The Nature of the Early Ottoman State (Soci Econ Hist Mid East

by Heath W. Lowry

A revisionist interpretation of the early origins of the Ottoman Empire.

Drawing on surviving documents from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, The Nature of the Early Ottoman State provides a revisionist approach to the study of the formative years of the Ottoman Empire. Challenging the predominant view that a desire to spread Islam accounted for Ottoman success during the fourteenth-century advance into Southeastern Europe, Lowry argues that the primary motivation was a desire for booty and slaves. The early Ottomans were a plundering confederacy, open to anyone (Muslim or Christian) who could meaningfully contribute to this goal. It was this lack of a strict religious orthodoxy, and a willingness to preserve local customs and practices, that allowed the Ottomans to gain and maintain support. Later accounts were written to buttress what had become the self-image of the dynasty following its incorporation of the heartland of the Islamic world in the sixteenth century.

Genres: History

210 pages, Paperback

First published February 1, 2003

Reviews

[Ibrahim · Rating 2 out of 5]

Lowry's point in chapter 3, that "the field of Ottoman studies is still in its infancy" is important (and is still valid 20 years after the publication of this book).
However, Lowry misses out on mentioning what is perhaps the biggest obstacle contemporary Ottoman studies face in moving past infancy and reaching maturity, and that is the heavy politicisation of the field. Every student of Ottoman studies should be aware of this fact as they proceed on their reading of all the most foundational works of this field.
I will, however, not delve into the numerous accusations that have been levelled against Lowry and his scholarship, for that will make this review unbearably long. I only wish to make future readers of this work aware of the political arena in which Ottoman studies operate.
If we were to pretend for a moment that Ottoman studies exist outside of this political arena (and were to consider the book by itself, as it is), we still find the main arguments presented in this work to be problematic.
Lowry's treatment of the word "gaza" and his suggestion that in fourteenth century Anatolia "gaza" was a secular term used synonymously with the word "akin" is wholly unsatisfying. I found it quite astonishing when in chapter 4, in which he considers the case of Bayezid II's edict for the Moldavian Campaign, he claims that the word "gaza" and "cihad" were used separately in order to appeal to all religious factions (instead of the much more obvious conclusion which was that Bayezid II was interchangeably using words that were considered as synonyms). The latter conclusion aligns comfortably within the larger context of Islamic jurisprudence and the development of these terms.
Lowry's insistence that the word "gaza" carried a secular meaning perhaps stems from his lack of understanding of the nuances of this term as it pertains to the Islamic tradition. This is evident when Lowry discusses Ahmed's work and fails to understand that Ahmed's discussion of the gaza does not equate to Ahmed advocating for a "convert or be killed" policy for non-Muslims. This is but a misunderstanding of how the gaza/cihad was conducted by Islamic states and how it was conceived by Muslim statesmen and scholars as a means of spreading the message of Islam. This is also why I contend with Lowry's remark in his last chapter that the warfare conducted by the early Ottomans was different in nature to that conducted by early Islamic states. If anything, Lowry has failed to properly grasp the meaning of gaza/cihad.
Inalcik was not "oblivious" (chapter 5) to the facts that Lowry describes in this book, what is perhaps more likely is that Inalcik carried a more nuanced understanding of the Islamic tradition than Lowry does.
It's this lack of nuance which causes another problem for Lowry. Lowry both claims that the early Ottoman state showed features of "high Islamic" culture while at the same positing that the ruling elite were secular in their rule and did not give much concern to religion. How these two realities existed concurrently within the Ottoman state apparatus, Lowry does not say.

[Jonathan Widell · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, Heath Lowry sets out to refute Paul Wittek's "Gazi Thesis". The Gazi thesis maintains that the Ottoman Empire was hellbent on converting the infidels. According to Lowry, the early Ottoman Empire was a Islamo-Christian "plundering confederacy" that could not care less of converting anybody to anything. The fundamental misunderstanding is that gaza did not mean holy war but plundering, hence gazi was not a holy warrior but a plunderer.

Even later, the Ottoman Empire preserved its cosmopolitan character. The early Ottoman Empire was a meritocracy in which anyone could benefit from social ascent regardless of faith. The nature of the early Ottoman State changed only slowly into the centralized Islamic Empire in terms of which we think of it today.

Lowry has been accused of being an Ottoman apologetic in a different context. However, I have no trouble accepting the thesis he puts forward in this book. I came across a similar view in a much earlier work by the Romanian historian Nicolae Jorga: Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches.

[Elmira · Rating 2 out of 5]

I have beef. He is so dead set on his argument it makes him tunnel visioned. This whole book is a response to another historian viewing the sources in retrospect but this guys doing the exact same thing. Moral of the story is get more female historians