Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy

by Steven Metz

Book by Metz, Steven

127 pages, Paperback

Published January 1, 2007

Reviews

[Steven Peterson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Steven Metz' work, published by the estimable Strategic Studies Institute of the U. S. Army War College, is a sound, useful brief analysis of lessons learned in Iraq regarding counterinsurgency. He begins by noting that (page v)): "Iraq. . .has forced the U.S. military to relearn counterinsurgency on the fly." He observes that since 2003, there has developed a deadly competitive learning game between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Metz' starting point regarding the problems with the American presence in Iraq (page vii): "We used flawed strategic assumptions, did not plan adequately, and had a doctrinal void." In short, he claims, there was a classic mismatch between strategic ends of the U.S. and the means adopted to achieve those ends.

He explores the development and unfolding of American strategy and its implementation in Iraq. He is dismayed by a parallel with Viet Nam. He states (page 85): "In Iraq the United States did precisely what it did in Vietnam: misunderstood the wider historical-strategic context." Americans in both instances saw the struggle as democracy and freedom versus oppression; in both instances, many of the people themselves considered it a struggle against Western domination." Metz uses Mao's ideas well to demonstrate the difficulty of fighting an insurgency with conventional methods.

There is a brief speculation as to the future of Iraq. I would have wished that it were developed further.

All in all, this is a nicely done volume on the strategic side of Iraq. Worth looking at.