What wasn’t learned from a U.S. intervention that succeeded
In July 1958, U.S. Marines stormed the beach in Beirut, Lebanon, ready for combat. They were greeted by vendors and sunbathers. Fortunately, the rest of their mission—helping to end Lebanon’s first civil war—went nearly as smoothly and successfully, thanks in large part to the skillful work of American diplomats who helped arrange a compromise solution. Future American interventions in the region would not work out quite as well.
Bruce Riedel’s new book tells the now-forgotten story (forgotten, that is, in the United States) of the first U.S. combat operation in the Middle East. President Eisenhower sent the Marines in the wake of a bloody coup in Iraq, a seismic event that altered politics not only of that country but eventually of the entire region. Eisenhower feared that the coup, along with other conspiracies and events that seemed mysterious back in Washington, threatened American interests in the Middle East. His action, and those of others, were driven in large part by a cast of fascinating characters whose espionage and covert actions could be grist for a movie.
Although Eisenhower’s intervention in Lebanon was unique, certainly in its relatively benign outcome, it does hold important lessons for today’s policymakers as they seek to deal with the always unexpected challenges in the Middle East. Veteran analyst Bruce Reidel describes the scene as it emerged six decades ago, and he suggests that some of the lessons learned then are still valid today. A key lesson? Not to rush to judgment when surprised by the unexpected. And don't assume the worst.
Bruce Riedel is a senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, part of the Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. In addition, Riedel serves as a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy. He retired in 2006 after 30 years of service at the Central Intelligence Agency, including postings overseas. He was a senior advisor on South Asia and the Middle East to the last four presidents of the United States in the staff of the National Security Council at the White House. He was also deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Near East and South Asia at the Pentagon and a senior advisor at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels.
Riedel was a member of President Bill Clinton’s peace process team and negotiated at Camp David and other Arab-Israeli summits and he organized Clinton’s trip to India in 2000. In January 2009, President Barack Obama asked him to chair a review of American policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, the results of which the president announced in a speech on March 27, 2009.
In 2011, Riedel served as an expert advisor to the prosecution of al Qaeda terrorist Omar Farooq Abdulmutallab in Detroit. In December 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron asked him to brief the United Kingdom’s National Security Council in London on Pakistan.
Riedel is a graduate of Brown (B.A.), Harvard (M.A.), and the Royal College of Defense Studies in London. He has taught at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and Johns Hopkins University’s School for Advanced International Studies, and he has been a guest lecturer at Dartmouth, Harvard, Brown, and other universities. Riedel is a recipient of the Intelligence Medal of Merit and the Distinguished Intelligence Career Medal.
I was drawn to reading this book because my late father was a young Marine Corps officer who took part in US military deployment to Beirut in 1958. His stories of the landing craft hitting the beach only to be greeted by well-wishers (many in bikinis) who were enjoying a beautiful day at the shore - and his struggle to keep his men focused and alert as they secured the beach and began planning to move into the city - were riveting and quite funny. Old memories were rekindled by this wonderful book by Bruce Reidel. At the time, Reidel was living in Beirut at the time as a young boy and the son of a senior United Nations officer assigned to help monitor and quell growing internal tensions in Lebanon. Here he offers a superb history of US engagement in the broader Middle East that led to this historically monumental order by President Eisenhower to send in the Marines to Lebanon. A slim 136 pages, Reidel somehow covers the how US policy in the Middle East (a Middle East that no longer exists as we know it with multiple kings, electrifying nationalist leaders like Egyptian leader Sharif Nasser and tin-pot military commanders who led one coup after another). What happened in the few short years leading up to 1958 were, as he masterfully relates, the predicate for the broader, bloodier military engagement the US has had in the broader Middle East ever since. A Syria which once claimed all the territory that included what is today (then predominately) Christian Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian territories. This is essential reading to understand the underpinnings of Middle East policy today - and likely for a long time to come.
This book was so useful I bought it. I wanted a copy of my own that I could mark up, unlike the library copy I was initially reading. Bruce Riedel is a bit of a unicorn. My understanding from his other recent book, "Kings & Presidents" is that he was about as much of a US-Saudi relationship insider as it is possible to be. After a long career in and out of the CIA, he was one of the US government's point people on the Saudi relationship during the Clinton and early Bush administrations. He knew and socialized with DC and Saudi elites. Upon retirement, there were no doubt endlessly lucrative opportunities laid out in front of him. Instead, Riedel chose to become one of the most vocal critics of Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen, and has spent his retirement lobbying for reform in US Middle East policy and writing fabulously useful books. Honest public servants aren't as rare as some claim, but very few turn down the post-retirement rewards to the extent that Riedel has. He should be applauded.
Beirut 1958 one of those fabulously useful books. I was amused to learn that Riedel spent his childhood witnessing some of these events firsthand as the child of United Nations functionaries. The book is nominally concerned with the first "boots on the ground" US Middle East intervention in the post-WWII era. This came in Lebanon in 1958. The thing is there wasn't much to it. Some diplomacy and wise restraint made it one of the briefest and most successful interventions in our country's history. There isn't too much to say about it, and Riedel dispenses with it in a couple dozen pages at the end of the book. What makes "Beirut 1958" so invaluable is the set-up.
1958 is getting to be a long time ago now. A lot of the players look similar, but 65 years ago, these countries, their alliances and their politics were very different. In some cases subtly, in some cases wildly. Israel was only ten years old. Saudi Arabia was run by young lunatics rather than old ones (OK maybe that's not so different). Riedel meticulously lays out the events that led to the US intervention, but manages to give a brief but fairly comprehensive picture of the regional politics of the time as well. This will be my go-to reference the next time I find myself writing about the early independence era in the Middle East.
The only thing that keeps me back from giving this book a five star review is the oddly deficient editing. Is it the Brookings Institution that put out the book? On at least two occasions, a concept or figure is introduced at length on one page... and then introduced again two pages later. It felt as if the book had been written by a committee to some degree, which may have been necessary to cover so much, so well and so briefly. But at a mere 119 pages, somebody should have proofread it for clarity and style.
The United States began its military interventions in the Middle East in 1958, with a U.S. Marine landing in Beirut, Lebanon. Exploring the development of the socio-political background back to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and taking the reader to the parallels with the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the book is an eminently readable story as well as a solid analysis of the development of US foreign policy in the Middle East during the Cold War. A quick read, with only about 120 pages, the book is far more comprehensive than you would expect. A good choice.
This book tells the story of the first US military involvement in the Middle East and all the events that led up to it. Fascinating and detailed for a short book.
There are several interesting things about this slim volume.
In some ways, the author faces an immense challenge, trying to make compelling the story of a war which didn't start. While Lebanon would see more than its share of division and violence, 1958 was a false start. The United States invaded but didn't fight a war. The one time President Eisenhower initiated a military conflict, it wasn't one.
In order to tell the story, Riedel does a good job of balancing a "presentist" view of how the events were experienced, including his firsthand childhood view, alongside more retrospective documentation. The story this tells is one where no one was on the same page. Things were changing rapidly in the region, but no one could agree on why. No one was sure who was on whose side, and it was very easy to overreact. This is also a story about the near-miracle of this being a historical footnote instead of a tragedy.
The shortcomings of the book mostly draw from its strength: the brevity and readability. Sometimes in service of the swift pacing, Riedel skips too quickly. The Druze are not given their due as a distinct community. Some events and figures appear and disappear too quickly for the reader to process their relation. It even seems like the editing went as briskly as the narrative does, as there are several clear typos. Also, Riedel attempts to make this into a case study for conflict in the modern Middle East, but any application is necessarily so general that it feels more like a forced conclusion than a natural one.
All this does not detract from an enjoyable and engaging view of an incident I knew nothing about.
A good introduction to the political map in the middle east in the late fifties and early sixties (a crucial decade in the arab world). The book explains the beginning of American hegemony on the region and the challenges the adminstrations faced especially due to their lack of understanding of the complexities of the arab world at that time. The book exposed some insights only known to american intellegence. The author gave an aerial view on the conflicts between arabs especially in the light of Nassers project in egypt and syria and his wars with Saudi Arabia and Israel. The book was great in stating facts however its poor when anaylsing history. The author analysis to conflicts in the regionand explaining american interests in was very superficial and quick. In spite of that I found the book very informative.
Gave it four stars because the author touched on turning points in the regions history without analysis or in depth research. For example the relationship between Nasser and the CIA a covert relationship the writer moved through it in less than a page. I was expecting more revelations.