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The Geography of Risk: Epic Storms, Rising Seas, and the Cost of America's Coasts
This century has seen the costliest hurricanes in U.S. history―but who bears the brunt of these monster storms?
Consider Five of the most expensive hurricanes in history have made landfall since 2005: Katrina ($160 billion), Ike ($40 billion), Sandy ($72 billion), Harvey ($125 billion), and Maria ($90 billion). With more property than ever in harm’s way, and the planet and oceans warming dangerously, it won’t be long before we see a $250 billion hurricane. Why? Because Americans have built $3 trillion worth of property in some of the riskiest places on barrier islands and coastal floodplains. And they have been encouraged to do so by what Gilbert M. Gaul reveals in The Geography of Risk to be a confounding array of federal subsidies, tax breaks, low-interest loans, grants, and government flood insurance that shift the risk of life at the beach from private investors to public taxpayers, radically distorting common notions of risk.
These federal incentives, Gaul argues, have resulted in one of the worst planning failures in American history, and the costs to taxpayers are reaching unsustainable levels. We have become responsible for a shocking array of coastal new roads, bridges, buildings, streetlights, tennis courts, marinas, gazebos, and even spoiled food after hurricanes. The Geography of Risk will forever change the way you think about the coasts, from the clash between economic interests and nature, to the heated politics of regulators and developers.
Consider Five of the most expensive hurricanes in history have made landfall since 2005: Katrina ($160 billion), Ike ($40 billion), Sandy ($72 billion), Harvey ($125 billion), and Maria ($90 billion). With more property than ever in harm’s way, and the planet and oceans warming dangerously, it won’t be long before we see a $250 billion hurricane. Why? Because Americans have built $3 trillion worth of property in some of the riskiest places on barrier islands and coastal floodplains. And they have been encouraged to do so by what Gilbert M. Gaul reveals in The Geography of Risk to be a confounding array of federal subsidies, tax breaks, low-interest loans, grants, and government flood insurance that shift the risk of life at the beach from private investors to public taxpayers, radically distorting common notions of risk.
These federal incentives, Gaul argues, have resulted in one of the worst planning failures in American history, and the costs to taxpayers are reaching unsustainable levels. We have become responsible for a shocking array of coastal new roads, bridges, buildings, streetlights, tennis courts, marinas, gazebos, and even spoiled food after hurricanes. The Geography of Risk will forever change the way you think about the coasts, from the clash between economic interests and nature, to the heated politics of regulators and developers.
304 pages, Hardcover
Published September 3, 2019
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July 15, 2019
Gilbert Gaul shows unmistakably what we thought we knew all along: disaster relief and flood insurance have become a stealth entitlement for the wealthy. In his excellent The Geography of Risk, Gaul piles up the evidence through research, interviews and actual examination. It is a patient and relentless investigation. The government encourages the rich to build luxury second homes in floodplains, because they know the government will pay them to rebuild after a storm. And as these are often vacation homes, there’s no rush. The only stress is filing the paperwork.
Even in North Carolina, where it is illegal to claim the seas are rising, their Republican Senator works to make federal funds easily and quickly available, because North Carolinians “are entitled” to it. In Florida, where the former governor banned talk of rising seas by his staff, the federal government spends billions bailing out homeowners, rather than buying them out. After a hurricane, there isn’t a rush to relocate. There’s a rush to build even more.
Gaul examines the outrageous positions of people in North and South Carolina, Florida, Texas and (especially) New Jersey. He is thorough, fair and stunned. In Texas, there is simply no zoning. Anyone can build anything anywhere and the (federal) government will pay for repairs. In New Jersey, realtors forcibly oppose buyouts and other sustainability efforts as damaging - to their market. The planet is not a factor. Everywhere, small town mayors demand aid to armor their towns and won’t hear of efforts to move at-risk homeowners to safer grounds. If that means being a climate change denier, so be it. If it means ignoring what is plainly happening repeatedly in front of them, so be it. If it means taking an absurd position against the direct advice of all the experts around them, so be it.
Between disaster relief and flood insurance, the federal government has blown half a trillion dollars since 1950, mostly in just this decade. Forty billion (20%) are repetitive losses from people who rebuild and enlarge with federal dollars and get wiped out again, and again. And taxpayers continue to reinsure them. As dumb as the federal government looks in all this, state and local government look far worse. The combination of greed, selfishness, self-interest and hypocrisy is stomach-churning.
The main scam seems to be beach restoration. The Jersey Shore has lost about 200 feet of beach over its 141 mile length. Gaul says sand doesn’t sit still. It is constantly on the move between winds, rains, tides and storms. Building permanent and intensely dense communities on sand reefs is demonstrably unwise, but municipalities only look at tax revenue. More is better. Common sense never factors into their actions. So millions of tons of sand are dredged from the ocean every year and carefully spread over beaches in front of mansions to make the beaches much wider, only to wash away again, even the same year. Gaul calculates for New Jersey alone, 700 cubic yards of sand are replaced for each of the 19,000 homes packed onto the Jersey Shore. The cost to taxpayers is $32 million per mile, and the Corps of Engineers has a fifty year contract to top up the sand annually. This is madness writ large, and the book simply reports it as the way the American world works.
Because of the home density and the “improvements” (patios, driveways, tennis courts, swimming pools), there is very little natural surface still exposed in these areas. Rains cannot soak into the ground because of all the housing and paving. The result is frequent flooding, mold, teardowns and rebuilding. It is a way of life, paid for almost entirely by US taxpayers.
The whole federal flood insurance program is a massive scam. Private insurers won’t offer it because it is a guaranteed loser. The federal program is underpriced, overly generous, and even offers steep discounts to the worst offenders. There is no limit to the number of claims an insured can make, and no one need fear having their policy cancelled. No one will force them to leave the area, and buyback programs are tiny and insignificant when they exist at all. The insurance plan currently estimates the value of the floodplain buildings it insures at $100 billion – just in New York and New Jersey, Gaul says.
As the seas rise, as the storms dump bigger quantities of water, and the building density increases, as the economic loss becomes more and more important with higher populations, federal funding has become a critical entitlement – a guarantee of the beach life. And after every event, the rich move in to buy up and bundle properties, build suburban size and style homes and mansions, and make the payout problem even worse for next time. Gaul calculates there are seven million properties in floodplains.
The arrogance of the homeowners can be eyeopening. Gaul cites people on Sullivan’s Island in South Carolina who objected to a maritime forest holding their barrier island together. They said it was blocking their view of the sea. They actually sued the town for holding back their property values. When the town declined to remove the forest for them, one of them simply started cutting it down.
The 1300 federal disasters since 1990 are a bad omen, as more and more weather events are declared disasters worthy of cash relief, and as the weather itself becomes more and more cantankerous. That people should simply not be allowed to build in floodplains is beyond the scope – of the nation. Other countries do it, but it will simply become a bigger and bigger problem in the USA. And federal taxpayers will foot the bill.
David Wineberg
Even in North Carolina, where it is illegal to claim the seas are rising, their Republican Senator works to make federal funds easily and quickly available, because North Carolinians “are entitled” to it. In Florida, where the former governor banned talk of rising seas by his staff, the federal government spends billions bailing out homeowners, rather than buying them out. After a hurricane, there isn’t a rush to relocate. There’s a rush to build even more.
Gaul examines the outrageous positions of people in North and South Carolina, Florida, Texas and (especially) New Jersey. He is thorough, fair and stunned. In Texas, there is simply no zoning. Anyone can build anything anywhere and the (federal) government will pay for repairs. In New Jersey, realtors forcibly oppose buyouts and other sustainability efforts as damaging - to their market. The planet is not a factor. Everywhere, small town mayors demand aid to armor their towns and won’t hear of efforts to move at-risk homeowners to safer grounds. If that means being a climate change denier, so be it. If it means ignoring what is plainly happening repeatedly in front of them, so be it. If it means taking an absurd position against the direct advice of all the experts around them, so be it.
Between disaster relief and flood insurance, the federal government has blown half a trillion dollars since 1950, mostly in just this decade. Forty billion (20%) are repetitive losses from people who rebuild and enlarge with federal dollars and get wiped out again, and again. And taxpayers continue to reinsure them. As dumb as the federal government looks in all this, state and local government look far worse. The combination of greed, selfishness, self-interest and hypocrisy is stomach-churning.
The main scam seems to be beach restoration. The Jersey Shore has lost about 200 feet of beach over its 141 mile length. Gaul says sand doesn’t sit still. It is constantly on the move between winds, rains, tides and storms. Building permanent and intensely dense communities on sand reefs is demonstrably unwise, but municipalities only look at tax revenue. More is better. Common sense never factors into their actions. So millions of tons of sand are dredged from the ocean every year and carefully spread over beaches in front of mansions to make the beaches much wider, only to wash away again, even the same year. Gaul calculates for New Jersey alone, 700 cubic yards of sand are replaced for each of the 19,000 homes packed onto the Jersey Shore. The cost to taxpayers is $32 million per mile, and the Corps of Engineers has a fifty year contract to top up the sand annually. This is madness writ large, and the book simply reports it as the way the American world works.
Because of the home density and the “improvements” (patios, driveways, tennis courts, swimming pools), there is very little natural surface still exposed in these areas. Rains cannot soak into the ground because of all the housing and paving. The result is frequent flooding, mold, teardowns and rebuilding. It is a way of life, paid for almost entirely by US taxpayers.
The whole federal flood insurance program is a massive scam. Private insurers won’t offer it because it is a guaranteed loser. The federal program is underpriced, overly generous, and even offers steep discounts to the worst offenders. There is no limit to the number of claims an insured can make, and no one need fear having their policy cancelled. No one will force them to leave the area, and buyback programs are tiny and insignificant when they exist at all. The insurance plan currently estimates the value of the floodplain buildings it insures at $100 billion – just in New York and New Jersey, Gaul says.
As the seas rise, as the storms dump bigger quantities of water, and the building density increases, as the economic loss becomes more and more important with higher populations, federal funding has become a critical entitlement – a guarantee of the beach life. And after every event, the rich move in to buy up and bundle properties, build suburban size and style homes and mansions, and make the payout problem even worse for next time. Gaul calculates there are seven million properties in floodplains.
The arrogance of the homeowners can be eyeopening. Gaul cites people on Sullivan’s Island in South Carolina who objected to a maritime forest holding their barrier island together. They said it was blocking their view of the sea. They actually sued the town for holding back their property values. When the town declined to remove the forest for them, one of them simply started cutting it down.
The 1300 federal disasters since 1990 are a bad omen, as more and more weather events are declared disasters worthy of cash relief, and as the weather itself becomes more and more cantankerous. That people should simply not be allowed to build in floodplains is beyond the scope – of the nation. Other countries do it, but it will simply become a bigger and bigger problem in the USA. And federal taxpayers will foot the bill.
David Wineberg
October 27, 2019
This book, published in February of 2019, is an example of what I would like to see provided for each of all the problems that face American society today.
Gilbert Gaul toured the parts of the coastal United States that are threatened by hurricanes and "rain bombs" which are hurricanes or lesser storms that damage because of deluge rather than wind. He tours the Gulf Coast, Florida and the East Coast up to Boston with climate change and the resulting rise of water level in mind. He quite properly cites the now familiar saying about insanity being the repetition of an action expecting different results, as that is what he finds.
Through the author's extensive and non judgmental interviews, the reader will learn of a common practice where developers build homes, increasingly large and more expensive, virtually on the water's edge, the government provides flood insurance, the Army Corps of Engineers provides sand to extend beaches and hurricanes arrive periodically to wipe it all out...only to have everything rebuilt at greater public expense each time to await the inevitable next episode of destruction.
Delving into history, Gaul describes the archetype - Long Island Beach, NJ, a sand spit connected to the mainland by a single bridge. This area started to develop in the 1920's by a man who saw money to be made in building tiny (600 square feet) beach bungalows for people living in the heavily populated Philadelphia/NYC area. Cheap to buy and spartan, these summer cottages were something ordinary working people could afford and if damaged by wind or tides could be cheaply fixed up.
As is the American way, the level of development increased, more land was bought and more houses built. The profit motive started to rule. When nature struck, speculators would buy the damaged properties for little, tear them down and build larger more substantial homes. Increasingly wealthy people would replace Joe Average. Some people would take up year-round residency. The simple wooden bridge became a four lane modern span.
As you'd expect and have seen if you have visited any well known vacation spot, the area becomes packed with homes, streets, restaurants. A vested interest constituency then demands attention and money from Washington if disaster strikes, as on the coast it predictably will. On the coast you take your pick for federal money: buy cheap subsidized flood insurance from Uncle Sam, or skip it and wait for disaster funding after the destruction occurs, or have both.
The Army Corp of Engineers (ACE), originally refusing to become involved in beach maintenance is now in it big time. Contracts are signed for the ACE to keep a beach in place for 50 years with no limit on the expense. As predictable as hurricanes, such maintained beaches get wiped out or modified beyond recognition in a day or two of heavy weather. ACE then dredges more sand to replace that lost only to have that effort undone. Do you know the myth of Sisyphus? This is that story brought to life and all Americans are paying for it.
The problem is the view that once people settle in a disaster prone area, that area must be maintained almost as an outpost of civilization, no matter the cost and regardless of natural processes that cannot be stopped. Government flood insurance has gone from providing about 15% of the cost of repair/replacement to 70% with premiums staying low. This is of course a direct subsidy of mostly expensive vacation homes for the wealthy by the American taxpayer. It is analogous to the wildfire problem in California where people are living at high risk, but there is no fire insurance scam going on as with flood insurance.
Mayors demand funding and will not take no for an answer. Taxes would be too expensive and would harm the economy of the town and lower real estate values. Governors, with an occasional exception, act the same way. Congress cowers fearing the votes to be lost if common sense prevailed.
The major cities are at risk as Sandy proved with NYC. Elaborate anti-flooding plans costing billions of dollars are proposed, these mega-projects are hard to put through while each city...Miami, Tampa, Charleston, Galveston, Houston all await "the big one." Big cities can hardly move so they truly are challenged. Think of the funds required for the post Katrina measures taken at New Orleans.
But in vacationland (where 70% of the houses are not lived in full time), development proceeds heedless of the proven danger, building right over already destroyed areas in a process realtors call "clearing the market" allowing pricier homes with each rebuild. For anyone to throw their hands up and leave could start a run for the exits and those ACE maintained beaches in fair weather are wonderful.
The reader gets a full picture from all sides...the mayors, the residents, environmentalists, scientists. The rational plan would be a gradual withdrawal from risky areas, the removal of subsides and the pricing of insurance in line with the cost and risk involved. Tellingly, private insurance companies refuse to offer flood insurance and are instead employed by the federal government to sell government flood insurance. As with much of privatization, companies insert themselves as middlemen to divert money to themselves at public expense.
This book is a story of large scale perversity, has great human interest, perfectly describes the situation and brought me right up to speed on something I knew little about. I intend to get another of Gilbert Gaul's books, Billion Dollar Ball, A Journey through the Big Money Culture of College Football based on the excellence of his investigation in this book.
UPDATE: FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which runs the NFIP (National Flood Insurance Program) has finally started increases in insurance premiums of up to 15% per year starting in 2020 that are to bring premiums more in line with risk. See here. As the NFIP is 50 years old, one could say this move is overdue.
Gilbert Gaul toured the parts of the coastal United States that are threatened by hurricanes and "rain bombs" which are hurricanes or lesser storms that damage because of deluge rather than wind. He tours the Gulf Coast, Florida and the East Coast up to Boston with climate change and the resulting rise of water level in mind. He quite properly cites the now familiar saying about insanity being the repetition of an action expecting different results, as that is what he finds.
Through the author's extensive and non judgmental interviews, the reader will learn of a common practice where developers build homes, increasingly large and more expensive, virtually on the water's edge, the government provides flood insurance, the Army Corps of Engineers provides sand to extend beaches and hurricanes arrive periodically to wipe it all out...only to have everything rebuilt at greater public expense each time to await the inevitable next episode of destruction.
Delving into history, Gaul describes the archetype - Long Island Beach, NJ, a sand spit connected to the mainland by a single bridge. This area started to develop in the 1920's by a man who saw money to be made in building tiny (600 square feet) beach bungalows for people living in the heavily populated Philadelphia/NYC area. Cheap to buy and spartan, these summer cottages were something ordinary working people could afford and if damaged by wind or tides could be cheaply fixed up.
As is the American way, the level of development increased, more land was bought and more houses built. The profit motive started to rule. When nature struck, speculators would buy the damaged properties for little, tear them down and build larger more substantial homes. Increasingly wealthy people would replace Joe Average. Some people would take up year-round residency. The simple wooden bridge became a four lane modern span.
As you'd expect and have seen if you have visited any well known vacation spot, the area becomes packed with homes, streets, restaurants. A vested interest constituency then demands attention and money from Washington if disaster strikes, as on the coast it predictably will. On the coast you take your pick for federal money: buy cheap subsidized flood insurance from Uncle Sam, or skip it and wait for disaster funding after the destruction occurs, or have both.
The Army Corp of Engineers (ACE), originally refusing to become involved in beach maintenance is now in it big time. Contracts are signed for the ACE to keep a beach in place for 50 years with no limit on the expense. As predictable as hurricanes, such maintained beaches get wiped out or modified beyond recognition in a day or two of heavy weather. ACE then dredges more sand to replace that lost only to have that effort undone. Do you know the myth of Sisyphus? This is that story brought to life and all Americans are paying for it.
The problem is the view that once people settle in a disaster prone area, that area must be maintained almost as an outpost of civilization, no matter the cost and regardless of natural processes that cannot be stopped. Government flood insurance has gone from providing about 15% of the cost of repair/replacement to 70% with premiums staying low. This is of course a direct subsidy of mostly expensive vacation homes for the wealthy by the American taxpayer. It is analogous to the wildfire problem in California where people are living at high risk, but there is no fire insurance scam going on as with flood insurance.
Mayors demand funding and will not take no for an answer. Taxes would be too expensive and would harm the economy of the town and lower real estate values. Governors, with an occasional exception, act the same way. Congress cowers fearing the votes to be lost if common sense prevailed.
The major cities are at risk as Sandy proved with NYC. Elaborate anti-flooding plans costing billions of dollars are proposed, these mega-projects are hard to put through while each city...Miami, Tampa, Charleston, Galveston, Houston all await "the big one." Big cities can hardly move so they truly are challenged. Think of the funds required for the post Katrina measures taken at New Orleans.
But in vacationland (where 70% of the houses are not lived in full time), development proceeds heedless of the proven danger, building right over already destroyed areas in a process realtors call "clearing the market" allowing pricier homes with each rebuild. For anyone to throw their hands up and leave could start a run for the exits and those ACE maintained beaches in fair weather are wonderful.
The reader gets a full picture from all sides...the mayors, the residents, environmentalists, scientists. The rational plan would be a gradual withdrawal from risky areas, the removal of subsides and the pricing of insurance in line with the cost and risk involved. Tellingly, private insurance companies refuse to offer flood insurance and are instead employed by the federal government to sell government flood insurance. As with much of privatization, companies insert themselves as middlemen to divert money to themselves at public expense.
This book is a story of large scale perversity, has great human interest, perfectly describes the situation and brought me right up to speed on something I knew little about. I intend to get another of Gilbert Gaul's books, Billion Dollar Ball, A Journey through the Big Money Culture of College Football based on the excellence of his investigation in this book.
UPDATE: FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which runs the NFIP (National Flood Insurance Program) has finally started increases in insurance premiums of up to 15% per year starting in 2020 that are to bring premiums more in line with risk. See here. As the NFIP is 50 years old, one could say this move is overdue.
December 10, 2019
Gaul’s history of the Jersey shore (it is sometimes also about Houston) strongly recalls Lanchester’s account of the 2008 financial crisis. In both cases, lobbyists highjack insurance policy to eliminate risk. In IOU: Why Everyone Owes Everyone and No One Can Pay, Lanchester argues that the financial sector felt it had found a way to remove risk from its books. Here, Gaul shows that if a hurricane destroys a town along New Jersey’s shore, it is rebuilt on public funds. The cost of coastal real estate rises, which means that the buildings built along the coast are bought by wealthier citizens who build still bigger buildings, which increases the amount of money invested in this precarious real estate.
Sometimes I get the sense that much American policy is just a form of kicking the can down the road. Someday, someone will have to pay, as Americans did in 2008 as they bailed out their financial sector CEOs and industries. Politicians will complain when citizens of another state receive aid, as some Republicans did after Sandy. They unsurprisingly change their tune when their districts are hit by hurricanes. There is a line here about how some of these threatened areas want nothing to do with the government, until disaster strikes.
Sometimes in green literature, heterodox economists will draw attention to economic externalities. Normally, externalities in environmental policy refer to moments in which costs are swept under the bookkeeping rug thanks to public intervention. A mining operation leaves behind a lot of chemicals that pollute drinking water? The taxpayer cleans up. Here, wetlands, which offer little to nothing on a spreadsheet, are developed over to heat up the real estate market. Hurricanes become more powerful and the coast’s ability to resist them becomes less powerful as the developments along the coast become more valuable.
Points of interest... First, I never realized until now how much sand is brought to these coastal shores and boardwalks. These beaches are more artificial than I would have guessed. Second, when observers note that human ingenuity will solve the problem of rising shores, I think it might worth looking at the numbers. How much shore will be covered by what percentage of what government's budget? It's not obvious to me after reading this book that all threatened coast lines will defy the sea in line with the Netherlands model.
A couple minor complaints... First, readers interested in the notion of climate justice as something that will affect impoverished coastal populations will not find much of use here. This is mostly a book about New Jersey, mostly the most well off people within New Jersey, written by a New Jersey resident in the wake of Superstorm Sandy. Second, how much money does the Jersey shore bring to the state annually? In other words, the costs of rebuilding suggest that it is illogical to continually rebuild the shore, but I didn't feel as though I could say just how illogical it was relative to revenue. Maybe I skimmed over that point.
Sometimes I get the sense that much American policy is just a form of kicking the can down the road. Someday, someone will have to pay, as Americans did in 2008 as they bailed out their financial sector CEOs and industries. Politicians will complain when citizens of another state receive aid, as some Republicans did after Sandy. They unsurprisingly change their tune when their districts are hit by hurricanes. There is a line here about how some of these threatened areas want nothing to do with the government, until disaster strikes.
Sometimes in green literature, heterodox economists will draw attention to economic externalities. Normally, externalities in environmental policy refer to moments in which costs are swept under the bookkeeping rug thanks to public intervention. A mining operation leaves behind a lot of chemicals that pollute drinking water? The taxpayer cleans up. Here, wetlands, which offer little to nothing on a spreadsheet, are developed over to heat up the real estate market. Hurricanes become more powerful and the coast’s ability to resist them becomes less powerful as the developments along the coast become more valuable.
Points of interest... First, I never realized until now how much sand is brought to these coastal shores and boardwalks. These beaches are more artificial than I would have guessed. Second, when observers note that human ingenuity will solve the problem of rising shores, I think it might worth looking at the numbers. How much shore will be covered by what percentage of what government's budget? It's not obvious to me after reading this book that all threatened coast lines will defy the sea in line with the Netherlands model.
A couple minor complaints... First, readers interested in the notion of climate justice as something that will affect impoverished coastal populations will not find much of use here. This is mostly a book about New Jersey, mostly the most well off people within New Jersey, written by a New Jersey resident in the wake of Superstorm Sandy. Second, how much money does the Jersey shore bring to the state annually? In other words, the costs of rebuilding suggest that it is illogical to continually rebuild the shore, but I didn't feel as though I could say just how illogical it was relative to revenue. Maybe I skimmed over that point.
November 10, 2019
Well researched and well written. Also a clear warning to all coastal communities ..
August 14, 2019
I've read more than a few books about climate change and the rising waters and they all elicit an emotional reaction of fear and sadness but I'm not sure I have read one that has made me quite as angry as this one. My disclaimer, while I love to visit the ocean, I live in one of those states squarely in the middle, so maybe that's why all those numbers affected me so much. So much (so, so much) federal tax money goes to the protection, construction and rebuilding of million dollar second homes that are built on land that just shouldn't be built on in the first place. This is an important, very well written book that should be read widely. I received a digital ARC of this book through NetGalley in exchange for an honest review.
October 27, 2021
This is a really interesting and prescient topic, but Gaul seems to spin himself in circles for large chunks of the book. There’s not a strong narrative thread running through the book, though I did ultimately find it valuable.
July 8, 2025
A fascinating, eye-opening and convincing exposition of the lunacy the U.S. currently finds itself in with respect to coastal property: coastal property owners (NJ, NC, FL, AL, TX et al.), who could never acquire private insurance on their properties due to the outsized actual risk, routinely rely on federal disaster insurance to subsidize, or outright pay for, their continued rebuilding of bigger and bigger coastal properties, all in locations increasingly likely to be routinely hammered with devastating storms. Stop the madness!
December 21, 2019
Excellent analysis of the impact of climate change and poor policy choices that encourage coastal and barrier island settlement that, in the near future, will become unsustainable. I especially enjoyed the chapter on Dauphin Island, a barrier island that my ancestors settled in the early 18th century.
July 19, 2019
A Warning For The Entire US Eastern And Gulf Coasts. This book is fairly comprehensive in its history of coastal development, with particular emphasis on the back bays of New Jersey but also discussing development all the way South to Florida and up along the Florida Gulf Coast all the way to Galveston Bay and Houston, with detailed discussions of Mobile and New Orleans along the way. And even discounting its heavy emphasis on global warming / global cooling / climate change / whatever the alarmists are calling it these days, the book paints a very stark picture about just how much coastal redevelopment costs people all over the country, including the landlocked midwest, due to heavy Federal subsidies in the post-WWII era. Its ultimate points are solid, yet it is also extremely realistic that the best solution to the problem is extremely politically unlikely. Very much recommended reading, and certainly a discussion that should factor into election discussions going into the 2020 Presidential race.
September 11, 2019
This is a book I didn’t want to read. Denial is powerful. Yet I recommend it highly for my coastal friends. It’s quite compelling, much (but by no means all) of it centered on LBI. Pull in science, weather, politics, wind, water, water, water, money, money, money and it all seems overwhelming. Only a fool builds a home on a barrier island and expects it to be safe and secure forever. I am a beneficiary of that happy foolishness, as we have stood guard for nearly 70 years as our 110 year old house has withstood many challenges. I pray Heaven we are spared the inevitable. One of the final sentences in the book encapsulates my fears best: “Those old beach cottage homes that have been passed down for generations? They’re gone...”
4 stars #Books2019 #Books
4 stars #Books2019 #Books
November 15, 2022
As a newcomer to the East Coast, I was interested to learn the history of floodzone development. However, this was a hard book to motivate myself to read. Two big influences on my reading were: visiting the Outer Banks in North Carolina (and seeing development, housing, and stormwater structures in the barrier islands myself) and Hurricane Ian (where I learned that the water isn't always the scary part of hurricanes, but also the surges and the wind; I'm a hurricane newbie, have grace).
TLDR; coastal development is bad, but measures we should have taken decades ago now seem too extreme for the US to take action against hurricane destruction. Insurance.
TLDR; coastal development is bad, but measures we should have taken decades ago now seem too extreme for the US to take action against hurricane destruction. Insurance.
May 8, 2020
Interesting analysis of the evolution of America's Atlantic and Gulf Coasts from fishing villages, to middle class retreats, to second home McMansion refuges and ultimately back to Nature courtesy of global warming, sea rise, governmental incentives and misplaced, misguided policy which has perpetuated and accelerated an unsustainable massing of populations on fragile shores.
December 4, 2023
The Geography of Risk: Epic Storms, Rising Seas, and the Cost of America's Coasts, by Gilbert Gaul, does a great job of describing the development of coastal communities, especially along the Jersey shore. Of more importance, he further describes the physical and economic risks associated with developments along the coastlines in America. Warming oceans and rising sea levels are contributing to increases in storm damage and flooding of homes along the coasts. Years ago, storm damage to simpler homes made it possible to repair or rebuild relatively easily, however current trends have been to build larger and more expensive shoreside homes, meaning storm damage repair and rebuilding costs are rising proportionally.
This continued investment into more costly development along the coastlines has a price associated with it. The author points out that the costliest hurricanes in U.S. history have occurred in our most recent years. Americans have built $3 trillion worth of property in some of the riskiest places on earth: barrier islands and coastal floodplains. Despite the risk, buyers have been willing to invest or even encouraged to do so by availability of government backed low-cost flood insurance, FEMA grants, federal subsidies, low-interest loans, tax breaks, grants, etc. Programs such as these tend to shift the risk of life at the beach from private investors to public taxpayers, radically distorting common notions of risk. Taxpayers also end up on the hook for repairs to coastal infrastructure supporting those expensive seaside homes, such as roads, bridges, schools, public beaches, powerlines, municipal buildings, etc. States, cities, and the Federal Government pay for repairing that infrastructure, leading to tax increases for all.
The author seemed particularly critical of local mayors, developers, and realtors who push for quick rebuilds following storm damage. They may recognize that flooding is likely to occur more and more often, and rebuilding will likely lead to the same problems, but many push to rebuild anyway. This approach keeps local tax revenues coming in and home values high. However, in locations where flooding has shown to be repetitive, that approach is foolhardy and unsustainable. Unfortunately, mayors who recognize this problem and who have suggested accepting 'managed retreat' face opposition from property owners, and often don't get re-elected.
Relating to the author's point was a story published in the August 27th Los Angeles Times. That article described observations by oceanographer, coastal geologist, and long-time professor at UC Santa Cruz, Gary Griggs, who explained how big waves can be so damaging to coastal infrastructure, and how expensive resulting repairs can be. Reinforcing that point, one California State Beach had an elaborate coastal barricade damaged or destroyed eight times since it was built in 1926. The 1982 repair was designed to last 20 years, and cost more than $1.5 million, yet it only lasted 6 weeks. Yet they continued to spend money on repairs, only to see repetitive failures. Additionally, the National Flood Insurance Program managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has identified over 3,000 properties which have had 10 or more claims over the past several decades. It brings to mind the oft-quoted definition of insanity, e.g., it's "doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” Water always wins.
One thing which may be changing in the several years since The Geography of Risk was published is the cost and availability of property insurance. For example, dozens of insurers have stopped selling new home insurance policies in Florida due to unsustainable losses, and others have raised their rates substantially. Recently, in an attempt to stabilize the insurance market, Florida regulators ordered the State-backed insurer (Citizens Property Insurance) to reconsider a previously proposed 12% rate hike for some homeowners, not because it was too costly, rather because it was considered to be too low. Federal Flood Insurance, which had been selling insurance at rates which didn't cover its losses, has also recently raised rates. Insurers are trying to send a message about risk, even if government, developers, and realtors are trying to suppress it.
Higher insurance rates, which better match the risk, may begin to change the mindset of homeowners and home buyers in storm threatened areas. After seeing monthly insurance rates become nearly as high as mortgage payments, the attractiveness of purchasing these homes decreases.
Decreasing home values or the inability to sell a home may reverse the process of continuing to build over and over again in flood prone areas. Owners of properties on the man-made barrier island in Miami known as "Billionaire Bunker", (where owners include people like football legend Tom Brady, Trump daughter Ivanka and her husband Jared Kushner, or Amazon founder Jeff Bezos), may be able to withstand losses should a hurricane hit their south Florida island, however, that's hardly the case for most coastal property owners. A more real-life example of the financial losses incurred by coastal property owners may be found in an excellent article on the subject from a March, 2023 article in the Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/climat...).
At any rate, the tide seems to be shifting regarding coastal property losses, and a more realistic approach seems to be occurring. For example, in Jack Bittle's recent book, The Great Displacement, he points out that in the last few decades, the federal government has moved tens of thousands of families away from flood zones, and tens of thousands more have moved of their own accord in the aftermath of natural disasters. Insurance and mortgage markets are already shifting to reflect mounting climate risk, pricing people out of risky areas. Also, new standards and building codes are being adopted in some regions to fortify coastal properties and reduce losses. This should be good news to author Gilbert Gaul, since until and unless insurance costs rise enough to cover the risks, rebuilding in flood-prone areas will continue again and again.
This continued investment into more costly development along the coastlines has a price associated with it. The author points out that the costliest hurricanes in U.S. history have occurred in our most recent years. Americans have built $3 trillion worth of property in some of the riskiest places on earth: barrier islands and coastal floodplains. Despite the risk, buyers have been willing to invest or even encouraged to do so by availability of government backed low-cost flood insurance, FEMA grants, federal subsidies, low-interest loans, tax breaks, grants, etc. Programs such as these tend to shift the risk of life at the beach from private investors to public taxpayers, radically distorting common notions of risk. Taxpayers also end up on the hook for repairs to coastal infrastructure supporting those expensive seaside homes, such as roads, bridges, schools, public beaches, powerlines, municipal buildings, etc. States, cities, and the Federal Government pay for repairing that infrastructure, leading to tax increases for all.
The author seemed particularly critical of local mayors, developers, and realtors who push for quick rebuilds following storm damage. They may recognize that flooding is likely to occur more and more often, and rebuilding will likely lead to the same problems, but many push to rebuild anyway. This approach keeps local tax revenues coming in and home values high. However, in locations where flooding has shown to be repetitive, that approach is foolhardy and unsustainable. Unfortunately, mayors who recognize this problem and who have suggested accepting 'managed retreat' face opposition from property owners, and often don't get re-elected.
Relating to the author's point was a story published in the August 27th Los Angeles Times. That article described observations by oceanographer, coastal geologist, and long-time professor at UC Santa Cruz, Gary Griggs, who explained how big waves can be so damaging to coastal infrastructure, and how expensive resulting repairs can be. Reinforcing that point, one California State Beach had an elaborate coastal barricade damaged or destroyed eight times since it was built in 1926. The 1982 repair was designed to last 20 years, and cost more than $1.5 million, yet it only lasted 6 weeks. Yet they continued to spend money on repairs, only to see repetitive failures. Additionally, the National Flood Insurance Program managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has identified over 3,000 properties which have had 10 or more claims over the past several decades. It brings to mind the oft-quoted definition of insanity, e.g., it's "doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.” Water always wins.
One thing which may be changing in the several years since The Geography of Risk was published is the cost and availability of property insurance. For example, dozens of insurers have stopped selling new home insurance policies in Florida due to unsustainable losses, and others have raised their rates substantially. Recently, in an attempt to stabilize the insurance market, Florida regulators ordered the State-backed insurer (Citizens Property Insurance) to reconsider a previously proposed 12% rate hike for some homeowners, not because it was too costly, rather because it was considered to be too low. Federal Flood Insurance, which had been selling insurance at rates which didn't cover its losses, has also recently raised rates. Insurers are trying to send a message about risk, even if government, developers, and realtors are trying to suppress it.
Higher insurance rates, which better match the risk, may begin to change the mindset of homeowners and home buyers in storm threatened areas. After seeing monthly insurance rates become nearly as high as mortgage payments, the attractiveness of purchasing these homes decreases.
Decreasing home values or the inability to sell a home may reverse the process of continuing to build over and over again in flood prone areas. Owners of properties on the man-made barrier island in Miami known as "Billionaire Bunker", (where owners include people like football legend Tom Brady, Trump daughter Ivanka and her husband Jared Kushner, or Amazon founder Jeff Bezos), may be able to withstand losses should a hurricane hit their south Florida island, however, that's hardly the case for most coastal property owners. A more real-life example of the financial losses incurred by coastal property owners may be found in an excellent article on the subject from a March, 2023 article in the Washington Post (https://www.washingtonpost.com/climat...).
At any rate, the tide seems to be shifting regarding coastal property losses, and a more realistic approach seems to be occurring. For example, in Jack Bittle's recent book, The Great Displacement, he points out that in the last few decades, the federal government has moved tens of thousands of families away from flood zones, and tens of thousands more have moved of their own accord in the aftermath of natural disasters. Insurance and mortgage markets are already shifting to reflect mounting climate risk, pricing people out of risky areas. Also, new standards and building codes are being adopted in some regions to fortify coastal properties and reduce losses. This should be good news to author Gilbert Gaul, since until and unless insurance costs rise enough to cover the risks, rebuilding in flood-prone areas will continue again and again.
November 1, 2019
Shocking, not just what storms do, which is much the result of Climate Change/ Global Warming.
Also shocking is that the federal and local governments encourage building in areas that are prone to hurricanes, fires, floods, and the less predictable tornadoes --and our tax dollars finance the re-building in the same place!
I recently visited a friend on Long Beach Island, NJ, featured here, whose home was damaged by Sandy, but not beyond repair --she wasn't very interested in details of this book!
Also shocking is that the federal and local governments encourage building in areas that are prone to hurricanes, fires, floods, and the less predictable tornadoes --and our tax dollars finance the re-building in the same place!
I recently visited a friend on Long Beach Island, NJ, featured here, whose home was damaged by Sandy, but not beyond repair --she wasn't very interested in details of this book!
August 16, 2021
This is the second book I have ready by Gilbert Gaul; both were excellent and both seriously dented my enjoyment of things I used to naively love - college football and the Jersey Shore. This book takes on the latter topic, framed more broadly as the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. East Coast to climate hazards. Gaul combines deep research (his citations include hundreds of interviews and thousands of documents reviewed) with an engaging, almost novelistic prose, which makes this book both informative and fun to read.
Centering the book around the development of New Jersey's Long Beach Island, Gaul traces the evolution of post-WW II economics, cultural tastes, and policies that encouraged development along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts as more Americans sought vacation homes by the beach. He details the 1962 Ash Wednesday Storm, which was one of the first in the Northeast to seriously damage coastal infrastructure, and served as a harbinger of damage to come. The book then traces the evolving science around climate change and flood risk in the 1970s and 80s, as policymakers wrestle with trying to limit coastal development on the one hand, while implementing a National Flood Insurance Program that essentially gives municipalities and homeowners a blank cheque to rebuild after storms. A key theme in the book is the mismatch between collective interests at the state and federal governance levels, vs. intense pressure from coastal municipalities to rebuild bigger and better after each storm, lest their tax base dwindle.
While most of the book is focused on Gaul's home state of New Jersey - which perhaps surprisingly, is the second most vulnerable state to increased flood risk after Florida, at least based on the number of vulnerable houses - he does travel to other spots along the Southeast Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. Through his travels and interviews, we get a taste of flood resilience best practices in Charleston, SC, which still seem nowhere near enough to manage the looming risks of sea level rise over the coming decades. We also see how homeowners along the nation's back bays, who tend to be considerably less wealthy than owners of beachfront property, are at even higher risk of eroding household assets in the coming decades.
This is an engaging and informative read to better understand the policy debates, or lack thereof, around disaster relief and rebuilding that will only intensify as the seas rise. While America for the most part has successfully avoided a hard conversation about how to contend with such risks, the twin propellors of climate change and unfettered coastal development will surely force such a discussion in the years to come.
Centering the book around the development of New Jersey's Long Beach Island, Gaul traces the evolution of post-WW II economics, cultural tastes, and policies that encouraged development along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts as more Americans sought vacation homes by the beach. He details the 1962 Ash Wednesday Storm, which was one of the first in the Northeast to seriously damage coastal infrastructure, and served as a harbinger of damage to come. The book then traces the evolving science around climate change and flood risk in the 1970s and 80s, as policymakers wrestle with trying to limit coastal development on the one hand, while implementing a National Flood Insurance Program that essentially gives municipalities and homeowners a blank cheque to rebuild after storms. A key theme in the book is the mismatch between collective interests at the state and federal governance levels, vs. intense pressure from coastal municipalities to rebuild bigger and better after each storm, lest their tax base dwindle.
While most of the book is focused on Gaul's home state of New Jersey - which perhaps surprisingly, is the second most vulnerable state to increased flood risk after Florida, at least based on the number of vulnerable houses - he does travel to other spots along the Southeast Atlantic and Gulf Coasts. Through his travels and interviews, we get a taste of flood resilience best practices in Charleston, SC, which still seem nowhere near enough to manage the looming risks of sea level rise over the coming decades. We also see how homeowners along the nation's back bays, who tend to be considerably less wealthy than owners of beachfront property, are at even higher risk of eroding household assets in the coming decades.
This is an engaging and informative read to better understand the policy debates, or lack thereof, around disaster relief and rebuilding that will only intensify as the seas rise. While America for the most part has successfully avoided a hard conversation about how to contend with such risks, the twin propellors of climate change and unfettered coastal development will surely force such a discussion in the years to come.
April 21, 2020
The kind of mind-blowing expose non-fiction that really deserves national headlines but likely won't get it with everything else going on. You read it, and you're amazed that you didn't already know all this because it seems so obvious and outrageous! It feels like there has to be a better way, but.... capitalism gotta have its infinite growth paradigm. At the very least, "natural" disasters deserve reporting that explain how we got here, to storms grossing in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
Gilbert Gaul describes the cycle of risky, speculative coastal/floodplain building, with short-term profits realized by the builders and long-term costs (environmental destruction, and the destruction and replacement of private buildings and public infrastructure) paid for by the taxpayers. It's an infuriating cycle, especially when he does the math and reports on the number of these houses that are paid for by all of us that are second homes and luxury vacation rentals, again with short-term profits privately siphoned off and true costs paid by us. If you want to know, you should really read the book.
Government flood insurance as originally envisioned was meant to be a minor backstop to prevent individuals becoming destitute in the face of natural hazards, not a full-value replacement of flooded homes 100% paid for by the government. Crucially, as planned in the 1960s, insurance premiums were never meant to be subsidized, but rather priced to accurately reflect the risk and cost of flooding in a certain area. But the real estate lobby wasn't having that, so cheap premiums incentivized building in incredibly risky areas, which weren't risky after all for the builders or owners because the federal government artificially props of the property values in these areas by being willing to pay for reconstruction when they're damaged, often repeatedly. If there weren't bailouts, these places would be worthless, or at least far less populated.
With over half a trillion dollars already spent, it's hard to imagine how such a program won't bankrupt the country if it continues in the face of worsening storms and flooding due to climate change, along with ever increasing development and population density at the coast.
Gilbert Gaul describes the cycle of risky, speculative coastal/floodplain building, with short-term profits realized by the builders and long-term costs (environmental destruction, and the destruction and replacement of private buildings and public infrastructure) paid for by the taxpayers. It's an infuriating cycle, especially when he does the math and reports on the number of these houses that are paid for by all of us that are second homes and luxury vacation rentals, again with short-term profits privately siphoned off and true costs paid by us. If you want to know, you should really read the book.
Government flood insurance as originally envisioned was meant to be a minor backstop to prevent individuals becoming destitute in the face of natural hazards, not a full-value replacement of flooded homes 100% paid for by the government. Crucially, as planned in the 1960s, insurance premiums were never meant to be subsidized, but rather priced to accurately reflect the risk and cost of flooding in a certain area. But the real estate lobby wasn't having that, so cheap premiums incentivized building in incredibly risky areas, which weren't risky after all for the builders or owners because the federal government artificially props of the property values in these areas by being willing to pay for reconstruction when they're damaged, often repeatedly. If there weren't bailouts, these places would be worthless, or at least far less populated.
With over half a trillion dollars already spent, it's hard to imagine how such a program won't bankrupt the country if it continues in the face of worsening storms and flooding due to climate change, along with ever increasing development and population density at the coast.
August 15, 2023
This book focused on the results of people building homes on barrier islands, which protect the coast from the storm surges caused by storms and hurricanes.
A large portion of the book focuses on one specific barrier island off the coast of New Jersey, but also talks about Tampa, FL and Galvaston, TX as well as Houston.
Many people started out building small vacation houses, but eventually the houses were replaced with 6 bedroom mansions. No matter where the houses were along the US coast, storms wiped away the sand on the beaches and US tax payers payed to have the Army Corp of Engineers replace the sand.
In addition, the flood insurance provided by the government is required to continurally replace the houses over and over again, instead of buying out the owners who kept building right along the coastline.
Many of the people who continue to build along the coast do not seem to understand that the ocean levels are rising which will cause worse damage as the storms intensify. They want to rebuild right where they are and expect the government to fix the problems. Some of the houses/bungalows are less than 5 ft. above sea level and some are less. Even elevating the houses does not solve the problem.
Another problem is that some of the houses are built on marsh land (which used to soak up the excess water) and the marshes were filled in with sand which makes the flooding problems worse.
In Tampa, the city hospital is build right on the edge of Tampa Bay and it is entirely possible that when it is most needed, it could be flooded.
Some storms are what is called "rain bombs". The warmer atmosphere can hold more water and so the areas hit by a slow moving system can end up droping huge amounts of rain.
This book is not the easiest read but it gives you a lot of info about where not to build/buy a home.
A large portion of the book focuses on one specific barrier island off the coast of New Jersey, but also talks about Tampa, FL and Galvaston, TX as well as Houston.
Many people started out building small vacation houses, but eventually the houses were replaced with 6 bedroom mansions. No matter where the houses were along the US coast, storms wiped away the sand on the beaches and US tax payers payed to have the Army Corp of Engineers replace the sand.
In addition, the flood insurance provided by the government is required to continurally replace the houses over and over again, instead of buying out the owners who kept building right along the coastline.
Many of the people who continue to build along the coast do not seem to understand that the ocean levels are rising which will cause worse damage as the storms intensify. They want to rebuild right where they are and expect the government to fix the problems. Some of the houses/bungalows are less than 5 ft. above sea level and some are less. Even elevating the houses does not solve the problem.
Another problem is that some of the houses are built on marsh land (which used to soak up the excess water) and the marshes were filled in with sand which makes the flooding problems worse.
In Tampa, the city hospital is build right on the edge of Tampa Bay and it is entirely possible that when it is most needed, it could be flooded.
Some storms are what is called "rain bombs". The warmer atmosphere can hold more water and so the areas hit by a slow moving system can end up droping huge amounts of rain.
This book is not the easiest read but it gives you a lot of info about where not to build/buy a home.
May 4, 2020
“Everything dies baby that’s a fact/ maybe everything that dies someday comes back.” The chorus of Bruce Springsteen’s Atlantic City serves also as a rough chronicle of the history of the beach communities on the Jersey Shore. As Gilbert Gaul describes in The Geography of Risk, the rebirth of coastal towns is not a natural phenomenon but is based on a system of privatized gains and publicly subsidized risks. Echoing earlier readings in this course, the increasing risk due to increasing property values is a theme running throughout Gaul’s book.
Gaul’s story focuses on Long Beach Island, and he weaves the story of growing American prosperity and inequality as a key factor in understanding the ever-growing costs of flood insurance payouts and beach replenishment. Long Beach Island is a microcosm of the postwar American story, with the rising middle class’ modest “Shapiro Shacks” giving way to opulent beachfront mansions and declining permanent residency.
The Geography of Risk does not make the reader optimistic about the possibilities of either our elected state governments or nonpolitical federal entities to address the growing problem of coastal flood risks. The chapter on pushback to the Coastal Area Facility Review Act and other actions of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection revealed the essentially reactionary nature of most movements for local control, particularly when the local officials have a stake in business interests. I found it infuriating learning the extent to which FEMA relief funds go to wealthy owners of second homes. Can we reform FEMA to include zoning reform and appropriate pricing of risks, or do we need an entirely new federal agency to coordinate our response to sea level rise?
Gaul’s story focuses on Long Beach Island, and he weaves the story of growing American prosperity and inequality as a key factor in understanding the ever-growing costs of flood insurance payouts and beach replenishment. Long Beach Island is a microcosm of the postwar American story, with the rising middle class’ modest “Shapiro Shacks” giving way to opulent beachfront mansions and declining permanent residency.
The Geography of Risk does not make the reader optimistic about the possibilities of either our elected state governments or nonpolitical federal entities to address the growing problem of coastal flood risks. The chapter on pushback to the Coastal Area Facility Review Act and other actions of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection revealed the essentially reactionary nature of most movements for local control, particularly when the local officials have a stake in business interests. I found it infuriating learning the extent to which FEMA relief funds go to wealthy owners of second homes. Can we reform FEMA to include zoning reform and appropriate pricing of risks, or do we need an entirely new federal agency to coordinate our response to sea level rise?
December 21, 2025
A fascinating and horrifying book. It's funny how the politicians who scream most loudly about "radical socialists" (I'm looking at you, Greg Abbott and at you Ron DeSantis) are the first ones with their hands out to the taxpayers of Utah and Kansas for a bailout, when (surprise, surprise) another hurricane devastates their communities. But the problem is not just a couple of hypocritical politicians, it is systemic. There is a complete imbalance between incentives and risks. Coastal municipalities, particularly in states like Texas and Florida, with no state income tax, depend entirely on property taxes, sales taxes and a variety of tourist occupancy taxes. So, there is an inexorable drive to build bigger, denser and more expensive, and don't talk about, or plan for, sea-level rise, because that will adversely affect real-estate values. At the same time, they have avoided paying for recovery as federal disaster relief has come to be seen as an entitlement, and vested interests - realtors associations and state politicians - make damn sure that it will always be so. But sea-level rise, like gravity, works whether you believe in it or not and a reckoning is coming and that right soon.
I have to say that his accounts of the US Army Corps of Engineers pumping mountains of sand onto the beaches at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, only to see their work undone by a bad storm a couple of years later reminded me of "Monty Python & the Holy Grail"; "T'other kings said I was mad to build t'castle in t'swamp, but I built it just the same. It sank into the swamp. So, I built another one. That sank into the swamp. So, I built another. That burned down, fell over and then sank into the swamp....." Unfortunately, there's a lot more tragedy than comedy in this book.
I have to say that his accounts of the US Army Corps of Engineers pumping mountains of sand onto the beaches at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, only to see their work undone by a bad storm a couple of years later reminded me of "Monty Python & the Holy Grail"; "T'other kings said I was mad to build t'castle in t'swamp, but I built it just the same. It sank into the swamp. So, I built another one. That sank into the swamp. So, I built another. That burned down, fell over and then sank into the swamp....." Unfortunately, there's a lot more tragedy than comedy in this book.
May 9, 2021
America has spent the better part of a century developing its coastlines in the face of increasingly severe weather. Despite the billions of dollars of damage, adding to the tally nearly every year, we keep making the same mistake over and over, even incentivizing developers and communities to rebuild in harm’s way. In this excellent book about America in an age of sea level rise, warming waters, and extreme weather, Gilbert Gaul explores why this is so, explaining everything from subsidies to flood insurance to just plain stubbornness.
Framing much of the book around a small beach area off New Jersey, Gaul dives into the local politics and development of beach town communities and their tendency to build back the same way and take federal money while doing it. We learn about the pride of beach town politicians, the political timeline of development, and the monumental risks developers take, only to know they’ll be bailed out by the federal government.
This creates an inequitable distribution of funds, where the wealthy benefit from taxpayers’ dollars and poor and marginalized communities are left behind. The system exacerbates this problem, as zoning, statistics, and rates are out of sync with the reality of the problem. Rather than retreat from these areas however, communities build higher, stronger flood barriers — sometimes dredging up entire islands that don’t even protect against the fiercest storms.
The tougher solutions — eliminating subsidies, raising premiums, restricting land use — are unaddressed, and managed retreat is out of the question, as many residents won’t get bought out. What’s left are ballooning insurance costs and increasingly expensive engineering projects, both temporary stopgaps against an inevitable wave of catastrophe. Meanwhile, the modest bungalows that were once built on these coasts are replaced by larger, more expensive homes that rely on the federal government when disasters strike.
America’s increasingly vulnerable coasts are an economic problem, as costs to rebuild skyrocket, as well as a societal one, as wealthy communities continue to reap the rewards of the system. But like our larger fight with climate change, it is a story we’ve heard before: business as usual continually trumps actual progress.
Framing much of the book around a small beach area off New Jersey, Gaul dives into the local politics and development of beach town communities and their tendency to build back the same way and take federal money while doing it. We learn about the pride of beach town politicians, the political timeline of development, and the monumental risks developers take, only to know they’ll be bailed out by the federal government.
This creates an inequitable distribution of funds, where the wealthy benefit from taxpayers’ dollars and poor and marginalized communities are left behind. The system exacerbates this problem, as zoning, statistics, and rates are out of sync with the reality of the problem. Rather than retreat from these areas however, communities build higher, stronger flood barriers — sometimes dredging up entire islands that don’t even protect against the fiercest storms.
The tougher solutions — eliminating subsidies, raising premiums, restricting land use — are unaddressed, and managed retreat is out of the question, as many residents won’t get bought out. What’s left are ballooning insurance costs and increasingly expensive engineering projects, both temporary stopgaps against an inevitable wave of catastrophe. Meanwhile, the modest bungalows that were once built on these coasts are replaced by larger, more expensive homes that rely on the federal government when disasters strike.
America’s increasingly vulnerable coasts are an economic problem, as costs to rebuild skyrocket, as well as a societal one, as wealthy communities continue to reap the rewards of the system. But like our larger fight with climate change, it is a story we’ve heard before: business as usual continually trumps actual progress.
December 13, 2024
4 stars, or perhaps 5 for its importance. This audiobook filled a huge gap in my knowledge of hurricanes, beaches, and the climate crisis.
Much of the focus was on barrier islands, such as New Jersey’s Long Beach Island. Google Maps shows many beach houses with swimming pools. When houses on barrier islands are destroyed by hurricanes, they are foolishly rebuilt in the same location using not private insurance but federal tax dollars.
The mayor of Tampa was very concerned about a hurricane that could come up Tampa Bay and hit the city. This book was published in 2019 so he did not know yet that, in 2024, two hurricanes would do just that.
For a more thorough review, see Davis Wineberg’s on July 15, 2019.
Much of the focus was on barrier islands, such as New Jersey’s Long Beach Island. Google Maps shows many beach houses with swimming pools. When houses on barrier islands are destroyed by hurricanes, they are foolishly rebuilt in the same location using not private insurance but federal tax dollars.
The mayor of Tampa was very concerned about a hurricane that could come up Tampa Bay and hit the city. This book was published in 2019 so he did not know yet that, in 2024, two hurricanes would do just that.
For a more thorough review, see Davis Wineberg’s on July 15, 2019.
February 12, 2025
I picked up this book because, prior to reading it, I had little understanding of the financial implications of hurricanes and flooding on the East Coast. I’m so glad I did.
This book is incredibly thorough. Despite being packed with political and financial information, I was never bored. In fact, it opened my eyes to a range of issues I hadn’t considered before, such as the complexities of conservation, the impact of climate change, the often frustrating bureaucracy surrounding climate policy, zoning laws, and the dynamics of public and private insurance. These are topics I likely wouldn’t have explored on my own, but the book made them not only accessible but engaging.
It’s a quick, informative read, and I’d recommend it to anyone looking to gain a deeper understanding of the financial, political, and environmental challenges posed by climate-related disasters. Whether you’re already knowledgeable about these subjects or coming at them from a place of curiosity, this book offers valuable insights that I think everyone could benefit from.
This book is incredibly thorough. Despite being packed with political and financial information, I was never bored. In fact, it opened my eyes to a range of issues I hadn’t considered before, such as the complexities of conservation, the impact of climate change, the often frustrating bureaucracy surrounding climate policy, zoning laws, and the dynamics of public and private insurance. These are topics I likely wouldn’t have explored on my own, but the book made them not only accessible but engaging.
It’s a quick, informative read, and I’d recommend it to anyone looking to gain a deeper understanding of the financial, political, and environmental challenges posed by climate-related disasters. Whether you’re already knowledgeable about these subjects or coming at them from a place of curiosity, this book offers valuable insights that I think everyone could benefit from.
March 6, 2021
A tour of coastal communities and the risk they face, this book is a reasoned approach to climate change. The book looks at cities such as Houston, Tampa, Charleston and others that are at major risk for flooding events. The conversation is less about the climate and more about the city officials, developers, and community members trying to make sense of the future. We have much to figure out when it comes to how to allocate funds for rebuilding or relocating. Building over and over again in a danger prone area is happening not just in flooded areas but also in places devastated by wildfires. At some point we need to ask ourselves why.
March 17, 2020
I will never look at a beach house on the East/Gulf Coasts the same way. This is a really interesting and thought-provoking book about the rise of multi-million dollar (second) homes along floodplains and barrier islands all down the East Coast and Gulf Coast, the federal flood insurance program, and the effects of climate change.
December 1, 2021
While this book was a harder read, somewhat repetitive in areas, I felt that the information is something each and every person in the United States should know. We all hear about hurricanes and the damage they cause through the media, but how can we prevent that damage? Or is it preventable? This is the book to find out.
July 23, 2025
A detailed historical walk-through with a first-person touch including many interactions and interviews with people at the front line of the many notorious floods in the last few decades. A clear emphasis on New Jersey as well. The message is clear, move to higher grounds, but the fascination with water is perhaps deeply cultural, if not psychological.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 23, 2020
A compelling write up of a problem that impacts all Americans (due to federal programs/disaster relief - taxes). The author's blend of testimony and facts makes what might otherwise be a dry topic into a gripping, human experience.
February 11, 2020
A good, narrative-focused investigation; I especially appreciated it as a New Jerseyan. Returns to the same themes and messages very often, but only because the message is so central and obvious: "stop spending money, and leave."
May 29, 2020
Explains in detail how riksy buildings are subsidized by the public (houses built on shorelines for example) and the benefits enjoyed by proivate indiviuals. Why? Interesting book. It does go in more detail than I was interested in.
September 18, 2020
Excellent, accessible analysis of risk posed by coastal development, rising seas, and intensified hurricanes. Takes historical perspective into account but highlights recent storms from the 2010s across the Eastern and Gulf coasts of the US.
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