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Demarcation and Demystification: Philosophy and Its Limits
Marx once declared that philosophers have only interpreted the world, but the point is to change it. Demarcation and Demystification examines the ways in which a radical practice of philosophy is possible under the aegis of Marx's 11th thesis, arguing that philosophy's radicality is discovered by understanding that it can only ever interpret the world; that social transformation lies beyond the sphere of its operations. 'Demarcation and Demystification is a major statement on the gulf between what philosophers actually do, and what they think they do.' Matthew R. McLennan, author of Philosophy and Vulnerability
220 pages, Paperback
Published November 4, 2019
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 18, 2021
An absolutely essential read for anyone who wants to understand where philosophy fits into the theory/praxis dialectic.
June 27, 2022
This is the first book I've read by J. Moufawad-Paul and I'm honestly pretty disappointed. I get the sense that many Marxists who've read this book and liked it may not have much of a background in philosophy, so they may have found it easy to agree with and may not have seen much wrong with it. But there's quite a lot wrong with it.
First, what this book did right: J. Moufawad-Paul correctly asserts that philosophy must be distinguished from theory and that Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach has given Marxists cause to question what role philosophy should play in actually changing the world as opposed to just interpreting it. He also correctly points out that the point of philosophy should be to seek clarity, to "demystify," and that philosophers must avoid the tendency towards what he calls "occultation," or a tendency in academic philosophy, in particular, to obscure and confuse. He gives good examples of this practice of occultation, such as post-Heideggerian thinkers who attempted to dismiss Marxism through petty language-games intended to obscure its categories. But this is the last of all the positive things I have to say about this book.
My first major issue: despite J. Moufawad-Paul's insistence that philosophy and theory are distinct from one another, he doesn't actually convincingly show that they are. This was pretty frustrating because I agreed with this point but he argues it very poorly.
When he defines his concept of a "theoretical terrain," he gives a definition that is far too broad (and it also must be noted that he never defines "theory" - the reader is left to infer a meaning of "theory" from his concept of a "theoretical terrain"). He says,
Since his definition of a "theoretical terrain" is too broad it actually works against his argument that philosophy is distinct from theory. After all, if art and even religion, of all things, can constitute theoretical terrains, why can't philosophy?
Actually, J. Moufawad-Paul allows philosophy the "potential" to be considered a theoretical terrain under one very bizarre and specific condition: when it takes itself as its own object, or in other words, when philosophy produces meta-discussions about itself.
Second, to continue with the geographical metaphor, if philosophy becomes a theoretical terrain when it takes itself as its own object, does the terrain remain after philosophy has "demarcated" its own limits etc. or does the terrain just disappear once it's no longer putting itself under a microscope?
My next major issue: I strongly disagree with the way J. Moufawad-Paul portrays philosophy and defines its function. He practically portrays it as an empty husk of a discipline that can only ever be filled with the content of other disciplines, never capable of producing any of its own content (or if it ever does produce any of its own content, it's too "speculative," abstract, and a waste of time). He says,
I actually found the way that J. Moufawad-Paul would talk about philosophy throughout the book very off-putting, such as when he makes comments like this:
In the end, I can only think that the warm reception this book has gotten among some Marxists can only come from them reading it uncritically or without thinking about it too much. There's not much of anything of substance in this book and I, personally, didn't find it very useful in thinking through how to practice philosophy as a Marxist. But then again, the author was at least self aware enough to anticipate this reaction, as indicated in the epilogue.
SECOND REVIEW: In retrospect, another gripe I had about this book was that JMF's answer to the question, "What should Marxist philosophers do?" was to just confine themselves to settling petty tit-for-tats over theory, which is a fucking boring and uninspiring answer. A much better answer can be found in Henri Lefebvre's "Metaphilosophy".
First, what this book did right: J. Moufawad-Paul correctly asserts that philosophy must be distinguished from theory and that Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach has given Marxists cause to question what role philosophy should play in actually changing the world as opposed to just interpreting it. He also correctly points out that the point of philosophy should be to seek clarity, to "demystify," and that philosophers must avoid the tendency towards what he calls "occultation," or a tendency in academic philosophy, in particular, to obscure and confuse. He gives good examples of this practice of occultation, such as post-Heideggerian thinkers who attempted to dismiss Marxism through petty language-games intended to obscure its categories. But this is the last of all the positive things I have to say about this book.
My first major issue: despite J. Moufawad-Paul's insistence that philosophy and theory are distinct from one another, he doesn't actually convincingly show that they are. This was pretty frustrating because I agreed with this point but he argues it very poorly.
When he defines his concept of a "theoretical terrain," he gives a definition that is far too broad (and it also must be noted that he never defines "theory" - the reader is left to infer a meaning of "theory" from his concept of a "theoretical terrain"). He says,
"A theoretical terrain is an organized body of conceptual thought that attempts to make sense of reality." (p.41)To further clarify, he says
"...a theoretical terrain could be religious or scientific, idealist or materialist, irrational or rational, and anything that passes for a coherent body of theory." (p.41-42)Not only is it unclear from this definition how philosophy must necessarily be distinct from theory (philosophy actually very easily satisfies this definition), this definition also includes things that I wouldn't consider "theory" at all, such as art (he later mentions "aesthetic terrains") and religion.
Since his definition of a "theoretical terrain" is too broad it actually works against his argument that philosophy is distinct from theory. After all, if art and even religion, of all things, can constitute theoretical terrains, why can't philosophy?
Actually, J. Moufawad-Paul allows philosophy the "potential" to be considered a theoretical terrain under one very bizarre and specific condition: when it takes itself as its own object, or in other words, when philosophy produces meta-discussions about itself.
"...since philosophy is the only discipline capable of taking itself as an object...we can also speak of a moment where philosophy itself becomes a theoretical terrain. In becoming a theoretical terrain in its own right, however, philosophy is no longer philosophy-qua-philosophy but simply a reflection of philosophical practice that has ossified into a potential theory [my emphasis] so as to allow for further philosophical practice." (p. 46-47)There are some problems with this. First of all, if doing philosophy about philosophy produces a theoretical terrain, then philosophy and theory aren't distinct at all - doing meta-philosophy (and, thus, doing philosophy) is doing theory, which is precisely why he then says that when philosophy takes itself as its own object it is "no longer philosophy-qua-philosophy." But how? I don't find this convincing.
Second, to continue with the geographical metaphor, if philosophy becomes a theoretical terrain when it takes itself as its own object, does the terrain remain after philosophy has "demarcated" its own limits etc. or does the terrain just disappear once it's no longer putting itself under a microscope?
My next major issue: I strongly disagree with the way J. Moufawad-Paul portrays philosophy and defines its function. He practically portrays it as an empty husk of a discipline that can only ever be filled with the content of other disciplines, never capable of producing any of its own content (or if it ever does produce any of its own content, it's too "speculative," abstract, and a waste of time). He says,
"...without the existence of theoretical terrains brought into being by concrete struggles there would be nothing [for philosophy] to interpret." (p. 175)Philosophy can only ever act upon other disciplines, interpreting them, "demarcating" their "routes" and boundaries and "forcing" meaning. Philosophy, therefore, only "emerges" out of its relationship to other disciplines. This actually puts the cart before the horse historically speaking, specifically with regard to philosophy's relationship with the natural sciences - historically, philosophy predated the natural sciences and even still provides them with the most general categories or concepts that they take as their basic assumptions. This is not to say that the natural sciences somehow need philosophy's input to function or to be coherent, but rather that they still operate on an implicit set of philosophical presuppositions which they cannot escape.
I actually found the way that J. Moufawad-Paul would talk about philosophy throughout the book very off-putting, such as when he makes comments like this:
"...rather than groundlessly ruminating upon life, the universe, and everything without any direction or basis in the real, a [philosophy of science] is primarily concerned with making sense of phenomena according to foundations that are antagonistic to any form of mystification." (p. 59)So, according to J. Moufawad-Paul, legitimate questions concerning meaning or how to live are baseless speculation and mystification (it should be noted that not only Western, but also Eastern philosophy, is concerned with these sorts of questions). This comes off as just dismissive of really any practice of philosophy outside of its interaction with other disciplines. The whole book, in fact, just reads, ironically, as disdain for "philosophy-as-such," or philosophy as a unique and independent discipline.
In the end, I can only think that the warm reception this book has gotten among some Marxists can only come from them reading it uncritically or without thinking about it too much. There's not much of anything of substance in this book and I, personally, didn't find it very useful in thinking through how to practice philosophy as a Marxist. But then again, the author was at least self aware enough to anticipate this reaction, as indicated in the epilogue.
SECOND REVIEW: In retrospect, another gripe I had about this book was that JMF's answer to the question, "What should Marxist philosophers do?" was to just confine themselves to settling petty tit-for-tats over theory, which is a fucking boring and uninspiring answer. A much better answer can be found in Henri Lefebvre's "Metaphilosophy".
March 30, 2022
I've been meaning to read this book for a while now, and I am glad to have finally done so. JMP has managed to succinctly articulate a number of views I have held about the practice of philosophy for several years now, but which I have only briefly put down on paper, usually under the name of what I call 'politics-first philosophy' (punning off of Heidegger's ontology-first philosophy, or Levinas' ethics-first philosophy). His comments on previous interpretations of Marx's 11th Thesis are also well-received by me, although the ultimate line of philosophers being propagandists is too harsh in my opinion (not for its substance, but because I think 'propaganda' is the wrong word for what JMP is describing).
My main gripe about this book is my disagreement with JMP's reading and dismissal of Laruelle, although he can hardly be blamed for this given Laruelle's difficulty, and neither can I claim to have understood Laruelle much better. Ultimately however, JMP's views allign very closely to what I think Laruelle is actually arguing for - not a prioritization of philosophy or non-philosophy, or a philosophical prioritization of science, but a democracy-of-thought which engages transcendental identities as equal in-the-last-instance, even if this in-the-last-instance exists only through another transcendental identity, that of the transcendental-clone. Despite this, JMP and Laruelle do appear to diverge substantially on the independent existence of philsophy, since for Laruelle it exists in the fullness of a transcendental identity, whereas for JMP its existence is parasitic upon the politics and science of its time.
My main gripe about this book is my disagreement with JMP's reading and dismissal of Laruelle, although he can hardly be blamed for this given Laruelle's difficulty, and neither can I claim to have understood Laruelle much better. Ultimately however, JMP's views allign very closely to what I think Laruelle is actually arguing for - not a prioritization of philosophy or non-philosophy, or a philosophical prioritization of science, but a democracy-of-thought which engages transcendental identities as equal in-the-last-instance, even if this in-the-last-instance exists only through another transcendental identity, that of the transcendental-clone. Despite this, JMP and Laruelle do appear to diverge substantially on the independent existence of philsophy, since for Laruelle it exists in the fullness of a transcendental identity, whereas for JMP its existence is parasitic upon the politics and science of its time.
February 5, 2020
Demarcation and Demystification is opened by the Author's note, which is intended as an introduction but in reality overflowed the boundaries into the first three chapters. It was only by the middle of the book that I felt I was approaching something of substance. For me that substance was the discussion of François Laruelle's and Alain Badiou's philosophy and the relation between ontology and politics.
This book is unlikely to persuade you to give up any of your firmly held political or philosophical beliefs (idealist or speculative philosophies are swiftly swept aside, those that claim to do politics outside of class struggle are quickly dismissed as liberals) the purpose instead appears to be to provide some tools for those already invested in historical and dialectical materialism to reflect on how philosophy may aid their radical and revolutionary cause.
There are occasional interesting insights and on the whole I agree with the author's take home message. But I feel that the text is weakened by an over-commitment in scope, talking about the entirety of philosophy and Marxism in very general and abstract terms with an under-commitment to detail, either a scarcity of detailed analysis or not enough concrete examples.
This book is unlikely to persuade you to give up any of your firmly held political or philosophical beliefs (idealist or speculative philosophies are swiftly swept aside, those that claim to do politics outside of class struggle are quickly dismissed as liberals) the purpose instead appears to be to provide some tools for those already invested in historical and dialectical materialism to reflect on how philosophy may aid their radical and revolutionary cause.
There are occasional interesting insights and on the whole I agree with the author's take home message. But I feel that the text is weakened by an over-commitment in scope, talking about the entirety of philosophy and Marxism in very general and abstract terms with an under-commitment to detail, either a scarcity of detailed analysis or not enough concrete examples.
April 6, 2022
“…academic Marxists in general, and philosophers specifically, are often guilty of imagining that their academic work is synonymous with changing the world that to interpret the world, to write a book on this-or-that theoretical problem, is revolutionary praxis. Such work, however, is not by itself political; if it was, based on the amount of books and papers published, capitalism would have already collapsed under the weight of academic
rigour.”
rigour.”
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews