The Problem of Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690

by Henry G. van Leeuwen

The revival of ancient Greek scepticism in the 16th and 17th centuries was of the greatest importance in changing the intellectual climate in which modern science developed, and in developing the attitude that we now call "The scientific outlook." Many streams of thought came together contributing to various facets of this crucial development. One of the most fascinating of these is that of "constructive scepticism," the history of one of whose forms is traced in this study by Prof. Van Leeuwen. The sceptical crisis that arose during the Renaissance and Refor mation challenged the fundamental principles of the many areas of man's intellectual world, in philosophy, theology, humane and moral studies, and the sciences. The devastating weapons of classical scep ticism were employed to undermine man's confidence in his ability to discover truth in any area whatsoever by use of the human faculties of the senses and reason. These sceptics indicated that there was no area in which human beings could gain any certain knowledge, and that the effort to do so was fruitless, vain, presumptuous, and perhaps even blasphemous. StaI'ting with the writings of Hen ric us Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-1535) and Michel de Montaigne (1533-92), a thoroughly destructive sceptical movement developed, attacking both the old and the new science, philosophy and theology, and insisting that true and certain knowledge can only be gained by Revelation."

176 pages, Hardcover

First published July 31, 1970

Reviews

[Dominic Foo · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a short academic book tracing the development of idea of epistemic certainty in English thought and how it lead to the philosophy of science of great names like Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton.

The problem of epistemic certainty ironically began first as a theological problem before it became a framework for the new scientific method being pioneered in 17th century England. It started with the "rule of faith" controversy where Roman Catholic apologists insisted that we need to possess absolute certainty about the faith and that the Church alone provided it. They employed pyrrhonist sceptical arguments to undermine the Protestant confidence in their reason to be able to discern the Bible's meaning or its composition. The Protestants instantly counter attacked by arguing that we likewise could not be certain of what documents composed the tradition of the church nor how to interpret church documents rightly (one Protestant apologist went so far as to say that probably only the Pope alone could be certain of the faith).

Thus both sides presented the unsavoury dilemma of either nihilistic scepticism of being unable to attain any theological knowledge or fidelistic dogmatism in simply making leaps of faith unto one's favourite Church or Bible.

The English thinkers and Anglican clerics sought a middle path between the two alternatives. Arguing against dogmaticism, they argued that the employment of our reason is necessary to determine the scope and contents of one's church/Bible, i.e. we still need to use less than infallible or absolutely certain historical methods to discern which books of the Bible are of apostolic origin or which ecclesiastical documents constituted the church's teachings. Against scepticism they argued that one did not need absolute but only moral certainty as far as theological or religious truths are concerned, that is, certainty sufficient for living and practice and proof "beyond reasonable doubt".

These thinkers however were also the founding members of the now prestigious Royal Society which was incorporated specifically for the advancement of scientific knowledge and experiments. Their epistemic system, originally employed in a theological context, would be employed by scientists like Boyle and Newton to support their scientific enterprise. They employed sceptical premises against dogmaticism in arguing against Aristotelian or metaphysical pretended demonstrations of the inner structure of nature. However against nihilism they adopted their predecessors in the Royal Society's framework of cautious derivation of theses based on careful experiments and disciplined observation between various phenomena which are morally certain.

Newton for example was careful only to demonstrate what is observably coordinate, e.g. the behaviour of bodies according to the laws of gravitation, while resisting the temptation to pass off his speculations on what constituted the nature of gravitation or its properties as scientific truth. Although he was particularly fond of his particle theory of light, he was careful only to present only the observably coordinated factors and resisted the temptation to pass off his "behind the phenomena" theory as certain truth.

All in all, it is a rather insightful book on how a theological debate lead to the constructive sceptical framework of Europe's first proper scientists.