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Little Mac : Demise of an American Hero
This work strongly supports the military actions of the controversial Civil War general, George B. McClellan. Here at last is a powerful story told from the other side--a narration that shreds the radical Republican view of the general as propagated by such renowned writers as Stephen W. Sears.
409 pages, Paperback
First published February 16, 2000
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January 15, 2025
This was an interesting book to read. I like how Ridgway gives a rational thinking to McClellan for once. Usually historians lambast him for things a general should never do, like not being at the front when battles were happening. No general in modern warfare should do that. When it did happen, it was only when it was necessary to give the troops a boost in confidence, which McClellan did plenty of times.
He also uses rational thinking when it comes to McClellan’s constant belief in himself being outnumbered. Today we have Official Records and countless other records stating what the true Confederate strength was. At the time it was widely believed the Rebels could build up a massive army especially to protect their capital. There is absolutely no way McClellan could have known his enemy’s true strength. Yet most historians act like he should have known! Figure that one out! Besides, McClellan believed Robert E. Lee’s army at Antietam numbered no less than 120,000 yet still attacked with his army that had been severely weakened over the previous month while Lee was on the high ground. If historians would use their brains, they’d be able to see this!
He also points out how some people contradict themselves. Like his Stephen W. Sears makes a point that McClellan’s numbered around 169,000 on the Peninsula yet at one point states that whenever McDowell would have arrived, it would’ve given McClellan only 130k. How does that make sense?!
Ridgway also places a lot of blame on Lincoln for the Union failures of 1862. Lincoln had strategic control of the Union Armies from March until July, and really never gave it up unofficially until March of ‘64. Lincoln should never have created all the departments he did especially in the Virginia theatre, which did more to hurt McClellan than anyone gives him credit for. And because of this division of command, they couldn’t track down Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah because he didn’t place one in charge. Lincoln also promised to give McClellan 4 Corps and didn’t. Some historians have criticized McClellan for not taking risks, but Lincoln clearly didn’t want to take any by leaving Washington uncovered. Ridgway also states that Lincoln may have been influenced by those who said that McClellan was going to move the army to uncover the capital to let the Rebels walk right in, which of course wasn’t true, but it puts some thought into the historians mind. Lincoln was a great statesman and we can’t take anything from that, but he was a terrible general. We should stop giving him credit for something he wasn’t good at. But he’s become so angelic, that some think he could do anything! Ridgway also points out though that there was no real set in stone rules on how a president and his general in chief should play. This was America’s first modern war, and there simply was no outline for how either should act. Hence why Lincoln did eventually take more control and also why McClellan got into politics more than he should have.
One knock I’ll give this book is that he didn’t leave any notes. I would have liked to have gone back through the books I already have of McClellan and already have that cheat sheet so to speak so I can find where he gets his lines. But I do get where he’s coming from on that most people who read McClellan already have the books he’s referencing. Ridgway also dives into how the Radicals were working behind McClellan’s back, I can’t confirm that myself, but based on what was happening, it seems like they were trying to hurt him. Yet Stephen W. Sears repeatedly denied this. How can he consider himself a historian!
One of my favorite lines Ridgway uses in explaining what faces McClellan on his Peninsula Campaign is an analogy similar to what all should know. He states something like, imagine if Eisenhower just before D-Day was informed that he was going to lose half his British force, all of his Canadian forces, and some of his paratroopers and get no naval support. And on top of it all, facing the worst weather known to that region in a while. This is essentially what happened to McClellan and yet he’s expected to succeed? Ridiculous!
I think anyone who’s interested will enjoy reading this but keep an open mind. There are a lot of things that contradicts itself in McClellan‘s story and this points a lot of them out.
He also uses rational thinking when it comes to McClellan’s constant belief in himself being outnumbered. Today we have Official Records and countless other records stating what the true Confederate strength was. At the time it was widely believed the Rebels could build up a massive army especially to protect their capital. There is absolutely no way McClellan could have known his enemy’s true strength. Yet most historians act like he should have known! Figure that one out! Besides, McClellan believed Robert E. Lee’s army at Antietam numbered no less than 120,000 yet still attacked with his army that had been severely weakened over the previous month while Lee was on the high ground. If historians would use their brains, they’d be able to see this!
He also points out how some people contradict themselves. Like his Stephen W. Sears makes a point that McClellan’s numbered around 169,000 on the Peninsula yet at one point states that whenever McDowell would have arrived, it would’ve given McClellan only 130k. How does that make sense?!
Ridgway also places a lot of blame on Lincoln for the Union failures of 1862. Lincoln had strategic control of the Union Armies from March until July, and really never gave it up unofficially until March of ‘64. Lincoln should never have created all the departments he did especially in the Virginia theatre, which did more to hurt McClellan than anyone gives him credit for. And because of this division of command, they couldn’t track down Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah because he didn’t place one in charge. Lincoln also promised to give McClellan 4 Corps and didn’t. Some historians have criticized McClellan for not taking risks, but Lincoln clearly didn’t want to take any by leaving Washington uncovered. Ridgway also states that Lincoln may have been influenced by those who said that McClellan was going to move the army to uncover the capital to let the Rebels walk right in, which of course wasn’t true, but it puts some thought into the historians mind. Lincoln was a great statesman and we can’t take anything from that, but he was a terrible general. We should stop giving him credit for something he wasn’t good at. But he’s become so angelic, that some think he could do anything! Ridgway also points out though that there was no real set in stone rules on how a president and his general in chief should play. This was America’s first modern war, and there simply was no outline for how either should act. Hence why Lincoln did eventually take more control and also why McClellan got into politics more than he should have.
One knock I’ll give this book is that he didn’t leave any notes. I would have liked to have gone back through the books I already have of McClellan and already have that cheat sheet so to speak so I can find where he gets his lines. But I do get where he’s coming from on that most people who read McClellan already have the books he’s referencing. Ridgway also dives into how the Radicals were working behind McClellan’s back, I can’t confirm that myself, but based on what was happening, it seems like they were trying to hurt him. Yet Stephen W. Sears repeatedly denied this. How can he consider himself a historian!
One of my favorite lines Ridgway uses in explaining what faces McClellan on his Peninsula Campaign is an analogy similar to what all should know. He states something like, imagine if Eisenhower just before D-Day was informed that he was going to lose half his British force, all of his Canadian forces, and some of his paratroopers and get no naval support. And on top of it all, facing the worst weather known to that region in a while. This is essentially what happened to McClellan and yet he’s expected to succeed? Ridiculous!
I think anyone who’s interested will enjoy reading this but keep an open mind. There are a lot of things that contradicts itself in McClellan‘s story and this points a lot of them out.
Displaying 1 of 1 review