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Büyük Sınıf Savaşı 1914-1918
Historian Jacques Pauwels applies a critical, revisionist lens to the First World War, offering readers a fresh interpretation that challenges mainstream thinking. As Pauwels sees it, war offered benefits to everyone, across class and national borders.
For European statesmen, a large-scale war could give their countries new colonial territories, important to growing capitalist economies. For the wealthy and ruling classes, war served as an antidote to social revolution, encouraging workers to exchange socialism's focus on international solidarity for nationalism's intense militarism. And for the working classes themselves, war provided an outlet for years of systemic militarization -- quite simply, they were hardwired to pick up arms, and to do so eagerly.
To Pauwels, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 -- traditionally upheld by historians as the spark that lit the powder keg -- was not a sufficient cause for war but rather a pretext seized upon by European powers to unleash the kind of war they had desired. But what Europe's elite did not expect or predict was some of the war's social revolution and Communist Party rule in Russia, plus a wave of political and social democratic reforms in Western Europe that would have far-reaching consequences.
Reflecting his broad research in the voluminous recent literature about the First World War by historians in the leading countries involved in the conflict, Jacques Pauwels has produced an account that challenges readers to rethink their understanding of this key event of twentieth century world history.
Table of Contents
CONTENTS
The Great War in Dali-Vision
PART THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY, “MOTHER” OF THE GREAT WAR
Chapter 1. The Revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848: First Steps toward Democracy
Chapter 2. The Nobility and the A Counterrevolutionary Symbiosis
Chapter 3. Socialism and Democratization
Chapter 4. Nationalism and “Social Imperialism”
Chapter 5. Nietzsche and Social Ode to War
Chapter 6. Imperialist Friends and Foes on the Road to a Great War
Chapter 7. Bourgeoisie, Aristocracy, Church, and Socialists Confront War and Revolution
Chapter 8. Fear and Tensions in the Belle Époque
Chapter 9. Reactionary and Bellicose Policies
PART THE GREAT CLASS WAR, 1914–1918
Chapter 10. August 1914: Enthusiasm and Resignation (1)
Chapter 11. August 1914: Enthusiasm and Resignation (2)
Chapter 12. The End of Politics
Chapter 13. Gentlemen and Plebeians on the War Path
Chapter 14. Fall 1914: Disillusion
Chapter 15. Friends and Enemies
Chapter 16. Militaria 1914: Aborted Plans
Chapter 17. Human Moles in the “Lovely Land of War”
Chapter 18. Militaria 1915: The Great Offensives
Chapter 19. From the Dolomites to the Dardanelles
Chapter 20. Tired of War
Chapter 21. Militaria 1916: Materiel and Human Material
Chapter 22. Disgruntled Soldiers and Civilians
Chapter 23. Militaria 1917: Catastrophes at Caporetto and Elsewhere
Chapter 24. 1917: The Year of Troubles
Chapter 25. The Yanks Are Coming!
Chapter 26. Revolution in Russia, on the Way to Revolutions in Asia
Chapter 27. Militaria 1918: German Spring Offensive, Allied Final Offensive
Chapter 28. Revolution, Counterrevolution, and Reforms
Chapter 29. Peace or Armistice?
PART THE LONG SHADOW OF THE GREAT WAR
Chapter 30. Via Fascism to a Second World War, 1918–1945
Chapter 31. Class Wars from 1945 to the Present
Acknowledgements
Endnotes
Bibliography
Index
About the author
For European statesmen, a large-scale war could give their countries new colonial territories, important to growing capitalist economies. For the wealthy and ruling classes, war served as an antidote to social revolution, encouraging workers to exchange socialism's focus on international solidarity for nationalism's intense militarism. And for the working classes themselves, war provided an outlet for years of systemic militarization -- quite simply, they were hardwired to pick up arms, and to do so eagerly.
To Pauwels, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914 -- traditionally upheld by historians as the spark that lit the powder keg -- was not a sufficient cause for war but rather a pretext seized upon by European powers to unleash the kind of war they had desired. But what Europe's elite did not expect or predict was some of the war's social revolution and Communist Party rule in Russia, plus a wave of political and social democratic reforms in Western Europe that would have far-reaching consequences.
Reflecting his broad research in the voluminous recent literature about the First World War by historians in the leading countries involved in the conflict, Jacques Pauwels has produced an account that challenges readers to rethink their understanding of this key event of twentieth century world history.
Table of Contents
CONTENTS
The Great War in Dali-Vision
PART THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY, “MOTHER” OF THE GREAT WAR
Chapter 1. The Revolutions of 1789, 1830, and 1848: First Steps toward Democracy
Chapter 2. The Nobility and the A Counterrevolutionary Symbiosis
Chapter 3. Socialism and Democratization
Chapter 4. Nationalism and “Social Imperialism”
Chapter 5. Nietzsche and Social Ode to War
Chapter 6. Imperialist Friends and Foes on the Road to a Great War
Chapter 7. Bourgeoisie, Aristocracy, Church, and Socialists Confront War and Revolution
Chapter 8. Fear and Tensions in the Belle Époque
Chapter 9. Reactionary and Bellicose Policies
PART THE GREAT CLASS WAR, 1914–1918
Chapter 10. August 1914: Enthusiasm and Resignation (1)
Chapter 11. August 1914: Enthusiasm and Resignation (2)
Chapter 12. The End of Politics
Chapter 13. Gentlemen and Plebeians on the War Path
Chapter 14. Fall 1914: Disillusion
Chapter 15. Friends and Enemies
Chapter 16. Militaria 1914: Aborted Plans
Chapter 17. Human Moles in the “Lovely Land of War”
Chapter 18. Militaria 1915: The Great Offensives
Chapter 19. From the Dolomites to the Dardanelles
Chapter 20. Tired of War
Chapter 21. Militaria 1916: Materiel and Human Material
Chapter 22. Disgruntled Soldiers and Civilians
Chapter 23. Militaria 1917: Catastrophes at Caporetto and Elsewhere
Chapter 24. 1917: The Year of Troubles
Chapter 25. The Yanks Are Coming!
Chapter 26. Revolution in Russia, on the Way to Revolutions in Asia
Chapter 27. Militaria 1918: German Spring Offensive, Allied Final Offensive
Chapter 28. Revolution, Counterrevolution, and Reforms
Chapter 29. Peace or Armistice?
PART THE LONG SHADOW OF THE GREAT WAR
Chapter 30. Via Fascism to a Second World War, 1918–1945
Chapter 31. Class Wars from 1945 to the Present
Acknowledgements
Endnotes
Bibliography
Index
About the author
494 pages, Paperback
First published April 1, 2014
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
February 2, 2022
This book exposed just how ridiculous and whitewashed public education is with regard to World War I - a war romanticism that says a political assassination sparked a four year war. I'm in awe looking back at what I was taught about WWI and what Pauwels correctly calls "vulgar propaganda."
When I glanced at the table of contents and saw that this book about World War I didn’t start talking about World War I until 130 pages in, I was very skeptical. But man was I proven wrong. Within the first 10 pages I was convinced. A deep dive into the political, social, and economic transformations of the 18th and 19th centuries is crucial to understanding the casus bellis of the 20th century.
Starting with the French Revolution and tracking the development of Europe from the perspective of the proletariat, the peasantry, the bourgeoisie, the clergy, and the nobility, Pauwels makes the eruption of a global conflict completely understandable and obvious - that is, World War I as a Great Class War between imperialist powers vying to annex colonies and territories from each other and to prevent the outbreak of a horizontal war between the elite and the poor within each country.
It also adds an interesting and important context to the Russian Revolution and class conflict that dominated both the cause of the war and the direction of the war for the Central Powers and the Entente.
This is a masterpiece.
When I glanced at the table of contents and saw that this book about World War I didn’t start talking about World War I until 130 pages in, I was very skeptical. But man was I proven wrong. Within the first 10 pages I was convinced. A deep dive into the political, social, and economic transformations of the 18th and 19th centuries is crucial to understanding the casus bellis of the 20th century.
Starting with the French Revolution and tracking the development of Europe from the perspective of the proletariat, the peasantry, the bourgeoisie, the clergy, and the nobility, Pauwels makes the eruption of a global conflict completely understandable and obvious - that is, World War I as a Great Class War between imperialist powers vying to annex colonies and territories from each other and to prevent the outbreak of a horizontal war between the elite and the poor within each country.
It also adds an interesting and important context to the Russian Revolution and class conflict that dominated both the cause of the war and the direction of the war for the Central Powers and the Entente.
This is a masterpiece.
October 14, 2022
THE book on WW1.
Pauwels continues to amaze me with the depths his analysis reaches. I had already read two of his other works The Myth of the Good War: America in the Second World War and Big Business and Hitler, both of which offer a radically different revisionist interpretation of the Second World War. This book is no exception, and despite being over 600 pages I found the entire text full of gripping revelations that kept me engaged until the end. The first 150 or so pages where he covers the historical context preceding the war's outbreak are worth the price of admission on their own.
This book continues to solidify my thesis that Marxist materialist analysis is the only true way to study history, as even the most famous texts on the topic of WW1 fail to reach a fraction of the depth that this seemingly obscure historian can.
Pauwels continues to amaze me with the depths his analysis reaches. I had already read two of his other works The Myth of the Good War: America in the Second World War and Big Business and Hitler, both of which offer a radically different revisionist interpretation of the Second World War. This book is no exception, and despite being over 600 pages I found the entire text full of gripping revelations that kept me engaged until the end. The first 150 or so pages where he covers the historical context preceding the war's outbreak are worth the price of admission on their own.
This book continues to solidify my thesis that Marxist materialist analysis is the only true way to study history, as even the most famous texts on the topic of WW1 fail to reach a fraction of the depth that this seemingly obscure historian can.
June 18, 2020
This is the first truly exceptional book I have read on the topic of World War I, which can correctly be defined as the "class war". Pauwels, a Belgian writer, delves into the real causes of the war, which had more to do with suppressing the democratization of the people than almost anything else, apart for the rush to partake in an exercise for acquiring plunder, particularly of oil. The ruling classes believed that war would eliminate strikes by workers, draw them back under the thumb of churches, and lead them to sacrifice themselves all to preserve the wealth and social control of the elites. Ultimately (and fortunately) the opposite occurred. The story ends with the glorious Russian Revolution, but also with a warning: the same imperialist aims are in operation today and the theories of Malthus remain. The working class is still considered surplus to the needs of the corporations and banks, and still therefore "expendable". Highly recommended.
June 2, 2023
Initially I gave this four of five stars because it can get a little repetitive with its confusing theme of “horizontal vs vertical war”. And the conclusion at the end seems a little stretched thin and weirdly tangential to the topic of the book itself at times.
That said, this is essential reading for anyone who wants an in-depth look at the miserable conditions for soldiers themselves in WW1. Sparing the reader any dull rundowns of battle strategies and tactics, the author illustrates the absolute apocalyptic direction the ruling classes took Europe in the vain hope of avoiding a proletarian revolution. This book humanizes individual soldiers and vividly deconstructs traditional notions around nationalism and the “fog of war”, which is so often a euphemism for simply whitewashing the responsibility for mass death that lies at the foot of generals and politicians.
That said, this is essential reading for anyone who wants an in-depth look at the miserable conditions for soldiers themselves in WW1. Sparing the reader any dull rundowns of battle strategies and tactics, the author illustrates the absolute apocalyptic direction the ruling classes took Europe in the vain hope of avoiding a proletarian revolution. This book humanizes individual soldiers and vividly deconstructs traditional notions around nationalism and the “fog of war”, which is so often a euphemism for simply whitewashing the responsibility for mass death that lies at the foot of generals and politicians.
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May 12, 2018Great book - gives the reader a different slant on the onset of World War I.
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January 5, 2020a must to understand modern history
November 17, 2021
Finishing this book on the former Armistice Day, Nov 11. Interesting that this is the one day I know of that the French wear their version of the poppy the Brits wear (and as kids we were once given a plasticized red poppy to pin on at school the day before "Veterans Day"), the bleuet or blue cornflower. The author explains the ecology of the red poppy that caused it to be a WWI symbol for the British army but not why a "bachelors button" is commemoratively worn by the French, the ecology being virtually the same.
In a closing chapter, the author reveals that the French capitulation in 1940 was "wanted". This assertion however was not clearly supported by any reference. That would be unlike every assertion made by the author, all superbly sourced. I was driven to look in the one book (never read) I had on that subject, To Lose a Battle France 1940, by Alistair Horne. As the Germans were reaching Paris, the French commanding general Weygand is said to have envisioned a repeat of the Paris Commune which erupted after the last French defeat by Germany in 1870, a greater fear of his than capitulating to Nazi Germany. He also recalled to the French cabinet meeting in Bordeaux how the soldiers of the Russian army had formed Soviets in the wake of the Russian imperial military's defeat at the hands of the Germans in 1917. Petain now sided with Weygand in the need for "internal order". We know what followed and the consequences the world faced as a result. This sealed the reality of the constancy among western nations of the cross border intra-elite, within-borders class war paradigm spanning the two world wars. The multiple motivations and goals of the elites in 1914, successful in seeking conflict, were to backfire on them as a result of WWI and 20+ years later, applying the same ideas (with a new wrinkle being the existence of the Soviet Union) in seeking war would similarly backfire to cause WWII. The US entry into the war followed a speech by the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand early 1917 stating "it would desirable at the peace conference to exclude the powers that had not been involved in the war." One such power was certainly the US. Maybe the only. This desperate (albeit successful) bluff came in the midst of the war not going well for the Entente powers (a euphemism for the Imperial Empires plus one Imperialist-power bloc), despite JP Morgan and others floating huge loans to the Entente powers and domestic civilian and troop unrest building in each of the Entente powers. Corroboration of the importance of these words of Briand comes from another work on WWI, "Fever of War" by Carol Byerly. It emphasizes the driving motive of the US to get a critical number of troops into the field to form an independent US force for the ultimately decisive Meuse Argonne Offensive of September to November, 1918 in the midst of the most deadly wave of the 1918-20 flu pandemic: prestige to be gained by a major if not chief role in the final defeat of Germany for a greater role in shaping the postwar world.
In a closing chapter, the author reveals that the French capitulation in 1940 was "wanted". This assertion however was not clearly supported by any reference. That would be unlike every assertion made by the author, all superbly sourced. I was driven to look in the one book (never read) I had on that subject, To Lose a Battle France 1940, by Alistair Horne. As the Germans were reaching Paris, the French commanding general Weygand is said to have envisioned a repeat of the Paris Commune which erupted after the last French defeat by Germany in 1870, a greater fear of his than capitulating to Nazi Germany. He also recalled to the French cabinet meeting in Bordeaux how the soldiers of the Russian army had formed Soviets in the wake of the Russian imperial military's defeat at the hands of the Germans in 1917. Petain now sided with Weygand in the need for "internal order". We know what followed and the consequences the world faced as a result. This sealed the reality of the constancy among western nations of the cross border intra-elite, within-borders class war paradigm spanning the two world wars. The multiple motivations and goals of the elites in 1914, successful in seeking conflict, were to backfire on them as a result of WWI and 20+ years later, applying the same ideas (with a new wrinkle being the existence of the Soviet Union) in seeking war would similarly backfire to cause WWII. The US entry into the war followed a speech by the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand early 1917 stating "it would desirable at the peace conference to exclude the powers that had not been involved in the war." One such power was certainly the US. Maybe the only. This desperate (albeit successful) bluff came in the midst of the war not going well for the Entente powers (a euphemism for the Imperial Empires plus one Imperialist-power bloc), despite JP Morgan and others floating huge loans to the Entente powers and domestic civilian and troop unrest building in each of the Entente powers. Corroboration of the importance of these words of Briand comes from another work on WWI, "Fever of War" by Carol Byerly. It emphasizes the driving motive of the US to get a critical number of troops into the field to form an independent US force for the ultimately decisive Meuse Argonne Offensive of September to November, 1918 in the midst of the most deadly wave of the 1918-20 flu pandemic: prestige to be gained by a major if not chief role in the final defeat of Germany for a greater role in shaping the postwar world.
May 14, 2023
A few months ago, after falling for the hype & watching All Quiet on the Western Front, I followed it up with Paths of Glory. Coincidentally, someone on my twitter feed recommended this book, in which the author refers to both the movie Paths of Glory & the book , All Quiet on the Western Front. Reading about the same topic I just watched a couple movies about reinforced my melancholy . The author used trooper’s journal entries , poetry & song lyrics to convey feelings & emotions mixed in with his narrative & gruesome statistics. He used examples from British, French , German & Russian Troops perspectives .
The author also compared the industrialist in each country having the same ambitions & motives for wanting a War. which actually helped create the opposite of what they intended. The Russian Revolution! Competition to the Capitalist System , which forced the elites to fall back and create “the welfare state” to assuage any revolutionary tendencies in the populace.
Part III compared the strategies of WW’s I & II with the ongoing War on Terror & NATO.
I’m gonna read Tuchman’s The Guns of August next, then I’m done with WW I.
The author also compared the industrialist in each country having the same ambitions & motives for wanting a War. which actually helped create the opposite of what they intended. The Russian Revolution! Competition to the Capitalist System , which forced the elites to fall back and create “the welfare state” to assuage any revolutionary tendencies in the populace.
Part III compared the strategies of WW’s I & II with the ongoing War on Terror & NATO.
I’m gonna read Tuchman’s The Guns of August next, then I’m done with WW I.
January 27, 2015
A convincing book but a tad repetitive and dogmatic. Not to mention contradicting: why fault the right for its democratic shortcomings when democracy is seemingly portrayed as less desirable than communist revolution. Equally scant attention is given to the reactionary aspects of certain policies of communist Russia and China, interior and exterior.
August 22, 2024
Wow what a fantastic book. For a long time this book was collecting dust in my house because what the hell could I possible learn from that war. Boy was I wrong, the world is so interconnected with each other, pretty insane. I am more interested in Marxist analysis about war then i ever was.
January 31, 2022
Heel interessant perspectief en veel bijgeleerd over de aard van dit conflict en beweegredenen. Heel leerrijk om te zien hoe de sociale strijd een doorn in het oog was van de elite en wat er diende veilig gesteld te worden.
Ik geef echter maar drie sterren omwille van in sommige hoofdstukken te weinig gediversifieerd brongebruik en het feit dat hij in het laatste hoofdstuk toch wat uit de bocht gevlogen is en aan geloofwaardigheid dient in te boeken.
Hij ziet de Sovjetunie teveel als een heilstaat (alsof daar geen elite was die zich verrijkte ten koste van de massa) en sommige stellingen zijn manifest onwaar. Bijvoorbeeld dat de afbraak van de welvaartstaat pas begonnen is nadat de dreiging van de sovjetunie is weggevallen. De neoliberale beweging was al stevig gestart voor het einde van de Sovjetunie en ik denk dat in het Westen nog maar heel weinig arbeiders keken naar de Sovjetunie als het paradijs op aard dat na te streven viel.
Ook mijn wenkbrauwen gefronst met het neerslaan van de protesten in Peking in 1989 te formuleren als het in de kiem smoren van de contrarevolutie / het veilig stellen van de revolutie. Dit zijn maar twee voorbeelden van zijn soms bedenkelijke heel eenzijdige Marxistische blik.
Ik geef echter maar drie sterren omwille van in sommige hoofdstukken te weinig gediversifieerd brongebruik en het feit dat hij in het laatste hoofdstuk toch wat uit de bocht gevlogen is en aan geloofwaardigheid dient in te boeken.
Hij ziet de Sovjetunie teveel als een heilstaat (alsof daar geen elite was die zich verrijkte ten koste van de massa) en sommige stellingen zijn manifest onwaar. Bijvoorbeeld dat de afbraak van de welvaartstaat pas begonnen is nadat de dreiging van de sovjetunie is weggevallen. De neoliberale beweging was al stevig gestart voor het einde van de Sovjetunie en ik denk dat in het Westen nog maar heel weinig arbeiders keken naar de Sovjetunie als het paradijs op aard dat na te streven viel.
Ook mijn wenkbrauwen gefronst met het neerslaan van de protesten in Peking in 1989 te formuleren als het in de kiem smoren van de contrarevolutie / het veilig stellen van de revolutie. Dit zijn maar twee voorbeelden van zijn soms bedenkelijke heel eenzijdige Marxistische blik.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews