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Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom
Winner of the Journal of the History of Ideas's Morris D. Forkosch prize This book traces the development thought about God and the relationship between God's being and activity from Aristotle, through the pagan Neoplatonists, to thinkers such as Augustine, Boethius, and Aquinas (in the West) and Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas (in the East). The resulst is a comparative history of philosophical thought in the two halves of Christendom, providing a philosophical backdrop to the schism between the Eastern and Western churches.
312 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2004
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January 28, 2009
If only Augustine had spoken Greek, John Calvin might have ended up where he belonged, which is laboring silently as an obscure clerk in the bowels of a Parisian law firm.
August 4, 2011
David Bradshaw angered a lot of people with this, though when one looks at what is actually said, it’s hard to see how Bradshaw said anything new. Even where he suggests new readings, he is not reconstructing the readings in any major way. It's actually kind of humorous: when Aquinas says that God's will and essence are the same (with the major implications by that statement), nobody bats an eye. When Bradshaw quotes Aquinas on that part, people get angry at Bradshaw. Wisdom is justified by her children.
A few words beforehand: this book cautions against reading later concepts into an earlier word. Contrary to the nonsense at Credenda Agenda, the Eastern fathers’ use of “energies” stems not from Plotinus (since Plotinus did not invent either the word or the concept) but rather was an older word that was continually reinterpreted around increasingly Christian categories.
Aristotle was the first to use this word, energia (or any of its semantic cognates). Aristotle’s use suggests something along the lines of actuality and activity. Other thinkers took the word and gave it different applications, but the term itself did not have much of a philosophical impact until Middle Platonism (the biblical use of the term will be dealt with later).
Plotinus makes several interesting suggestions. Plotinus expands energia from Aristotle’s actuality to the intrinsic productivity of all things (77). Plotinus’ Two Acts: Intellect comes from the One, leaving the one unchanged. The lower hypostasis goes forth from the higher hypostasis and looks to that higher hypostasis to attain being (81). The second act is the internal energia contemplating the return back to the higher hypostasis.
Palamas and Eastern theology in general have been accused of simply regurgitating Plotinus per salvation (cf. Doug Wilson’s moronic essay to this title). But given that many Eastern writers were saying similar things before Proclus and Plotinus, and that later Eastern writers fundamentally changed key moves in Plotinus’ system, it’s hard to say that the Eastern view is simply neo-Platonic .
The highlight of Bradshaw’s book is the comparison between St Gregory Palamas and the Augustinian-Thomist synthesis. Bradshaw got in a little trouble for this argument, but it’s hard to see why, since Western authors have said the same thing. Bradshaw points out that for Augustine’s view of divine simplicity (and truth in general), a number of reductios entail: if God’s will and God’s essence are identical, it’s hard to see how God could have willed otherwise (since God’s essence cannot be otherwise). Hence, a most radical form of fatalism. Thomas accepts this argument, but Bradshaw’s critique focuses mainly on Thomas’ inability to rise out of his presuppositions. He wants to have a form of participatory metaphysics in the afterlife, but this cannot square with his emphasis on the beatific vision.
While it is true that Roman Catholicism espouses a form of synergism, it’s hard to see how. Since Aquinas says that God wills all things in a single act of willing (which is identical with his essence), creatures cannot contribute anything to their salvation (or even spiritual life). Thus, all that remains is the relationship of grace manifested in an extrinsic and causal way (254).
While inviting opprobrium from the academia (who do nothing in response but chant “De Regnon” and sneer “neo-Palamite”), Bradshaw has clearly outlined his case. Even accepting that he has misread Proclus and Plotinus at places, it can no longer be gainsaid that the theological vision of Augustine and Aquinas is fundamentally at odds with the Eastern fathers. And since Christianity came from the East, and developed its theological expression in the East; ergo….
A few words beforehand: this book cautions against reading later concepts into an earlier word. Contrary to the nonsense at Credenda Agenda, the Eastern fathers’ use of “energies” stems not from Plotinus (since Plotinus did not invent either the word or the concept) but rather was an older word that was continually reinterpreted around increasingly Christian categories.
Aristotle was the first to use this word, energia (or any of its semantic cognates). Aristotle’s use suggests something along the lines of actuality and activity. Other thinkers took the word and gave it different applications, but the term itself did not have much of a philosophical impact until Middle Platonism (the biblical use of the term will be dealt with later).
Plotinus makes several interesting suggestions. Plotinus expands energia from Aristotle’s actuality to the intrinsic productivity of all things (77). Plotinus’ Two Acts: Intellect comes from the One, leaving the one unchanged. The lower hypostasis goes forth from the higher hypostasis and looks to that higher hypostasis to attain being (81). The second act is the internal energia contemplating the return back to the higher hypostasis.
Palamas and Eastern theology in general have been accused of simply regurgitating Plotinus per salvation (cf. Doug Wilson’s moronic essay to this title). But given that many Eastern writers were saying similar things before Proclus and Plotinus, and that later Eastern writers fundamentally changed key moves in Plotinus’ system, it’s hard to say that the Eastern view is simply neo-Platonic .
The highlight of Bradshaw’s book is the comparison between St Gregory Palamas and the Augustinian-Thomist synthesis. Bradshaw got in a little trouble for this argument, but it’s hard to see why, since Western authors have said the same thing. Bradshaw points out that for Augustine’s view of divine simplicity (and truth in general), a number of reductios entail: if God’s will and God’s essence are identical, it’s hard to see how God could have willed otherwise (since God’s essence cannot be otherwise). Hence, a most radical form of fatalism. Thomas accepts this argument, but Bradshaw’s critique focuses mainly on Thomas’ inability to rise out of his presuppositions. He wants to have a form of participatory metaphysics in the afterlife, but this cannot square with his emphasis on the beatific vision.
While it is true that Roman Catholicism espouses a form of synergism, it’s hard to see how. Since Aquinas says that God wills all things in a single act of willing (which is identical with his essence), creatures cannot contribute anything to their salvation (or even spiritual life). Thus, all that remains is the relationship of grace manifested in an extrinsic and causal way (254).
While inviting opprobrium from the academia (who do nothing in response but chant “De Regnon” and sneer “neo-Palamite”), Bradshaw has clearly outlined his case. Even accepting that he has misread Proclus and Plotinus at places, it can no longer be gainsaid that the theological vision of Augustine and Aquinas is fundamentally at odds with the Eastern fathers. And since Christianity came from the East, and developed its theological expression in the East; ergo….
May 28, 2021
This is my third read of this magnificent book (or perhaps my fourth, as I now reflect). I am not a theologian, nor do I teach in the academy, so I will quite frankly disclose that I do not keep up with contemporary scholarship on the essence/energies distinction in Orthodox Christian theological discussions. Nonetheless, I will say that this book, when I first read it, was a marvelous help as I was an inquirer/catechumen in the Orthodox Church (my first read was in 2005, just as this book had been published, while I was pursuing a PhD in ancient philosophy and ethics). As Bradshaw brings out in his work, the essence/energies distinction in Christian theology is uniquely Eastern (i.e., Orthodox), and it avoids many of the theological and philosophical aporia one encounters in Western theology and philosophy. Bradshaw has been criticized for his summation of Aquinas, and while I am admittedly not competent to speak authoritatively on this point, I have read some of the criticisms (and have done my own reading of Aquinas) and I do not find the criticisms as devastating to Bradshaw's assessment as some critics do. Even so, however, it does not negate his point about Western theology and philosophy in the wake of Augustine and Aquinas. It really is a divide upon how the West and the East conceive of and believe regarding the Divine Simplicity. I can recommend no more highly this particular book for introducing oneself to the overall debate. There are other critical works (Michel Barnes' The Power of God, and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz' Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa and The Transformation of Divine Simplicity are two good ones). But this, for my tastes, is very accessible. This will take some background in ancient philosophy, especially Aristotle (natch), and historical developments East and West. This is probably more technical than your average well-educated reader may be ready for. But if one has at least college level background in ancient philosophy and classical antiquity, as well as the differences between Eastern and Western Christianity, one would not struggle much in a close read.
September 15, 2025
Whimsical prosaic and sloppily investigated, Dr David Bradshaw commends his readers a reiteration of Dr Vladimir Lossky's neo-Kantian Parisian personalism that bears no similarity to the tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy. His avenues for such an endeavor depends on a spurious reading of Aristotle, such that ἐνέργεια is designated as not being bound notionally to time (a controversial reading) and that its contrast δύναμις is properly understood as being not passive but active (a correct reading before the 5th century, not so much afterward). Bradshaw then imposes Western anachronisms such as 'Cappadocian Fathers' (a term not native to Eastern liturgies or Orthodox writings) to conflate the thought of vastly different theologians and polemics. He reveals his hand too much when he equivocates Kantian epistemic species of noumena and phenomena with the Greek pro-Nicene distinction of οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. The outcome is an interpolated mess that is perhaps the most embarrassing academics in any patristic monograph this century.
When it comes time to roll around to pillorying St Augustine, as if he was receptive to theological projects in Asia Minor and not belonging to his own Latin pro-Nicene tradition alongside St Ambrose and St Hilary of Poitiers, Bradshaw plucks at Augustine's beard in a deflated analysis I can at best call sophomoric. Having not recognized what Augustine means by words like 'vision' or the historic reception of key Biblical passages like Philippians 2:7, 1 Corinthians 15:25-31 or John 14:9, Bradshaw comfortably sits himself down for a speedrun through history culminating in a final appraisal of St Thomas Aquinas. Bradshaw gives us a false humility regarding not knowing Aquinas or his systematic work but merely asks questions that have been refuted since the time of Florovsky.
The reason 'neo-Palamite' is a theological slur is because of works like this. Though there are small academic enclaves of Eastern Orthodox laymen who busy themselves with private interpretations of the Philokalia, most Orthodox monastics prefer Fr Sergei Bulgakov to Lossky, Florovsky and Thunberg. I don't think pilgrims on Mount Athos are going to ever find Bradshaw's book in the libraries of the heyschasts but they will indeed find plenty of Bulgakov, which speaks to the vanishing temporal minority that is neo-Palamism.
When it comes time to roll around to pillorying St Augustine, as if he was receptive to theological projects in Asia Minor and not belonging to his own Latin pro-Nicene tradition alongside St Ambrose and St Hilary of Poitiers, Bradshaw plucks at Augustine's beard in a deflated analysis I can at best call sophomoric. Having not recognized what Augustine means by words like 'vision' or the historic reception of key Biblical passages like Philippians 2:7, 1 Corinthians 15:25-31 or John 14:9, Bradshaw comfortably sits himself down for a speedrun through history culminating in a final appraisal of St Thomas Aquinas. Bradshaw gives us a false humility regarding not knowing Aquinas or his systematic work but merely asks questions that have been refuted since the time of Florovsky.
The reason 'neo-Palamite' is a theological slur is because of works like this. Though there are small academic enclaves of Eastern Orthodox laymen who busy themselves with private interpretations of the Philokalia, most Orthodox monastics prefer Fr Sergei Bulgakov to Lossky, Florovsky and Thunberg. I don't think pilgrims on Mount Athos are going to ever find Bradshaw's book in the libraries of the heyschasts but they will indeed find plenty of Bulgakov, which speaks to the vanishing temporal minority that is neo-Palamism.
July 31, 2023
Bradshaw recounts the division of Eastern and Western Christianity by focusing on the reception of Aristotle's Metaphysics, specifically in the subsequent interpretations of Aristotle's "Actuality" (or "being at work" in Joe Sach's excellent translation). Bradshaw's narrative shows how Aristotle's metaphysical terminology was gradually filtered through the emerging philosophical traditions in both East and West until the concepts were ultimately crystallized in the figures of Aquinas (West) and Palamas (East). In Palamas, actuality is equated with God's energies whereas Aquinas considers God's actuality in terms of his existence (esse, or "act of being"). At this point of the narrative, Bradshaw ventures into overt polemic, arguing that the Western understanding of actuality as God's existence renders us incapable of participating in God's being and drives us down the wide and straight path towards secularism and atheism. On Bradshaw's telling, Palamas secures a route towards genuine participation in God's being through an understanding of His actuality as uncreated energies. Although I disagree with his polemical conclusions, I can't deny that Bradshaw tells a good story and much of his analysis is compelling. A good Thomistic counterpoint to Bradshaw's argument is Peter Totleben's paper "The Palamite Controversy: A Thomistic Analysis".
May 27, 2025
A penetrating analysis of the philosophical foundations that undergird the differences in how the east and west understand God, and his interaction with creation. This is a technical read, a certainly pushed my understanding, as I’m not too well versed in philosophy, but his exposition of how the east and west view God was clear enough for me to follow.
Bradshaw does a terrific job of showing how these are not just heady theological and philosophical concepts that have no practical effects. Rather, these (now) presuppositions guide and direct intuitions such as how we are to pray, how we view the world, and questions as critical as what the goal of the Christian life is.
Really enjoyed this one, highly recommend for anyone interested in theology, philosophy, and church history.
Bradshaw does a terrific job of showing how these are not just heady theological and philosophical concepts that have no practical effects. Rather, these (now) presuppositions guide and direct intuitions such as how we are to pray, how we view the world, and questions as critical as what the goal of the Christian life is.
Really enjoyed this one, highly recommend for anyone interested in theology, philosophy, and church history.
December 27, 2025
One of the best books I have read recently! Quite difficult and rather niched but very well written and extremely useful for all of us interested in the Orthodox understanding of the Trinity and the major metaphysical differences between East and West!
Highly recommended though it requires a high degree of familiarity with Aquino, Augustine and the Orthodox Fathers!
Highly recommended though it requires a high degree of familiarity with Aquino, Augustine and the Orthodox Fathers!
June 18, 2021
This ought to be mandatory reading for anyone interested in theology!
March 29, 2022
The finest book about Aristotle's influence on theology and an excellent and systematic resource.
March 30, 2025
What if the philosophical presuppositions of Augustine and Aquinas were wrong and have directly led to the progressive secularism and societal misery of the western world?
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October 1, 2021The main takeaway I remember from this is that the West lost the documents and memory of how to see how a being could be both A) simple, that is without parts, non-composed or just One, yet also B) having multiple and different capacities, energies. The collapse of the different energies into each other, and those into the essence of God, by Augustine in his doctrine of absolute divine simplicity (ADS), set the West on a fatal course that would change Christian soteriology, i.e. the work of Christ - which is a crucial point of the religion. So by this time or at least by the time of the schism, the core message of the religion had been missed in the West. And as St Gregory Palamas predicted, this led to atheism in the West. Hence this is a great work of apologetics on behalf of Orthodoxy in particular.
A good accompaniment to this book is Gillespie's Theological Origins of Modernity, in which he shows the paths Western thought took at the point of the Reformation and its immediate precursors, once it denied the mind-independent reality of natures, like an independently existing human nature, existing independently of any human person's concept of it, which better explains why God incarnated as a man to save us, and didn't just enlighten us as an emissary or simply change a legal decree. Bradshaw's early chapters on Aristotle show one reason why these forms were rejected, because with ADS, all the forms were just different names for the same Person, namely the Father who is also the same thing as His essence, an ur-Nature. Given there is just this monist One, concerning the forms as mere names, how could these forms be necessary in our salvation? Why would God have to incarnate as a human? He wouldn't. All His actions in the bible would be rendered arbitrary, mere symbols, referring to some totally unknowable One. Because everything just is God already, there is no problem of salvation, no fall, nothing but God as Actus Purus (for us to apotheosize into, in a "beatific vision"). So Ockham got rid of the forms, since they didn't do anything in the ontology anymore.
The most interesting example Bradshaw uses of how the ancients saw the forms or energies, was the the form of health. God wills that someone is healed. He sends energy and this is through the form of health, the intended state of being of our nature, sort of like a blueprint, the image, in the doctor's mind. Then the energy through that form in the mind of the doctor, goes through the doctor like he's an instrument for the divinely-energized idea, arranging a sequence of the doctor's actions like gathering and administering certain material, applying it, so as to actualize that form that is potential in the patient. Bradshaw shows how the Greeks had a more differentiated notion of actuality, so not just potential (like I'm a human so I can learn language), but first act (I have the capacity for language), and second act (I am speaking, using the capacity for language). On the Latin theology without these distinctions, the above example doesn't make sense, and there was a reversion to a cruder form of monism, falling all the way back past Aristotle (the ostensible inspiration) to Parmenides.
A lot is going on in this work, probably more than I've mentioned here. He actually spends more time talking about neo-Platonists than Aristotle and it becomes quite obscure at times, but very much worth the read, as I said about the core theology of Christianity.
A good accompaniment to this book is Gillespie's Theological Origins of Modernity, in which he shows the paths Western thought took at the point of the Reformation and its immediate precursors, once it denied the mind-independent reality of natures, like an independently existing human nature, existing independently of any human person's concept of it, which better explains why God incarnated as a man to save us, and didn't just enlighten us as an emissary or simply change a legal decree. Bradshaw's early chapters on Aristotle show one reason why these forms were rejected, because with ADS, all the forms were just different names for the same Person, namely the Father who is also the same thing as His essence, an ur-Nature. Given there is just this monist One, concerning the forms as mere names, how could these forms be necessary in our salvation? Why would God have to incarnate as a human? He wouldn't. All His actions in the bible would be rendered arbitrary, mere symbols, referring to some totally unknowable One. Because everything just is God already, there is no problem of salvation, no fall, nothing but God as Actus Purus (for us to apotheosize into, in a "beatific vision"). So Ockham got rid of the forms, since they didn't do anything in the ontology anymore.
The most interesting example Bradshaw uses of how the ancients saw the forms or energies, was the the form of health. God wills that someone is healed. He sends energy and this is through the form of health, the intended state of being of our nature, sort of like a blueprint, the image, in the doctor's mind. Then the energy through that form in the mind of the doctor, goes through the doctor like he's an instrument for the divinely-energized idea, arranging a sequence of the doctor's actions like gathering and administering certain material, applying it, so as to actualize that form that is potential in the patient. Bradshaw shows how the Greeks had a more differentiated notion of actuality, so not just potential (like I'm a human so I can learn language), but first act (I have the capacity for language), and second act (I am speaking, using the capacity for language). On the Latin theology without these distinctions, the above example doesn't make sense, and there was a reversion to a cruder form of monism, falling all the way back past Aristotle (the ostensible inspiration) to Parmenides.
A lot is going on in this work, probably more than I've mentioned here. He actually spends more time talking about neo-Platonists than Aristotle and it becomes quite obscure at times, but very much worth the read, as I said about the core theology of Christianity.
Read
August 27, 2015This book is essential reading.
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