I read this book to expose myself to perspectives on Israel and Palestine that are not evident in my social media newsfeed, and although American diplomats are not the ones whose perspectives I am most interested it seeking out, it did provide a new angle for me and a somewhat objective look at what the conflict and peace negotiations have looked like from a third party. The authors have a clear bias in favor of Israel, but they do seem to report on all both sides of the negotiations using verifiable primary sources.
The authors begin with a deep dive into four Israeli prime ministers, from their formative years, to their military service, to their biggest decisions as national leaders. The leaders profiled are David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon. They then use these examples to criticize a lack of decisive action by the current Israeli leadership (as of its publication in 2019) and argue for certain actions to be taken by Israel's prime minister. They also recommend that the U.S. government and U.S. Jewish diaspora community pressure or incentivize Israel to take those actions.
The authors are vehemently in favor of a two-state solution in which Israelis and Palestinians each have their own nation with clear borders. They say that any one-state solution would lead either to a loss of the Jewish nature of the state of Israel because of demographics where Palestinians would make up up to 40% of the national population, or a loss of Israel's democratic nature if the Palestinians were absorbed but not given full voting rights as citizens. They also make some generalizations about the whole Middle East that any time there are two major religio-ethnic groups in one state, it results in conflict. Is that even true? If so, is it unique to the Middle East? I found that to be a bit of an overbroad and possibly dangerous stereotype.
The whole first two thirds of the book is just an endless recitation of facts, which I guess is the definition of nonfiction, but it was particularly tiresome and difficult to get through large chunks at a time. The last chapter on the implications for modern day Israel and prospects for peace was more interesting and I can see how the first part of the book built up to it. But I guess I have a low tolerance for this sort of political history book, so it took me 6 months to finish this.

[Howard Jaeckel · Rating 5 out of 5]

As a strong supporter of Israel who has grown weary of “progressives” who lecture the Jewish state to “take risks for peace,” while taking no account of unyielding Palestinian intransigence, I approached Be Strong and of Good Courage, by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, with considerable skepticism. What I half expected was more tired nostrums from inveterate peace-processers who refuse to realize that the vast majority of Jewish Israelis have justifiably concluded, from the Palestinians’ owns words and actions, that they have no interest in a peace that would permanently recognize a Jewish state in their midst, wherever its borders might be drawn.

My expectations were happily confounded. Messrs. Ross and Makovsky have written an excellent book that uses fascinating accounts of critical decisions made by four of Israel’s founding fathers and former prime ministers – David Ben Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon – as the jumping off point for a discussion of what Israel is to do about the West Bank, the great dilemma that the Jewish state now confronts.

Unlike Israel’s innumerable and facile leftist critics, the authors recognize that it is Palestinian rejectionism, and not Jewish settlements in West Bank or an Israeli unwillingness to compromise, that precludes a peace agreement in the foreseeable future. But they convincingly argue that asserting Israeli sovereignty over much of the area, whether by annexation or by some form of local autonomy arrangement, would ultimately make it impossible to retain Israel as a state that is both Jewish and democratic. They worry that although, contrary to popular perception, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has in fact restricted settlement growth, long term acceptance by the Israeli government of the current situation may cause the country to drift into the reality of a binational state.

So, now sounding a bit like more conventional peace processors, they call for bold action by Israeli leaders, akin to the decisions taken by the four heroic prime ministers to whom the heart of their book is devoted. But what, exactly, should that bold action be? The most that Israel’s leaders can realistically do, it would seem, is to keep the possibility of a future two-state solution alive by avoiding actions that would make it impossible of achievement.

[Daniel Goldman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent potted history of the big decisions of the central figures of the first 60 years of Israel's existence.
Obviously Ross comes with a view of the strategic challenges that Israel still faces with respect to the final status arrangements with the Palestinians, and addresses in some detail the demographic challenge, that, at sometime in the future is going to generate the choice between a binational state or some other solution, which he defines as separation.
There is a legitimate opposing view that out negotiating position is only improving and that the strategic dynamic will continue to improve for Israel. However it still does not envisage how this resolves to a political solution that does not include at least 35% Arabs in a greater Israel, with either the option of 40 MK's as a possibility, or the type of political arrangements that MK Bezalel Smortrich prefers, which is to annex without giving democratic rights. One option make me nervous, and the other is a country that would no longer be Jewish and Democratic.
The book does not offer what a different final status agreement might look like, although it recommends some interim arrangements. However the clear message of the book is that Ben Gurion, Begin, Rabin and Sharon were all called upon to take big decisions for the country, often in spite of their previously held and strongly held beliefs.
The open question hanging over us - can Netanyahu, or whomever may take over from him (right, left or center) conjure up the vision, courage and leadership to solve the issue.
Whilst the Palestinian question is not really on the table in a serious way, and has not been for some time (other than a swing towards annexation which also seems unlikely) it is crucial to keep this in sight. It remains one of the biggest, if not the biggest long term question to define the character and of course permanent borders of the State of Israel.

[Zeb Kantrowitz · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a history of the first men/women who's idea of a home for the (Hebrew) Jewish People lead to the creation of Israel. Almost all of the early Zionist were from Eastern Europe. This was easy enough to understand when you look at the pograms in Russia and Austo-Hungary in the late nineteenth century. At this time when the Ottoman Empire was in control of the Holy Land, though Hebrews were second class citizens (as were Christians) and lived under the rules of the Sultan, mostly they were able to lead quiet lives and live as merchants and such.

In 1897, the first of the Kishenev (modern Chisinau, capital of Moldova) Pograms, was propagated by the Russian Tzar's government. Zionism and the "Judenstat" were first described by Theodore Hertzl in 1896. We then follow Hertzl and the other founders of "Israel" through the UK's "Balfour Declaration", though the capture of Jerusalem by the British Army of WW1. After the war, the League of Nations, declared a mandate over the Holy Land under the control of the UK.

After the Shoah (the Holocaust) all of the early leaders were involved in helping to bring survivors to Israel and working against the British. On May 14, 1948 Ben-Gurion declared Israel independent.
From then on all the founders are involved in the early wars and the development of the new State, Army and political parties.

Ross does a yeoman's job in trying to keep this story rolling without getting bogged down in too much detail. I felt that he did a slight disservice to the reader by playing down the enmity between some of the Founders. All in all it's a good read for those who no nothing about the birth of Israel and the background to the current situation in the Middle East.

zeb kantrowitz zebsblog@gmail.com

[Alex · Rating 4 out of 5]

Dennis Ross and David Makovsky use leadership lessons of Prime Ministers David Ben-Gurion, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon to argue that Israel's current and future leaders need to be brave and decisive in pushing for a two state solution with the Palestinians. The four main chapters focus on each Prime Minister and is oriented to showing their decisive bravery and how that played a role in peace negotiations and establishing and Jewish state with room for a Palestinian one. They finished up by arguing why a brave Prime Minister was needed to push for the necessary two state solution. The overall argument was very strong as was the authors' research into the men in question and the consequences of the lack of a two state solution. However, the chapters on each man could be plodding, dull, off topic, selective in important examples and even a little unconvincing of the books overall purpose (while the argument for the two state solution was really good). The conclusion was mostly strong though it highlighted serious problems the books lessons seemed to ignore like the non-cooperation of Arab countries and Palestinian leaders. Overall it was a good book, with detailed personal histories of great men and a pretty strong argument for an important cause, but it is neither one of the best biographies of these men nor the most convincing final presentation.

[Mich · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is essentially a meager op-Ed that follows four interesting biographies of Israeli statesmen, Ben Gurion, Begin, Rabin and Sharon who took significant risks to make unpopular but important decisions - David Ben Gurion who declared the State when others recommended caution, Menachem Begin who risked Sinai disengagement with Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin who agreed to Oslo, and Arik Sharon who gave up Gaza and it’s settlements.
As described in the introduction and in the conclusion the authors advocate a two state rather than a single state solution. Their primary argument concerns who has the right demographics concerning Palestinian vs. Jewish birth rates as well as other arguments. Yes, they describe the difficulties and the prior refusals of the Palestinians but at the end of the day they offer no mitigants to the existential gamble that Israel would be taking in a two state solution.
If there was a clear way to significantly reduce the outcome to what might or would likely be to a bad outcome, one can be sure that it would be adopted in a heart beat. In the meantime the book offers a somewhat set of interesting biographies of four great leaders, though there are lots of better bios available.

[Charlsa · Rating 3 out of 5]

Dennis Ross has been a Mideast negotiator for the US State Department for several administrations and has been at the heart of negotiations with the Middle East during that time. He and Makovsky have written a well-researched book with great insights into the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts over the last 70+ years. The book focuses on four of the prime ministers who made decisions and led negotiations that in their way led Israel to where it is as a nation today. David Ben Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Rabin, and Ariel Sharon. I think it is interesting that Golda Meir was not included in these portraits of Israel’s leaders.
If you haven’t studied at least some of Israel’s history, it may be difficult to follow, but it is interesting and provides important information about both Israel and Palestine. Initially, it read as though it was going to be a balance looked at both groups. Unfortunately, as the book progressed the authors personal opinions began to come through and by the end their own agendas were set forth. Still, I enjoyed reading and for the most part it was a fair look at the Middle East.

Thank you to Net Galley and Perseus Books for the ARC. My opinion is my own.

[Joan Barden · Rating 5 out of 5]

Be Strong and of Good Courage is both a biography of four of Israel's greatest leaders who showed moral courage in establishing and leading the nation of Israel but also a guide for political leaders of any country who must hold onto and preserve the ideals of the nation it leads through challenging times. It also outlines the relationship between Israel and the United States. For me it helped put in sequence and importance the role of this relationship as well as the ongoing importance of that relationship.
This book is very readable for the armchair historian or anyone interested in the Middle East. It brings facts of history together for those whose understanding of this arena mainly come from movies and books by Leon Uris. Ben-Gurian, Begin, Rabin and Sharon discussed in detail in this book are not only heroes of Israel but heroes for all of us who want strong leadership based on the founding ideals of our nation.

[Gerry Connolly · Rating 4 out of 5]

Be Strong And of Good Courage is Dennis Ross and David Makovsky’s new tome of four Israeli leaders—BenGurion, Begin,Rabin and Sharon—who took big political risks for peace. The contrast with the Netanyahu era could not be sharper. The demographic imperative of a large Palestinian population under continued occupation threatens the very underpinnings of a Democratic And Jewish State. The state these four leaders fought for.

[Josh Ehrich · Rating 3 out of 5]

The history is very interesting however the authors bias comes through very clearly. If there is one thing the history of the Middle East demonstrates its that there isn’t only an option a or b. The premise here is that it’s a or b and if you choose one it’s war and the other is peace. This is calcified thinking that the last four years has proven antiquated.

[Michael · Rating 3 out of 5]

It’s a shame that after being wrong for 30 years, Dennis Ross is still not ready to change his views. The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over, while expecting a different result.

[Ilana · Rating 3 out of 5]

There are a couple of viable and interesting ideas explored, but I was not impressed - actually, didn´t like at all - the writing as such. From the point of view of the historical and political facts, it offers valuable testimonies.

[Lev Rothenberg · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent book zeroing in on the lives of four of Israel's most important leaders, the lessons they provide us and the the important challenges that Israel now faces.