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Historical-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology
Translated here into English for the first time, F. W. J. Schelling's 1842 lectures on the Philosophy of Mythology are an early example of interdisciplinary thinking. In seeking to show the development of the concept of the divine Godhead in and through various mythological systems (particularly of ancient Greece, Egypt, and the Near East), Schelling develops the idea that many philosophical concepts are born of religious-mythological notions. In so doing, he brings together the essential relatedness of the development of philosophical systems, human language, history, ancient art forms, and religious thought. Along the way, he engages in analyses of modern philosophical views about the origins of philosophy's conceptual abstractions, as well as literary and philological analyses of ancient literature and poetry.
264 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1856
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About the author
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling
542 books248 followersFriedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, later von Schelling, was a German philosopher. Standard histories of philosophy make him the midpoint in the development of German Idealism, situating him between Fichte, his mentor prior to 1800, and Hegel, his former university roommate and erstwhile friend. Interpreting Schelling's philosophy is often difficult because of its ever-changing nature. Some scholars characterize him as a protean thinker who, although brilliant, jumped from one subject to another and lacked the synthesizing power needed to arrive at a complete philosophical system. Others challenge the notion that Schelling's thought is marked by profound breaks, instead arguing that his philosophy always focused on a few common themes, especially human freedom, the absolute, and the relationship between spirit and nature.
Schelling's thought has often been neglected, especially in the English-speaking world. This stems not only from the ascendancy of Hegel, whose mature works portray Schelling as a mere footnote in the development of Idealism, but also from his Naturphilosophie, which positivist scientists have often ridiculed for its "silly" analogizing and lack of empirical orientation. In recent years, Schelling scholars have forcefully attacked both of these sources of neglect.
Schelling's thought has often been neglected, especially in the English-speaking world. This stems not only from the ascendancy of Hegel, whose mature works portray Schelling as a mere footnote in the development of Idealism, but also from his Naturphilosophie, which positivist scientists have often ridiculed for its "silly" analogizing and lack of empirical orientation. In recent years, Schelling scholars have forcefully attacked both of these sources of neglect.
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May 9, 2020
This work of Schelling’s was a part of his Berlin lecture series that was given in the 1840s. The Grounding of Positive Philosophy served as the introductory lecture; it was followed by his Philosophy of Mythology series of lectures, and then by his Philosophy of Revelation lectures. Schelling published very little after his Essay on Human Freedom in 1809. He was developing the ideas that would be found here, however. The never published Ages of the World went through several iterations, but was finally abandoned. The Berlin lectures were intended to be the culmination of Schelling’s entire system of philosophy, and the fruit of his efforts during his period of publishing silence.
This is the second time I’ve read this book. It was actually the first book I read by Schelling (I wasn’t writing reviews much at the time). I was impressed with it then, and I am still impressed with it. Not only was Schelling a philosopher, he was quite the scholar as well. He was fluent in a number of ancient literary languages and his notes make this evident. When the Age of Enlightenment was still in full swing, very few thinkers of note took mythology seriously. Schelling was an exception. There is much here that reminds me of Carl Jung and his take on mythology. Jung believed myths contained archetypes that are more or less universal. While Schelling doesn’t use the term “archetypal” he does hold that mythology expanded human consciousness. Indeed, he even ties it in with the development of language:
“One is almost tempted to say: language itself is only faded mythology; what mythology still preserves in living and concrete differences is preserved in language only in abstract and formal differences.” - Page 40
Schelling believed that mythology, and its often accompanying polytheism, was necessary for the expansion of human consciousness. He finds successive polytheism, such as is found in Greek mythology, particularly relevant to his philosophy. He thinks that it was necessary for humanity to experience religions where different gods could successively rule because it made evident that these could not ultimately satisfy the human need for a transcendent God. But, at the same time, these gods might give humanity a window into a more transcendent God. Schelling finds the biblical story of the expulsion from the garden and the division of people and language to be paradigmatic. These biblical occurrences separated humanity from an absolute monotheism. Humanity then had to pass through stages in their religious progress. Only through experience could humanity become mature. Humanity needed to go through polytheism and relative monotheism in order to grow. Discerning God, the absolute One, from polytheistic gods that were only one relatively speaking, necessitated that humanity had experienced both. Here it is obvious that Schelling held to something approximating Jung’s archetypes and collective unconscious because an experience had by any group of people of sufficient size will affect humanity as a whole. It isn’t necessary for an individual person to experience polytheism if it has been experienced by a contingent. Consciousness is universal. Schelling also makes passing references to unconscious tendencies in humanity as well. Clearly, Schelling was working with many of the ideas that would later be found in psychology.
Schelling’s use of language is incredibly nuanced. He believes there were different kinds of monotheisms and different kinds of polytheisms. He also uses different terms to indicate “history” and "pre-history" as well. And as I’ve mentioned in other reviews, Schelling used various terms to indicate his nuanced approach to “being.” This tendency in Schelling has made it difficult for translators to render him easily in any other language. It probably isn’t any wonder that his writings were not seriously translated until the 21st century.
The sources for ancient mythology was rather paltry at this time. Schelling had to rely on Greek mythology and fragments of writers like Sanchuniathon for his sources. One wonders how he would’ve integrated the later discoveries of mythological texts. The discovery of the Epic of Gilgamesh was made in the following decade. The Ugaritic texts weren’t discovered until the 1920s. I don’t think any of these discoveries would have negatively affected his thesis, but it might’ve given him more to work with in terms of textual evidence.
I should comment on Schelling’s approach to civilization. Schelling did not view all “nations” (I’m using the term in a loose ancient sense) as equal. This makes the translator even accuse Schelling of racism. That Schelling was racialist in his philosophy is easily disproved by his own writings. Schelling makes it clear even in this work that he believed all human beings stemmed from the same root, and he denies any fundamental difference between human beings of different ethnicities. It is the behavior of these contingent groups that indicated whether they could be defined as savage—NOT their underlying ethnicity. Schelling’s negative comments on Latin American Natives doesn’t betray a racialist perspective. His acquaintance with Native practice in these areas came from the writings of those who had personally witnessed these practices. Obviously, human sacrifice was something that even Greek pagans had renounced as barbaric long before the influence of Christian ethics. It was the practice that caused Schelling to label these nations as savage, not their ethnicity. Indeed, and interestingly enough, one of the articles that Schelling wrote that has been included in the new translation of his Philosophy of Revelation, makes it clear that Schelling considered even savage nations to be fragments of high civilization originally. I’m not saying that Schelling didn’t have his biases and prejudices, but I am saying that labeling him as racist is a rather superficial appraisal of his position. There’s nothing that suggests to me that Schelling believed particular races were inferior based on their genetic lineage. One could argue whether his position indicates cultural prejudice, but racial prejudice would be a hard case to make. Germany during the Romantic era was not the Germany of the National Socialist era. Conflating the two is a prejudicial move in itself. I should note too that Friedrich Schlegel—who was a close friend of Schelling’s—was vehemently opposed to slavery and other barbaric racialist ideological practices. It would be fair to extrapolate that Schelling also rejected racialist ideologies.
This is really an intriguing work. I am very ready to finally read his Philosophy of Revelation. One should note that this book only contains about half of the lectures that made up his Philosophy of Mythology series of lectures. Apparently, there were around 20 lectures in all. This book contains lectures 1-10. I just recently realized that this is not the complete series of lectures. Investigating the output of Schelling is often difficult—made worse by the fact that allied bombing had destroyed the originals of his writings. That being said, this is a great collection of Schelling's lectures that I would certainly recommend to anyone who is wanting to read Schelling for the first time. He combines 2 of my main reading interests: philosophy and scholarship. That made this an enjoyable read when I first read it, and still is. I had already highlighted quite a few passages when I first read it. I highlighted even more on my second reading.
This is the second time I’ve read this book. It was actually the first book I read by Schelling (I wasn’t writing reviews much at the time). I was impressed with it then, and I am still impressed with it. Not only was Schelling a philosopher, he was quite the scholar as well. He was fluent in a number of ancient literary languages and his notes make this evident. When the Age of Enlightenment was still in full swing, very few thinkers of note took mythology seriously. Schelling was an exception. There is much here that reminds me of Carl Jung and his take on mythology. Jung believed myths contained archetypes that are more or less universal. While Schelling doesn’t use the term “archetypal” he does hold that mythology expanded human consciousness. Indeed, he even ties it in with the development of language:
“One is almost tempted to say: language itself is only faded mythology; what mythology still preserves in living and concrete differences is preserved in language only in abstract and formal differences.” - Page 40
Schelling believed that mythology, and its often accompanying polytheism, was necessary for the expansion of human consciousness. He finds successive polytheism, such as is found in Greek mythology, particularly relevant to his philosophy. He thinks that it was necessary for humanity to experience religions where different gods could successively rule because it made evident that these could not ultimately satisfy the human need for a transcendent God. But, at the same time, these gods might give humanity a window into a more transcendent God. Schelling finds the biblical story of the expulsion from the garden and the division of people and language to be paradigmatic. These biblical occurrences separated humanity from an absolute monotheism. Humanity then had to pass through stages in their religious progress. Only through experience could humanity become mature. Humanity needed to go through polytheism and relative monotheism in order to grow. Discerning God, the absolute One, from polytheistic gods that were only one relatively speaking, necessitated that humanity had experienced both. Here it is obvious that Schelling held to something approximating Jung’s archetypes and collective unconscious because an experience had by any group of people of sufficient size will affect humanity as a whole. It isn’t necessary for an individual person to experience polytheism if it has been experienced by a contingent. Consciousness is universal. Schelling also makes passing references to unconscious tendencies in humanity as well. Clearly, Schelling was working with many of the ideas that would later be found in psychology.
Schelling’s use of language is incredibly nuanced. He believes there were different kinds of monotheisms and different kinds of polytheisms. He also uses different terms to indicate “history” and "pre-history" as well. And as I’ve mentioned in other reviews, Schelling used various terms to indicate his nuanced approach to “being.” This tendency in Schelling has made it difficult for translators to render him easily in any other language. It probably isn’t any wonder that his writings were not seriously translated until the 21st century.
The sources for ancient mythology was rather paltry at this time. Schelling had to rely on Greek mythology and fragments of writers like Sanchuniathon for his sources. One wonders how he would’ve integrated the later discoveries of mythological texts. The discovery of the Epic of Gilgamesh was made in the following decade. The Ugaritic texts weren’t discovered until the 1920s. I don’t think any of these discoveries would have negatively affected his thesis, but it might’ve given him more to work with in terms of textual evidence.
I should comment on Schelling’s approach to civilization. Schelling did not view all “nations” (I’m using the term in a loose ancient sense) as equal. This makes the translator even accuse Schelling of racism. That Schelling was racialist in his philosophy is easily disproved by his own writings. Schelling makes it clear even in this work that he believed all human beings stemmed from the same root, and he denies any fundamental difference between human beings of different ethnicities. It is the behavior of these contingent groups that indicated whether they could be defined as savage—NOT their underlying ethnicity. Schelling’s negative comments on Latin American Natives doesn’t betray a racialist perspective. His acquaintance with Native practice in these areas came from the writings of those who had personally witnessed these practices. Obviously, human sacrifice was something that even Greek pagans had renounced as barbaric long before the influence of Christian ethics. It was the practice that caused Schelling to label these nations as savage, not their ethnicity. Indeed, and interestingly enough, one of the articles that Schelling wrote that has been included in the new translation of his Philosophy of Revelation, makes it clear that Schelling considered even savage nations to be fragments of high civilization originally. I’m not saying that Schelling didn’t have his biases and prejudices, but I am saying that labeling him as racist is a rather superficial appraisal of his position. There’s nothing that suggests to me that Schelling believed particular races were inferior based on their genetic lineage. One could argue whether his position indicates cultural prejudice, but racial prejudice would be a hard case to make. Germany during the Romantic era was not the Germany of the National Socialist era. Conflating the two is a prejudicial move in itself. I should note too that Friedrich Schlegel—who was a close friend of Schelling’s—was vehemently opposed to slavery and other barbaric racialist ideological practices. It would be fair to extrapolate that Schelling also rejected racialist ideologies.
This is really an intriguing work. I am very ready to finally read his Philosophy of Revelation. One should note that this book only contains about half of the lectures that made up his Philosophy of Mythology series of lectures. Apparently, there were around 20 lectures in all. This book contains lectures 1-10. I just recently realized that this is not the complete series of lectures. Investigating the output of Schelling is often difficult—made worse by the fact that allied bombing had destroyed the originals of his writings. That being said, this is a great collection of Schelling's lectures that I would certainly recommend to anyone who is wanting to read Schelling for the first time. He combines 2 of my main reading interests: philosophy and scholarship. That made this an enjoyable read when I first read it, and still is. I had already highlighted quite a few passages when I first read it. I highlighted even more on my second reading.
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May 6, 2021In the translator’s (Mason Richey) introduction, speculations are made about the early life of Schelling as he was roommates with Holderin, who went mad, and Hegel, whose own totalizing system of “the real as rational and the rational as real” was in itself its own type of madness. Pinkard’s biography of Hegel also suggests that Schelling’s own fame in his youth and the subsequent rise of Hegel’s fame exacerbated the growing rivalry between the two thinkers. Schelling’s later work strikes me as the point where the differences between the two ought to be most clear. Before I get too into this perhaps an exposition of this work is in order.
Cutting to the chase, my best summary of Schelling’s point of view is that Christianity is the internal goal of mythology, that is, a higher spiritual monotheism from the initial relative monotheism of the prehistorical, pre-babel period, where the subject is full conscious of themselves and of God. If in the beginning (and beginnings for Schelling are important) our relationship with God was so simple that we didn’t recognize Him, Mythology is a “theogonic” process whereby we journey to know God “as such.” Only then will we find ourselves reconciled to the world, finding that “passionless and nature less” freedom and “will-less will” that Schelling outlines in his earlier “Ages of the World.”
In characterizing mythology, Schelling rejects previous irreligious theories of mythology which maintained that no truth had been contained in mythology or that no truth was meant to be found in mythology itself (that truth was prior), the whole point being to establish, as early as the third lecture, the link between language and mythology in relation to their people and community of peoples. He stresses that a people’s history *is* its mythology. In Schelling’s own words—
“Now I ask you, however, if Hellene is still Hellene, the Egyptian still Egyptian, if we take away his mythology. Thus he has neither adopted his mythology from others nor created it himself *after* he was a Hellene or Egyptian; he first became a Greek or Egyptian *with* this mythology, when this mythology became his.”
This is to say the the relation of truth to mythology is a close one. It sort of reminded me of that Lakoff and Johnson book I read ages ago, ‘Metaphors We Live By’, where we commonly regard metaphor as outside of a correct orientation to truth, yet metaphor is the possible condition of language, where truth is expressed. One’s mythology *is* ones truth. One’s mythology and its doctrine is its *people.*
Passages in Lecture 8 develop to this notion in a forceful way—
“The mythological ideas are never invented nor voluntarily taken on—Products of a process independent of thinking and willing, they were of unambiguous and urgent reality for the consciousness subjected to this process. Peoples and individuals are only tools of this process, which they do not survey, which they serve without understanding it. It is not up to them to elude these representations, to take them up or not to take them up; for they do not *come* to them externally, but rather they *are* in them without being conscious of how; for they come from out if the inner part of consciousness itself, to which they present themselves with a necessary that permits no doubt about their truth.”
The fourth lecture attempts to account for the multiplicity of doctrine (or similarly, peoples), concluding through a series of exercises (among which Hume makes an appearance) that rather than polytheism arising from a relationship to multiplicity found in nature, polytheism arises out of an initial revelation, the announcement of God, an event which could only be divinely revealed. As a result, divine revelation, supernatural fact, is the catalyst that lends the religious surrogates of mythology their power.
Schelling’s assertion is none other than that monotheism preceded polytheism. Polytheism is the corruption of the purer religion. Polytheism was the result of the multiplicity of elements found in teachable doctrine which arose by merit of the event of revelation not being immediately graspable in the growing historical distance from it. The form of doctrine causes the withdrawal of the unity of the initial revelatory idea.
Reminiscent of Schelling’s earlier formation in his mid-career ‘Ages of the World’ (I read most of it before moving on to this work…) wherein a creation myth of sorts is put forth—the initial motive force is God’s withdrawal (negative, first potency) which follows necessary being (positive, second potency) which is then animated through unity by the universal soul (third potency, spirit). The father, the son, and the holy spirit. Mythology is thus a “diverged monotheism.”
The latter lectures seek to establish a linkage of language and peoples through the story of Babel. The differentiation of peoples is also a differentiation in languages as “language is, after all, something *spiritual.*” A spiritual crisis internal to mankind, a “tremoring of consciousness itself” was experienced prior to the determination of different peoples and their attendant languages. God’s withdrawal (which was in effect a revealing of Himself) gave rise to this vision of humanity who, akin to the second potency, established positive notion of doctrine. This vision was fertile ground for the rise of polytheism since “God was no longer identical to itself.” In short the emergence of peoples was a “confusion of languages” similar to that found in Genesis and the Tower of Babel. History is thus set in motion. Each people manifests through monuments of almost superhuman ability its fear of disunity so that they “may make a name for themselves” and become a people, finally activated as a temporal species.
Noah’s flood serves as a turning point in mythology—people resigned to polytheism afterwards. Noah no longer lives in shelter but establishes permanent residences, sows the soil, becomes fixed in position which allows for the inevitable spread of polytheism and proliferation of peoples. We might as well once again let Schelling speak for himself on this process referred to earlier in this review—
“the final content of the history of the gods is the production of an actual becoming *of God* in consciousness, to which *the gods* are related only as the individual, productive moments.”
furthermore,
“in this way the final mythology, uniting all moments, must be the true religion. And in certain ways so it is—namely, *to the extent* that the truth is at all reachable on the path of the presumed process, *which always has as its presupposition the estrangement from the divine self.*”
The monotheism which results from the theogonic process is truer since it is more actual, grasped by self-consciousness. No step in this process lacks this truth, though no individual moment alone contains it.
I suppose it remains to assess more deeply whether Schelling achieves what he sets out to do. Similar to Kant and Kierkegaard, Schelling provides a space for faith, yet unlike Kant, faith seems to be to take a pride of place as a prime motive force outside the totalizing Reason of philosophy. In Schelling’s view, the myth belongs neither to science nor to philosophy. Christian revelation allows for the notion of beginning and ending that offers a grounding for philosophy, and is therefore prior to it. Without this grounding, philosophy is “limitless in all directions” and therefore cannot fulfill its task. Furthermore, the imperative set by revelation is not something external to ourselves, but internal, the mythological process nothing if not that by which our consciousness is moved.
I’ll say this—despite the beauty of Schelling’s argument, I am skeptical that it has achieved a true alternative to the Hegelian system. Hegel himself, in differentiating Schelling from Fichte in his early work, that “faith is the immediate certitude of Reason that does not understand itself as such.” Here faith is not so much a grounding as a moment of analyticity. I’ve always argued that the infamous “real is rational, rational is real” passage is a making space for the irrational in a system which inevitably totalizes faith. This often misunderstood passage, in my mind, paradoxically disarms the idea that Hegel’s system is a cold rational totalizing monster. While I find Schelling’s exposition truly fascinating, I wonder at the need for it. And perhaps I risk being overly generous to Hegel when I insist that a sense of beginnings and endings in his philosophy is apparent in the lectures wherein Hegel with incredible detail and nuance articulates the movement of history.
What if History itself was revealed as God? I don’t find the idea so impossible. Whether that’s a misunderstanding remains to be seen, I guess.
Still, this is an incredibly compelling work which I have only just finished. I am perfectly welcome to the idea that my assessment at this point may be premature. My hope is that as my relationship with Schelling matures I will find more room for him. At the moment, Hegel takes up a lot of space…
Cutting to the chase, my best summary of Schelling’s point of view is that Christianity is the internal goal of mythology, that is, a higher spiritual monotheism from the initial relative monotheism of the prehistorical, pre-babel period, where the subject is full conscious of themselves and of God. If in the beginning (and beginnings for Schelling are important) our relationship with God was so simple that we didn’t recognize Him, Mythology is a “theogonic” process whereby we journey to know God “as such.” Only then will we find ourselves reconciled to the world, finding that “passionless and nature less” freedom and “will-less will” that Schelling outlines in his earlier “Ages of the World.”
In characterizing mythology, Schelling rejects previous irreligious theories of mythology which maintained that no truth had been contained in mythology or that no truth was meant to be found in mythology itself (that truth was prior), the whole point being to establish, as early as the third lecture, the link between language and mythology in relation to their people and community of peoples. He stresses that a people’s history *is* its mythology. In Schelling’s own words—
“Now I ask you, however, if Hellene is still Hellene, the Egyptian still Egyptian, if we take away his mythology. Thus he has neither adopted his mythology from others nor created it himself *after* he was a Hellene or Egyptian; he first became a Greek or Egyptian *with* this mythology, when this mythology became his.”
This is to say the the relation of truth to mythology is a close one. It sort of reminded me of that Lakoff and Johnson book I read ages ago, ‘Metaphors We Live By’, where we commonly regard metaphor as outside of a correct orientation to truth, yet metaphor is the possible condition of language, where truth is expressed. One’s mythology *is* ones truth. One’s mythology and its doctrine is its *people.*
Passages in Lecture 8 develop to this notion in a forceful way—
“The mythological ideas are never invented nor voluntarily taken on—Products of a process independent of thinking and willing, they were of unambiguous and urgent reality for the consciousness subjected to this process. Peoples and individuals are only tools of this process, which they do not survey, which they serve without understanding it. It is not up to them to elude these representations, to take them up or not to take them up; for they do not *come* to them externally, but rather they *are* in them without being conscious of how; for they come from out if the inner part of consciousness itself, to which they present themselves with a necessary that permits no doubt about their truth.”
The fourth lecture attempts to account for the multiplicity of doctrine (or similarly, peoples), concluding through a series of exercises (among which Hume makes an appearance) that rather than polytheism arising from a relationship to multiplicity found in nature, polytheism arises out of an initial revelation, the announcement of God, an event which could only be divinely revealed. As a result, divine revelation, supernatural fact, is the catalyst that lends the religious surrogates of mythology their power.
Schelling’s assertion is none other than that monotheism preceded polytheism. Polytheism is the corruption of the purer religion. Polytheism was the result of the multiplicity of elements found in teachable doctrine which arose by merit of the event of revelation not being immediately graspable in the growing historical distance from it. The form of doctrine causes the withdrawal of the unity of the initial revelatory idea.
Reminiscent of Schelling’s earlier formation in his mid-career ‘Ages of the World’ (I read most of it before moving on to this work…) wherein a creation myth of sorts is put forth—the initial motive force is God’s withdrawal (negative, first potency) which follows necessary being (positive, second potency) which is then animated through unity by the universal soul (third potency, spirit). The father, the son, and the holy spirit. Mythology is thus a “diverged monotheism.”
The latter lectures seek to establish a linkage of language and peoples through the story of Babel. The differentiation of peoples is also a differentiation in languages as “language is, after all, something *spiritual.*” A spiritual crisis internal to mankind, a “tremoring of consciousness itself” was experienced prior to the determination of different peoples and their attendant languages. God’s withdrawal (which was in effect a revealing of Himself) gave rise to this vision of humanity who, akin to the second potency, established positive notion of doctrine. This vision was fertile ground for the rise of polytheism since “God was no longer identical to itself.” In short the emergence of peoples was a “confusion of languages” similar to that found in Genesis and the Tower of Babel. History is thus set in motion. Each people manifests through monuments of almost superhuman ability its fear of disunity so that they “may make a name for themselves” and become a people, finally activated as a temporal species.
Noah’s flood serves as a turning point in mythology—people resigned to polytheism afterwards. Noah no longer lives in shelter but establishes permanent residences, sows the soil, becomes fixed in position which allows for the inevitable spread of polytheism and proliferation of peoples. We might as well once again let Schelling speak for himself on this process referred to earlier in this review—
“the final content of the history of the gods is the production of an actual becoming *of God* in consciousness, to which *the gods* are related only as the individual, productive moments.”
furthermore,
“in this way the final mythology, uniting all moments, must be the true religion. And in certain ways so it is—namely, *to the extent* that the truth is at all reachable on the path of the presumed process, *which always has as its presupposition the estrangement from the divine self.*”
The monotheism which results from the theogonic process is truer since it is more actual, grasped by self-consciousness. No step in this process lacks this truth, though no individual moment alone contains it.
I suppose it remains to assess more deeply whether Schelling achieves what he sets out to do. Similar to Kant and Kierkegaard, Schelling provides a space for faith, yet unlike Kant, faith seems to be to take a pride of place as a prime motive force outside the totalizing Reason of philosophy. In Schelling’s view, the myth belongs neither to science nor to philosophy. Christian revelation allows for the notion of beginning and ending that offers a grounding for philosophy, and is therefore prior to it. Without this grounding, philosophy is “limitless in all directions” and therefore cannot fulfill its task. Furthermore, the imperative set by revelation is not something external to ourselves, but internal, the mythological process nothing if not that by which our consciousness is moved.
I’ll say this—despite the beauty of Schelling’s argument, I am skeptical that it has achieved a true alternative to the Hegelian system. Hegel himself, in differentiating Schelling from Fichte in his early work, that “faith is the immediate certitude of Reason that does not understand itself as such.” Here faith is not so much a grounding as a moment of analyticity. I’ve always argued that the infamous “real is rational, rational is real” passage is a making space for the irrational in a system which inevitably totalizes faith. This often misunderstood passage, in my mind, paradoxically disarms the idea that Hegel’s system is a cold rational totalizing monster. While I find Schelling’s exposition truly fascinating, I wonder at the need for it. And perhaps I risk being overly generous to Hegel when I insist that a sense of beginnings and endings in his philosophy is apparent in the lectures wherein Hegel with incredible detail and nuance articulates the movement of history.
What if History itself was revealed as God? I don’t find the idea so impossible. Whether that’s a misunderstanding remains to be seen, I guess.
Still, this is an incredibly compelling work which I have only just finished. I am perfectly welcome to the idea that my assessment at this point may be premature. My hope is that as my relationship with Schelling matures I will find more room for him. At the moment, Hegel takes up a lot of space…
March 1, 2019
I read the "presentation of the purely rational Philosophy", which were 10 lectures Schelling added to the critical historical introduction. Since I couldn't find the above, I simply used the critical historical introduction as the review work.
Schelling continues to rise in my estimations. his similarities to Hegel (via the objective idealist framework and dialectical approach) highlights his differences to the latter.
Schelling, as with his usual theme (to be expected considering the tradition of German idealism), explores the philosophy of science. Specifically, the science of science, the science upon which all other spheres of science depend, and which depends upon no other science. This cannot be a being, as then it would fall into one of the other spheres of science (physics, chemistry etc) but can only be said to be that which is being itself.
I particularly appreciated how Schelling here offers illuminating discourse on the subject-object relation, and how being-in-itself and being-outside-itself come together necessarily to form being-with-itself.
Schelling continues to rise in my estimations. his similarities to Hegel (via the objective idealist framework and dialectical approach) highlights his differences to the latter.
Schelling, as with his usual theme (to be expected considering the tradition of German idealism), explores the philosophy of science. Specifically, the science of science, the science upon which all other spheres of science depend, and which depends upon no other science. This cannot be a being, as then it would fall into one of the other spheres of science (physics, chemistry etc) but can only be said to be that which is being itself.
I particularly appreciated how Schelling here offers illuminating discourse on the subject-object relation, and how being-in-itself and being-outside-itself come together necessarily to form being-with-itself.
November 14, 2019
If Schelling’s ages of the world is the primordial theogony of God, then his philosophy of mythology is his explanation and dialectic of God’s coming into being through human consciousness. Mythology, therefore, has an objective Content That moves historically from the super historical, to the prehistorical, To the historical. This is essentially the development from humanity in its primordial form, to absolute yet unconditioned monotheism, to conditional monotheism, and ultimately into polytheism.
Shelling spends great links arguing against a lot of other theologians and philosophers at that time that considered monotheism as a leader development after polytheism, and also that polytheism was invented or had no objective or true content. On the contrary, Schelling states that mythology is rooted in revelation and history, and is an ineluctable process, that is to say it’s necessary.
Revelation comes to an end in Christ. The coming of God to mankind in Christ is the end of all revelation. Therefore, it is the end of mythology.
I continue to read the corpus of Friedrich Schelling’s philosophical works for my PhD program. Pray for me.
Shelling spends great links arguing against a lot of other theologians and philosophers at that time that considered monotheism as a leader development after polytheism, and also that polytheism was invented or had no objective or true content. On the contrary, Schelling states that mythology is rooted in revelation and history, and is an ineluctable process, that is to say it’s necessary.
Revelation comes to an end in Christ. The coming of God to mankind in Christ is the end of all revelation. Therefore, it is the end of mythology.
I continue to read the corpus of Friedrich Schelling’s philosophical works for my PhD program. Pray for me.
November 9, 2022
A fascinating but challenging book to read. I don't think I can do it justice to try and explain it in a review, it is perhaps one of the densest things I have tackled in recent memory. Schelling moves deftly in an inter-disciplinary and wholistic fashion though seemingly the entirety of the fundamental considerations of Mythology writ large. While today we might see some of his assumptions and determinations as outdated and ultimately unsupported, as a whole it is surely a strong and durable piece of philosophy, one that must be reckoned with by any scholar of mythology and the history of religion looking for philosophical grounding in their studies.
January 4, 2024
Leído en la reciente traducción de Yago López para la editorial Sígueme. Edición mucho más bonita que esta italiana random.
Cuando no están los libros en la aplicación, normalmente los dejo pasar. Pero este... me ha gustado bastante. Me considero fan de Schelling, como persona no sé qué tal sería, pero es un filósofo estupendo.
Se trata, en este libro, de buscar la génesis de la Mitología. Hacer un análisis de las posturas precedentes y valorarlas. Con un dominio amplio de las mitologías y las lenguas en que estaban escritas, tan solo se le pueden imputar presunciones algo racistas al hablar de ciertos pueblos y sus lugares comunes. De todas maneras sería una discriminación cultural (que no racial) tan anecdótica que él mismo, enmedio de la obra, reconoce haber urgencia de una etnología filosófica, idea bastante modernilla para un señor que llevaba más de cincuenta años dando clase.
Pero la justicia es pasatiempo superficial. La única preocupación del filósofo es la Verdad. Y eso intenta. Apunta a la aniquilación de viejos conceptos, a la reformulación de categorías. Recicla el Tiempo asumiendo un tiempo "vertical" pre-histórico como preconceptual. De la misma forma, al dar nombre a la divinidad la humanidad se abre al politeismo. Esto es importante porque invierte el orden asumido. Para Schelling primero, en la definición de pueblo, hay un monoteísmo absoluto, primigenio; después una verificación de la divinidad, un nombramiento; y solo más tarde una diversificación para dar cuenta de los procesos externos.
¿Qué lugar le deja a la revelación? Esto sí que es interesante. Pero, de nuevo, me interesa no según sea cierto o incierto (pues para Schelling todo lo mitológico, en tanto que intrínseco al proceso, es Real) sino por la forma que tiene de atajar los temas.
Que luego se diga... este escrito ya avanza la contemporánea idea de cosmovisión, la posibilidad de la pluralidad de los relatos en la diversidad de pueblos y bastantes cosas más. Pero, además, presupone un origen común a la humanidad en que la relación preconceptual con la divinidad es igual para todos. Vaya... qué será después de la "disposición afectiva" heideggerana... Pero, ¡No me hagáis caso! eso ya soy yo proyectando.
Cuando no están los libros en la aplicación, normalmente los dejo pasar. Pero este... me ha gustado bastante. Me considero fan de Schelling, como persona no sé qué tal sería, pero es un filósofo estupendo.
Se trata, en este libro, de buscar la génesis de la Mitología. Hacer un análisis de las posturas precedentes y valorarlas. Con un dominio amplio de las mitologías y las lenguas en que estaban escritas, tan solo se le pueden imputar presunciones algo racistas al hablar de ciertos pueblos y sus lugares comunes. De todas maneras sería una discriminación cultural (que no racial) tan anecdótica que él mismo, enmedio de la obra, reconoce haber urgencia de una etnología filosófica, idea bastante modernilla para un señor que llevaba más de cincuenta años dando clase.
Pero la justicia es pasatiempo superficial. La única preocupación del filósofo es la Verdad. Y eso intenta. Apunta a la aniquilación de viejos conceptos, a la reformulación de categorías. Recicla el Tiempo asumiendo un tiempo "vertical" pre-histórico como preconceptual. De la misma forma, al dar nombre a la divinidad la humanidad se abre al politeismo. Esto es importante porque invierte el orden asumido. Para Schelling primero, en la definición de pueblo, hay un monoteísmo absoluto, primigenio; después una verificación de la divinidad, un nombramiento; y solo más tarde una diversificación para dar cuenta de los procesos externos.
¿Qué lugar le deja a la revelación? Esto sí que es interesante. Pero, de nuevo, me interesa no según sea cierto o incierto (pues para Schelling todo lo mitológico, en tanto que intrínseco al proceso, es Real) sino por la forma que tiene de atajar los temas.
Que luego se diga... este escrito ya avanza la contemporánea idea de cosmovisión, la posibilidad de la pluralidad de los relatos en la diversidad de pueblos y bastantes cosas más. Pero, además, presupone un origen común a la humanidad en que la relación preconceptual con la divinidad es igual para todos. Vaya... qué será después de la "disposición afectiva" heideggerana... Pero, ¡No me hagáis caso! eso ya soy yo proyectando.
May 4, 2024
In this text, Schelling applies the historical-critical methodology, which developed in Germany and was first used on Christian scriptures, to attempt to identify the origin of mythology.
Schelling sees myth as present in all nations and cultures. He explores whether mythology emerged from one people and spread to others, or whether it spawned simultaneously for others. Though his research on religions and spiritual traditions is outdated and at times problematic, this is a good book for those interested in perhaps less philosophical and more clear texts written by the protean, mercurial thinker.
Schelling sees myth as present in all nations and cultures. He explores whether mythology emerged from one people and spread to others, or whether it spawned simultaneously for others. Though his research on religions and spiritual traditions is outdated and at times problematic, this is a good book for those interested in perhaps less philosophical and more clear texts written by the protean, mercurial thinker.
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